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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 2, 2014 13:58:12 GMT -6
That’s my point Chuck, when DC wrote “getting away from deep analysis and just taking what was known at the time’’ I thought fair enough lets go for it, so we know that Custer moved over the bluffs with five companies, so he must have known that he would come into contact with the river and it probably could be between him and the village.
The next thing is deployment, how and when could he concentrate his force for such an attack, initially it would be in a long column so this would have to shift formation before any assault, plus as you said this is not good cavalry ground so everything is working against him when he arrives at his position overlooking the camps.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 2, 2014 14:07:02 GMT -6
Ian: It's just not good "anything" ground. What the man was thinking or what he thought he would find over there is beyond me. Maybe he was trying to get fancy. Maybe he was in for the big score, and was bidding on the come. Maybe he just had several screws loose. I think there are so many maybes but no clear answers and we could toss this ball around until doomsday and never come up with the right one that would satisfy all. I put it down to Fido fornicating and leave it at that.
All we can do is trace his movements and the counter moves of the opposition, and try to divine motivation. Sometimes it seems like this noble company needs reinforcement by a witch doctor and one who communes with the dearly departed.
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 2, 2014 14:51:09 GMT -6
Ian: I would first have to be convinced that he tried a long distance strike as you put it. I can't see where Custer himself, tried anything like an offensive move. There was no place to do it. There was no opening, no terrain to fully deploy an attack force. There was of course, but it was not where he was. There is to the north of Ford D. There is beaucoup good terrain for deployment south of the village. East of the river was one big dry hole for the intent of offensive action. That is probably why he was screwing around so long to the point where he was caught up in his own folly. No one speaks to this terrain over there more eloquently than DC. It was a crap hole. Nothing offering anything for offense in the direction Custer needed to go, and I really don't have to comment on any good defensive possibilities do I. It is really to bad that some of these later day buckskin cavaliers don't get down in the weeds, for if they did, the folly of what they say would soon become apparent even to them. It seems as if many assume or believe that Custer's scouts would have been able to tell him everything that he needed to know about the terrain, possible fords, etc., but I'm not so convinced. I tend to think that while some like Boyer may have passed through the general area a time or two in the past, that doesn't mean that they had the detailed knowledge of that particular location, let alone the disposition of the Indians, that Custer needed in order to make the best decisions. The only way to obtain that knowledge was by reconniering ahead of the attack, but Custer, rightly or wrongly, decided that he could not afford to do that and had to go with what he had.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 2, 2014 15:25:35 GMT -6
And that is why the death date on his tombstone reads 25 June 1876. They, the tombstone company, had to go with what they had too.
Custer did not have to do anything as soon as he did. There was nothing that could not wait for another day, and had he had eyes on the place he would have known that.
Stuart was a man of similar personality who made some really big screw ups along the way, Viedersville, Chantilly, and not turning around at Salem come readily to mind. Can you, or anyone see Stuart pulling one like this? I sure can't., nor could I see Merritt, Mackenzie, Carr, Grierson, Hampton, Fitz Lee, Rosser, Butler, or even Grumble Jones. I don't even want to mention Forrest or Joe Wheeler.
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 2, 2014 15:49:03 GMT -6
I agree. The point I was trying to make was that I think it is likely that Custer was even more in the dark than many feel that he was, as I'm not convinced that his scouts were as knowlegeable of the situation as it seems is generally perceived. What I mean is that we frequently see statements like "Boyer would have been able to tell him that there was not a good ford in close proximity to the north of Ford A", and I'm just not convinced that is the case.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 2, 2014 17:14:48 GMT -6
And I agree with you. I doubt if any non-military employee of the U S Government was qualified to make a tactical reconnaissance of that area in the detail it should have been made in.
There is a crossing of the Potomac way up river that I have been to once. It was one of those crazy ass trips Steve Blum arranged, bless his three star bald headed soul. In fact I paddled a boat from the Maryland to the West Virginia side, and at that point I could have just as easily gotten out and walked. I know approximately where it is. I have a pretty good idea of what the water depth was 28 years ago. I know it can be crossed., but I will be double damned if I could relate enough information about it today to enable a tactical river crossing.
I put no faith in what someone once saw, where they camped, where the fords were, how much vegetation in the area, all these things, unless he saw them five minutes ago and had enough military knowledge to know what he was looking at and the ability to articulate it with complete clarity, and better yet sketch it out for me. All the rest is hoo haa.
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Post by wild on Jan 2, 2014 17:22:18 GMT -6
If the Indians ran as was expected they would run across the river to put an obstacle between them and the pursuing cavalry.And Custer would be waiting?I mean where did Reno run to for safety?Just a suggestion. Maybe that is why he never formed for attack.
They would not run in front of Reno but break away either left or right but left was just out onto the plain so it would have been right to the river with its loops and brush wood. How would that fit with Custer's failure to break into the village and his rather indecisive maneuvering?
Sorta a variation on the ford D scenario.
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Post by wild on Jan 2, 2014 18:04:00 GMT -6
Was a recce needed?ya seen one village you have seen them all.I mean there were no defences,no mine fields,mg emplacements. Surprise was paramount and a terrain recce would take Custer too close to the village. The Reno avenue of attack was not chance Custer probably knew that it was the best avenue of attack just maybe he decided to await the refuges on the other side of the river.Just saying
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Post by scottbono on Jan 2, 2014 18:29:40 GMT -6
Mac, I think it could as simple as Custer underestimating his enemy. Ian. Being quite new here I have adopted the position of listening to those who tend to be erudite, knowledgeable and 'experienced'. Having read many, many of the same books and reports as others posting here and trying to think my way through all the various scenarios I am going to take a deep breath and jump in with a very general view on a rationale behind this LBH debacle. Certainly GAC underestimated his enemy as well as overestimating himself and his troops. Was the 7th ever engaged in an action where the NA's actually fought back as an 'aggressor'? I think not, actually. So what was the regiment prepared and trained for? I believe they were prepared for their enemy to scatter after a holding action. As for their training? I don't believe there was any...not in the sense we look at it today. I freely admit my ignorance of tactics, etc. (though I love our military) but a few good friends and 2 relatives were formerly SOC folks and I remain amazed at their training regimen - and with a specific task at hand they trained 'specifically hard'; hence, they were prepared and not just for the immediate task but for the variables: if this goes wrong, we do this; if this happens we do that, and the like. I cannot find any of that involved in the command thinking of the 7th that day...or days preceding. Instead, there was the surety the Northern Tribes would act as they always acted; no need for contingencies, no "Plan B" (and Plan A was no winner either). It's been covered here before (I think it was Quincannon) that simply because a dog will run from you 9 times is no guarantee it will happen the 10th. And, as I have mentioned, on top of that, the 7th wasn't trained nor prepared for...well, not only what transpired but for anything beyond a very narrow bandwidth. I believe GAC had some idea what HE planned to do but events seem to show even that was made up as they went along - hence, absent a couple walki-talkies, nobody knew exactly was was going on and they were all pretty much propelled along by the energy of events. And once the breakdown occurred, whether it was Calhoun Hill or the Keough Sector, total panic ensued; nobody knew what to do in response to unexpected problems. I'm pretty sure this is very basic to most of you but, for me, it's noteworthy. I'm certainly open to correction and further illumination. Cheers, Scott
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Post by wild on Jan 2, 2014 18:34:58 GMT -6
Hello Scott you are very welcome.Nice intro.Enjoy
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Post by benteen on Jan 2, 2014 19:02:09 GMT -6
That’s my point Chuck, when DC wrote “getting away from deep analysis and just taking what was known at the time’’ Ian, I agree with yours and Dark Clouds assessment of a deep analysis, but for a different reason. I think the analysis should not be just on the battle but of Custer himself. I submit the following The CW where Custer gained his fame was mostly men charging other men. What was needed was courage of which Custer had more than his fair share. He didn't have to think much he was always under someone else command who did the thinking. All he had to do was charge when and where he was told. In the West when he had field command of the 7th Cavalry and no one to tell him what to do, he didn't even follow tactical fundamentals which I have posted before. No Patrols (Pawnee Killer) no recon (Washita) no assess and evaluate a situation (on the Yellowstone he saw Indians and just charged, almost straight into an ambush). This is what this man had done his entire career , he charged. As someone said and I like the term, Custer was a "One trick pony" attack, attack, attack. Now at the LBH we have him scouting, doing recon at 2 different fords, assessing and evaluating the situation, waiting for Benteen, when the people that knew him said he wouldn't wait five minutes for anything. Another words doing things he just didn't do in his 15 year career There are men like Mr Donald Horn, Dark Cloud and other historians that believe that Custer was wounded early in the fight. The more I think about it , the more it makes sense. I don't pretend to know what Custer was thinking, but when he told Reno to attack the village and he would support him I don't believe he had in mind he was going to do all this recon and waiting for Benteen, I believe he meant he was going to also attack from another direction. When Renos attack gave him a window I believe he went to Ford B to do just that, Attack. which he had done his entire career. There is a warrior that said the Cavalry came forward at Ford B and they fired on them and one fell in the water. The soldiers all stopped and put him back on the horse and left. If this is true, I say IF this is true then it is very possible it was in fact Custer as that is where Custer would be, in front I think the rest of what followed would make sense. There would be some confusion on who was in charge. Keogh by Army chain of command or Tom by Custer chain of command. Colonel Montrose said a while back that we would like to think the Army acts immediately but that is not always the case. And if there ever was a case of an Officer core divided down the middle it was the 7 Cavalry. Be Well Dan And Happy New Year to all.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 2, 2014 19:17:14 GMT -6
Scottbono: Your observations about training are not far off the mark. I will say though that a collection of farmers and immigrants that you eluded to in your previous post calling upon the wisdom of Saint Connell (who I have no personal gripe against any more than any other story teller) are excellent candidates to be molded into a fighting force, particularly the farmers. The problem with training was the problem with leadership. Leaders that are not very good or do not tend to their business are not likely to produce well trained units. This becomes particularly true above the company level where units must learn to operate effectively together or debacles like LBH are the result. That takes command emphasis, and if you read Montrose on this thread commanders can't influence diddly squat if they are off clubbing on Broadway, or trying to swindle some poor sod out of his last buck.
You correctly quoted me about the dog, but the lesson of course is not about dogs at all, but the greater lesson of CAN trumping WILL just about every time the cards are dealt.
I was rough on you a while ago because for the life of me I did not see any point to what you were saying, or any possible meaning to it. I have no intention of offering an apology, because for me the jury is still out on you. You keep offering and asking as you have done above you will eventually do well. If you bring up tall tales, purple backsides, and arrows stuck in Custer's penis though, and offer opinion on general officers where no real comparison can ever be made, then you might run your vessel aground upon the rocks and shoals of scorn. Both of them were damned good, each in his own way, and I would not mind serving under either of them. So when you make statements like - I think not - you had better have your sheets together here or folks will be on you like brown is on Shinola.
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 2, 2014 19:21:00 GMT -6
Hey Scott,
The training of lack thereof was a big part of the problem, and it was nothing like what we are familiar with or think of today. To begin with, whereas today a new recruit goes through several months of intensive training before ever reporting to his/her unit, at that time they would generally receive only the most basic of training, mainly consisting of drill and such, and, after that it was basically on the job training and was primarily company oriented. That means that the level of training/proficiency could vary considerably between companies and was largely dependent upon the officers and non-coms of each particular company and what and how much they chose to train. I imagine that, when two or more companies were based at the same post, there was at least some attention given to training in squadron or battalion operations, but, again, that would be dependent upon the senior officer and what he chose to do, and I feel certain that there would be little or no attention given to things like contested river crossings, which may have come into play at the LBH. As far as the regiment goes, the 7th had been scattered among several posts, and the campaign of 1876 was the first time that all of the companies had operated together in a number of years, so, obviously, there was a lack of expertise in regiment operations. This was exacerbated by the fact that many of the senior officers had been on detached duty, so there was really no one to exercise overall control of training. That is something that would have normally fallen to Custer, as the regimental Lt. Col and effective commander, but he had spent several periods of long absences either by choice of because of suspension, so, although that is not something that you normally see in criticisms of Custer, it is something that I fault him for and that possibly had a big impact on the battle.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 2, 2014 19:30:17 GMT -6
OK Dan: You made your statement. Now you tell us all just how that attack was to be conducted. Fine detail will do just fine. Then you back it up with evidence, and what Don Horn and DC says is not evidence. It is nothing more than what you just expressed - opinion. You just hung your ass out, now convince me that Custer would attack with two companies and not his whole available force when he had never before in his life had done so. You are trying once again to have it both ways. You have stated many, many times before why would anyone take only two companies to attack Ford D. Well why would anyone take two companies to attack Ford B. You asked it about one but state it happened at the other. A little bit inconsistent don't you think, seeing that Keogh was a mile or so away when Custer was a B?
This may sound brutal. I suppose it is. Brutal but not personal. For once in your life on this board, examine the facts on your own. Do not accept the opinion du jour. Think for yourself. If you run across something that seems to stink it probable does. One of those things you are likely to come upon that stinks is when military units do something outside the norm. The norm is normal, because they are a doctrinally based organization. Wearing pink pants with a dress blue jacket is beyond the norm of a Marine, so your next question is why the Marine was wearing pink pants. You inquire of all available sources, to find out why the Marine was wearing pink pants, and the only thing you come up with is Don Horn and Dark Cloud said he was wearing pink pants so it must be so . RUBBISH.
DC is one of the smartest men I will ever know. He trumps me in nearly every field of endeavor and he can play the guitar, which really pisses me off because I can't. Don Horn I do not know, but I have heard of him and all has been good. But for the love of the Good Lord above neither of them were there, so are you going to believe what they say, when it may be contrary to what your lying eyes are seeing? If that is how you move from one posters opinion to that of another, how do you ever keep track of what you thought yesterday?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 2, 2014 19:31:29 GMT -6
This is sort of an example of "re-enactment" that isn't given much attention, or as I'd like. Fussell talked up literary templates and how WWI was impossible for previous templates to fit, and so when people tried it was quite obvious, and illustrated how we've always done this. People into Freud and the unconscious tried that on Custer and failed as bad as Freud himself on Wilson.
As the joke goes, the plural of anecdote is not data. Garbage in, garbage out.
People tried to refight Vietnam with this battle and had to contort it to do so. They mentally re-enacted the battle according to the results they wanted or had seen. Vets recognized types in Custer's men similar to their own peers or superiors. Southerners didn't like Benteen simply because he fought for the North against family. Nothing too preposterously bad was too much to drape him with. Didn't work, and their active templates were obvious and silly and, in fact, exposed the falsities in the templates they were using derived from other battles and events.
I'm not a historian, benteen. I like history, but that isn't the jump. I still think you have to weigh when an account or story - like Martin meeting Boston - first appears, and from where. You have to be willing to lose some truth to torch out the blarney, and what's true will hang in. This isn't a unique event, and guys probably acted as they do today and had previously with recognizable and familiar responses to trauma.
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