|
Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 22, 2008 17:14:57 GMT -6
So Reno's retrograde was a demonstration of regular army cohesion in the 7th cavalry correct?
|
|
|
Post by BrokenSword on Aug 22, 2008 19:44:49 GMT -6
"Beware underestimating the cohesion of Regular Army units, and a tight group of Soldiers led by veteran Sergeants and officers."
Come on Clair. (He groans)
First Bull Run and Chancellorsville aside, ‘the cohesion of any Regular Army unit, and a tight group of soldiers [easy targets] led by veteran sergeants and officers’ can dissolve away quickly, before the onslaught. That’s a fact and not an opinion.
"Any model that uses "panic" as its main method of explaining how Custer's battalion was destroyed is on very shaky ground according to military history and military theory."
My ‘main method of explaining how [and why] Custer’s battalion was destroyed’ isn’t based on ‘panic’ for its grounding. Read again and carefully so. "It simply isn't very plausible to those who understand Regular army military units."
I’ll let the nuance of ignorance and inexperience on my part slide, but will ask you to rethink your statement concerning plausibility, and again we'll toss First Bull Run and Chancellorsville out of the discussion.
"So if you need things simple, and don't have a lot of evidence, don't grab onto a theory that the Soldiers quickly panicked and were all shot down in a giant "buffalo hunt." I advise you that this is a deceiving image of any probable truth."
I have no need to have things ‘simple’ neither have I ‘grab[bed] onto a theory’ nor even said ‘the soldiers quickly panicked and were all shot down in a giant buffalo hunt.’ The warriors who were there described it as a buffalo hunt. Benteen, who actually saw the pristine battlefield, described it as a route.
If those two statements were, or my [thoughtful] conclusion are ‘a deceiving image of any probable truth,’ fine then - PROVE IT. I'm open minded, but, I advise you - wishing them away into the corn field through the magic of textbook theory, will not make it so.
Respectfully, Michael
|
|
|
Post by clw on Aug 23, 2008 7:52:33 GMT -6
OK. Here goes and most will shout me down, but I believe the two battalions were on the move, back from Ford D along Battle Ridge, when things completely fell apart. Massive charges from both sides cut them up, dividing companies and leaving groups in the obvious places shown by the locations the bodies, and the remnants scattered over the field -- messengers, men cut off and running for their lives, etc. Company C at both ends of the ridge is a good example. I believe they tried to rally on the officers as best they could - Calhoun Hill, Finley, Keogh Swale, SSL and LSH -- only to suffer the inevitable anyway. Great courage and the tactics of brilliant officers were useless against sheer numbers and neither provided the difference, on the day, between life or death. The broken glass theory fits.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 23, 2008 8:34:32 GMT -6
Another stellar outing of conz' famed intuition and military judgement. Really, they should be kept and subject to concordance and index and grade and offered to West Point alumni and/or combat vets as well as future posters here for their hushed awe. Start with arrow training by cavalry and Sioux, inability to get a twelve word missive correct, social climbing by funeral attendance, and work from there, with a cover letter explaining how honored they are to be in tenuous contact with this Great Man on Horseback, sponsored by Bevo Beer. No doubt, a photo enshrining all will somehow be available to enclose.
Well.....yeah, clw. Simplicity, coherent to previous actions, requiring nothing new or demanding of a scapegoat.
And, just to round it off to a cool 3400 times, it fits the field as photo and testimony describe it. This drunken theory is easier to digest should people take the 5.6 minutes to actually redo the markers by diagram and destroy forever the historic hold by iconic imprint of the current field, looking like a defensive position, surrounded by the fence with visualization of clustered men fighting to the last. In reality, thready, scary, with officers furthest from the village and at the circumference line, where they would not, could not organize a surround defense. And did not.
Apparently the Indians got there furstust with the mostest and blew them off their mounts. Of course, that's a Famous Saying by a dead General, and nothing excites idiot civilians or General Staffs more, unfortunately, but since it cannot be believed that common sense and millennia of hunting would prompt the same observation in anyone burdened with a third column of IQ to the left of the decimal by those same civilians or General Staffs, we have to utilize the template.
I merely remind, and not nag.
For I am Bonehead.
|
|
|
Post by clw on Aug 23, 2008 8:51:16 GMT -6
I am finally working on the markers and the errors thereof, dc. And they do tell the tale.
But it's taking much longer then 5.6 minutes.
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Aug 23, 2008 9:09:26 GMT -6
clw,
Sounds highly credible. But can you clarify: are you suggesting both battalions went to Ford D (which would make military sense) or that one went to Ford D, attempted to reunite with the other, and both were marching back along Battle Ridge when hit?
|
|
|
Post by clw on Aug 23, 2008 9:26:51 GMT -6
I think both went to Ford D, or tried to. All the dividing and subdiving makes no sense to this civilian.
|
|
|
Post by BrokenSword on Aug 23, 2008 9:29:52 GMT -6
clw,
No shouting from this corner. Elisabeth beat me to the punch with my question. You don't think the two battalions split apart before the Ford D excursion? I'm not arguing it, just a little unclear. Your scenario is just as firm (based on actual evidence, scant though it is) as any and has more solidity than several published by the experts.
I'll have to work on moving my decimal point a column or two, but I think I understand and pretty much agree with DC's outlined critique of your theory.
I'm also not sure that there would have been time or opportunity to start messengers off on a mission, but I hear the ring of truth from the overall picture you've painted.
BS
(No shouting, but reserving the perogitive of a snicker or two)
|
|
|
Post by BrokenSword on Aug 23, 2008 9:31:20 GMT -6
Okay - so you beat me to the answer too. Big deal.
M
|
|
|
Post by clw on Aug 23, 2008 9:50:14 GMT -6
It's not just my theory. You've heard it before from one much more knowledgeable than me.
|
|
|
Post by conz on Aug 23, 2008 10:40:56 GMT -6
So Reno's retrograde was a demonstration of regular army cohesion in the 7th cavalry correct? Did the Soldiers of Reno's command really "panic?" Not in the way I think most here considered it. They lost cohesion due to inept leadership, but they were following orders in their "charge to the rear," right? The definition of panic is failure to follow the orders of your officers out of fear. Is this what happened to Reno's men? And as soon as they could get their act together, did they come back together and fight as a cohesive unit, after only a few minutes? Yes...they did. Just like cavalry always rallies after the disorganization of any charge. So I guess we can't accuse Reno's battalion of panic at all...they were following orders, and they rallied on command. That's not panic, right? Clair
|
|
|
Post by conz on Aug 23, 2008 11:10:25 GMT -6
First Bull Run and Chancellorsville aside, ‘the cohesion of any Regular Army unit, and a tight group of soldiers [easy targets] led by veteran sergeants and officers’ can dissolve away quickly, before the onslaught. That’s a fact and not an opinion. What Regular Army units panicked at these battles? I don't find any...the U.S. regiments held their ground in every firefight, I believe. That's okay...I wasn't commenting on your model specifically. If your model indicates that it was tactical errors on the U.S. side and good tactical initiative on the Native side that caused the catastrophe for the Army, then you are probably on solid ground. Again, I wasn't referring to any model specifically...I just shuddered at some of the discussion above, and its my job to bring us back to reality where it concerns tactical causes and consequences. There were a couple "buffalo hunt" episodes we can easily decipher, at least...Reno's "charge" and C Co's rout from Greasy Grass ridge, at least. That doesn't mean the entire battle was a "buffalo hunt," and many Native witnesses indicate plenty of action that was nothing like a "hunt." So these are distinct and separate episodes, and not a description of the entire, or even most, of the battles there. Benteen didn't talk to the Natives, so he doesn't know squat about what happened to Custer. Custer didn't know what happened to Benteen, either, come to think of it, and that being part of the problem probably influences Benteen's statements... Years of studying military history, teaching tactical history of world warfare, and years listening to my mentors who have seen a LOT of combat...all different kinds. What kind of proof do you need to believe in heroism in combat? Tens of thousands of medal citations? Multiple witnesses of cavalry columns cheering en masse upon reports that they are about to ride into battle? Men cheering because they are leaving garrison and going out on campaign against hostiles? I think it would rather be on people to prove that Soldiers don't want to be heroes as they ride into combat...the reverse is rather the rule, don't you think? Clair
|
|
|
Post by BrokenSword on Aug 23, 2008 15:44:53 GMT -6
AAARRRGGGHHHHH!!!!
I must be unknowingly writing in Chinese or something. Is there a translation problem?
WU FONG
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 23, 2008 16:53:57 GMT -6
So Reno's retrograde was a demonstration of regular army cohesion in the 7th cavalry correct? Did the Soldiers of Reno's command really "panic?" Not in the way I think most here considered it. They lost cohesion due to inept leadership, but they were following orders in their "charge to the rear," right? The definition of panic is failure to follow the orders of your officers out of fear. Is this what happened to Reno's men? And as soon as they could get their act together, did they come back together and fight as a cohesive unit, after only a few minutes? Yes...they did. Just like cavalry always rallies after the disorganization of any charge. So I guess we can't accuse Reno's battalion of panic at all...they were following orders, and they rallied on command. That's not panic, right? Clair For Custer, I see it as rout in the end with horses in panic. The end came quickly and not much time to panic more likely shock with ineffective defense especially in close quarters. I agree that Reno was not in panic and it was a tactic that worked. That has always been my position. As we begin to understand men under stress and tunnel vision the end of Reno's movement is inevitable. AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by conz on Aug 23, 2008 18:00:38 GMT -6
AZ,
Do you think it could be panic if the men were in clusters around their officers?
In a panic, especially where Soldiers have horses, shouldn't the men have been spread around for miles and miles?
To me, the fact that they are clustered so tightly around Calhoun and Custer Hills (within a mile of the top of each) says that there was no panic here, at least not on any "unit" scale.
It is a military history rule that units and armies that panic early have the most survive the immediate battle...many get away. It is the units with the best cohesion that die to the last man.
Clair
|
|