Benteen Reinforce Reno Theory

[montrose]

1. Purpose. Discuss the theory that Custer's plan was for Benteen to reinforce Reno.

2. Background. This theory keeps being floated around, mainly by folks seeking to show that Custer did intent to provide some type of support to Reno. Arguments are mainly based on emotion, vice reason.

3. Messengers. Neither Martin nor Kanipe stated that they carried an order for Benteen to reinforce Reno.

4. Departure point. The two messengers left after the Custer/Reno split, somewhere on the bluffs. The exact departure points of the messengers is not relevant beyond on the bluffs and after Custer had made a personal observation of some part of the valley.

5. Martini note. Whether being or coming, the note is for Benteen to move to Custer. Since Custer continued to move north, he meant for Benteen and the packs to follow.

6. Custer's actions. Custer kept moving north. After the Ford B probe, he left Keough Bn on Calhoun Hill and went north with Yates BN. Custer's action makes little sense if he meant for Benteen and the trains to go to Reno.

If he thought he had sufficient combat power to attack, he should have and would have attacked. Patience is not a Custer virtue.

Custer was wasting time. The only logical reason is that he was waiting for reinforcements.

I have written before on the inherent contradiction in Custer's desires in actions. He was impatient at waiting for the Regiment (-). So due to his impatience, he kept moving north. His actions further delayed this linkup, creating more impatience. This type of decision making death spiral is commonly seen at NTC/JRTC training exercises.

7. Logic error. The theory has to explain why Benteen and the trains would march to Calhoun Hill or farther north, and then counter march to Ford A to reinforce Reno. It makes no sense whatsoever.

The alternative is that Benteen was to attack Ford B with 3 companies, sweep through the village and head south to Reno. The regiment en mass could not do this. It is a tactically impossible option. Of course, the usual crew who don't understand tactics will not let this get in their way.

8. Straw man theory. This is a typical straw man theory. It has no substance. In military decision making, straw man theories are used to mask real discussion or analysis. Say I have to give my boss 3 courses of action (Very common).

I give him the one I want, and 2 straw men. This means I really only gave him one COA, and denied him the ability to make a true decision, or to understand the pros and cons of the battle.

Another use of a straw man theory is to get your opponents to waste time and energy arguning against nothing.

9. I am getting used to discussions on internet forums. I see the straw man approach.

I see the Twisted Smile: restate someone's statements, then say that that proves or supports something the exact opposite of what they said.

I see the Steve Ambrose school. Ambrose's contributions to historical research includes fake citations, citations claiming things not contained in the citation, and the bravado of a con man. He never showed any shame for his fraud, his fraud and theft of other's works made him millions.

I see the Quantity approach. When your posts have low quality, or you lose an argument: post 25 non sensical short posts. This drives the comments you don't like so deep in the forum that other posters will not see it.

Most of this is linked to the Ego poster. Someone who has attached their ego and sense of self worth to their pet theory. For the Ego poster, mentioning facts, testimony, terrain etc brings on an emotional, vice rational response.

v/r
William

[Dark Cloud]

1. I'm one of those who never served and does not understand some of your points here. I don't know how Custer could assume much beyond generalities about what Benteen would do, and suspect Custer relied upon Benteen's judgment for reason.

2. Custer surely intended to support Reno somehow; otherwise, what was the point?

3/4/5. The note is more of an exhortation than an order, giving neither time nor location for Benteen to achieve, nor very informative, yet repetitive in only twelve words or so. There's no indication Benteen is to be included in any plan beyond get to the village and do what they do. The packs precluded a speedy arrival, and their contents had to be available to all absent cause, not offered, and had to be protected so as not to initiate a share program with the enemy, which could easily happen at close quarters.

6. We don't know this. Custer did keep moving north, but he could have been driven there as Keogh could have been. Custer's actions make little sense past MTC anyway if he intended to continue an offense, given once stopped under fire on high ground with no cover, you lose mounts and men and have to protect wounded. I don't see how he could imagine Benteen and packs would arrive at Weir Point in less than a half hour. He knew the trains were a wreck.

Time may not have been his to own, at that point.

7. That doesn't make sense, true, but neither the note nor the orals of which we know demand presence with Custer, but to seemingly just to hasten towards the village and join in.

I don't understand this:

"The alternative is that Benteen was to attack Ford B with 3 companies, sweep through the village and head south to Reno. The regiment en mass could not do this. It is a tactically impossible option. Of course, the usual crew who don't understand tactics will not let this get in their way."

We don't really know where in the village that day, Ford B was, since no descriptions agree, nor do I understand why the remaining companies of the regiment couldn't cross at MTC had they been together. I don't know why they'd have to rush to Reno if they did or for what purpose not handled by splitting the pony herd off, or rounding up the civvies, or just engage in battle.

It seems the village was too big for that anyway, and the regiment not together, but if it were not and the regiment was, why not?

I guess in my ignorance I don't get the need for Custer to have formulated exactly what Benteen had to do when he arrived because the time to elapse between would provide new and exciting possibilities or new and terrifying inevitabilities. His emphasis was on the train, so Benteen had to look to that first.

[Melani]

For the record, I have no pet theories and little understanding of tactics--I am interested in everyone else's opinion before trying to form one of my own. If it is true that Custer did not give any more specific orders than what we know of, he may have meant for Benteen to simply come up as fast as possible and join in in whatever way seemed best. He certainly knew Benteen's caliber as a soldier, and would have trusted him to make the right judgment of the situation.

The note is terribly unclear in some ways, and the repetition makes me feel that Cooke was very excited when he wrote it. Perhaps what Custer actually wanted was for Benteen to hustle ASAP, and make sure the packs followed. I also have a vision of Custer impatient to send Martini on his way, while Cooke made sure he had the note to supplement his English skills, causing Cooke to scrawl in haste.

[crzhrs]

I can only conclude from the message that Custer wanted Benteen . . . somewhere . . . other than where he was. Just come back and join in . . . somewhere.

And as it turned out Benteen had no idea there was an attack order . . . no idea the command had been further divided . . . no idea of anything other than he found nothing to "pitch into."

It seems fairly simple . . . Benteen had not much to go on with a cryptic message and an even more cryptic messenger.

As for Cooke's "hasty" scrawl . . . maybe his horse was not exacting standing still causing Cooke's writing to be "scribbled"

[Dark Cloud]

Isn't creating something further north 'support?' Even if not, Custer still might have labored under the supporsition it could be achieved quicker than geography proved to allow. I don't think he envisioned support as something a half hour after Reno engaged. Certainly Reno didn't, and I don't think many would.

There are two conflicting offered Custer mindsets after splitting with Reno. The first says Custer was concerned with keeping the dust down and the movement hidden. If so, then riding to the high ground and waving makes no sense, and in any case the Indians saw the guidons and the horsemen easily and often enough, suggesting improper decision to achieve the goal or the assumption of the goal is wrong. Its one of the reasons I think it possible that Boston might have been involved, since Martin's description of 'on the hill' doesn't necessarily mean, as Gray assumed, the summit.

The second was a speedy move to support. Definite speed over iffy stealth at that point strikes me as optimal. But oddly, he didn't do either. It's that which suggests to me that he was wounded early, the command confused, because the retreat to the east and north both AWAY from the village and invisible to the eye until Sharpshooter Hill was passed is what temp command might do under fire, as opposed to returning to SH or Weir Point where they were both hidden from the village and visible to approach from the south.

Once visible, he could not think the warriors would wait before attacking, either to deflect attention from their retreating civvies or actually meaning it, which was the case.

These odd conficts are also represented back at the divide, where he was concerned about discovery yet fires were allowed previous to being told about the dropped box and, I recall, bugles used, although I think there is conflict about that.

This is one of the reasons I reference all this as 'fan fiction', because there are infinite possibilities and what evidence exists either conflicts or doesn't suggest a consistency of concerns or plan needed to argue the case.

Remarkably, I also think the 'be' vs. 'come' quick issue is a good one. And one proof of it is the way the Custerphiles keep trying to pretend it's the same thing and yet, if it's the same thing, why the need to pretend it says something else? They WISH it said 'come quick.' But it does not.

It isn't the same, and the example I gave - again, but less remarkably - I think is a good one that speaks to the issue. He wanted Benteen asap with the train under control to come up, and he could count on Benteen's judgment on arrival, which was subsequently fully justified. He knew that conditions would change and any pointless specificity in the note likely rendered moot to greater or lesser degree. I don't read fear or much more than 'Yee-HA!' excitement in the note.

[montrose]

Custer Support for Reno. I believe Custer changed his mind on supporting Reno. His decision not to follow Reno but rather to head up th bluffs immediately means that his intended support was slight.

After 3411 Custer appears to have gone firm not to support Reno. His messenger (s) ordered regiment main body to join him. Custer's main effort would be somewhere in the sector bounded by Ford B to D.

DC's point on time is relevant. When Custer saw the village, he also saw the distance to the Ford B area and the time it would take to get there. He had lost the ability to attack while the Indian main body was on Reno.

Custer's decision to not support Reno and attack elsewhere is not a betrayal. Enemy and terrain gets a vote. I will say that it should not have been rocket science that a flank attack on the right had numerous terrain issues. From 3411 he could see the Indian exposed flank, he just had no way to get there in a timely manner.

Custer's order to Benteen is a fragmentary order. It is a hasty order. Today we have formats for a Frag-O. From this note you can see why a format would help.

I think after 3411, GAC's next decision point was at Calhoun Hill. The Calhoun Hill decision meant Custer was going to lose the battle, but not necessarily the command.

He moved the linkup time with Regimental main body by moving north. His estimate of moving times of the trains seem hopelessly optimistic. (If he hadn't spent 9 months away from his command; and had prepared like a professional officer to organize a mule train; maybe he would not have been so out of touch with his command's abilities). (See Crook, George).

He ceded the terrain south of Calhoun to the enemy. This means the trains would have to fight through Indians to conduct the linkup. This is another example of poor judgment and haste.

"Again, if COL Custer had waited until is regiment had closed up and crossed it at the point Major Reno did, and had made his attack in the level valley, posting some of his men in the woods, all the Indians there could not have defeated him. I do not attribute COL Custer's action to either recklessness or want of judgment, but to a misapprehension of the situation and a superabundance of courage."

This was written by GEN Sheridan in 1877. I agree with his first sentence, and disagree with the second.

Respectfully,

William

[Melani]

The main question I have about Custer being wounded early on and the command being confused as a result would be that if he were so seriously wounded as to not be in command, is it feasible that they would have withdrawn farther away from Reno and Benteen? And who, if anyone, do you think went to Ford D?

[sfchemist]

I seem to be having posting issues on this forum, so this might appear twice.

This was just posted on 'the other forum' and I was looking for a place to post it here and this thread seemed like an appropriate venue.


….....(when Custer first realized Reno's predicament he)...neither attacked at that point (Ford B) nor made any effort to support Reno, knowing full well that Reno needed help: I don't consider a failed advance or a feint at Ford B successful support of Reno. All Custer did was move farther downstream putting more distance between his command and the rest of his Regiment.

Here's Custer, seeing Reno's inexperienced forces completely surrounded by warriors, probably in close quarter combat requiring the use revolvers, with only a total of 18 rounds available per man (the revolvers were loaded with 6 rounds and the soldiers carried another 12 on their person, with none in the saddlebags). What does Custer do? Basically nothing but 'feint' an attack and then move downstream. Even Custer's note (written by Cooke) never mentioned Reno's location or that Reno needed help. Yes, Benteen may have ultimately seen Reno and moved in for support----but Custer does not know this. Custer can only assume this might happen.

I suppose moving downstream looking for another point to cross LBH might be considered support, but how could Custer assume a suitable ford would be discovered prior to Reno being chewed to pieces? Or, more importantly, did Custer even care what happened to Reno?

If Reno's mission was to be an advanced guard (and admittedly I don't know precisely what that entails) and 'fix' the enemy at what point does Custer realize that Reno's mission cannot be accomplished? If Reno's advance guard to fix the enemy was that important for Custer's success, why not send an explicit and unequivocal note to Benteen saying something like: “Reno is in trouble at point xyz, go there now and help him.” “Now” “And, oh by the way, I'm going to point xyz...” Instead of the “be quick” or whatever the actual implicit note said. Even though we will never know exactly what Custer said to Cooke, it was Custer's responsibility to insure that the note sent to Benteen did not require any translation.

How do Reno's forces 'fix' the enemy when they are surrounded, in a defensive mode within a wooded area, have a minimal amount of ammunition, with no sign of the promised support? How could Custer expect Reno to take no action to save his command, and just sit there becoming the first “last stand'” that day? As a civilian, it seems as if the warriors were the ones to send out an “advance guard” and did in fact “fix” their enemy: Reno. Thus allowing the balance of their forces to attack Custer, who could clearly be seen on the bluffs, waving his hat etc.

It is unrealistic for Custer to assume that Reno could hold out for a couple of hours while he, Custer, looked for a suitable place to attack the village. Again, as a civilian, I cannot find fault for Reno's retreat from the timber to higher ground, other than the obvious issue of leaving injured soldiers behind---a death sentence.

At the point when Custer knew Reno was in trouble (and thus his plans might be in jeopardy) he should have consolidated his forces, before moving downstream. Custer's decisions to distribute his command over a greater area of space and time, in the face of an overwhelming enemy force, allowed his units to be decimated one small piece at a time.

Remember: Custer's mission was not for him to be the hero, but rather for his Regiment to locate and contact the encampment, keep them from fleeing, and ultimately force them onto a reservation. Custer could have at least kept the Indians from successfully fleeing in an organized manner by simply attacking the herd of ponies. This may not have had the penache of a cavalry charge, may not have made the headlines in the Eastern Press, but his mission may have been accomplished---particularly when one considers that Terry/Gibbon were at that moment proceeding upstream on the LBH.

Wayne

Read more: lbha.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=theories&action=display&thread=3856&page=1#ixzz1Aq0IDwGf

[montrose]

Wayne,

You show a sound understanding of the situations of Custer and Reno. Do not let the snipers get you down.

Advance Guard. The advance guard argument is nonsense. If Reno were an advance guard, the regiment main body would follow directly behind him. This means Custer crossing at Ford A, and being 6-800 meters behind Reno.

Obviously, Custer did not do this. The next question is whether Reno was the main attack, or a supporting attack.

The evidence is also clear. Custer treated Reno's a supporting attack. There may have been a brief window where Custer considered treating Reno as a main attack. This window was definitely closed when Custer sent two messengers back and continued north after 3411.

Reno believed he was going to get some support from Custer. The issue is what Custer told Cooke, and Cooke told Reno. This is not the first time that the child's game of telephone has impacted military operations. Custer and Reno minimal experience campaigning together. Custer should have taken the time to explain his intent to Reno.

By the way, if Custer had used Reno as an advance guard and followed his attack in the valley, he may have won a stalemate or slight tactical win. His only chance at success was in the valley.

Flank attack. The idea of a flank attack is simple. Fix the enemy in place with a base force, and maneuver a second force to the enemy flank or rear. The critical issue is coordinating events in time and space.

And this is where the flank attack theory fails. The 1873 carbine has an effective range of 300 meters, though it is clear US forces were firing at targets as far as 600 meters. Custer never came anywhere near the Indian force on Reno in time or space. Showing up hours to late is failure. You have a window of opportunity. Use it or lose it.

I do not believe Custer made any effort to make a flanking attack on the Indians fighting Reno. He saw the position of Reno, the village (at least that part closest to Reno), the pony herds, Indian forces engaged with Reno, Indian forces moving to engage Reno, and Indian warriors still in the village (hundreds).

Custer took an element to Ford B for a reconnaissance and then moved to Calhoun Hill. His main body stayed on Luce ridge. What is the range from Luce ridge to Reno's timber position? What is the range from Calhoun Hill to Reno's timber position.

Penn and Teller used to have a show called Bullshit. They examined many myths like the Kennedy assassination and many other issues. And that's how this situation plays out. Nonsense.

First, there is no way Custer was conducting a flank attack with Reno as his fixing force.

Second, Custer did not attack Ford B at all, with or without Reno. The only attack Custer may have ordered was E Company's action that left them all dead in deep ravine. It appears Custer was planning an attack from Battle Ridge after Benteen and the trains arrived, but it never happened.

Stick to your guns, Wayne. You are on the right track.

v/r
William

[fred]

Wayne,

It is my opinion that people lose sight of the overall mission when they think Reno has gotten into trouble.

The strategic objective was to end the nomadic way of the Plains Indians lives; it was to bring them to the reservations/agencies by hook or by crook. This was a no-nonsense campaign, epitomized by the Reynolds fiasco on the Powder River in March 1876, an action, if carried out properly, that would give one the exact intent of the campaign.

Reno's discomfit was of no concern to Custer, not when he was this close to achieving his goal. If Reno was of such import, Custer would have gone back to assure Reno's rescue, not dally at a ford, then head farther away from Reno's plight.

It is also apparent to me that Custer had no idea of the magnitude of Reno's situation, nor of its implications with respect to the rest of the regiment.

As to Ford B, I also disagree-- strongly-- with the business of the move there being either an attack or a feint. It was clearly not an attack because no commander in his right mind would leave almost 60% of his force a mile back from the point of assault and then be deterred by two dozen Indians. And those who claim he was overwhelmed there aren't interpreting either the artifactual or anecdotal evidence very well.

As to the move being a feint, that is just as ludicrous an assumption as an attack. A feint is a diversionary tactic designed to distract the enemy from recognizing your real intent. But Custer was the real intent, not Reno! The only reason Custer no longer cared about being seen that close to the village was because he was so supremely confident is his ability to prevail that his discovery that far north no longer mattered to him. "Montrose" nailed it in a number of his posts-- both here and "there"-- when he discussed Custer's actions in moving away from the rest of his regiment.

Don't let these "never done anything" tacticians sway you with their nonsense. This is real simple stuff that does not need to be complicated by a lot of over-wrought imagination. Custer went to the Ford B area to look, to see, to view. Even from the heights of the ridges, he was still more than a mile away from the village and Greasy Grass Ridge and the bluffs along the river still obscured a great deal of his view. The dust created by running families and herded horses in the chewed-up valley also made viewing difficult.

Again Wayne, keep it simple and logical and you will be steered in the right direction. There were no West Point-taught or text book feints or securings of the river crossing. Securing for what? So it could be given back five minutes later? The whole day was punctuated with Custer's frenzy, the whole route was covered by the man's sweat... and suddenly these clowns have him feinting, securing, attacking an 1800-lodge village with 75 men. We need to give the man more credit than that, especially if we are on our way to condemning him.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[montrose]

Wayne,

Hang in there, and apply common sense.

1. Advance Guard. An advance guard leads the unit main body. If Reno were the advance guard, Custer would have followed him across Ford A and been 600-1000 meters directly behind Reno during the attack.

2. Flank attack. A flank attack uses a fixing force to hold the enemy while a flanking force maneuvers on enemy flank or rear. This operation requires synchronization in time and space. This means flanking force has a window in time to operate.

Custer lost this opportunity by his move north along the bluffs. Any discussion of any activity at Ford B must recognize that it was too small, too far, and too late.

And please note that it was aimed at a different Indian force. Custer did not engage the "fixed" Indians fighting Reno.

3. Be aware of emotion and value laden arguments. For example, the cautious and timid can not understand the cavalry/Custer mindset or tactics. Or that infantry and USMC veterans do not understand cavalry tactics, in fact constitute those who least understand cavalry tactics. In addition, those who oppose an attack on Ford B are influenced by Hollywood portrayals.

So you are getting arguments that are heavy on emotion, and light on logic. Then you get the second level, where rather than argue facts there is a conscious effort to argue the personalities of the posters.

4. Let's look at Custer at Ford B. He kept his main body well back from Ford B at all times. Neither Luce ridge or Calhoun Hill are in supporting range of any activity at Ford B, outside of being a reserve. The 1873 carbine has an effective range of 300 meters. US forces at LBH did shoot beyond this range, out to 600 meters, with little result.

a. Attack. Custer approached Ford B with two companies. One dismounted well short of the ford, the other company stayed back in reserve. If this were an attack, the officer in charge has serious tactical problems. Out of a 12 company force, your main effort is a single company?

b. Feint. A feint would have no impact on Reno, Again, too far, too late, too small, wrong Indian force. A feint would draw uncommitted Indian forces to battle ridge. If this was Custer's intent, it again reflects a very poor tactical decision.

Custer clearly intended to make his main effort from the battle ridge area. He summoned Benteen and McDougall to join him, and this linkup would be at Calhoun Hill. Inviting Indian forces to respond at Ford B meant that at least a thousand Indians would arrive before the trains. So the trains would have to fight through superior Indian forces.

c. Reno could fight in the timber for 2 hours. Now, I assume you have fired a weapon in the service, M14 or M16. A single shot weapon can be fired every 10 seconds. I will use 15 seconds for loading and acquiring a target. So in two hours you can fire 480 rounds.

Now training matters significantly. Officers and NCOs control firepower by identifying targets, controlling rate of fire, controlling range, etc. And the 7th was a poorly trained unit. We know as fact that they frequently fired at targets out of range, wasting ammo. Indians say Custer elements fired carbines from horseback at long range. The 7th had issues with individual, collective and leader training.

The timber position followed a terrain feature called Gerard's brow. It did not tie into the river on the right, and the the left flank hung in the air. Reno's position was untenable as soon as several hundred Indians rode past his open left flank, cut off access to Ford A, and headed into his rear to trap him in place.

When he retreated, he retreated into a superior enemy force. The people who say he could have used an overwatching skirmish line to defeat this force do not explain how this skirmish line was going to get past the Indians to establish this line.

This is one of the typical LBH paradoxes. Reno reacted to enemy actions, whereas Custer did not. Whatever analysis you do in the Reno sector should be consistent in the Custer sector. You will frequently see posters make one argument for Reno, and the exact opposite argument for Custer.

If you want to say this is all cavalry tactics, fine. Except for Crittenden, these were all cavalry officers.

By the way, Indian accounts say that the majority of their casualties occurred in defeating Calhoun and Crittenden. Is it a coincidence that the toughest resistance involved the only infantry officer?

(Yes, it is a coincidence. Calhoun's company fought as the only organized skirmish line in the Custer sector. When C Co collapsed, L company tried to switch their skirmish line from south to west. Both officers died a few yards apart, exactly where they should be when controlling this movement.)

5. Summary. Use your own judgment. Look at the situation, and ask yourself if it makes sense.

Now you can say I am a monday morning quarterback. But I spent years teaching tactics. The issues I raise are the same way I approach a fight, and the same way I have evaluated students on their own plans.

Respectfully,

William

[fred]

Jan 13, 2011 4:46:07 GMT -6 montrose said:

1. Advance Guard. An advance guard leads the unit main body. If Reno were the advance guard, Custer would have followed him across Ford A and been 600-1000 meters directly behind Reno during the attack.

2. Flank attack. A flank attack uses a fixing force to hold the enemy while a flanking force maneuvers on enemy flank or rear....

4. Let's look at Custer at Ford B. He kept his main body well back from Ford B at all times. Neither Luce ridge or Calhoun Hill are in supporting range of any activity at Ford B, outside of being a reserve...

a. Attack. Custer approached Ford B with two companies. One dismounted well short of the ford, the other company stayed back in reserve. If this were an attack, the officer in charge has serious tactical problems. Out of a 12 company force, your main effort is a single company?

b. Feint. A feint would have no impact on Reno, Again, too far, too late, too small, wrong Indian force. A feint would draw uncommitted Indian forces to battle ridge. If this was Custer's intent, it again reflects a very poor tactical decision.

Custer clearly intended to make his main effort from the battle ridge area. He summoned Benteen and McDougall to join him, and this linkup would be at Calhoun Hill. Inviting Indian forces to respond at Ford B meant that at least a thousand Indians would arrive before the trains. So the trains would have to fight through superior Indian forces....

The timber position followed a terrain feature called Gerard's brow. It did not tie into the river on the right, and the the left flank hung in the air. Reno's position was untenable as soon as several hundred Indians road past his open left flank, cut off access to Ford A, and headed into his rear to trap him in place.

When he retreated, he retreated into a superior enemy force. The people who say he could have used an overwatching skirmish line to defeat this force do not explain how this skirmish line was going to get past the Indians to establish this line.

This is one of the typical LBH paradoxes. Reno reacted to enemy actions, whereas Custer did not. Whatever analysis you do in the Reno sector should be consistent in the Custer sector. You will frequently see posters make one argument for Reno, and the exact opposite argument for Custer...

... Calhoun's company fought as the only organized skirmish line in the Custer sector. When C Co collapsed, I [L ?] company tried to switch their skirmish line from south to west. Both officers died a few yards apart, exactly where they should be when controlling this movement.

This is the best synopsis I have read.

Everything else is about as unrealistic and as fanciful as the imagination can make it. In fact, Will's post should be used as the template for each of the main actions (though I made one small correction in Will's last paragraph, above).

If everyone studied this post, remembered it, and applied the same logic to the entire mess, we would have a far better understanding of the battle at the Little Big Horn.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[AZ Ranger]

Great post Will.

Regards

Steve

[Dark Cloud]

Happy Day. Really, really happy.

Finally, actual combat vets and experienced soldiers more or less agree on these boards - and agree in some detail - to a perfectly plausible and probable scenario that explains virtually everything of note without melodrama and nonsense. They may have always and I missed it, but this is the first time I've seen them post it down and write it down so coherently and well and memorably.

It is fitting that sfchemist was the conduit for it. His newbie questions went right to the essence of the issues. This page should be printed out.

I say this in a massive fit of petty bitterness because the scenario offered is not mine. But in reality I favored any plausible scenario that most embarrassed the poseurs. This works for me. I just won't admit it.

Most especially, this: "You will frequently see posters make one argument for Reno, and the exact opposite argument for Custer." THAT felt good to read. If I've screamed anything particularly loud, it was that the three main officers have to be judged by the same standards, but Custer was somehow exempt. When judged by the same standards, almost regardless of which, Custer always is third. For examples:

1. "Ride to the sound of the firing/guns!" This is treated as dogma by Custerphiles riled up over nobody risking the remaining regiment to save Custer. But Custer did not ride to that symphony and, in fact, ended up furthest from the village. Both he and Reno appear to have sought high ground.

2. Reno shoulda coulda done thus and so to get to the eastern high ground different than what he did. Yet, the vaguely offered general solutions sound exactly like what Custer did to somewhat lesser success.

If, changing nothing else, Reno and Custer are exchanged in the story, the Custerphiles would credit Custer with brilliant, outa the box thinking to utilize cavalry strengths of surprise and speed and thus saved his command from the incoherent orders of his superior. Whereas plodding Reno, locked in book-learnin' pedantics from the Point, failed to be more insightful and was slaughtered after one failed inappropriate tactic after another as if he had no idea how to fight Indians.

[sfchemist]

Will,

That truly was an excellent posting and summarized my feelings exactly. I've copied your text and placed it among my copious amount of notes, and will study and refer to it often.

Well stated, to the point, factual, without emotion, logical, coherent, need I say more? As a former peer reviewer for a few science journals this type of writing was always enjoyed and appreciated.

I thank you, Fred, and dc for your comments and encouragement,

Wayne