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Post by montrose on Feb 22, 2011 11:21:45 GMT -6
1. Purpose. I want to start a new thread to discuss command and control.
2. Background. Steve has been raising command and control issues in different threads. My intent is to consolidate my responses here. My response will take several posts. I am going to start with Custer's long history on the plains of independent movements.
3. Scouting. The purpose of scouting is to gain relevant and timely information for the unit. Scouting is an art of both getting information, and getting it back to commanders in enough time that they can respond.
4. GAC and scouting. I call this the Custer Scouting Myth. Because Custer often went far off from his command, therefore he was scouting.
a. Custer romps. By his own admission, Custer left his command on campaign to joy lark. Nearly every day he would ride off into the prairie. He hunted fished, collected animals as pets, collected animals to practice taxidermy, and played pranks.
b. Custer reprimands. Stanley and Terry both reprimanded Custer for his unauthorized absences. He was not tasked to scout, and he provided no relevant information.
c. Independent command. On independent operations, Custer could and did claim he was scouting. Obviously, no one could challenge him. But his own writings show that he was not scouting.
Remember when he left his regiment on a true scouting mission to find a river? When he got there he drank, and went to sleep. Column was left to their own devices. Any LT who did that would be fired.
d. Custer's ability. When Custer wanted to, he was a talented scout. I find it amusing that some of his best scout efforts were immediately after being reprimanded for screwing around. Custer had a natural eye for terrain.
4. Commander. For a regiment sized force, scouting is a LT responsibility. The purpose of scouting is to provide information to influence a decision. When the commander leaves his own command for extended periods every day, how is this influencing anything?
a. Command training. One of the challenges in rise in rank is the change from doing yourself, to delegating to others. It is a transition in mindset to delegate an important function like scouting to others, since junior officers lead from the front. It takes training and experience to develop a feeling for translating scout reports.
Since Custer rarely let others scout, he never developed this ability. Another consequence is that Custer had little faith in scouts observations. He wanted to see for himself.
b. Subordinate training. Training scout leaders is important. They have to learn their jobs through experience. In today's army, the scout platoon leader is one of the top LTs in the battalion.
7th Cav officers were not given enough opportunity to learn this vital task. As a scout you have to learn the balance between boldness and caution. You learn by doing. I admit I learned by dying. I remember many times looking at the blinking orange lights of the army laser tag MILES system. Out in the plains you only were allowed to die once.
c. Vignettes.
(1) LT Bradley and Gibbon had an awkward relationship. Bradley's writings show that he was routinely challenged by unnamed members of Gibbon's staff. He was defensive in his later writings. Somewhere there was a shortfall between Bradley's ability to communicate and be trusted, and Gibbon's ability to hear and react.
(2) GAC appeared to have uncertainty responding to his scout's reports at the Crow's nest. Custer's record of second guessing scout reports is lengthy, and I would like discussions kept to a minimum. It has been discussed many times.
(3) Hare and Varnum returned to their units. Being in close contact with the enemy is not the time to abandon scout efforts. I admit this call boggles my mind.
Imagine if Custer left an observation post (OP) on the bluffs to observe Reno's fight and report developments? His move to Ford D operated under the assumption that Reno was fine, and there was little Indian threat to his northern force. An OP would have warned him of Reno's defeat, the movement of Indians towards Keough sector from the village and pony herds, and the movement of The Indians from Reno's sector back to the village.
5. LBH. Implications for LBH.
a. Custer scout. The move north was influenced by Custer's scout mentality. It should have been a move to support and/or take opportunity of Reno's attack. But Custer was still in scout mode. His delay on the bluffs, ford B actions (quite a bit if Thompson is right, moderate if not), and Ford D scout show a focus on reconnaissance, not an attack.
b. Custer command and control. As Custer pursued his scout function, he lost control of his command function. After leaving 3411 he lost the ability to know or influence what was happening to the 7 companies and trains in the south. After leaving Calhoun Hill he lost the same ability with three more companies. He went from a regimental commander to a scout platoon leader.
c. The gap. As Custer pushed north, he knowingly created a wide gap between the north and south ends of the regiment. It was essential to create a command and control measure on this gap. This was critical terrain, if the Indians occupied it, it could fatally compromise his plans.
(1) An OP on the bluffs would seem essential, since no combat power was left to control the terrain. An OP could observe the Reno fight, movement on the backtrail, and movement to their north. They could provide information to both the Custer force and Regimental units arriving from the south.
(2) The decision to move Keough from L/C/N complex to Calhoun Hill shows a conscious decision to cede ground between the two halves of the regiment to Indian forces. Messengers became impossible. As a consequence of this decision, Custer had a responsibility to stay at Calhoun Hill.
d. Critical terrain. Calhoun Hill became the vital place on the battlefield. It was the key terrain for linking up the regiment. It also was the closest US position to the village, directly beside the main enemy avenue of approach, ford B. It also was very weak defensive terrain. This was the key terrain for the regiment, and the place where the commander needed to be.
e. Second gap. Custer's move to Ford D created a second gap. It is probable (I would say a near certainty) that again there were no command and control measures in place to control this gap.
f. Command versus scout leader. Custer's move north shows he was thinking like a scout, not a commander. As he kept moving north he showed less and less regard for what was behind him. This may make sense as you approach an enemy force. But he was no longer approaching, he was bypassing the enemy. His follow on units would have to deal with the enemy main body, and he did not warn them that they would have to fight the enemy to reach him.
g. Custer's performance. Custer did not act like a commander on 25 June. At first I thought that LBH was an aberration. It seems totally out of touch with his ACW performance. But then you have to consider that he faced a very different enemy and ACW was 11 years ago. He showed a pattern of behavior during his decade on the Plains that set the conditions for LBH. Not just for himself, but for his unit.
Steve, do you see the link to Blink yet?
6. Summary. I see an issue between GAC in his responsibilities as regimental commander, and his personal preference for scouting. In addition, this tendency for 10 years in the 7th led to a unit that organizationally had issues with managing the function of scouting with the function of command. The eyes and brain were often not connected.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by montrose on Feb 23, 2011 8:10:35 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss the function of command with respect to LBH.
2. Command is a function. It is not simply who is the commander. Regard the 7th Cav as an entity. Command is the process of controlling that entity. As I hope to explain, the function of command is broader than GAC.
3. Organization. The 7th had structural and personal issues that impacted its command flow.
a. Ghost leaders. The actual commander and 3 majors were permanently detached. This left the acting commander as a LTC with one MAJ as his second in command.
b. Dispersion. The War department played chess using companies as their pieces. The constant movement of companies disrupted relations between regiment and companies. Companies did not have a routine relationship with one another. Companies assigned to different Departments fell under a different chain of command during their deployment, and this could be for years.
c. Span of control. Organization theory holds that a headquarters can control 3-5 subordinate organizations. The Army has incorporated this into its organization design from squads to armies.
(1) The 1876 cavalry organization design had one HQ to 12 companies. When operations required two or more companies they formed an adhoc task organization called a battalion.
(2) Do not confuse this with a modern battalion, which is a permanent organization with a massive staff and support element. A Bn HQ staff would be about 6 officers and 25 EM. Note Bns were permanently organized shortly after the Plains wars, though I would defer to Jose or Ray on exact dates and organizational designs.
(3) Bn Command. The BN CDR was the senior officer. If 4 Majors served with the regiment, the regiment could assign a MAJ to run herd on the company commanders. Due to the self inflicted field grade officer shortage, BN CDRs were normally Captains.
Now let me add military culture. If you outrank me, I salute and move out. If we are same rank, I don't give a rat's tale what your date of rank is. We are peers. There is going to be friction. I may not obey an order I think is wrong. If you don't like it I will sing you Cee Low's greatest hits. Court martial charges from one CPT to another will normally never, ever happen. (Maybe in garrison where one is post commander, but for an adhoc task organization, I know of no examples from this period).
(4) Lack of staff. Both Regt and Bn lacked adequate staffs. In fact, by definition, Bn had no permanent staff. The shortfall was made up by tasking companies for details. Some men served for a period, many served just for one day. This means you get quality crap shoot, and on 25 Jun Custer rolled a Martini.
(5) Scouts and guides. Army had a problem in that scout skills varied widely by Department due to the various tribes and varying terrain. The solution was to hire civilian and Indian guides by campaign, without continuity. Selection was a function of availability, with wide variations in quality. Training was nil, since you were hopefully buying a fully qualified individual.
So now the Regt has to manage another adhoc entity. They are not military and the Indian side will have limited or no english skills, requiring interpreters.
At LBH the span of control issue is two groups of Indian scouts, Ree and Crow. This gets added to the 12 companies.
(6) Trains. The Regt had no permanent trains. Trains were organized by the Quartermaster Department. Civilians were hired to operate the trains. So this adds yet another non standard element to Regt span of control.
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Post by fred on Feb 23, 2011 9:08:39 GMT -6
Scouts and guides. Army had a problem in that scout skills varied widely by Department due to the various tribes and varying terrain. The solution was to hire civilian and Indian guides by campaign, without continuity. Selection was a function of availability, with wide variations in quality. Training was nil, since you were hopefully buying a fully qualified individual. So now the Regt has to manage another adhoc entity. They are not military and the Indian side will have limited or no english skills, requiring interpreters. At LBH the span of control issue is two groups of Indian scouts, Ree and Crow. Will, As usual, beautifully crafted: sharp, succinct, accurate. Let me make one correction, however. There were three groups of Indian scouts: Dakota. Four of them, though initially five. (Interesting story with the fifth; he defected and was killed at the LBH... or so it seems.) That is why Isaiah Dorman was there. He was the interpreter for those guys. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Feb 23, 2011 9:14:34 GMT -6
montrose
William, thank you for taking the time to share your extensive military knowledge as to the responsibilities,concerns, and functions of officers and the Army in general.It is enjoyable and entertaining to discuss was Reno drunk or not, but these to me are the most valuable posts. They go a long way to help explain not WHAT happened at the LBH but more importantly WHY it happened.These are two of the type of posts I print out, study, and use as reference when forming my opinions on this engagement. Thank you again sir, for the fine posts
Be Well Dan
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 23, 2011 9:49:16 GMT -6
When Boulanger killed himself on the grave of his mistress after failing to lead a coup against the French government, Clemenceau remarked that 'inside the Man on Horseback (then a General) was the soul of a second lieutenant.'
In a somewhat different, somewhat similar way, Custer never shed the idea of leading the charge, even when duty and some common sense required him to be above the fray and controlling it, not in it and reacting to only that part affecting him.
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Post by fred on Feb 23, 2011 10:00:32 GMT -6
In a somewhat different, somewhat similar way, Custer never shed the idea of leading the charge, even when duty and some common sense required him to be above the fray and controlling it, not in it and reacting to only that part affecting him. Hey, my boy! Could that be considered a "death wish"? <g> Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Feb 23, 2011 10:40:14 GMT -6
Continuation of previous post.
4. Deputy Commander. Custer and Reno had a poor working relationship. They had not worked together in previous campaigns. Reno had been absent a year due to his wife's death and settling his family. He returned after Custer left for the east for 9 months. So the two had not worked together on campaign preparation.
a. Process. Custer basically ignored Reno as deputy commander. Reno knew no more about major decisions than any other officer i the Regiment. Day to day operations were executed by Custer with help from his adjutant. Decision making was reserved for Custer. It wasn't that Reno was not part of the Custer clan. The issue is that the second highest ranked officer in the unit was not part of the decision making and execution functions of command. He was the only field garde officer in the 7th beside LTC Custer.
b. Custer rarely delegated tasks to Reno. The Reno scout illustrates his attitude toward Reno. The Reno scout was ordered by Terry, and Custer did not agree. Custer wrote or was responsible for a Herald article directly attacking Reno as unfit for command and saying he should be court martialled.
Attacking a subordinate in national media is a guaranteed method to create a lack of trust between commander and subordinates. The command climate in the 7th was one of total control at the top. Subordinates had little independent decision making authority and could and did suffer for independent actions.
5. LBH Command and Control. Once Custer moved north with 5 companies, he created a command problem for all the moving parts he left behind. Reno should have been placed in command of everything Custer left behind: Benteen Bn, trains, scouts, valley force.
a. Vacuum. By putting Reno in command of the valley attack force, Custer created a command vacuum. Custer was too far away, and soon separated by enemy forces. Custer was trying to command all his moving parts directly. His failure to delegate creates a serious slowing of Regimental decision making.
b. Location, location, location. If I stick a pin in your toe, message goes to brain and you say ow. If I replace your nerves with messengers like Kanipe, I can burn your foot off before you notice. The data has to get to a decision point, and then back; before you can react.
You mitigate this by putting your brain where it can best send and receive data.
So the location of the command post is critical. I have said before that the command post should have been located somewhere between 3411 and Calhoun Hill. I believe it should have stayed on the high ground south of Calhoun; the L/C/N or Weir terrain features.
c. Command of split unit. Custer's move split the unit in half with 5 companies in the north and everything else in the south. He should have designated a commander for all forces in the south, while he commanded personnally the north force.
One technique is to split his own command element. Send CPT Cooke and CSM Sharrow with 2 orderlies back to establich a rear command post. Reno is not available since he has been assigned to a BN and committed to an attack. Reno could eventually move to Cooke's CP and take over, as conditions permitted.
5. Post split actions for Custer. Custer continued to divide his forces and place them in separated positions. He left Keough when he went to Ford D. When he returned he waited for 20 minutes at the north end of the ridge. It can be assumed he was waiting for Keough, Benteen, and the trains to arrive at his location.
a. Keough. He had no idea what was going on with Keough at the south end of the ridge, a mile away. For all the arguments on times, does anyone think it would take longer than 20 minutes to travel from the cemetery to Calhoun Hill?
Custer's first decision after the pause was a move to LSH. Keough's Bn was already broken. There is a reason I have called the 20 minute delay the Lethal Pause. The opportunity for a decision came and went.
The issue is the function of command. The brain, Custer, put himself in a situation where he could not know what was going on to his 5 company force. Not only did he not know, he could not react. The gap between Calhoun Hill and Ford D was too great to control a 5 company force.
b. Regiment minus. Custer going to Ford D exacerbates his command and control issue with the rest of the regiment. If word had gotten to Calhoun Hill of the problems to the south, who was going to decide on a reaction? Even if you do see forces at Weir peak, again, who will decide?
Keough is not the deputy regimental commander. All he had was 3 companies, and likely very restrictive orders from Custer. In addition, he was trapped by the Custer force to his north. Moving south would abandon Custer to destruction. Moving north would delay regimental linkup, and could result in a surprised Benteen or trains being destroyed.
6. Post split actions for Reno. After arrival on Reno Hill, Reno started assuming command over the Regiment's moving parts. He took command over Benteen, McDougall and the trains. He failed to fully take command of the scouts. The Rees tried to cooperate, but their interpreter abandoned them at the beginning of the fight.
a. Reno's personality. For the moment, disregard Reno the person. Unlikable, scruffy, woebegone whatever. Let us look at actions taken.
b. Consolidate. The Reno element established a hasty defense with a casualty collection point. When Benteen arrived his companies also were sent to from skirmish lines. Before someone asks, when Weir left on his own followed by Benteen, these lines went away. So when the pack train arrived, they saw no defense, and established their own security.
c. Patrol the crossing ford. About a third of Reno's Bn did not arrive at the Hill. There was a strong possibility of survivors. It made sense to send a patrol back down to the crossing area to check for survivors.
The justification for this patrol remains in controversy. One NCO participant said they were going for water. Reno detractors said it was only for Hodgson.
My point is a patrol should go, and it did. Reno led it himself. Patrol may have found one G Company soldier and brought him back. My concern is I have never found a name.
d. Bring up the trains. It was a tactical imperative to bring up the trains. McDougall had the fighting power of 3 companies. The need was to mass combat power. Reno understood this, Custer did not.
Custer's order to Benteen reinforces the requirement to bring up the trains. Yet Custer's intent was to bring Benteen and McDougall to the north for an attack. The tactical situation in the south demanded massing of combat power. Men were more important than mules to Reno.
e. Bury Hodgson. This is not a rational decision. It is a waste of time and effort, under the circumstances. Reno had flaws.
f. Move North. The time to move north was after the trains had closed, and preparations made to move the wounded. In addition, the valley fighters had an unknown number of dismounted men, which would mean any move north would be at the pace of walking men.
As we know, Weir went off early. Then Benteen moved. Reno moved only after he had control of the trains and wounded. By accident or design, the whole body was moving only after the southern half of the Regiment had consolidated. This was the proper decision/action. The decision making process may have been flawed, but not the action taken.
g. Fall back. The decision to fall back to the closest defensive decision was also correct. To their north was a vastly superior enemy force. Custer's main body was not in sight, but was likely on the other side of the Indians. It appeared Custer had made some contact, and had taken casualties.
The execution of this retreat was flawed. Godfrey formed a rearguard, apparently, on his own. Other companies fell back in an incohesive rush. Nevertheless, they only had one KIA.
h. Organize a defense. The unit organized a defensive position that was 360 degrees with interlocking fields of fire. They had a CP, aid station, and animal holding area. They established observation posts outside their perimeter at night. The defense the next day showed that they could move companies around to reinforce weaknesses, and conduct limited counterattacks.
Nothing like this happened in the Custer sector. Five companies fought five individual engagements. Their was no central brain in the north.
7. Summary. The function of command was performed more successfully in the south than in the north. Custer was the better commander, maybe a better person. But Reno executed the functions of command more effectively then Custer.
Howzat?
Respectfully,
William
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Post by benteen on Feb 23, 2011 10:56:21 GMT -6
In a somewhat different, somewhat similar way, Custer never shed the idea of leading the charge, even when duty and some common sense required him to be above the fray and controlling it, not in it and reacting to only that part affecting him. Darkcloud, Your post as to Custer's frame of mind,gives rise to a question I would like to pose.Clair is adamant on this Cavalry/Infantry mentality. I wonder if there is in fact some logic to it. Custer had an outstanding record as a Cavalry officer during the CW. He knew cavalry and its purpose, hit fast and hard,almost like shock troops. He also knew the enemy had the same training and could predict their movements and beat them to the punch. Even in the west his only victory over the Indians(if you want to call it that) was at the Washita. Which was basically a Cavalry charge At the LBH when Yates withdrew from his probe at ford B this became an Infantry fight. Something for which Custer was not trained in nor had any experience with. I know Custer supporters will say he was trying to this or that, but I don't like to form my opinions based on my thinking I know what was going through another mans mind I like to base it on facts. The facts are from what I can tell, that Custer did nothing. Absolutely nothing.The only sign of any military organized resistance was in the Keogh sector and he even moved away from support of him Custer it seemed, for lack of a better word, was clueless as to what to do.My question is, do you think this Cavalry/Infantry mentality played a role in his battalions quick demise Be Well Dan
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Post by locoweed on Feb 23, 2011 12:50:49 GMT -6
Benteen,
I would like to expand upon your infantry comment.
If you stop to think about it, Custer was actually commanding dragoons that day, not true cavalry. While the definitions of dragoon and cavalry changed throughout the 1800's, consider the issue from the weapons viewpoint.
Dragoons: Generally they are mounted infantry that quickly move to a location, dismount and fight as infantry. Their weapons are often pistols and long range carbines that are not easily usable on horseback. Thus their battles often unfold as long range encounters -- 500-1000 yards.
Cavalry: Their primary weapon is the shock and awe of the horseback charge. Their weapons are usable on horseback. Thus one would expect to see to pistols, sabers, and short range, repeating carbines (Spencer) that are usable on horseback.
Observation: Custer had no sabers or short range, repeating carbines. His single shot, Springfield rifles were outstanding at 500+ years, while fired on foot.
Once shock and awe was impossible (due to Indian numbers and officer decisions), the battle would have to unfold as a defensive, infantry type engagement. Indeed, both Reno and Benteen experienced the same problem.
In a letter to friends, Captain Keogh once described his regiment (7th cavalry) as dragoons.
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Post by locoweed on Feb 23, 2011 14:30:41 GMT -6
Benteen,
I would like to expand upon your infantry comment.
If one stops to think about it, Custer was actually commanding dragoons that day, not true cavalry. While the definitions of dragoon and cavalry changed throughout the 1800's, consider the issue from the weapons viewpoint.
Dragoons: Generally, they are mounted infantry that quickly move to a location, dismount and fight as infantry. Their weapons are often pistols and long range carbines that are not easily usable on horseback. Thus, their battles often unfold as long range encounters -- 500 - 1,000 yards.
Cavalry: Their primary weapon is the shock and awe of the horseback charge. Their weapons are usable on horseback. Thus one would expect to see pistols, sabers, and short range, repeating (Spencer) carbines that are usable on horseback.
Observation: Custer had no sabers or short range, repeating carbines. His single shot, Springfield rifles were outstanding at 500+ yards, when fired on foot.
Once shock and awe was impossible (due to Indian numbers and officer decisions) the battle turned defensive and had to be fought on foot.
Captain Keogh once wrote to a friend that his regiment (7th Cavalry) were in fact dragoons. With military knowledge on two continents, including the American Civil War, I respect his language choice.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 23, 2011 15:16:33 GMT -6
Custer made a mounted charge at the Washita, but was it a cavalry charge? In that there was no shock wave of a line of horsemen, but a thin column to get in among the lodges. I'm under the impression that it's one element of what gives distinction to cavalry above, say, the Sioux.......or the 7th. The Sioux did much the same in their warfare. Quick insertion of firepower and all, but not the battering ram of the line of knights which was the CW. Even there, certain units like Buford's and others employed and enjoyed volume fire at enemy cavalry charges and made few if any of their own.
I'm also under the impression that Forrest getting there first with the most was dragoon and not cavalry in attitude, although they all enjoyed playing the role. Cavalry couldn't do much against rifled infantry. The horse was an easy target. I can't seem to imagine much different in history if horses had died out in 1600.
No, I don't think Custer had a death wish. He was reckless and without fear but I have never seen evidence he wanted to die. That's fifty year old pop psychiatry of the sort Edward Albee wrote.
I agree with Montrose in that Custer behaved like a Captain or Lt. leading his company rather than the guy keeping multiple operations coherent.
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Post by fred on Feb 23, 2011 18:20:13 GMT -6
If one stops to think about it, Custer was actually commanding dragoons that day, not true cavalry... Dragoons: Generally, they are mounted infantry that quickly move to a location, dismount and fight as infantry. Their weapons are often pistols and long range carbines that are not easily usable on horseback. Thus, their battles often unfold as long range encounters -- 500 - 1,000 yards.... Captain Keogh once wrote to a friend that his regiment (7th Cavalry) were in fact dragoons. With military knowledge on two continents, including the American Civil War, I respect his language choice. This is a really good observation and one I had never thought of before. Nicely done. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 23, 2011 18:52:48 GMT -6
William I appreciate your effort and that was very informative and yes I can see the Blink connection which makes Custer more understandable even though it went bad for him. By the same token I see it applying to Reno as well. His decision to leave the timber fits well.
I have to agree with Dan these are posts to copy and save and study along with the ones I save of Fred's and others.
Thanks again for your efforts
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 24, 2011 7:39:40 GMT -6
Benteen, I would like to expand upon your infantry comment. If one stops to think about it, Custer was actually commanding dragoons that day, not true cavalry. While the definitions of dragoon and cavalry changed throughout the 1800's, consider the issue from the weapons viewpoint. Dragoons: Generally, they are mounted infantry that quickly move to a location, dismount and fight as infantry. Their weapons are often pistols and long range carbines that are not easily usable on horseback. Thus, their battles often unfold as long range encounters -- 500 - 1,000 yards. Cavalry: Their primary weapon is the shock and awe of the horseback charge. Their weapons are usable on horseback. Thus one would expect to see pistols, sabers, and short range, repeating (Spencer) carbines that are usable on horseback. Observation: Custer had no sabers or short range, repeating carbines. His single shot, Springfield rifles were outstanding at 500+ yards, when fired on foot. Once shock and awe was impossible (due to Indian numbers and officer decisions) the battle turned defensive and had to be fought on foot. Captain Keogh once wrote to a friend that his regiment (7th Cavalry) were in fact dragoons. With military knowledge on two continents, including the American Civil War, I respect his language choice. I don't believe because you take away the sabre that it made Custer a Dragoon in his approach or his troops proficient in the tactics. I am not sure of your weapon systems designation as indicative of the difference between Dragoon and Cavalry. The U S Dragoons became US Cavalry in 1861. The US Dragoons became the 1st and 2nd Cavalry and the uniform changed but the weapon system remained the same. My question is what weapon systems were deployed by the first U S Dragoons? Were there repeating carbines even available? I suspect that Keogh might have made the distinction that Dragoon came from the use of a firearm horseback rather than the tactics themselves. My point is that if you train as cavalry taking away a CQB weapon doesn't make you a proficient infantry man in regards to tactics especially against Indians. There were mounted rife units also and it would be interesting to see the dismounted tactics both in differences and similarities of US Dragoon, US Mounted Rifle, and US Cavalry. AZ Ranger
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Post by Mike Powell on Feb 24, 2011 10:06:18 GMT -6
(3) Command versus scout leader. Custer's move north shows he was thinking like a scout, not a commander. As he kept moving north he showed less and less regard for what was behind him. This may make sense as you approach an enemy force. But he was no longer approaching, he was bypassing the enemy. His follow on units would have to deal with the enemy main body, and he did not warn them that they would have to fight the enemy to reach him.
(4) Custer did not act like a commander on 25 June. At first I thought that LBH was an aberration. It seems totally out of touch with his LBH performance. But then you have to consider that he faced a very different enemy and ACW was 11 years ago. He showed a pattern of behavior that set the conditions for LBH. Not just for himself, but for his unit.
I've read little, call it nil, on Custer and the ACW. I find this thread very provocative and it leads me:
(1) To ask if there were instances during the Civil War when he functioned as a commander in a manner completely different from that manner at LBH, as proposed above? That is, did he ever perform successfully as a commander, under circumstances as uncertain and difficult as he found in Montana? And:
(2) To ask if his actions at LBH were an aberration or had the man benefited solely from his personal bravery and good fortune for an entire career?
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