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Post by fred on Mar 20, 2012 11:26:21 GMT -6
A very fine student of this battle posed a question to me recently and I thought it would be appropriate to answer it by starting its own thread—especially since we seem to have obscured everything with this, “They wish they’d said…” thread.
Apparently the boon-dogglers next door claimed Custer was trying to aid Keogh by having E Company form some sort of skirmish line to ease the pressure, then sending F Company over to help Keogh defend Calhoun Hill or that general area (I am not positive of the specifics… someone who knows what is going on over there is welcome to correct me here).
This smells a little like the north – south battle-flow claptrap and seems to echo the theories of Charles Kuhlman, none of which makes any sense.
In the work I have done, at 3:55, Crazy Horse began his run through Keogh. Within a five – minute span, Calhoun is shifting to cover the rout of C Company, Custer is sending F Company toward the basin to try to stem the flow of Indians coming out of the Deep Ravine head-cut, and Indians out of the Henryville area are making their move up the slopes of Calhoun Hill.
Within the next 10 minutes, Custer and E Company are overrun on Cemetery Ridge and Custer—now partially dismounted—begins his move up toward LSH.
All of this is supported by a myriad of Indian accounts, probably around 16 or more.
To my way of figuring, by the time Custer begins arriving on LSH, Keogh’s command has only about two minutes or so before it is completely overrun, all organized resistance ceasing, and only individual killing and mop-up remaining. The last of the known Keogh stragglers reach LSH, and resistance there continues for about 25 minutes more.
So… the closest Custer ever got to aiding Keogh was in sending Yates into the basin area in an attempt to block the egress from Deep Ravine. Neither Custer nor his “E” and “F” troop commanders ever saw Keogh again after departing Calhoun Hill in search of Ford D, and if Custer set up any skirmish lines, they certainly did not operate as such, probably being overrun before it/they could function as such.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Mar 20, 2012 15:08:20 GMT -6
Well said Capt. Now the other two standbys have to fall as well.
1.....Custer intentionally drew the Indians to him to save Reno.I say Nonsense pigs wouldn't fly, they would put on an air show before Custer was worried about Reno, Reno was written off. (It would seem being Custer's XO was not conducive to a long and healthy life)
2.... If Reno could have held out longer Custer would have been victorious.......Even worse nonsense. Reno held out as long as he could, he gave Custer a window of opportunity, Custer didn't take it. I believe it was Dark Cloud who said "What was Reno to do, hold out in perpetuity".. Oh sorry I forgot, there was this Capt Carter who was in the Officers club at the time of this battle but knows Reno could have held out all day
Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Mar 20, 2012 15:38:16 GMT -6
1.....Custer intentionally drew the Indians to him to save Reno. Your "nonsense," Dan, mirrors mine. That is an utterly ridiculous theory, unsupportable by any timing scenario, any account, any proof-- anecdotal, archaeological or otherwise. Only from dreamers. There is a beautifully written description of people like that, written by Fred Dustin about 76 years or so ago. I thought it so beautifully constructed, I copied it into my notes: “It is the fashion of unthinking people to be guided by their prejudices…. They worship the idols they have set up… they regard their popular heroes as gods, and at once decide offhand that all who differ with them are entirely and utterly wicked, hateful, and malicious. Persons of this type may be convinced against their wills of the wrongness of their opinions, but they will still go on and add new defenses, new excuses, new apologies, all equally untenable with their previous arguments, and we, naturally, come to the conclusion that time is wasted on such….” Agree, as well. Robert Carter-- 4th Cavalry-- was an ass, and you are probably right about his hanging around the "O Club." If people who believe such nonsense would only take the time and make the effort to figure out which Indians were where and at what time, they would see-- quite clearly-- that the Indians who cleaned George's clock needed no help from up-river. Hope you are feeling OK, my boy. I miss our talks! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Mar 21, 2012 11:46:49 GMT -6
There is a beautifully written description of people like that, written by Fred Dustin about 76 years or so ago. I thought it so beautifully constructed, I copied it into my notes: “It is the fashion of unthinking people to be guided by their prejudices…. They worship the idols they have set up… they regard their popular heroes as gods, and at once decide offhand that all who differ with them are entirely and utterly wicked, hateful, and malicious. Persons of this type may be convinced against their wills of the wrongness of their opinions, but they will still go on and add new defenses, new excuses, new apologies, all equally untenable with their previous arguments, and we, naturally, come to the conclusion that time is wasted on such….” Best wishes, Fred. Kudos to Mr Dustin, and to you Capt for posting it. Outstanding. Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Mar 21, 2012 22:09:09 GMT -6
Custer is sending F Company toward the basin to try to stem the flow of Indians coming out of the Deep Ravine head-cut, Should that not be E company Fred? How many companies is that he has shed,9 ?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 22, 2012 4:52:44 GMT -6
Hi, I remember reading the excellent info Fred posted a while ago concerning the Indian accounts of the Custer battle, there was accounts of Troopers (E Coy) making preparations on a hill (Cemetery I believe) when the suicide boys made their assault, now I don’t know where F Coy and the HQ were stationed (maybe in the basin area) but I am sure the Indians said that they were mounted waiting around for about 20 minutes, taking these account into context, it seems like Custer was deploying E Coy to stop warriors from moving up from the deep Ravie area and F Coy and the HQ were waiting for Benteen and Keogh to join them, if the later was untrue can anyone come up with another reason why Custer would hang around this position, if he knew that the Keogh sector was on the verge of collapse he would have ridden back over there to aid them and to try and stabilized the situation, but going on the info I have seen so far it was too late for Custer to help Keogh because he was under pressure himself from warriors trying to skin is ass.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Mar 22, 2012 6:41:48 GMT -6
Custer is sending F Company toward the basin to try to stem the flow of Indians coming out of the Deep Ravine head-cut,Should that not be E company...? No, F Company. I have a number of Indian accounts talking about gray horses being overrun. This is a difficult area of the battle... maybe the toughest to understand of all the areas. I think it has to do with the constant dust and smoke, plus the continuing arrival of more and more Indians, helter-skelter, confusing the situation. You should understand I use a lot of reason, logic, and my own experience... i. e., what I would do as a troop commander based on my experience-- limited, mind you-- under the circumstances as I have been able to figure them. To me, Custer would have sent the senior officer-- Yates-- into that area in an attempt to head off Indians moving up the head-cut. The danger Custer would have seen was palpable... those Indians posed a serious threat in cutting off Custer's reinforcements. You slay me, Richard! What a hoot! Eleven, wouldn't you think? ... there was accounts of Troopers (E Coy) making preparations on a hill (Cemetery I believe) when the suicide boys made their assault, now I don’t know where F Coy and the HQ were stationed (maybe in the basin area)... Custer, as a commander, would have remained on the higher ground with HQ. In my opinion, he would have sent the senior officer, Yates and "F," into the basin. That is what I would have done. This "20 minute" business comes primarily from John Stands In Timber who was born after the battle, but who was the nephew of Lame White Man... (am I correct here?)... and who must have gotten it from somewhere. Also, I might think "20 minutes" is a rather loose interpretation. (Remember the "sun passing the lodge pole" analogy?) And again, "waiting around" is misinterpreted as, "sitting there, picnicking." A real good study of what was going on indicates Custer was rather busy the whole time. ... just the reverse: "E" and HQ; "F" in the basin area. I doubt he would have "known," but he was worried certainly. I believe this to be quite true. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Mar 22, 2012 7:11:24 GMT -6
Custer is sending F Company toward the basin to try to stem the flow of Indians coming out of the Deep Ravine head-cut, The problem Custer faced and ignored was that the 7th was devoid of any control system to facilitate detachment/deployment of it's constituent parts.It was divided into troops but once detached these troops/battalions could not be controled and acted independently.We start with Benteen moving out of communication followed by Reno and then Keogh if a move to the North ford is considered. If Custer moved North detaching Keogh then in reality the mission was down to 2[?] troops. And as suggested if F troop is detached it seems that the last tactical move made by Custer was to further scatter his remaining forces. LSH has what 40 markers?.Custer began the mission with 600 troops he finished it with 40.To lose control of 85% of your command takes a level of incompetence bordering on genius.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 22, 2012 8:11:39 GMT -6
No this was not a problem of incompetence completely. There was some to be sure, but it was in the main a problem of organization.
The cavalry regiment of 1876 was organized into six squadrons of two troops each. The thoeretical battalions were in reality three men (the majors). Any command and control assistance they had came out of hyde. This organization was designed for big wars like the Mexican adventure and the civil war, and under those conditions were organized fairly well, where command and control could be exercised in a relatively small geographic area. Fighting indians was another matter entirely.
When you look at this thing in modern terms, the regiment was divided, less the logistics (with security), into a reinforced rifle company and two understrength rifle companies. Can one concieve of a commander in WWII or Korea spreading his three companies out over that distance and have any chance of success, facing a foe of that size?
William pointed out a few days ago the organizational reforms that followed LBH. Chief among them was the establishment of fixed (sized) battalions (three) under commanders with the ability to fight them either alone or as part of the larger regimental battle. I believe this to be a very important point. Custer as a regimental commander had no business doing what he was doing. Leading from the front as our brothers over yonder like to praise him for is not acting as a company commander or a platoon leader. Leading from the front is controlling the entire command at the forward edge of battle, but letting his commanders execute their portion of the battle. Custer lost control. He lost control, due to the nature of the terrain. He lost control because of his deployment in that terrain. He lost control because of his own arrogance and preconcieved notions of how indians would react and fight or not fight as the case may be. But, more than anything he lost control because he had an organization that was designed primarily for one type of war and was faced with fighting another where the organization, particularly deficient in the means of command and control, was completely inadequate and ill suited to the task.
There is a very good reason why military units are organized by echelon. There is value in the numbers three and four. Is anyone here old enough to remember the battle group in U S Army structure, an organization that went directly from Colonel to Captain? Perhaps not because it was short lived, having the same deficiencies that the 1876 cavalry regiment did, to thin to plow, to thick to drink.
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Post by wild on Mar 22, 2012 8:22:45 GMT -6
Nice professional view Colonel. Just to comment on this---- Leading from the front is controlling the entire command at the forward edge of battle Agreed but at the end he was in effective[that word again]command of 2 troops. Have a nice day.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 22, 2012 8:29:40 GMT -6
Richard: I am not sure he was in "effective" command of his guidon bearer.
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Post by fred on Mar 22, 2012 8:37:29 GMT -6
Queenie,
Your analysis in that last paragraph was brilliantly stated. Really nice job.
And Wild, I agree with you, as well. In the end, Custer commanded one company, and that was under-strength to begin with and had already lost several men on Cemetery Ridge.
The problem was not so much in dividing his force; it was in allowing mutual support to evaporate. A few years before he died, this is precisely what Benteen claimed: February 24, 1892, “That is all that I blame Custer for—the scattering, as it were, (two portions of his command, anyway) to the—well, four winds, before he knew anything about the exact or approximate position of the Indian village or the Indians.”
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 22, 2012 9:12:31 GMT -6
One of the main problems with Custer is he doesn’t know when to give up, either he still thinks victory is achievable or he has a big ego, he still gambled when the chips were down, now either he thinks he will go back east as a failure (perish the thought he thinks) or a hero (now I like the sound of that he must have thought), if he played poker like he used his command then he must have lost a lot of pay (I read a story a while back now about Benteen taking him to the cleaners at cards, I hope I have got that right).
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 22, 2012 9:16:19 GMT -6
Fred: I suppose you were in at the tail end of the battle group. So was I, but you as an officer had a much more sophisticated view than I did for I was then a private in the rear rank. The problem as I am sure you know was that when the mission called for a company it was OK. When the mission called for something more than a company but less than a battle group (five companies) it always had to ad-hoc out its ass. Same thing I think for the 7th. When you have an organization that is good for only two things on purpose, and it is faced with a third, nothing good can happen.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 22, 2012 9:34:18 GMT -6
Ian: There are a lot of folks, particularly on the other board, that believe I am anti-Custer. That just isn't so. As a commander in the Civil War his record is hard to dispute. I believe however that this very record was the engine of his own undoing. He was ill suited by temperment to fight in an irregular conflict, at least that is my opinion. Give him a Hanover, or a Yellow Tavern and he was in his element. Give him a brushfire conflict on the vast expanse of the American West and he was a fish out of water tactically and technically.
If you have a Bulge you need a Patton, but a Patton in Palo Duro Canyon or hunting Dull Knife is a slegehammer, where the sharp and tapered blade of a Bank, Vlockman, or David Sterling is called for.
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