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Post by wild on Jan 2, 2016 8:49:15 GMT -6
Hi Tubman [t's been pissing rain here for the last month with the Shannon now looking like the Atlantic . We had one forecaster announce that showers were clearing to rain otherwise it will be wet. Perhaps the strain is creeping into the posts. Ch- gurgle- eers
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 2, 2016 14:36:21 GMT -6
In any case with regard to this thread, just because you are in command does not mean you are in control, certainly not in this case. You have pretty well hit the nail on the head.
Regards, Tom
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Post by jodak on Jan 2, 2016 15:58:38 GMT -6
For some time I've intended to start a thread to explore how the OODA Loop impacted the decisions and actions of various of the key participants. This seems to be an good time and place to do that, so I propose that we take each key decision point in turn, beginning with Custer's visit to the Crow's nest and the decision to advance on the morning of the 25th. Any thoughts? en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop
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Post by edavids on Jan 2, 2016 17:38:40 GMT -6
As a non-military guy I did have to look up OODA! Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. IMHO, Custer's OODA at Crows Nest illustrates that he was a calculated risk taker. His penchant for the gamble raised its ugly head shortly after the Ford B rec. He was not able to see for himself what the scouts told him was a big village (1st O). He at least had visual proof previously that the large trail(s) went that direction (2nd O). He chose to move the regiment in the direction he was pointed aided by the report that Indians were found rummaging through the discarded pack (D) otherwise he would have let the men rest on June 25, moving into place for a dawn attack on June 26 (a neat trick in the dark!?). Of course I am aware that scouting a viable route would have taken place during daylight hours. ACT (A) he did as the regiment moved out quickly. I say calculated risk taker as he could not himself visually verify the pony herds or village but I believe that given observations of the 3 days prior permitted him to make an educated guess that his actions would get him into battle. I handled the easy one, the experts can take the harder ones.
Best, David
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Post by dave on Jan 2, 2016 19:15:07 GMT -6
jodak Great post! I look forward to reading the responses. Glad to see you back, I've missed your wise and interesting posts and thoughts. Regards Dave
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 3, 2016 6:26:04 GMT -6
Dave, Somewhere on this board is a lengthy discussion of the term. a search may bring it up. Certainly worth revisiting, Montrose, may have brought up.
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 3, 2016 6:37:13 GMT -6
This may have been the genesis. Mar 11, 2014 at 5:49am . Post by Mike Powell on Mar 11, 2014 at 5:49am QC, I don't believe the OODA loop can only be breached by a mistake within the loop. OODA has a finite minimum cycle time and new events that require reaction which occur more rapidly than cycle time will disrupt the loop leading to flailing or paralysis. I think Mike Tyson had another idea though of how to go about it, "Everybody has an OODA loop until they get punched in the face." Mac, All swarms are by definition sentient, that is able to perceive or at its broadest meaning "alive". Insects perceive and respond by swarming to pheromones emitted by individuals that are attacking. The NDNs at LBH had only to swarm to visible cavalry, gunfire, yelling and dust clouds. I'm open to arguments that there was a more developed command and control system in play than swarming on June 25th. And if there was, then evaluating for structure, competence of employment or other dimensions against any template of military tactical practice would make some sense. Absent compelling evidence of such a system, I think the swarm is the best fitting template. And given the numbers available over the terrain involved, the swarm was the most effective tactic the NDNs could have employed against Custer. It's elimination of the friction inherent in formalized command and control allowed the most rapid employment of their dominating advantage of sheer numbers. The results have spoken volumes with more to follow (especially I hope from Gordie and Fred). Read more: lbha.proboards.com/thread/4605/indians-underestimated#ixzz3wBUGM7Yg
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Post by wild on Jan 3, 2016 7:40:19 GMT -6
Hi Tubman
All swarms are by definition sentient, that is able to perceive or at its broadest meaning "alive". Insects perceive and respond by swarming to pheromones emitted by individuals that are attacking. The NDNs at LBH had only to swarm to visible cavalry, gunfire, yelling and dust clouds.Agreed good observation. They had leadership as opposed to Custer's dysfunctional half arsed command and control. And the LBH was the perfect environment with the perfect conditions for the swarm to be there the [i"]fastest with the mostest"[/i]. It raises the question; was the 7th hamstrung by command and control? There is a level where leadership becomes the operating system . Custer perhaps got caught between the two systems.I don't think you can be both controller and leader .I think you touched on that Tom. Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 3, 2016 7:55:48 GMT -6
Last year at the battlefield an older Cheyenne gave a demonstration of the use of the wing bone whistle. He stated it was used to signal when to get up and charge and when to get down for at least concealment.
I told the owner of one of the stores he should order some wing bone whistles and include some of the uses.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by jodak on Jan 3, 2016 16:25:08 GMT -6
Let me elaborate a little further on my previous post about OODA Loops and how they applied to the BLBH. I couldn't find a link with a really good definition so posted a link to the Wikipedia definition, which is not really that good. As David indicated, it stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. This is a diagram of the process - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop#/media/File:OODA.Boyd.svg. Studying the diagram and applying it to Custer at the Crow's nest, we can ask the following questions: Observe1. What were his personal observations? 2. What feedback or outside information did he receive from others? 3. What unfolding circumstances were there? 4. What, if any, were the interactions with the environment? 5. What sort of implicit guidance and control was exercised on him? Orient1. What did Custer's previous experiences tell him as to what to expect? 2. What sort of cultural traditions might come into play? 3. What did analysis of all of the above, in both sections, tell him? Decide/Act1. Were the decisions that Custer made and the actions that he took in accordance with the information received and analysed above? One thing to keep in mind is that the opponent also has an OODA Loop, and one of the factors fundamental to success is being able to "get inside" the opponent's loop, which means that, in a given situation, completing your loop and taking appropriate action more rapidly than the opponent. That being the case, what was occurring in the Indians' OODA Loop at the same time that Custer was at the Crow's nest? Who "closed" their loop at that time the quickest and most appropriately? p.s. Dave, I've been here reading all along but just don't actually log in unless I have something to say. Things have been pretty quiet lately, with nothing much to comment on.
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Post by dave on Jan 3, 2016 20:11:22 GMT -6
jodak I certainly enjoy your're WW II posts and look forward to more. So if you get bored just send me some more info. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Jan 4, 2016 3:09:29 GMT -6
Jodak Hi Complex systems for a cavalry regiment? I would have some reservations. A cavalry regiment is designed to charge the enemy to it's front . The battle Custer tried to fight was foreign to it's nature . Benteen was right the regiment should have been kept together and led from the front.It had neither the training nor the means whereby to control fast moving dispersed units in unknown terrain against an enemy of unknown disposition. Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 4, 2016 5:22:43 GMT -6
I think the OODA loop is what happens regardless of training or experience but once recognized or not you can speed up the cycle through training and experience. I read somewhere that the OODA loop for a jet pilot is very short but everything is there in seconds.
AZ Ranger
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Post by fred on Jan 4, 2016 8:35:12 GMT -6
I think the OODA loop is what happens regardless of training or experience but once recognized or not you can speed up the cycle through training and experience. I read somewhere that the OODA loop for a jet pilot is very short but everything is there in seconds. I am not completely sold of the utility of this theory. I understand it from a philosophical point of view, but its utility, to me, is limited. From a practical viewpoint, OODA occurs virtually every moment of our lives and we become inured to it: it is virtually instinctive. It is, therefore, more of a sand table exercise to determine how we act. The problem is, we know how we act and trying to figure out how the other guy will act becomes an almost excessive burden leading to a slowing of instinct and an adding-on of complications. I find OODA more practical in business planning and possibly even strategic military planning, but again, an excessive reliance takes one out of the realm of "simplicity," making things overly complicated. I much prefer to concentrate on my own strengths and forcing those upon my adversary than worrying about what my adversary may do. I agree with the premise of surprise being the most important element in military planning, but excessive reliance on "game theory"-- and unless I am dead wrong, OODA is just another element of that-- takes us from the pragmatic to the philosophical. Ideas are philosophical; dead bodies are pragmatic. So I guess I yield on strategy, but prefer to use my instincts for moment-to-moment tactical decisions, letting the over-achievers assess my success afterwards. It is fine to break down a fighter pilot's actions later, but I see no practical application, prior. OODA is not an end in itself; I might consider it more of the means to a strategic end. Military strategy means one thing to me, and only one thing: the destruction of the enemy's forces. You do that, you win... period. OODA's application works fine in developing the "how" to achieve that goal; for immediate, jungle-fighting, tank battle tactical warfare, it is merely a game. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 4, 2016 10:17:59 GMT -6
I think the OODA loop is what happens regardless of training or experience but once recognized or not you can speed up the cycle through training and experience. I read somewhere that the OODA loop for a jet pilot is very short but everything is there in seconds. I am not completely sold of the utility of this theory. I understand it from a philosophical point of view, but its utility, to me, is limited. From a practical viewpoint, OODA occurs virtually every moment of our lives and we become inured to it: it is virtually instinctive. It is, therefore, more of a sand table exercise to determine how we act. The problem is, we know how we act and trying to figure out how the other guy will act becomes an almost excessive burden leading to a slowing of instinct and an adding-on of complications. I find OODA more practical in business planning and possibly even strategic military planning, but again, an excessive reliance takes one out of the realm of "simplicity," making things overly complicated. I much prefer to concentrate on my own strengths and forcing those upon my adversary than worrying about what my adversary may do. I agree with the premise of surprise being the most important element in military planning, but excessive reliance on "game theory"-- and unless I am dead wrong, OODA is just another element of that-- takes us from the pragmatic to the philosophical. Ideas are philosophical; dead bodies are pragmatic. So I guess I yield on strategy, but prefer to use my instincts for moment-to-moment tactical decisions, letting the over-achievers assess my success afterwards. It is fine to break down a fighter pilot's actions later, but I see no practical application, prior. OODA is not an end in itself; I might consider it more of the means to a strategic end. Military strategy means one thing to me, and only one thing: the destruction of the enemy's forces. You do that, you win... period. OODA's application works fine in developing the "how" to achieve that goal; for immediate, jungle-fighting, tank battle tactical warfare, it is merely a game. Best wishes, Fred. At least in law enforcement the part that needs the most training is the very first part you have know you're in a gun fight. Working on the skills that prevent you from walking blindly into a situation and not recognizing it speed up the OODA loop beginning time. I agree that in general it occurs all the time without knowing about it but some things are a starting point of discussion and not an end to themselves. If no work is done to avoid or assess bad situations than you have a longer or non existent OODA loop. You can be killed without ever starting the thinking process. After you learn to recognize the situation is bad then your practice at speed and accuracy do play a role in survival also. Off to Phoenix for 3 days of firearms instructor meetings and training of new officers. Regards Steve
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