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Post by rosebud on Dec 16, 2011 19:55:56 GMT -6
C'mon, Rosebud! What do you think I am, a dullard?
Well, kind of,
What I was asking is if the >>>>>MAP<<<<<<< could have the location marked
X....Morass C....Time R...Time B...Time PT..Time
If this was on the map, we could follow along and understand ...EXACT placement and time.
Nothing worse than saying at the lone tepee at such and such a time and everyone using a different location for the tepee.
I did not want or expect anyone to use any of the times and refute them.
But thank you for doing that. Means nothing if we are using a different spot for the morass and a different spot for the Lone Tepee.
Times mean nothing when locations are not the same. Lone Tepee?...I am not convinced of your location yet but if I do change, I will get rid of the other one. I am not one that thinks there is more than one lone tepee. That is a cop out for people. I do have a theory of how some of these extra tepees got placed where they did.
Rosebud
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Post by fred on Dec 17, 2011 9:14:52 GMT -6
C'mon, Rosebud! What do you think I am, a dullard?Well, kind of... Oh, nice! Real nice! And it's Christmas, no less! <g> Well... you are correct about the map references; without proper references all the times are meaningless. I can give you speeds and distances, as well as those times, but without a proper map, even that would be difficult to follow. As for multiple "lone tepees," while I am convinced of the accuracy of my own work, I am only willing to wave off the possibility of that second-- or, actually, first... eastern-- tepee as a sop. It bears no import, has no meaning, and has about as much relevance to the LBH as Fort C. F. Smith's location. So, believe me, when this book comes out there will be no confusion where things were located, events occurred, and people were seen. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Dec 17, 2011 10:16:42 GMT -6
Fred,
I may be unclear here.
Gerard's knoll is 1.7 miles from Ford A. How close is it, and in what direction, from the lone tepee. I thought Gerard's hill was 300 meters downstream from the tepee. Now I am not so sure.
Where were the Indians that Gerard saw? I have always assumed he saw Indians heading for Ford A, at least half a mile away. So somewhere between Ford A and 1.2 miles upstream n Reno Creek. I believe, from maps only, that the hill has no view of LBH valley, due to intervening higher ground.
The reason this is important to me is that at this location, Custer made the decision that guaranteed a defeat.Up to this point, he was on a glide path to a draw or limited victory.
Custer made a decision, without knowing where the village was, its size and disposition. Gerard's observation of a handful of Indians fleeing towards the village was soon to be contradicted by Reno's messengers, and Cooke, and Keough; telling him that the Indians were counter attacking in great strength.
Maybe 15 minutes later( I defer to Fred, not a time guru like others here), Custer had reached 3411 and saw the massive village, and massive Indian assault on Reno.
It appears that Custer overreacted to Gerard's excited observation of fleeing Indians, and then undervalued all other intelligence of enemy size, activity, and intent.
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Post by rosebud on Dec 17, 2011 10:51:53 GMT -6
It appears that Custer overreacted to Gerard's excited observation of fleeing Indians, and then undervalued all other intelligence of enemy size, activity, and intent. Montrose
I don't agree with you at this TIME. Indian actions were exactly as expected. They were doing things like in the past. Delay the troops and escape. The village itself was starting.....STARTING to run. It is just a darn big village and they will need more time to get the job done. The big advantage they have this time is that their delaying tactics will have FAR more numbers and will not only DELAY the troops. They will bring the troops to a complete halt and even run them back up the hill.
I would not argue that Custer had INTENTIONS of trying to hit the village from the other side. Something changed and prevented him from making this move, and he was also unable to put any pressure on the village.
Rosebud
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Post by fred on Dec 17, 2011 11:47:23 GMT -6
I may be unclear here. Gerard's knoll is 1.7 miles from Ford A. How close is it, and in what direction, from the lone tepee. I thought Gerard's hill was 300 meters downstream from the tepee. The absolutely precise location is unclear, but I believe it to be at the foot of Gerard's Knoll. The knoll, however, is fairly long, so the tepee could have been anywhere along its length and closer to the stream. I measured the center of the knoll as 1.7 miles from the river and I used what appears to be the 1876 channel as opposed to the 2011 channel or the 1962 (?) channel on the topo map. Generally, I just say the tepee was in "the vicinity" of the knoll. Based on everything I have been able to piece together-- including terrain descriptions; straight-line eye distances, i. e., no "monutains" between the viewer and those being viewed!!; possible dust clouds; and reasonableness-- you know, "I saw them 20 miles downstream!" Yeah, right!-- they were about one mile away, near a knoll I have labeled "Middle Knoll" because it is the middle one of three we refer to: "Cooke's Knoll"... adjacent to the river; "Middle Knoll"... 1.1 miles west of Gerard's Knoll; and "Gerard's Knoll"... 1.7 miles east of the LBH. This is correct, though you may still be able to see into the LBH valley from atop Gerard's Knoll. It was the highest ground before the river and the route around "Middle Knoll" doesn't block the entire sight-line. I would qualify this by saying the "event" occurred-- my figuring-- at "Middle Knoll," not Gerard's Knoll. There are sundry reasons for my belief Custer got that close to the river. My only issue here is that this close to the river I find it hard to believe Custer didn't have some inkling of the village's whereabouts. My work puts Custer at "3,411" some 29 minutes after turning right at Middle Knoll. He has watered his horses; traveled 2+ miles at between 7 and 9 MPH; slowed his troops down after directing them toward Cedar Coulee; then backtracked a couple of hundred yards to the high point at the edge of the bluffs. I think that is a very fair statement. At the least, Custer should have verified Gerard's sighting and should have determined what it signified in the overall scheme of things. Nice analysis, Will. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 17, 2011 11:55:45 GMT -6
It appears that Custer overreacted to Gerard's excited observation of fleeing Indians, and then undervalued all other intelligence of enemy size, activity, and intent. MontroseI don't agree with you at this TIME. Indian actions were exactly as expected.... Delay the troops and escape. I do not see a disagreement here; the "over-reaction" comes because Custer didn't follow through Gerard's "intel findings." To my way of thinking, Custer should have absorbed this data, then checked it through to a conclusion. Instead, he assumed it permeated the entire village and that it was on the run. These Indians simply turned and formed a screen, joined by others coming out of the village. It was this screening news that changed Custer's plans, because now he fully understood surprise was not complete. Reno could deal with the screening actions, draw more warriors toward him, and Custer would now end-run in an attempt to bag those who were escaping. Right on the money! That "something" was size... as measured by quantity and distance. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by rosebud on Dec 17, 2011 12:02:43 GMT -6
I think that is a very fair statement. At the least, Custer should have verified Gerard's sighting and should have determined what it signified in the overall scheme of things.
Nice analysis, Will.
Best wishes, Fred.
Isn't it possible that Custer is doing this very thing as he is headed to 3411? Looks like he is headed to high ground to get a look and decide what action to take next. Just like every one wants him to do.
If Fred is right about the location of the lone tepee.....Benteen is a hell of a lot closer than I have thought in the past. About two to three miles closer.
Rosebud
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Post by fred on Dec 17, 2011 15:31:21 GMT -6
At the least, Custer should have verified Gerard's sighting and should have determined what it signified in the overall scheme of things.Isn't it possible that Custer is doing this very thing as he is headed to 3411? Looks like he is headed to high ground to get a look and decide what action to take next. Just like every one wants him to do. I would agree with you here. The problem with the Gerard sighting was that it was just a bunch of Indians running away, no more, no less. It proved nothing, yet if we play it out to some conclusion, we have accepted Gerard's impression that the village was running, which obviously was not the case. Apparently Custer accepted that as proof with no further analysis and this was a bad assumption, for when he got the next message-- from Cooke-- that now the village was not running, but was in fact going to stand a fight, Custer made another assumption that these "fighters" were merely a screening force to hide a scattering camp. Ironically, part of that was true... but only to a point; the "point" being Squaw/Chasing Creek. To my way of thinking, by the time Custer realized the flight was limited-- at Ford D-- he was delighted because at that point-- and for only a few minutes more-- he believed he had them bagged. It was the reality of Cemetery Ridge that upset the apple cart. I do not understand this. Why would it bring Benteen closer? The various accounts from Benteen's command have him traveling some distance from the morass before they came upon the tepee. The tepee was 3.4 miles from the morass. Maybe this little schematic-- if it takes-- helps some: Ford A ↔ 1.7 miles ↔ Gerard’s Knoll/“lone tepee” (in the “flats”) ↔ 2.3 miles ↔ South Fork ↔ 1 mile ↔ No – Name Creek ↔ 6.9 miles ↔ divide crossing. Total distance: 11.9 miles. The morass was located between No - Name Creek and South Fork. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by rosebud on Dec 17, 2011 16:53:16 GMT -6
Time and space
Benteen meets Kanipe and Martini ......after leaving the Lone Tepee. We all agree with this. This would force the meeting of Martini to be within one mile of 3411.
At a walk Benteen is now within 15 minutes to 3411. I know Benteen and others think they have traveled a mile or so.. ( after leaving the lone tepee).. before they even meet Kanipe and another 10 to 15 minutes or over a mile before the meet Martini,
Even if Benteen is wrong and only traveled 1/2 mile from the lone Tepee when he meets Kanipe, he will need to be closer to the bluffs than I have ever imagined.
What ever you were trying... and I did try and understand......to tell me... It did not take. sorry. I will keep trying to get it. But right now it is not sinking in.
Rosebud
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Post by montrose on Dec 21, 2011 11:59:16 GMT -6
Fred.
Ok, I will try again to state my views on actions from Gerard's sighting to 3411.
After Gerard's fleeing Indians comments; LTC Custer ordered Reno to advance. He waited for Reno to establish an interval appropriate to an advance guard, then led his five companies as a main body behind Reno.
While waiting for Reno to get ahead, LT Varnum reported in, saying he saw signs of Indian village north of Ford A.
Custer with the main body continues to trail Reno for 1.1 mile to vicinity of middle knoll. Custer was seen moving ahead of his force, going up the slope to the right. Reno's two messengers probably arrived and reported to LT Cooke, due to LTC Custer's absence.
I have stated before the Goldin's use as a messenger was an initiative from Cooke. Coke used his own assistant in lieu of designated HQ messengers, since the official messengers belonged to Custer. They were the commanders silver bullets, and Cooke would not use them without approval from the commander.
So I see Custer leaning towards the right before reaching middle knoll. I also think he made the decision to move right before getting report's from Reno, Cooke, and Keough.
From the slopes, Custer signalled main body to follow him. 3411 becomes very significant. Now Custer has the reports that the enemy is counterattacking Reno, and he can personally see both Reno and enemy forces.
I think Custer formed an estimate of the Indian situation between Gerard's knoll and middle knoll. When reports and his own eyeballs showed a different situation, he had already made up his mind. So rather than listen to his officer's reports and what he could see; he tried to force the data to fit his desired enemy course of action. A classic case of cognitive dissonance.
So I assume 20 minutes from Gerard's report to middle knoll, and accepting Fred's 29 minutes from middle knoll to 3411. These 49ish minutes were a critical period for LTC Custer's decision tree. He made the decisions that lost the battle in this period.
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Post by fred on Dec 21, 2011 19:26:18 GMT -6
After Gerard's fleeing Indians comments; LTC Custer ordered Reno to advance. He waited for Reno to establish an interval appropriate to an advance guard, then led his five companies as a main body behind Reno. I agree with this. This is correct. Correct. This, I do not know. We know he did so--with his command-- but I do not believe anyone noticed him doing it at the time. I believe this to be an assumption; not one I would make, because I believe Custer ordered his command to stop and water the horses for as much as 5 to 10 minutes. This occurred near the confluence of North Fork and Reno Creek. I do not believe Custer moved up the slopes by himself. He could have, but I have seen no evidence of him doing so. This possible, though I, personally, do not believe Goldin. What he does have going for him, however, is that he is never mentioned by anyone at any phase of the valley fight. Of course, that pertains to scores of men.... I do not believe this to be the case, because I believe Custer had every intention of supporting Reno directly by a river crossing and a follow-up down the valley. Cooke's report of Gerard's report turned Custer to the right, McIlhargey and Mitchell merely confirming Gerard's notification. Again, I believe this to be an assumption. After watering, the command started up the slopes, turned somewhat to the right, found easier footing, then turned slightly back to the left and mounted the hills toward Reno Hill. You could be right; I do not know. I still think Custer intended to follow Reno and form a second "wave" that would knife through the Indians meeting Reno. Under normal circumstances that sort of a double blow could shatter resistance and scatter an already jumbled mass. This is where I think Custer failed to understand his foe, both in terms of numbers and resolve. This I would clearly agree with, one way or another. My timing would be as follows: 1:15 PM-- Gerard is informed that the Indians are coming back up-valley. Within a minute, Gerard tells Reno; Reno ignores him; Gerard turns and starts back, spotting Cooke. At 1:16, he tells Cooke of the report. All very quickly. 1:19-- Cooke, heading back, sees Custer at Middle Knoll and informs him. Custer is 1/2 mile from the river. This may seem ridiculously fast, but remember... according to where Gerard claimed he met Cooke, it was only 850 yards to where Cooke would have met Custer. That is less than 1/2 mile and at a gallop of 10 MPH, it would have taken Cooke only three minutes to go that distance. To give some spacing between the two commands, Custer would have been moving at a slow trot, 5 to 6 MPH. As you can see, I believe this all happened very quickly; there is no evidence otherwise, and in fact, from the tenor of the various accounts, i. e., Gerard, Reno, Herendeen, this all occurred very quickly. It takes Custer only a few seconds to decide, and within another minute or so he turns. North Fork is right there-- no more than 335 yards away-- they stop, water the horses, and by 1:26 - 1:27, the command begins mounting the bluffs. This is the first sighting-- by Reno's troops-- of Custer's command. Privates O'Neill, Petring, and others report this sighting. Again, from all of this, I do not believe there was any dilly-dallying, emphasizing the importance of speed, surprise, and the fact that you had a Type-A military man in a military situation. And Merry Christmas, Will!!! Best wishes, Fred.
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jag
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Post by jag on Dec 21, 2011 20:27:25 GMT -6
Today at 11:59am, montrose wrote:
While waiting for Reno to get ahead, LT Varnum reported in, saying he saw signs of Indian village north of Ford A.
Prove it. He told the court what he saw, but to my knowledge he never ever said he reported anything of the kind to Custer either there at the court or elsewhere.
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Post by montrose on Dec 21, 2011 21:48:01 GMT -6
Varnum said, " I had seen a portion of the Indian village before Custer and Reno separated."
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jag
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Post by jag on Dec 21, 2011 21:51:46 GMT -6
Varnum said, " I had seen a portion of the Indian village before Custer and Reno separated." Have no problem with that at all. What I have a problem with is this, "LT Varnum reported in, saying he saw signs of Indian village north of Ford A." There is no proof of this.
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Post by fred on Dec 22, 2011 6:12:06 GMT -6
What I have a problem with is this, "LT Varnum reported in, saying he saw signs of Indian village north of Ford A." There is no proof of this. Actually, there is: At the RCOI, 1. Varnum thought the separation must have occurred after passing a tepee that stood on Reno Creek. [145] • When asked about a village on the right bank of the LBH, Varnum thought the Recorder meant in the area leading up to the river, i. e., along Reno Creek. Varnum mentioned an “old tepee… and a piece of another tepee.” He said this was a mile from where Reno crossed. [168] 2. Varnum was unsure what Reno’s command had seen, but Varnum “had seen the Indians in the bottom for an hour or more before the separation took place….” Varnum had been on the high bluffs. [139] 3. “There were more Indians than I ever saw before. I had seen immense numbers of Indians from the top of the bluffs while out scouting and knew there was a very large village there.” [140] Solves a couple of issues here, doesn't it? Moving down Reno Creek, Varnum and Strode passed the “lone tepee” some distance to the left of the tepee, then over on high ground where they could look down the valley of the LBH. They turned back and eventually met Custer’s column. [61] [Hammer, Custer in ’76] From the Walter Camp letters and interviews, Hardorff, On the Little Bighorn With Walter Camp: 1. As they rode down Reno Creek, Varnum “reported to Genl. Custer two or three times on what I saw, but got at last far to the left front and found I had only Pvt. Strode… with me.” [53] 2. “As our paths had diverged to some extent, I was some time rejoining the command and found all my scouts bunched at the head of the column.” [53] 3. Varnum reported to Custer, who asked him what he had seen. Varnum replied that the village was out of sight behind the bluffs, but the valley was full of Indians. [53] Seems to me that while Varnum said the village was "out of sight," the village was there. Merry Christmas everyone. Best wishes, Fred.
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