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Post by BrokenSword on Aug 21, 2008 13:58:03 GMT -6
Gordie- “…The devil is in the details, as someone once said, or wrote, or whatever.…”
It does enhance one’s opinion of investigators tasked to learn the cause of an airliner crash. Doesn’t it?
Am I over simplifying? To me the basic flow of action is pretty clear. A couple of variations maybe, but each with the same conclusion in the end. I see randomness in the 'final' positions of the companies rather than from a calculated plan of manuver and defence. The reasons that the flow I’ve suggested occurred are not terribly obscure or out of the ordinary for engagements of combat, or even for many other unrelated events.
The running of the bulls in Spain has a fundamental similarity. Something bigger and more powerful comes your way and you either outrun, leap aside or get run over. Emerge from the run unscathed, and many will grant you bragging rights (dare I say ‘glory‘?). Get run over and many will considered you a fool for having tried it.
From my point of view, Custer was no greater or more talented a cavalry leader than was Crazy Horse. He was no better a strategist or general than was Red Cloud in an earlier war.
Custer certainly had advanced technology on his side (the ‘whiteman‘ always did), but that tactical advantage was countered very effectively by his foes that day. The fight at the Little Bighorn was NOT his to lose, although HE thought victory was his for the taking. There are those who believe that victory was stolen from him that day by subordinates who failed in this way or that. Not so. It was the Indians who had other ideas, and made good on them.
I guess it hinges on how thoroughly one wants the event explained, and just how much detail one thinks is possible to discern. The fascination holds, so obviously no one has yet presented any satisfying scenario of the event, if that’s at all possible - which I doubt.
M
(The opinions expressed above are strictly those of the poster and are not necessiarily those of the providers of this board, or even of a majority of the board's participants)
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Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 21, 2008 15:10:25 GMT -6
It still is best and most reasonable to start with empirical evidence, in this case the location of the bodies on the 27th.
It's helpful to recall that some officers said the firing heard were not volleys, but sorta/kinda like volleys, so rather than formulate theories to explain a proactive volley by soldiers, formulate something to explain similar sounding activities, like coagulated Indian firing and dropping groups of soldiers in Keogh's and Custer's areas. That would explain the clump of officers about Custer if they summitted the hill first.
If you place the markers where photo and testimony places them, and reduce the total by taking out the spuriious, a pretty clear illustration appears, subject to variable specifics, but in general pretty clear.
Those are the most solid bits of evidence we have.
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Post by bc on Aug 21, 2008 19:19:43 GMT -6
Which theory do you want from me? Having read one or two books, parts of two or three more, and looked at the pictures (my favorite by the way) in the rest of the books, I don't know much except what I'm learning here the past number of months.
1. After reading Custer Fell First as a kid, I have always that probably happened at ford B and then they fell back in confusion. However since no one around here thinks John Lockwood was even at the LBH as a packer, then that account may not be true, so I've "temporarily" abandoned that theory.(until someone discovers Lockwood was really there)
2. I still thought then that Custer attacked at ford B and still tried to cross before being repulsed for some reason. Even Benteen found enough evidence of shod horses at Ford B that he thought they tried to cross. However, since no one around here thinks there was any more than light resistance at ford B and apparently all the shell casings that would have formed some archeological evidence were picked up by the bucket loads to be sold to tourists, then that may not be true, so I've "temporarily" abandoned that theory.
3. I now believe that Custer feinted an attack or demonstrated at the ford B area to draw the NAs to that area so he could move north to Ford D to attack at that end of the village to hit the vill from three sides similar to Washita.
I believe he knew from his viewing of the Reno fight when DeRudio saw him that Reno's attack was tenuous at best or a defeat at worst and the demonstration at ford B may be enough of a surprise to the NAs to cause those that weren't running to run when they see they have been flanked(probably enough to have convinced the Johnny Rebs in the cw to run). That demonstration would also serve to support Reno and draw fire from him(did it ever). If Custer really wanted to cross the river at ford B in a charge of companies mounted in fours, there was not enough resistance to stop him and they would have bulldozed their way into camp which is something he had done on countless charges in the cw which is why I now believe he didn't really intend to cross there "yet".
Custer would supply the coup de grace at the north end at ford D and cut off the women and children at the same time cause the remaining NAs to capitulate. His preferred plan would have been to hit the vill from 3 or 4 sides at the same time a la Washita. However, they did not have that same exact opportunity since they were coming in from the south end of a long village and they had already been discovered. Keough was in reserve to hold the NAs in that area and to wait on Benteen to help move in for the mop up.
The NA masses then formed around them and they instead supplied the coup de grace on him.
4. This is reserved for my new theory next month as I learn more.
The details: As Gordie said: the devil is in the details. Therefore you can all go to the devil to get them cause I don't have them. We can generalize or go to the extreme of trying trace and follow every hoof and foot print left that day. Good luck.
I think that Clair, Keough, Gordie, and Fred have laid out a lot of details that I am close to adopting but I don't understand them enough to have a full grasp of the details. Having been to the battlefield a few times, last time a number of years ago, I have never understood all the terrain features by name that are discussed here(the coulees & ridges, etc). Until I can take my new knowledge back to the battlefield and eyeball the situation, I can't draw anything conclusive. I want to hear more about the movement to and from ford D yet. I suspect anything at ford D failed because he did not have the numbers of troops to bulldoze his way through the defenses that probably set up there.
The last time at the LBH, I drove around with my video camera stuck out the window, while stopping at all the view points, viewing all the terrain while giving my narative of the terrain and what I thought happened at the battle. Probably walked down deep ravine and got some video. When I got home I found the wind noise from the camera out the window drowned out all my narative. I suppose that tape is now lost in the basement in boxes of numerous other vacation videos of which I probably didn't write down the contents on the tape.
I agree with Gordie that there are bits and pieces of events and even theories all over this board by a lot of people that pop up in miscellaneous threads. I also believe that except for some details and maybe the language they use to describe their theories, most people on this board are not that far apart on the basics of what happened.
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Post by biggordie on Aug 21, 2008 22:51:07 GMT -6
I agree with Gordie sometimes, too. Sometimes.
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Post by ozcuster on Aug 22, 2008 4:39:30 GMT -6
brokensword, I'd agree that the Indians willingness to fight rendered obsolete existing beliefs so I guess Custer is a bit stiff on that one. Although was that based on a firm premise or one that could be reversed if the Indians had the big numbers as on this occasion? Unfortunately that would only be known in hindsight . Or was it?
Clearly Crook would have added some thoughts from the Rosebud but equally Custer may have reflected the other villages on the Washita didn't evaporate and he [ or Ben Clark ] had to do some fancy footwork to get out of trouble. Even the response to Reno may have suggested running wasn't at the top of the Indian ' must do' list. And that he may have to tailor his plan accordingly. i.e dont split into 6 elements strung out over miles.
The distances and topography in particular were things I only fully appreciated when I did my driving trek from Australia around the battlefields in 2002. I'll tell ya this though. It's a long way from Melbourne to Montana.
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tatanka
Full Member
Live for today like there was no tomorrow
Posts: 125
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Post by tatanka on Aug 22, 2008 5:56:57 GMT -6
I have enjoyed reading all the comments about why Custer was defeated, There have been opinions, informed opinions, uninformed opinions, guesses, arguments, etc. Benteen has been blamed for not moving fast enough, Reno for not fulfilling his "task" successfully, Custer for dividing his command umpteen times and not doing a proper recon, panicky soldiers throwing their guns away. But I know the real reason for Custers' demise ~ those nasty Indians didn't run away from the Boy General!!!!!
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Post by conz on Aug 22, 2008 6:57:40 GMT -6
I have enjoyed reading all the comments about why Custer was defeated, There have been opinions, informed opinions, uninformed opinions, guesses, arguments, etc. Benteen has been blamed for not moving fast enough, Reno for not fulfilling his "task" successfully, Custer for dividing his command umpteen times and not doing a proper recon, panicky soldiers throwing their guns away. But I know the real reason for Custers' demise ~ those nasty Indians didn't run away from the Boy General!!!!! Aye, but remember it is a two-parter. 1) the Native had to be aggressive, but also 2) the Army had to make a mistake. Without BOTH these conditions, the Army probably wins, the Natives at least can't do much damage and go back on the run, and they are all on the reservations before winter even comes. So don't think that just because the Warriors had their "bloodlust" up and were all over the Cavalry columns that this meant Custer was doomed. Clair
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tatanka
Full Member
Live for today like there was no tomorrow
Posts: 125
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Post by tatanka on Aug 22, 2008 8:20:55 GMT -6
Agreed. But I still think there were too many warriors. By the time Custer got around to crossing the river most of the noncombatants would be safely away.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 22, 2008 8:28:34 GMT -6
Volley fire would indicate a skirmish line under control and lead one to believe organization. What would it sound like if your company while moving or stationary was attacked by hundreds of Indians at close quarters. It might sound like a volley only tapering off longer than volley fire. I suspect that Keogh getting overrun sounded like organized volley fire to some but was panic in nature and at close quarters.
I believe that the majority of Custer's battalion died in a defensive battle and at close quarters. There was a failure in the offensive plan that required going on the defense. Even going to defense there was a failure in tactics. The Indians being willing to fight took advantage of these failures.
The battlefield as a scene to collect evidence to support a theory is a nightmare. Image going into house and there is a chalk drawing of a body on the floor in the living room then another in the bedroom and your told only one person died in the house with no other evidence on both markings being placed in the house. You would start with a drawing and work backwards on how it got there yet one theory has to be wrong.
Archeology can not help on which items have been removed either by man or other natural events. The placing of items that are period correct can not be determined to the actual day of placement.
The horses I believe play a more important role because of their nature. You can't scare a jeep. If the horses panic then you have a panic run whether the rider likes it or not. The fastest horses would be in the lead and officers had those horses.
I believe I understand how it ends. It is the MTC to the ending that leaves something to be desired. I do not have enough evidence that would support a theory at a 50 % level of what happened after MTC.
My simple theory is a succession of failed offensive tactics because of a failure to recognize the total picture and then a failure to go on the defensive soon enough in an organized manner.
AZ Ranger
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Post by conz on Aug 22, 2008 8:29:13 GMT -6
Tatanka,
Probably true...it was definitely a long shot. But note that for Custer to be successful, he doesn't have to capture everyone. He just needs to do enough damage to keep them on the run. If he can destroy the property of the village without killing many Natives at all he would still be judged a huge success by his superiors.
Of course, had Custer not been destroyed, the campaign would not have ended at this battle for him...he would have kept on their trail, day after day, and he still would have gotten the job done...just not with as much glory. <g>
Clair
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Post by BrokenSword on Aug 22, 2008 9:38:38 GMT -6
Oz-
Hindsight is the booger in the oatmeal which is ALWAYS nearly impossible to get out of our thinking on this event.
Someone here, a month or two ago made a excellent posting (apologies that I can’t remember now just who it was) concerning a ‘mistake’ as defined by way of the decision making process and its consequences, and how that reasoning played into Custer’s actions at the Little Bighorn. That brings us back to hindsight.
Most of what Custer, as well as Reno and Benteen, chose to do in the real time of their world can only be termed a mistake through hindsight.
Custer’s decisions were made on what he knew of the Indians’ normal reactions, and the tactics that had been successful against them in past experiences.
1. That he chose to attack the village at multiple points, which necessitated the division of his command, cannot, in all fairness, be termed a mistake.
2. That he faced greater numbers of warriors than he had soldiers, cannot be termed reckless. It was routine procedure for soldiers to do so in the Plains Wars.
3. That he ignored warnings and reports by his scouts that it was a ‘big village’ through a number of their descriptions, I don’t believe to be the case. ‘Big’ and ‘largest’ are what I call fat words. That is: words which can mean many things or mean literally anything. He was given (from what I know) the scouts’ opinions, which were at odds with what ‘official’ intelligence reports of specific numbers had provided.
Terry and Custer had received faulty reports from the agencies on the full number of ‘Tee-Pees’ (very low numbers compared to the actual fact) absent from the reservations. In fact, Terry received far more accurate numbers several days AFTER the Custer fight. Simply put, the rather vague reports from scouts combined with the faulty numbers provided by the Indian Agents caused a processing error in Custer’s calculations.
4. That he sent Benteen off scouting for satellite villages to the left (sort of to the left) wasn’t a mistake. He successfully attacked the Cheyenne village at the Washita, only to have the inhabitants from outlying encampments come up and put a black stain on the whole affair that virtually split the Seventh Cavalry into pro and con Custer factions wich still existed years after his death. Custer wasn’t stupid - he had learned from that experience, and applied the lesson.
5. That the Indians were in a mood to fight and NOT scatter and run, as usual, was a miscalculation. Again, based on past history I don’t see Custer at fault for not understanding that situation. He wasn’t a mind reader after-all. Neither did he know of the Crook debacle, which had probably emboldened the Indian warriors even more as to what they could achieve against white soldiers.
6. HOWEVER - My opinion is that Custer’s great and actual mistake was how he made use of himself as a resource in the battle. He was the over-all commander, but went dashing off in the lesser roll of a battalion commander. Custer should have positioned his headquarters in such a way that he could have over-seen the actions of the actual battalion commanders and made adjustments as the situation developed. Somewhere BETWEEN the Reno/Benteen and the Keogh/Yates battalions was his no-brainer and proper place, rather than at the extreme end of the field and beyond reasonable reach by messenger - available when needed once the attack began.
Custer’s failure to act in his proper role leaves one wondering if the Seventh wasn’t therefore lacking in adult supervision, in a manner of speaking. Custer as an Indian fighter and Regimental commander was a coin toss. One that had an unusually long run of heads-up, with friendly newspaper stories to describe the toss. That’s my opinion again - firmly rooted in hindsight.
(Everything included in the above post is true and correct, except for those parts that are not)
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Post by shan on Aug 22, 2008 10:22:06 GMT -6
Good points brokensword, especially the one about Custer not placing himself at one remove from the action so that he could get a clearer picture of developments.
Reading through what people have had to say, I am aware that most of us, and I include myself in this, are drawn into thinking that Custer was pretty much in control of events at least as far as Calhoun, with some even thinking that he remained in charge right up until things fell apart around Cemetery ridge. Because we tend to go for this model of the battle, we can often find ourselves being drawn into trying to understand troop movements, which wing was where, and various deployments, as if whoever was in charge had all the time in the world to carry these manouvers out.
The trouble is, the evidence both on the ground, i.e. the way the bodies are scattered and, as darkcloud points out, the suspicious way that nearly all the officers and friends of clan Custer are gathered together on LSH, plus the oral evidence from a number of Indians, evidence which indicates that once the troopers started to pull back from the river, they were ponched upon and pushed and back, leaving them virtually no time to gather their wits; especially once a number of horses were run off, not to mention those terrified animals that broke free, to where they were eventually destroyed.
Having been an avid reader of the posts on these boards for a number of years now, I realise that this theory is unpalatable to many of those that post, besides which, at a fun level it robs most of us of the undeniable pleasure of countless what ifs and hows, in other words, endless debate, endless speculation.
When I started laying out my own theories as to what happened from Luce ridge on, I to was unwittingly drawn into this pattern of thinking, but as I now move on onto Nye Cartwright myself to try and determine what happened from there on, I am beginning to think that those volleys were indeed a sign that things were beginning to unravel for Custer and his command.
shan
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Post by mcaryf on Aug 22, 2008 12:38:55 GMT -6
I have a theory about some aspects of Custer's movements which is a bit out in left field but is based on the timing of events rather more than the archaeology or the body positions.
I reckon that the De Rudio sighting was not of Custer because he was long gone by then down MTC. If it was Custer why did he waste 30 minutes staying in that vicinity?
In my timelines I have Custer despatching Martini from some position (possibly Cedar Couley) on Custer's route to MTC at about 1.50pm. Custer becomes involved with some light skirmishing in MTC as he moves towards the river - this may be with the Wolf Tooth band so his own fight starts soon after 2pm. This threat from his rear causes him to hold part of his command in the vicinity of Luce whilst sending a force to the river to test resistance there. I am here considering that Custer's theory is that many warriors are away from the village an idea reported by Martini. Thus Custer would be sensitive to what might possibly be a large force (actually only Wolf Tooth's 50 or so warriors) appearing on his flank or in his rear.
Unlike others I do beleive that the river was strongly defended - the references to few warriors relate to the numbers on the East bank. In my view many more were visible approaching the West bank and as the village spread this far it made Ford B an unattractive option for an opposed river crossing which would end up amongst the tepis. Custer's default orders were probably to move downstream to find a better crossing if Ford B was unsuitable. I reckon the battalion that went to Ford B moved off downstream as per the plan. However (and this is the wild surmise), I think that Boston Custer now appeared trying to rejoin the battalion that Custer had held back from the river (it was him and Martini that De Rudio saw on the bluffs about 2.05pm so he gets to Luce about 2.30pm). The command on Luce now fires several volleys in support of Boston to scare off the warriors trying to intercept him - these are the volleys heard on Reno Hill and by the remnants in the timber. For about 15 to 20 minutes prior to this both Girard and others in the timber have been hearing scattered fire from Custer's direction, this was the skirmishing down MTC and to the area of the LBH.
The need for part of the command to wait for and provide supporting fire for Boston completely disrupts Custer's planned move of his two wings downstream (I suspect Custer was with the command that went to the river). This causes a disjointed move downriver and explains the gap that develops between Custer's two battalions. Warrior numbers then rapidly build up and the two commands are defeated in detail.
This scenario does fit with timeline data that I have and explains why Custer's force became split, apart from this there is no other real evidence for it so it has to be one possibility amongst many.
Regards
Mike
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Post by BrokenSword on Aug 22, 2008 14:55:06 GMT -6
Shan-
I understand everything you have said, and we are in agreement, especially so, regarding your point about being ‘drawn into’ picturing events as they might have happened and why. Like the shattered glass notion I put forward, there can appear to be a pattern created by design where no such thing exists. Randomness can easily leave a pattern. We often see what we expect or want to see and our mind’s eye can easily fool us in its interpretations of what is seen.
In my opinion, Custer can only be termed ‘in control’ up to the point of actual contact with the warriors. The Indians decided to make their move and that was that. A surge, as it’s been described in recent months. From there, as you say, the fierceness of the combat and the rapid and extreme pressure that was applied to the soldiers left them barely enough time to run to some hoped for place from which they might mount a defense. Much less were they given room to turn about and shoot in any organized and effective fashion.
Added to that, I understand that horses can smell fear and panic. A wounded horse feels pain too, but has no understanding as to the cause or what to do about it other than leave the area as fast as it can. If it can. Once their noses picked up on the human fear or panic, they adopted their own agenda of survival and probably became uncontrollable in many, many instances. Attempting to fight as well as quickly retreat in some semblance of order, while mounted was, doubtless in my mind, nearly complete chaos.
I’ve also always had trouble seeing that officers were so out of place or suspiciously clumped together. Where they were reported found (the ones that were) is more indicative of them all being stopped in their tracks rather than running for Papa Custer’s protection and abandoning their troops to do so.
Those two supposed volleys are interesting. I don’t see a reason in the world to think that Custer held up anything to wait for Benteen, or that he would leave so many of his small immediate command behind to point Benteen in the direction of the fighting, only a few hundred yards away and more or less out in plain sight. IF there were two signal volleys, it’s more likely, in my mind, that they were from Keogh or Calhoun to Custer calling for his return from a Ford D excursion when it all began to unravel rather than a plea for help to Benteen. Or perhaps, just the fighting between the soldiers and warriors on the Custer part of the battlefield when the ‘surge‘ began. Witnesses aren’t at all in total agreement that they heard the shooting as volleys or even heard them at all.
I can’t find any logical explanation as to why companies or individuals ended up where they did. Little is there that shows maneuvers and counter maneuvers were executed on the battlefield in a fight of any substantial length of time. No one else has either, which may be telling. That is why I question whether this thing has been over analyzed. One wing under Keogh and another under Custer trying to reunite across too great a distance. Keogh pinned in place and crushed. Custer trying to get there, but stopped cold is how I see it.
Small groupings among a large scattering, give the appearance of organized effort, while in reality - a rout from start to finish, just as Benteen read it to have been.
Michael
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Post by conz on Aug 22, 2008 16:29:37 GMT -6
Beware underestimating the cohesion of Regular Army units, and a tight group of Soldiers led by veteran Sergeants and officers.
Any model that uses "panic" as its main method of explaining how Custer's battalion was destroyed is on very shaky ground according to military history and military theory. It simply isn't very plausible to those who understand Regular army military units.
So if you need things simple, and don't have a lot of evidence, don't grab onto a theory that the Soldiers quickly panicked and were all shot down in a giant "buffalo hunt." I advise you that this is a deceiving image of any probable truth.
Clair
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