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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 10:40:32 GMT -6
Maybe, maybe not. I think it more likely that under those conditions both E and F's last remnants would be going down at nearly the same time. The only thing that gives me pause on this scenario is the very thing DC points to, that being the leadership group clustered together. If they all got whacked early on E would have been totally under the control of the First Sergeant, and if that is so he did a good job in my opinion of getting that company deployed as we see it portrayed.
I did forget to mention Ian that the only theory I dismissed out of hand was the simultaneous pin theory, where all the companies were pinned down at the same time. My reasoning here was that it did not fit with known movements, the gap between battalions or after battle body locations,
Also I have mentioned the conjectural lines on the Park Service map handout before snd I continue to be intrigued by the one that has the hostiles crossing at Ford D then moving over battle ridge extension then splitting near where the Indian Memorial now stands, one going into Custer's rear on LSH and the other continuing on to Keogh. More and more I am coming to think that Keogh outlasted Custer, or at the very least they went down together at nearly the same time. That fits with the Harper Theory as well.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 11:38:32 GMT -6
wilde: What is apparently stupid in hindsight is not so apparent when looking at what is seen at the time. The only thing stupid here is you not knowing the difference between hindsight and foresight.
For instance I once though you were a pretty decent and smart guy. In hindsight I realize that it was stupid of me to ever think you had either of these attributes.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 3, 2014 13:16:15 GMT -6
Chuck, the pin theory looks unlikely when you consider the marker placements, they are like a band running from FF Ridge through Calhoun then on to the swale and up over Custer Ridge and ending on LSH, it looks like Companies are collapsing into each other like a row of dominos.
The fact that the Regimental Brass got clustered could be down to the HQ and F Company being together, now I don’t know if F was picked as the HQ Escort but they seem to have died together.
Look at the Officers below, all of these were found dead on LSH;
Col. Custer Capt. Custer Capt. Yates Lt. Reily Lt. Smith (maybe wounded) Lt. Cook Lt. Lord
Now if the HQ and F Company were riding together, then I see nothing unusual about this group of Officers being killed together.
If Lt. Sturgis was commanding E Company at the time, his body was not found (some of his clothes were found in the village) on the battle field, if he fell before E Company got cut off then 1st Sgt F Hohmeyer could have taken over, the other NCOs found were Sgt Ogden, Corporal Brown and Corporal Meyer, E Company had three more NCOs in the shape of Sergeant James, Corporal Hagan and Corporal H. Mason, I don’t think they found the remains or identified the bodies of any of these other NCOs.
Has someone took down a post? You seem to be answering yourself there Chuck.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 15:14:36 GMT -6
No it's still there. It's just before yours of this morning. I get what is important out of the way before I address the junk mail. Hope it stays there it proves my point.
I hate it when you make sense. I had forgotten Sturgis was not identified on LSH. He probably died there, but we just don't know.
I don't think Smith was wounded earlier and carried all the way to LSH. He may have been wounded nearby, or he may have just contracted there as E collapsed. People bunch in times of perceived danger, just as units bunch closer together when circumstances dictate they form a tight perimeter.
If you are looking at the simultaneous pin theory, and I suspect that is what you are addressing, your observations are quite correct, plus, plus, plus the head, center, and rear of the column would have to be hit at the same time, and that is damned near impossible given the terrain, and movement time required, unless the Indians were lying close by to ambush in route, which would mean advance positive knowledge of Custer's intended route of travel.
There was a big surprise associated with each of these scenarios, but jumping out from behind the sofa was not one of them.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 3, 2014 17:30:26 GMT -6
I remember having a discussion with you and Fred and I mentioned about E Company deploying on cemetery ridge, Fred mentioned that they went down to stop the warriors from coming up from deep ravine, now that got me thinking and what I found striking was the fact that why would Custer deploy a Company of around 36 men to stop a hoard of Indians, don’t forget that this Company presumably formed skirmish line so that would mean one man in every four would act as a horse holder, take out your command element of Sturgis and Hohmeyer and you are left with a line that could bring to bear 24 carbines, so if this actually happened then why did this unit give up its mobility to try and stop this wave of warriors? Well the only thing I can come up with is the fact that they could not see all of them due to the nature of the terrain and when they found out the full extent of the crap they had got themselves in it was too late, they were fixed and if the accounts are correct the horse holders in cemetery ravine could have got cut off a killed leaving them stranded.
You could be right about Smith, I threw his name into the hat when we were discussing the possibility of an Officer getting hit at the ford, but if Custer had re-united with Keogh up on Custer ridge then he would have left Smith with L Company.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 17:47:04 GMT -6
Also remember what Fred had to say about meeting with Fox this past June, and how those head cuts had changed over the years. History is full of sending to few to do the job where lots more are needed and usually the answer is that they did not know they would need so many.
For the record I think that was another one of those OK in foresight, stupid in hindsight moves. If Custer knew what we know, he would have never left Fort Lincoln I'd wager.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 3, 2014 17:55:37 GMT -6
I forgot to ask Fred what type of distances we are talking about here, if for arguments sake that the Custer/Yates Battalion had spotted the Indians moving up deep ravine and the distance between the soldiers and Indians was say 400 yards then why didn’t they attempt a gallop back to Keoghs position and assess the situation then, if most of the Indians were on foot then the Cavalry should have been able to make this run without getting caught.
Ian.
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Post by wild on Jan 3, 2014 18:11:34 GMT -6
What is apparently stupid in hindsight is not so apparent when looking at what is seen at the time. The only thing stupid here is you not knowing the difference between hindsight and foresight. Then use the right terminology.Hindsight does not make an action stupid.It might make it unlucky or unfortunate.If ford D is correct in real time then hindsight does not make it stupid.You take decisions based on what is known and judge those actions in real time. Your problem is that Ford D was stupid in any time.
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Post by wild on Jan 3, 2014 18:21:36 GMT -6
For the record I think that was another one of those OK in foresight, stupid in hindsight moves. If Custer knew what we know, he would have never left Fort Lincoln I'd wager. Again you use the wrong terminology. Foresight is having the knowledge which hindsight confirms. No such thing as OK in real time,stupid in hindsight.Actions are not stupid because of unavailable information.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 18:26:21 GMT -6
Ian: I don't know the exact position Fred starts them from, but 400 or less meters seems in the ball park. Better ask him to be sure.
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Post by scottbono on Jan 3, 2014 18:52:18 GMT -6
Scottbono: Your observations about training are not far off the mark. I will say though that a collection of farmers and immigrants that you eluded to in your previous post calling upon the wisdom of Saint Connell (who I have no personal gripe against any more than any other story teller) are excellent candidates to be molded into a fighting force, particularly the farmers. The problem with training was the problem with leadership. Leaders that are not very good or do not tend to their business are not likely to produce well trained units. This becomes particularly true above the company level where units must learn to operate effectively together or debacles like LBH are the result. That takes command emphasis, and if you read Montrose on this thread commanders can't influence diddly squat if they are off clubbing on Broadway, or trying to swindle some poor sod out of his last buck. You correctly quoted me about the dog, but the lesson of course is not about dogs at all, but the greater lesson of CAN trumping WILL just about every time the cards are dealt. I was rough on you a while ago because for the life of me I did not see any point to what you were saying, or any possible meaning to it. I have no intention of offering an apology, because for me the jury is still out on you. You keep offering and asking as you have done above you will eventually do well. If you bring up tall tales, purple backsides, and arrows stuck in Custer's penis though, and offer opinion on general officers where no real comparison can ever be made, then you might run your vessel aground upon the rocks and shoals of scorn. Both of them were damned good, each in his own way, and I would not mind serving under either of them. So when you make statements like - I think not - you had better have your sheets together here or folks will be on you like brown is on Shinola. Noted. Thank you.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 20:09:52 GMT -6
You are quite welcome, and I look forward to seeing your contributions here in the future
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Post by scottbono on Jan 7, 2014 13:51:59 GMT -6
At the Rosebud it was the Crookes Indians who saved the command from a worse mauling. I don't think regimental tactics are suitable for a brawl.You take a mob to fight a mob. Wild, I'm going to have to disagree with you here, beginning with the premise that Crook was "mauled". He lost the battle 'tactically' in the sense that the Indians caused him to delay and regroup, but they far from mauled him, and he won the battle in all other respects. You are correct that the actions of his Indian scouts had an important hand in that, in that they precluded him from being surprised in march order, but, once engaged, I think that he did a very good job of conducting the battle - changing focus, redeploying troops, etc. It seems that he doesn't normally get credit for that and most, like you, seem to portray the battle as a devastating defeat for the army, but I just don't see it that way. I'd agree Crook was not 'mauled'; the casualties on both sides are striking for a 6-hour battle ranging over such vast terrain. While not always a benchmark for victory or defeat, the relative losses for Crook's troops are amazing (understanding both sides seem lousy shots). However, though Crook retain command of the field, he was stopped in his tracks and would not proceed further without reinforcements. If he was not 'mauled'; he was surely 'shaken'. I believe it was Anson Mills who noted battle-hardened Civil War veterans were frightened and terrified by the Lakota and Cheyenne and made the comment that they (NA's) proved themselves to be the finest light cavalry in the world. I'm not sure if the story is apocryphal or not but it's said that when the NA's decided they didn't feel like fighting further, they rode entirely AROUND Crook's command in an unveiled statement of disdain. Crook didn't pursue. It would seem what sucess Crook had with the Apache never found its analog with the Plains tribes. Scott
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Post by quincannon on Jan 7, 2014 14:28:37 GMT -6
I am having a very hard time figuring out how you are going to develop a "happy ending" screenplay out of the Rosebud Scott, as was your earlier stated intention. At least the screenplay was. I seem to remember one earlier loosely based on Rosebud but cannot remember the name. It was mid 1950's vintage though. You might want to look into that.
The fight at Rosebud was too much for Crook's logistics, and he had to fall back on them, located somewhere around president day Sheridan, Wyoming. Terry C. Johnson did a quite decent, I thought, fictional version of the battle.
Fighting Apache was much harder in my opinion than fighting the northern plains tribes. They were as different as night and day, and I think it fair to say that Crook, at the time of the Rosebud, had yet to adapt. He would greatly improve later.
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Post by scottbono on Jan 7, 2014 16:56:45 GMT -6
I am having a very hard time figuring out how you are going to develop a "happy ending" screenplay out of the Rosebud Scott, as was your earlier stated intention. At least the screenplay was. I seem to remember one earlier loosely based on Rosebud but cannot remember the name. It was mid 1950's vintage though. You might want to look into that. The fight at Rosebud was too much for Crook's logistics, and he had to fall back on them, located somewhere around president day Sheridan, Wyoming. Terry C. Johnson did a quite decent, I thought, fictional version of the battle. Fighting Apache was much harder in my opinion than fighting the northern plains tribes. They were as different as night and day, and I think it fair to say that Crook, at the time of the Rosebud, had yet to adapt. He would greatly improve later. I read Johnston's novel ' Reap the Whirlwind' and enjoyed it a great deal. I'm currently working on a broad synopsis of the story from which the screenplay will be developed and, frankly, I do not see a happy ending in the traditional sense. At the moment what I am working in terms of 'ending' is the Lakota and Cheyenne riding around Crook's command in a display of derision and as they ride out, a [VO] - Voice Over or on-screen graphics comments just what the historical perspective is: the NA's rode out in great numbers to stop Crook and they did. When they grew weary of fighting they simply left. George Crook claimed victory because he was left on the field, not because he'd defeated the Lakotas and Cheyenne; with an additional VO or graphic stating these same NA's wiped out George Custer 8 days later.
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