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Post by conz on Dec 19, 2008 20:03:40 GMT -6
I wouldn't be surprised if Custer's grave at West Point is shared with a bit of Vic. M LOL...so true, and I'm sure he would like that! Clair
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Jan 11, 2009 20:19:44 GMT -6
I thoroughly believe E Company was deployed on CR prior to right-wing collapse on Calhoun Hill. But here is where I have trouble understanding movements:
1.) When were grey horses stampeded by warriors? Fox says at or around time of right-wing collapse. This would explain why 40-45 men rush off last stand hill without their horses; they had already lost them.
2.) If E Company formed skirmish line on CR, did they lose horses and THEN pull back towards Last Stand Hill, from which they later rushed off of? Or did they remain on CR and then rushed down into the basin, where they were decimated?
3.) If E Company did rush off of Last Stand Hill, why would they do it when the Custer command was under extreme duress? They couldn't seriously have tried to "charge" the Indians on foot, who outnumbered them 7:1. It was a dusty hot ridge in Montanta, not the epic battle of Troy. The idea that it was a clearing party just makes me laugh ...I can just imagine Custer saying to his officers, "those boys better come home with their shields or on them!" Doesn't any historian think that an E Company on foot (which most historians, including the park service generally suspect) deployment in the last final moments of the battle from Last Stand Hill lack any sense?
The only alternative is that E Company deployed FAR earlier than is believed, and possibly not from Last Stand Hill. But there isn't an impressive case for a skirmish line in the basin...
There have also been "two exoduses" described as coming from Last Stand Hill. One was supposedly the E Company deployment (40-45 men), the other survivors from the Hill who fled in the very last minutes of the battle (7-15 men). What is interesting is that no single Indian account i have read describes BOTH exoduses...it is either one or the other. Does that mean that no single Indian account witnessed both? That a warrior showed up too late for the E Company deployment? Or that a warrior was too preoccupied with E Company to have seen the others run from the hill? Or is it possible that warrior eyewitness on the Northeast side of LSH only saw 7-15 men run, while warriors on the Southwest side of LSH saw more like 40-45 men run? Could location, not so much time, explain the numerical discrepancies? And certainly men ran at different times, not in groups necessarily.
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Jan 11, 2009 20:26:28 GMT -6
I forgot to add that it is difficult to examine the Deep Ravine episode without better understanding Indian movements to the North of Custer's command. If we suspect Custer reached CR and perhaps Ford D, we might also suspect he was repulsed or at least met some resistance. How strong were Indian movements in the North compared to Indian pressure encountered at Calhoun Hill. Was there even pressure coming from the North? Did this contribute to left-wing movements towards LSH and/or Deep Ravine? Fox mostly emphasizes warriors pressing Keogh's command to the South as the reason for Custer's squadron pulling back to LSH. But what about warriors to the Northwest, which presumably E Company had been deployed to fire on from CR?
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Post by shan on Jan 12, 2009 5:52:18 GMT -6
comanche1986,
There is one reason which I think is very rarely discussed, when it comes to any discussion as to why E company may have been forced to make a move from LSH, and that is, put very simply, overcrowding. Let me unpick that a little. By the time Custers wing had gathered on LSH, and had then been joined by a number of survivors from Keoghs wing, the likelihood is that there may have been 100 or more men, plus some sixty odd horses gathered in what was, given the numbers, a very small area indeed. Whatsmore, here we have a piece of ground with no cover, unless you count a few sage bushes, exposed to fire from at least 3 directions by increasing numbers of Indians, who have by now, many more firearms than they had started the battle with, some of whom were getting far too close for comfort.
Trapped and surrounded, with a growing number of wounded hindering any further movement, that movement further restrained by the fact that many of his men had lost their horses by stage, what were Custers options at this point? Perhaps I should say here that I think there may be a chance that Custer himself may have already been killed by this point, or if not, was killed soon after. So, what was he to do? He could squat down and have a fire fire with these Indians--not a good option given that A, he would at some point run out of ammunition, and B, he was totally exposed, whereas they were not. Failing that, he could go on the offensive by attempting to try and clear the ground in front of him as best he could, which, if successful, would at least eliminate some of the more damaging effects of that incoming fire.
Just how bad was that incoming fire? Well, much has been made as to the general level of poor marksmanship displayed by Indians, and whilst this may have been true, any individual pointing his gun in the general direction of a large, huddled mass of men and animals will, even by sods law, eventually score some hits. And if you then multiply the number of Indians engaged in taking this kind of pot shot at a static, exposed target by at least 100--and I'm being generous there-- as you can see, you don't have to be Custer to realise that you won't last very long.
There seems to be plenty enough Indian evidence both oral and visual, that there was at least one movement off the hill, and I am of the opinion that whilst there had been no SSL prior to this movement, that E troop were deployed off the hill, partly in order to to reduce the numbers up there, and partly in a last ditch attempt to drive the Indians from his front.
I think you are correct when you say that we tend to get conflicting accounts because the Indian giving his account was in a part of the field where he missed seeing some other event given by another witness. Interestingly, I think white races are much more given to speculation, and to offering up their opinion about things they didn't see, whereas the feeling one gets from Indian testimony is that if they didn't see it with their own two eyes, then on the whole, they would rather not comment on it. I could be totally wrong about this, and it may be more of a translation problem, i.e., the translator simply abbreviating, or eliminating what he considered to be superfluous to the main thrust of the story.
All of which is a rather long winded way of saying that yes, I do think that there were at least two groups of men that left the hill, an organized one, and a later, get out of here while you can one at the very end of the fight.
Shan.
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Post by conz on Jan 12, 2009 7:17:33 GMT -6
1.) When were grey horses stampeded by warriors? Fox says at or around time of right-wing collapse. This would explain why 40-45 men rush off last stand hill without their horses; they had already lost them. My model has the time about the same, but they are stampeded during the E Co charge from the cemetery area towards Keogh...a reaction to the impending collapse of the Calhoun area squadron. I see E Co being stopped by the gully, dismounting under fire from Warriors in the Deep Ravine area, and the horses being run off during this confusion. I think the suicide boys were mostly to blame for the horses being lost...I think they charged E Co from the rear as they left the cemetery, and caught up to them when E Co stopped at the gully, running right through their horses attempting to be held by each Trooper. This is one of the cases, I believe, where the Troopers were trying to fire their carbines and each holding their own horse too, accomplishing neither very well. In the end, most of them dove into the gully for cover. My model is the latter, and those that think the men in the gully came off Custer Hill would have to assume the first model, looks to me. I can't see any good explanation why Custer would order E Co off Custer Hill down to the gully, nor how a perfectly intact company would do this all together if they were not ordered to do so. The evidence of the gully bodies doesn't fit this model, to me. Trouble is that there is no evidence to show WHY the men were in the gully, so it is easier to just say they were fleeing off the hill toward cover. Doesn't make much sense, but few historians are willing to stick their necks out further for reasons no more than military logic, which none of them have. <g> I think most historians, including the park professionals, agree that there was a skirmish line at the present cemetery, and that it may have adjusted direction at times. Most agree that this was E Co, that offer an opinion. Some do put in their model that it was there for quite a bit of time...upwards of 20 minutes or more. There aren't many Indian testimonies that put a series of events in place and time, all in one statement. So you get bits and pieces, and I believe you do get pieces of an E Co attack into the gully, and pieces of a misc. movement off the hill toward the river, down the same ridge E Co was stuck on before the gully. I believe the casualties on that ridge ("south skirmish line ridge," to some) reflect a combination of casualties from E Co's initial halt and dismount in their aborted attack towards Keogh, and a desperate movement, later, of men off Custer Hill toward the trees on the river. Just my current model, of course. Clair
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Post by conz on Jan 12, 2009 7:21:52 GMT -6
Fox mostly emphasizes warriors pressing Keogh's command to the South as the reason for Custer's squadron pulling back to LSH. But what about warriors to the Northwest, which presumably E Company had been deployed to fire on from CR? In my model, there aren't many Warriors to the north, and only a few following Custer back from his Ford D excursion. I believe E Co was firing mostly at Deep Ravine, and the huge mass of Warriors coming up that way. I believe that probably over a third, and maybe up to half, the Warriors fighting Custer came up Deep Ravine, not MTC ford, including Crazy Horse and his couple hundred Oglala Warriors, along with most of the Cheyenne. Clair
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Jan 12, 2009 19:52:32 GMT -6
I am very impressed with both of your responses, Clair and Shan. Very good points on both fronts. To Shan: One of the things which I noticed this past September when I visited the Little Bighorn is, frankly, how tiny the slope of LSH really is. It looks so imposing in photographs, almost like a Little Round Top of Indian fights...when I saw it in person, I couldn't believe how crammed the stones were. Heightwise, the hill is formidable. But it wasn't a particular huge perimeter those guys had established (even when you mentally subtract the ten or so spurious stones on the hill, it didn't allow for much room for 40 men, muchless as many as a 100 men and at least 39 horses). In that sense, I could easily imagine 40 or so men just running off the hill to get away from such a compressed perimeter. In addition, there is a fold of land, a small hillock, directly in front of the western slope of Last Stand Hill. I would imagine that warriors used that fold to their advantage...like a trench from WW I, I could almost imagine a warrior with a Henry popping up, shooting, ducking, popping up, shooting...and given the proximity, it would have been pretty easy to empty several magazines without really have to aim, yet nevertheless inflicting casualties. Perhaps that little fold inspired the E Company movement...just to clear the area immediately in front of the hill.
To Clair: I have heard of the Deep Ravine model - and I believe it was an Indian position. I do believe warriors used this Ravine to attack right-wing contingents, which could have compelled E Company to move towards the Ravine through the basin below CR...but if Indians were INSIDE the ravine, they must have been under considerable duress to jump into the ravine at all - and make what was likely a 12-14 foot drop to the floor below! I think your model does work well with my belief that the cavalry didn't make a huge fight in that sector...there was certainly a trooper movement there, but I don't buy that it was a skirmish line. Do you figure Lame Whiteman came from Greasy Grass, and Crazy Horse came up Deep Ravine?
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Post by biggordie on Jan 12, 2009 23:24:48 GMT -6
Crazy Horse crossed at MTC, went east and then north, while Crazy Horse, Touch the Clouds and Hump were going across Deep Ravine Ford and up Deep Ravine, and Crazy Horse came around from the west, having earlier crossed at either Ford D or Crazy Horse Ford, and then struck from the north, across Backus Ridge to Battle Ridge.
Gordie
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Post by conz on Jan 13, 2009 15:16:19 GMT -6
Commanch...
I believe Crazy Horse and Lame White Man both crossed at Deep Ravine ford, and I believe LWM attacked on foot up Calhoun coulee when C Co charged down off Battle Ridge, while Crazy Horse at the same time charged mounted up Deep Ravine right over Battle Ridge and into I Co hidden on the east side...that's my model, anyway. It fits most testimony, but can't be proved any more than any other model. I do believe it is the most tactically feasible, however, which is why I've adopted it.
Clair
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Jan 14, 2009 15:27:32 GMT -6
I largely agree with this scenario, except I don't think E Company had its horses at the time it moved into the environs of Deep Ravine. My only other unanswered question is: why would troopers plunge into the Ravine when it figured so prominently as an Indian position beforehand? What's your take? I suppose they were acting out of sheer panic by the time they got there? I dislike Greg Michno's theory, but he does have a good point there. Wouldn't panic drive men AWAY from perceived danger? Yet, I don't think they had a tactical reason for going into the ravine proper...Indian accounts and white accounts alike generally characterize the ravine as a deathtrap.
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Post by conz on Jan 15, 2009 9:52:25 GMT -6
I largely agree with this scenario, except I don't think E Company had its horses at the time it moved into the environs of Deep Ravine. My only other unanswered question is: why would troopers plunge into the Ravine when it figured so prominently as an Indian position beforehand? What's your take? ...Wouldn't panic drive men AWAY from perceived danger? Yet, I don't think they had a tactical reason for going into the ravine proper...Indian accounts and white accounts alike generally characterize the ravine as a deathtrap. First, distinguish between "Deep Ravine" and the "gully" that E Co was found in...sometimes referred to as the "North Branch" of Deep Ravine. I don't think Warriors were in the gully...it was too deep to use as a position, although they could hide in there. But I don't think many Warriors were heading for Custer hill at the time, so they would have no reason to be in that gully...they were following Deep Ravine towards Calhoun Hill, I think. E Co was charging into that groups flank, I believe. I think E Co was mounted when they moved off the cemetery towards Keogh. I don't find any credible evidence that they had lost their horses before then, or were under much pressure. If they were, they would not have moved from the area...I think they would have been found as part of the perimeter around Custer Hill had they been dismounted already. But when their "charge" ended at the gully, which they could not cross, they would have to dismount to fight all the Warriors in the area, which would be turning on them. When they dismounted, hastily without horseholders, their horses were vulnerable to being run off and they were vulnerable by their fire ineffectiveness to being closed upon, both of which I think happened due to aggressive Warrior behaviors. In this situation, the men who didn't die up on the ridge dove into the mostly unoccupied gully below them, to finish their stand there, is my model/explanation/interpretation. Clair
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