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Post by montrose on Jan 4, 2016 11:43:51 GMT -6
1. OODA loop theory was developed to improve fighter combat fights. It is relevant to air or ground gunfights, where you seek an edge on one on one who kills who first fights.
2. The problem is rapid decision making in a gunfight may be counterproductive in managing a battle or a campaign. My thesis, which is getting as old and grey as I am, examined how a short cycle decision making process can be very counterproductive in meeting group/nation goals.
Let's say Arizona focused on maximizing their OODA loop on anyone carrying a weapon. As soon as you see a weapon you do the double double tap. That means two rounds in the chest and two rounds in the face, in case they have body armor. Maximize training to ensure rapid response. I am positive they will win 99.9% of all OODA loops. I am also positive hundreds of hunters, civilians, kids, members of other LEOS will die.
3. LBH is an interesting example of how an OODA mentality caused a tactical, operational and strategic defeat for the USA. LTC Custer made numerous decisions. His OODA loop cycle was faster then the Indians. This means that he could take an action and move on long before the Indians could respond.
GAC's key decision points:
Send Reno detachment into valley Move main body out of support of Reno Det Observe from 3411 Ford B recon Calhoun Hill reconsolidation Ford D recon Deer in the headlights at north end Battle Ridge
In each case his need for speed to chase the OODA loop contributed to the catastrophe. I do not believe a single officer of his grade would fail as badly as he did. He simply was unfit for combat command in any level in the post ACW Army.
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Post by fred on Jan 4, 2016 12:47:33 GMT -6
Please do not get me wrong; I think OODA has great validity, but I think that validity increases as the situation becomes codified. We can sit and break down actions as they occur-- after they have occurred-- but I see less application for the immediacy than I do for something more long and drawn out. The LBH is probably a rather good example of its application and as a study tool. An ambush of a convoy, less so... if at all. In the latter case I suspect the two "O"s are discarded almost immediately, while the "D" and "A"s are put into force almost simultaneously. After the fact, it is fine to break down the convoy commander's actions, but as a training tool to teach troops what to do when their convoy ambushed, I find it cumbersome, simplistic, and quite frankly, rather silly: a corporate solution to a military problem. Personally, having succeeded and survived in both worlds I found it a little more efficacious to apply military solutions to corporate problems.
I do understand the theory's application to aerial combat-- somewhat, anyway: and I wish Andy Bush were here so we could get his opinion. I suspect today's fighter pilot has some decision-making time on his hands because of all the advanced warning technology, so good, solid training in OODA would help. (I am guessing similar technology was available during Vietnam-- maybe not as sophisticated, but available nonetheless.)
Again, as a matter of tactical application where immediacy is most important, I find this theory either superfluous or unnecessary. In critical situations such as tactical immediacy, I believe good training in both leadership, fire control, and tactics is much more important that a four-step process of decision-making. The results can be assessed by that process... that is fine... but to formulate tactics based on the process itself doesn't do the job... in my opinion.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 4, 2016 13:35:10 GMT -6
Well, we could breakdown management by objective, nah! However GAC's management style as much as anything led to a lot of deaths. Controlling, is not leading nor is it commanding. What we consider Command and Control broke down rather early on.
Proper planning was not done, a plan was not shared, back up plans were not considered. O and O were brushed past, the D was singular and the A rash.
Regards, Tom
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Post by jodak on Jan 4, 2016 17:27:38 GMT -6
As it applies to a rapidly developing combat situation, I don’t see OODA as being a checklist that a decision maker should consciously go through to insure that they are taking all of the right factors into consideration and taking the correct actions, but as means of quantifying and understanding what they do, in some cases subconsciously or intuitively. What I was trying to get at with this exercise is that, by retrospectively applying OODA concepts, can we better understand the factors that influenced critical decisions and the decisions themselves? As I’ve said on numerous occasions, I believe that to understand and critique these decisions we have to try to divorce ourselves from our current knowledge and understanding of factors and attempt to see things through the eyes of the participants, seeing and knowing only what they did at the time. What I mean by that is that, while it is OK for us to say that, based upon some consideration that we now know, we feel that someone made a poor decision, it is not necessarily OK to condemn him for that decision based upon what he knew at the time.
To illustrate, let me answer my own previously posed questions as they apply to Custer on the morning of the 25th –
Observe
1. What were his personal observations?
He couldn’t see the village, but he should have been able to obtain a good picture of the general terrain, distances involved, etc.
2. What feedback or outside information did he receive from others?
He was told that there was a very large village, possibly too big for the 7th Cav to handle, its location, and the relative position of the horse herd. He was probably informed that the village showed no signs of alarm, with no immediate threat of breaking up/moving or of threatening him. He was also informed that there was a likelihood that his advance party had been sighted by an Indian band and that other Indians had discovered his back trail, so the overall situation might soon change.
3. What unfolding circumstances were there?
The above mentioned possible discovery of his command and the Indians’ reaction to it.
4. What, if any, were the interactions with the environment?
The obvious is that he knew what the weather was, such that it wasn’t raining and was likely to be a hot humid day. Other “environmental” factors were the knowledge that his men and horses were tired and the horses had not been adequately watered for some time. He also knew that the location where the command was presently halted was a fairly good location offering several advantages.
5. What sort of implicit guidance and control was exercised on him?
Terry’s “instructions” as to what he should do, including an admonition to “feel always to his left” so as to preclude any Indians moving south around his left flank. We might also include in this a presumed pressure felt by Custer to do well, or even spectacularly, in order to redeem himself with his superiors.
Orient
1. What did Custer's previous experiences tell him as to what to expect?
That the Indians would generally avoid direct confrontation with the army if at all possible, unless it was on favorable terms to them, or the old adage that it was “easier to fight them than to catch them”. Also even if the village(s) did not move or disperse as a direct reaction to him, they generally moved frequently anyway for sustenance and sanitation purposes and could not be counted on to remain where they were for very long or even through the day. His experience also told him that Indians were generally no match of the army in a stand up fight and that most successful attacks upon villages had been launched at dawn from multiple directions, and had targeted the Indians’ means of survival, such as their horses.
2. What sort of cultural traditions might come into play?
The only thing that I can think of to include here is the knowledge that, if the village were attacked it would be likely that it would take a while for the warriors to react in full force, due to their rituals for getting ready for combat. There may be some other things along those lines that I am not thinking of.
3. What did analysis of all of the above, in both sections, tell him?
We can only surmise about this, both as to what it did tell him and what it should have told him, but let’s move on and include this under the following question of -
Decide/Act
1. Were the decisions that Custer made and the actions that he took in accordance with the information received and analyzed above?
Based upon all of the above, was Custer’s decision to deviate from the normal practice of launching a surprise attack at dawn after gathering intelligence and instead advancing to attack immediately with little intelligence the best alternative available to him? If not, what were his alternatives and the potential consequences? Keep in mind that any contention that Custer had already put himself in a bind by advancing too rapidly, allowing himself to have possibly been discovered, etc. are irrelevant at this point, and the best decisions now need to be made based upon the situation as it currently exists. Also keep in mind that the operative word in OODA Loop is “loop”, meaning that it is not a one-time thing but is dynamic with constant inputs and updates being made. In that sense I propose that our next step will be to further analyze Custer’s actions/decisions as the command advanced across the divide down to the river, followed by Reno’s OODA loop(s) in the valley, and so on, but, for right now, we are concerned only with Custer’s decision to move forward and attack immediately.
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Post by dave on Jan 4, 2016 20:29:26 GMT -6
It seems to me that Custer's refusal to accept anything that did not support his decisions and ideas overrode all objections and observations made by anyone. Am I over simplifying over just missing the point? Regards Dave
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Post by edavids on Jan 4, 2016 21:46:40 GMT -6
It seems to me that Custer's refusal to accept anything that did not support his decisions and ideas overrode all objections and observations made by anyone. Am I over simplifying over just missing the point? Regards Dave ---------------------------------------------------- Hi Dave: I do get the impression he was a "my way or the highway" kind of leader. I think a plausible answer to your question is look which officers were with him when he veered right...his brother Tom, good friend Capt. Yates and his brother in law, Lt. James Calhoun. I don't get the impression Capt. Keogh would kiss anyone's derriere but from what I can tell LTC Custer had officers with him who would follow orders and not make waves. Doesn't mean they weren't fine officers but they were not likely to cross their commander. As far as I know, Benteen was the only one recorded that day who questioned Custer's judgment to his face just prior to his scout to the left - "hadn't we oughta stay together" or some such thing. As far as I know the answer from Custer was a simple "you have your orders". On a side note - what is more revealing to me about Custer's decision making that day is the fact that he permitted 2 civilian relatives to tag along with his battalion (Boston Custer and nephew Harry Reed). To me that speaks volumes about how Custer believed the battle would go. Of course, we can only guess at any conversations that occurred within the Custer battalion after Martini left with the message for Benteen. Clear as mud? Best, David
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Post by dave on Jan 5, 2016 12:12:36 GMT -6
Brother Dave In my experience those who surround themselves with family and sycophants do so for ego centered reasons. A person who needs continual support and praise makes a poor leader in any profession. Tom Custer, Yates, Calhoun and Weir stand out as acolytes but there were others.
Keogh seemed to be the "hail fellow well met" guy in the middle of the regimental politics. He was able to get along with Custer and Benteen, no little feat. Benteen was a hard ass man who detested Custer and his entourage and resented any slight he perceived and sought redress. Great soldier that he was I can see him as a bitter resentful man, especially serving under a lesser man like Custer.
Custer had made his own rules since before his arrival at West Point and continued to do so for the rest of his life. He always felt entitled to do as we wished and gotten away it for the most part. Someone, and I forgot who it was, said that "Custer treated the 7th like a fraternity" and he was the chapter president.
HR's anger and resentment against Reno is telling. You have to be invested to hate with such fervor and I wonder what his angle is? Distant kin wronged by Custer? Regards Dave
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Post by edavids on Jan 5, 2016 12:18:53 GMT -6
Gave up trying to figure HR out. Even the moderator on the other board, the consummate Reno detractor, doesn't seem to acknowledge HRs rants. With that nonsense for support better off winging it on ones own.
Best,
David
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Post by herosrest on Jan 5, 2016 17:23:33 GMT -6
Brother Dave In my experience those who surround themselves with family and sycophants do so for ego centered reasons. A person who needs continual support and praise makes a poor leader in any profession. Tom Custer, Yates, Calhoun and Weir stand out as acolytes but there were others. Keogh seemed to be the "hail fellow well met" guy in the middle of the regimental politics. He was able to get along with Custer and Benteen, no little feat. Benteen was a hard ass man who detested Custer and his entourage and resented any slight he perceived and sought redress. Great soldier that he was I can see him as a bitter resentful man, especially serving under a lesser man like Custer. Custer had made his own rules since before his arrival at West Point and continued to do so for the rest of his life. He always felt entitled to do as we wished and gotten away it for the most part. Someone, and I forgot who it was, said that "Custer treated the 7th like a fraternity" and he was the chapter president. HR's anger and resentment against Reno is telling. You have to be invested to hate with such fervor and I wonder what his angle is? Distant kin wronged by Custer? Regards Dave DucemusUnfortunately, this is a typical mistake made now by Dave. Start a thread about Custer and you might be surprised. However - if you put personality aside which you may find easy or hard to do, any group endeavour invariably runs along very practised and established lines to the detriment of those who do not wish to fit in. Therefore, firstly, Custer may well have been a nut job prima donna. Reno was a useless idiot and Benteen a little boy with way too much of a big head. Apparently they were all good fighters. What the hell they were doing in the army, is anyone's guess. Like it or not, Custer had a commander's mind and Reno and Benteen were too used to doing their own thing. Besides that. outside my current topic, Reno was a liar, manipulater, could not be trusted, and ratted on his colleagues. He probably beat women, had illegitimate children, chewed tobbaco and enjoyed singing when he was drunk, which got him slung out of West Point. Benteen was a man of principle and blind courage but always, always knew best. Custer should have whipped his little donkey, and sacked Reno, but couldn't, could he. They sat behind Weir's heights out of sight and watching the tepees being taken down in the valley, expecting the hostiles to run. They didn't and what I would give for a picture of Rattie Reno's face when Half Yellow Face was asked why the tepees were being set up again. It's the little things... like giving the impression that Custer was trying to get him killied. That is the classic paranoia problem, isn't it. I have a sneaking admiration for Reno but in the real world I wouldn't spit on him if he was on fire! The Battle on Little Bighorn, 25th June 1876. explained. Military expets, theorists, dice tumblers and historians take note, the centre, Reno's advance, collapsed very quickly preventing development of the attack. Reno ran, Benteen was late. Custer was cut off, forced north, surrounded and wiped out in short order. This occured because the centre (Reno) failed to hold their position and hold the enemy in combat. It is the simplest of military problems. No guts, no glory. This matter also, is, very simple. I cannot and will not abide liars, whatever their excuse and Marcus A. Reno was a liar! He had no honour! He was a disgrace. Alfred H. Terry, 27th June, 1876 - He also came up to Reno. Soon this united force was nearly surrounded by Indians, many of whom armed with rifles, occupied positions which commanded the ground held by the cavalry, ground from which there was no escape. Rifle-pits were dug, and the fight was maintained, though with heavy loss, from about half past 2 o'clock of the 25th till 6 o'clock of the 26th, when the Indians withdrew from the valley, taking with them their village.
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Post by montrose on Jan 5, 2016 19:07:18 GMT -6
Okay Hero,
You do not like some folks who fought at LBH. So what?
Connect the decisions made by an officer at LBH to the outcome, something you have yet to do.
In your recent ramblings, you wrote: "Reno's advance, collapsed very quickly preventing development of the attack. Reno ran, Benteen was late. Custer was cut off, forced north, surrounded and wiped out in short order. This occurred because the center (Reno) failed to hold their position and hold the enemy in combat."
This is a laughable theory. LTC Custer was not cut off and forced north in the valley fight. He was not in the valley fight.
The order for the valley fight was an 8 company attack. 3 companies formed the advanced guard, 8 formed the main body. Explain to me why the main body did not fire a single round in the valley fight. Explain to me why the main body did not deploy after receiving 4-5 messages to do so (depending on whether you believe Gerard).
If you want to discuss your theories with facts and analysis, I am open to a discussion.
If you want to rant and rave on emotional drama, go back to the other board. This is not the place for drama.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by jodak on Jan 5, 2016 19:14:11 GMT -6
It seems to me that Custer's refusal to accept anything that did not support his decisions and ideas overrode all objections and observations made by anyone. Am I over simplifying over just missing the point? Regards Dave ---------------------------------------------------- Hi Dave: I do get the impression he was a "my way or the highway" kind of leader. I think a plausible answer to your question is look which officers were with him when he veered right...his brother Tom, good friend Capt. Yates and his brother in law, Lt. James Calhoun. I don't get the impression Capt. Keogh would kiss anyone's derriere but from what I can tell LTC Custer had officers with him who would follow orders and not make waves. Doesn't mean they weren't fine officers but they were not likely to cross their commander. As far as I know, Benteen was the only one recorded that day who questioned Custer's judgment to his face just prior to his scout to the left - "hadn't we oughta stay together" or some such thing. As far as I know the answer from Custer was a simple "you have your orders". On a side note - what is more revealing to me about Custer's decision making that day is the fact that he permitted 2 civilian relatives to tag along with his battalion (Boston Custer and nephew Harry Reed). To me that speaks volumes about how Custer believed the battle would go. Of course, we can only guess at any conversations that occurred within the Custer battalion after Martini left with the message for Benteen. Clear as mud? Best, David The idea that Custer had specifically selected members of his clique to be part of his immediate command that day is something that pops up frequently, but I persist in believing that it was just a coincidence that it worked out that way. There was a prescribed methodology for assigning companies to commands based upon the seniority of the respective commanders, and I believe that those that ended up with Custer did so just because that was what "the formula" called for. Prior to Custer's return to command Reno had divided the regiment into wings and battalions following the prescribed method, and on the march out from FAL the two wings were commanded by Reno and Benteen, with battalion commanders Keogh and Yates under Reno and Weir and French under Benteen. Custer officially abolished the wings at the Powder River camp, but they still lingered on in practice. The companies that had previously composed the Reno wing were the same ones that subsequently took part in the "Reno Scout" as well as being the ones, with the same battalion commanders, that directly accompanied Custer during the battle, with the Benteen wing split into battalions under Benteen and Reno. Therefore, Custer really only perpetuated the assignments that Reno had already made.
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Post by edavids on Jan 5, 2016 19:27:16 GMT -6
Duly noted and opinion respected, Jodak. I was not aware of formulas beyond battalion commanders by seniority. I know that Weir and Moylan were part of Custer's clique but I do not believe they were placed as spies per some Custer-phobe conspiracy theories. What you say makes sense not that I am buying into it hook, line and sinker just yet ;-)
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Post by dave on Jan 5, 2016 19:27:46 GMT -6
HR I believe you might be just a tad too close to the subject matter. Your statement: "However - if you put personality aside which you may find easy or hard to do, any group endeavour invariably runs along very practised and established lines to the detriment of those who do not wish to fit in."
These men who were are discussing have been dead for over 100 years and whatever their sins they have answered for them. You are attempting to extract justice and that is a futile task. Like or dislike them based on their actions at the LBH not previous or post behavior.
How are you able to know without a doubt that Reno left the valley early? Also following Fred's time line shows they did not dance and drink or "They sat behind Weir's heights out of sight and watching the tepees being taken down in the valley, expecting the hostiles to run."
Your personal dislike is causing you to lose focus and I am unsure what you meant by "That is the classic paranoia problem, isn't it." I enjoy your posts and learn from them but please refocus. Regards Dave
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Post by montrose on Jan 5, 2016 20:11:04 GMT -6
Jodak,
1. I believe the wing and battalion arrangements from Nov 75 to Jun 76 are totally overblown and misunderstood. The 7th Cavalry regiment consisted of a regimental headquarters and 12 companies. There were no organizations between the regiment and the companies. The unit was established in 1866, so by LBH they had been operating in this manner for a decade.
a. Detachments. When 2 or more companies operated together, they were designated a battalion. The term battalion has no more organizational meaning than the term set of fours. A battalion was a temporary grouping designed to accomplish a specified task. It dissolved when the task was complete. The Bn could exist for 30 minutes, or a campaign. Note how the Benteen and Reno battalions at LBH existed for about 3 hours from formation to termination.
b. Company command. In this environment, company commanders had enormous autonomy. Their only true restraint was being directly under the command and control of the regimental commander. Company commanders are peers. It does not matter whether captain, 1LT or 2LT. There is a certain authority vested in command.
I may not be explaining this concept well for folks outside the military. Command is a formal authority. The Army used green tabs to indicate command authority for squad leaders to army commanders. The green tab is a felt 1 inch thing you put on your shoulder boards in the Class A uniform.
Another way at looking at this is ownership by money. Squad, platoon, and company commanders sign for and own all property for their unit. If there is something missing that you failed to account for properly, it comes out of your pay. I am still pissed that I had to pay $3.84 for a lost wrench when I was a mechanized platoon leader, signed for $!.4 million in property. I have 11 years of green tab time, and that was my sole loss in government property.
Bottom line. In this environment, the temporary groupings called battalions had little or less formal authority. It was routine for company commanders to ignore orders from the Bn commander, and suffer no consequences for doing so. Weir's behavior was consistent with dozens of other officers, until the modern battalion organization was created, decades later.
2. An alternative view of the Custer clique. There is a culture in the military, which I am sure also exists in the civilian world, though I lack that experience to know. Commanders, or civilian executives, favor some subordinates over others, despite seniority or organizational authority. This is not necessarily a bad thing. If you favor the competent over the incompetent, the unit is better off. If you favor lapdogs and sycophants, problems ensue. And Custer did both.
a. E Company. The senior officer in E Company was LT De Rudio. He was an anarchist, terrorist, coward, convicted felon and escaped convict. His performance at LBH prove that he was unfit to be an officer, unfit to e a private. He should have been court martialed and executed for LBH. So Reno played an administrative game to make sure this incompetent did not command in the 1876 campaign. De Rudio was attached to a company led by a Captain. A junior officer, Smith, was assigned to command E company as his replacement. Given De Rudios cowardice and incompetence at LBH, this was the right decision.
b. C Company. The commander of C Company in the 1876 campaign was 2LT Harrington. There were at least a dozen officers senior to him in the regiment. The admin game was that CPT Tom Custer was the formal green tab, detached to work as his brother's aide. (There are no aides authorized in the Army below the rank of brigadier general, and many BGs have no authorized aides, just the ones in command). Harrington had 4 years in the Army, which would make him a senior 1LT, or junior CPT in modern Army. He seems from accounts to be a better than average officer, and I am certain a more efficient and effective commander than Tom. He dis make a tactical error at LBH, that contributed to the 100% loss of life of his unit. Here is my bottom line: if you put a 2LT in command of a company, over th majority of the officers in the unit, you better damn well make sure you have a superior officer supervising him.
c. L Company. Calhoun and Crittenden. I believe these officers had the finest performance of any other officers on Battle Ridge, including GAC. They fought well, and died hard.
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Post by edavids on Jan 5, 2016 21:18:47 GMT -6
Thank you Montrose. Great stuff and very informative.
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