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Post by El Crab on Jan 30, 2008 0:26:04 GMT -6
I think E Company was deployed down below Last Stand Hill, crushed and some of them ran for the ravine. Later, after the last stand was almost over, a few others ran for the river/ravine/anywhere but Last Stand Hill. Not necessarily from E Company, but a random collection. Possibly including Bouyer, Harry Reed and Boston Custer.
I think the horses were let go after enough were destroyed to form barricades. It might say something about how desperate their situation was. Living, breathing horses would represent the last chance to escape, but if they did kill some and then let the remaining horses go, they clearly only felt their survival hinged on defense. Perhaps the few that fled from various parts of the field were noticed to have not made it. Or, just maybe, Custer ordered some of the horses destroyed and the rest let go as a deterrent for escape. Meaning Custer (or whomever was in charge, if Custer was downed) realized they were 99.9% screwed, but having soldiers running all over the battlefield would guarantee the withering battalion's demise. So much like an officer threatening to shoot those who do not follow orders, Custer ordered the horses not needed for barricades to be let go.
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Post by El Crab on Jan 30, 2008 0:33:29 GMT -6
I agree that there is strong evidence that the "Finley" position was held for some time as an all-around perimeter. Early models had this as a rear-guard position covering Yate's retreat up Calhoun Ridge from the MTC ford early on. But I agree that it is more probably a portion of C Co that didn't make it to Calhoun Hill...probably under less pressure as the "left flank" (looking west) of their movement to Greasy Grass ridge..the right flank being caved in by Warriors coming up Deep Ravine and Calhoun Coulee. The right flank guys would have scattered in all directions, and several bodies were found throughout Calhoun Coulee, the survivors making it to Calhoun Hill and on. The left flank, with SGT Finley, instead made a stand, and died there. It is possible that Finley's group was actually cut off from Calhoun Hill by a surge of Natives coming up the slopes to the south (Henryville area and south) in response to the Calhoun position turning around to face their rear, lessening the fire keeping Gall's men pinned down to the south. So maybe this prevented Finley's flank from being able to run, while the boys down in Calhoun Coulee had an open route to the top of Calhoun Hill (closely pursued, "buffalo hunt" style, by LWM & Co). Clair I think when Calhoun Hill was occupied, so was Finley. I don't pretend to be a tactician, but having seen the field, I think Custer would have been a moron to not put soldiers on Finley Ridge if he intended to hold Calhoun Hill. They are nearly the same elevation, and I think they should be viewed as part of the same terrain complex. It wouldn't make sense to me to put L Company on Calhoun to slow the warriors chasing the battalion and then leave Finley Ridge unoccupied. With the river on the right flank, it makes sense why more pressure was applied to L on Calhoun Hill. Warriors moved around their left flank to Keogh. And Calhoun fell first, while the mostly unmolested troopers on Finley had little to do. Until L and I gave way, then they were completely and utterly hosed.
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Post by conz on Jan 30, 2008 7:54:28 GMT -6
That is certainly possible, although the distance from Calhoun Hill to Finley is rather long for two companies to cover. But in support of this theory, Keogh perhaps didn't occupy Finley hill and Greasy Grass ridge initially, and thought the better of it, sending C Co down there after Calhoun was occupied, to that Troop's demise.
Also mitigating against this theory though is that the Calhoun Hill is the much stronger position...best overall on the battlefield, in fact...suggesting that it wouldn't go down so easily as Finley which was so readily flanked. But then, in warfare, ANYTHING can happen.
As well, Calhoun going down first doesn't support any model that allows the Natives to get "inside" Keogh's defenses and around his fields of fire.
The Natives are fairly insistent that the fight went up Calhoun ridge, over Calhoun Hill, and then over to Custer Hill in that order, but again, Native interpretations are mercurial.
So I think this model of Calhoun falling before Finley is possible, but not probable, in military lingo. <g> But I keep all these possibilities in mind as I sort through more evidence, or just the same old evidence for the "nth" time.
Thanks, Clair
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Nov 16, 2008 19:05:03 GMT -6
My feeling is that, following a reconnaissance of Ford D (somewhere North of present cemetery), Custer and Yates' wing relocate to the Cemetery Ridge prominence for an indeterminate length of time. As Richard Fox suggests, I believe F Company is held in reserve in the basin below Custer Hill, and E Company formed a skirmish line along Cemetery Ridge to engage warriors now beginning to mass in the environs of upper Deep Ravine and the area surrounding "the flats." Archeology and Cheyenne accounts more or less confirm a general deployment here. Around the time that the right wing collapsed (following C Company's foray along Finley-Finckle Ridge), Custer and F Company immediately ascend LSH to receive right wing survivors, and assess the developing tactical situation.
Where I differ from Fox's theory is the point from which E Company's moved, and the lack of organization that characterized the movement. While Fox suggests E Company moved with F towards LSH, alternating with one another to provide covering fire, I find myself skeptical that an entire dismounted company would move 2,000 feet from LSH to the Deep Ravine in a concerted deployment towards the River, having struggled on foot to reach LSH in the first place. Fox suggests there was tactical intent behind this movement, to either get couriers out or to flush out warriors nearby. Because it is generally accepted that E Company (and hence, no other company) ended up in Deep Ravine, he had two choices to demonstrate why one company made it to the ravine, without members of any other. He could either A.) suggest it was a tactical deployment of that one Company towards the river, which did not include any other personnel, or B.) tentatively suggest that it was an outright panic (since panic isn't confined to units, but rather is an emotion experienced by men in stressful situations), and thus contradict the belief that only E Company men rushed off of Custer Hill. Fox's theory omits the possibility that it was a blend of the two; it was E Company as a unit that panicked, and fled into the ravine - for the simple reason that there were no other units operating with it at the time it ran towards the ravine.
There is no evidence that E Company ever really ended up on Last Stand Hill...Indian accounts describe men leaving LSH, but I believe these men left in the last few minutes of the fight (perhaps 10-15 men in total, from various companies). I think one movement has often been conflated with the other, and the result is they are both believed to have originated from the same point. All the same, they came from the same ridge (if not the same hill per se), so in essence, the Indian perspective is not in error to suggest 40 men came from the soldier position atop Custer Hill (the apex of Cemetery Ridge).
Pressure from the direction of Ford D has also accumulated by this time, which possibly placed E Company under duress atop Cemetery Ridge. Suicide Warriors attack E Company, who reportedly hold their ground, but lost their horses in the process. The suicide warriors crash through the line, and spill over into the Keogh Sector. Perhaps at this time, or not long after, E Company loses its tactical integrity atop Cemetery Ridge and scrambles down the ridge towards Deep Ravine.
Eyewitness accounts make two things clear: E Company was dismounted, and was NOT making a charge. Indian accounts make this pretty clear; 40 men on foot shooting pistols in the air, arms flailing, "so scared they didn't know what they were doing"...this is not the bugle-blaring cavalry charge of a John Wayne flick. Unlike the C Company charge of mounted men who subsequently dismounted to fire into Calhoun Coulee, the E company movement lacks any discernible objective beyond a possible relocation towards LBH River. Indian accounts simply say they started towards the river (which, of course, was also in the direction of a large, hostile Indian encampment that would offer neither escape nor replenishment for a cavalry troop under duress). Best guess is that the E Company men were forced from their original position, and were not following orders at this point...they were running AWAY from something, not so much running TOWARDS something. That is the only reasonable explanation, since Indians obviously occupied Deep ravine...a fact that E Company troopers were unable to appreciate in their stampede away from perceived danger. Seeing E Company swept from Cemetery Ridge with a foe in hot pursuit, Custer and his men shoot their horses for cover.
With so much of the battlefield North of the visitor's center still unexplored/unknown, who's to say an unexplored Indian position north of the soldier position on Cemetery Ridge did not cause E Company to flee towards the environs of Deep Ravine? We know most of the bodies were found in a heap in a DEEP ravine, which is certainly not Cemetery Ravine by geographical or testimonial definition. But some were found scattered across the ravine itself, one just a stone's throw from the river. Pursued by warriors, troopers were killed en route to the ravine (6-10 bodies in upper SSL segment, 16 bodies in lower SSL segment just above DR), and 28 unfortunate men scrambled into the ravine, not thinking about anything else but getting away from danger. When it became clear that warriors were in the ravine itself, these men attempted to scramble back out. It was too late for them. The men atop LSH were largely killed off by the time these poor sops met their demise, although several men atop LSH may have tried to run towards E Company when things were at their bleakest atop the hill.
Oh, and I believe Algernon Smith was not with his company because, simply put, he had been wounded either at MTC or at Ford D. Very likely, he was incapacitated from wounds sustained earlier in the engagement, and as a company officer was retained by HQ when it reached LSH.
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Post by biggordie on Nov 16, 2008 22:38:16 GMT -6
Welcome to the forum, Comanche. Nice first post.
Gordie
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Post by conz on Nov 17, 2008 12:07:14 GMT -6
I'll second Gordie's commendation and welcome. And 'll offer in response... Eyewitness accounts make two things clear: E Company was dismounted, and was NOT making a charge. Indian accounts make this pretty clear; 40 men on foot shooting pistols in the air, arms flailing, "so scared they didn't know what they were doing"...this is not the bugle-blaring cavalry charge of a John Wayne flick. Unlike the C Company charge of mounted men who subsequently dismounted to fire into Calhoun Coulee, the E company movement lacks any discernible objective beyond a possible relocation towards LBH River. Indian accounts simply say they started towards the river (which, of course, was also in the direction of a large, hostile Indian encampment that would offer neither escape nor replenishment for a cavalry troop under duress). Best guess is that the E Company men were forced from their original position, and were not following orders at this point...they were running AWAY from something, not so much running TOWARDS something. That is the only reasonable explanation, since Indians obviously occupied Deep ravine...a fact that E Company troopers were unable to appreciate in their stampede away from perceived danger. Seeing E Company swept from Cemetery Ridge with a foe in hot pursuit, Custer and his men shoot their horses for cover. I'm not sure we can rule out that the E Co movement from the cemetery into the "Deep gully" wasn't an offensive movement ordered by Custer. This is what I believe, because, 1) I don't think a panic would go AWAY from F company...I would think the men would naturally join F Co. Especially if Warriors occupied Deep Gully, why would panicked men go towards them? 2) Native testimony does allow for a controlled, E Co charge due south. 3) If you put yourself in Custer's place, and he is watching a stream of Warriors coming up Deep Ravine into Keogh's rear over battle ridge, wouldn't you order an attack into their flank to cut them off, and save Keogh's command? 4) Had E Co been ordered to do such, while F Co maintained a defensive position on LSH, they would have run into Deep gully, where they were found...fell right into it, literally. Many men would have stopped before going in, and if not able to easily get around, would dismount and jump into the gully for cover as Warriors closed in on the western flank of their charge, and from behind (where perhaps the "suicide boys" rode them down...from behind). At any rate, might consider this possibility. I think so, too. Great analysis, all around...keep it up and share! Clair
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Post by bc on Nov 17, 2008 14:31:24 GMT -6
The poll doesn't have my position. I think they were attacking to drive NA's out of there. Standard tactic used over on Calhoun hill and by Benteen on Reno Hill.
I kinda follow your reasoning Clair. Offensive and not a panic at all until maybe when they got trapped there. I haven't decided where they were coming from yet, LSH, cemetery ridge either to or from ford D, from MTC reasonably close to the river, or even from the river up deep coulee or deep ravine. I tend to have E moving away from some part of the river being more of a rear guard although some of you may have them in front moving north. With E company taking fire from deep ravine and being partially or all surrounded by circling warriors, an attack on Deep ravine was the best option. Not sure who would have ordered it, Custer, Yates, or even Sturgis.
Clair, I've followed your theory and maps on the Keogh sector of the battle with all the cav and NA band movements but I can't tie it all in until you do the same for the LSH and north battlefield. Unless you've done it and I missed it. Before I could understand your discussion of indirect fire, guess I'd need to know how everyone got to that point. Thanks.
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Post by conz on Nov 17, 2008 15:49:57 GMT -6
Yeah...I haven't drawn that firefight out yet. It has more different possibilities to model than any other LBH episode, I think. Might as well make a stab at one...
And yes, my current model is same as yours, with my E Co in the cemetery firing both toward their former Ford D foray area and then down toward Deep Ravine where Lame White Man's attack was crawling up Calhoun Ravine. I think when the Warriors got over (or near) battle ridge behind Calhoun and Keogh, Custer decided he had to do something and threw E Co at them...both mounted and dismounted, and when they stopped at "deep gully," they all dismounted and took cover.
When E Co left, F Co and HQ would have formed a tight perimeter around the SW side of LSH top.
Clair
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Post by lutherhare on Nov 18, 2008 14:32:09 GMT -6
While I can't really add much to what's already been said, here's my two cents for what it's worth:
I agree that the fact that the bodies of E Company were found together suggests very strongly a tactical disposition and tends to rule out a panicked flight. It's not unreasonable to find some parallels with the offensive thrusting from the Calhoun sector and forward deployments in the Finley sector and a similar move with E Company. It's a matter of interpretation if E Company "charged" down there to clear out the Indians from the basin-probably not that aggressive of a movement I guess- but a forward movement and the creation of a sort of defense in depth makes sense to me.
With this, I tend not to buy into Fox's Deep Ravine theory. Geomorphology theories are fine, but at the end of the day we have archaeological evidence of a fight along the "SSL" but none in Deep Ravine. For the reasons stated above, a panicked flight into the depths of the ravine by a whole company doesn't really make sense, but neither does a tactical deployment in the bottom of it. I think a lot of the accounts of the "deep gully" and "ravine" in the RCOI, Camp, etc automatically gets turned into "Deep Ravine". My guess is that the current markers are fairly accurate. While I don't exactly endorse Michno's theory or particularly like his Cemetery Ravine/Deep Ravine dichotomy, I think he hits on the fact that many or most of those accounts don't necessarily mean Deep Ravine as Fox and many folks tend to think of it. Walking down that slope, it's not unreasonable to see how those bodies could be construed as being in a "deep gully" in some spots, especially since one presumably walks down from Custer Hill. In short, that whole basin and the several gullies and folds in it has been collapsed into "Deep Ravine" in many minds.
That being said, a final flight from Custer Hill makes sense and is backed up by Indian accounts. I suspect that's how Mitch Boyer wound up down there. Thus, there's probably some overlap between E Company and this later flight. Some of these guys, not to mention survivors of E Company's earlier destruction, certainly could have made their way into Deep Ravine proper in search of shelter. So, there's an element of truth in the "panicked flight" theory. I'd have to dig up the quote, but I think Lt. Roe got it closest when queried about the 28 bodies in the ravine and he replied (in paraphrase) that they never were down there, only a handful. That's probably about right-a few fugitives/wounded seeking shelter in the depths of Deep Ravine, but E Company in bulk falling more or less where they're marked.
One thing that's always intrigued me- Lt. Sturgis' spurious marker. It could be expected that it wouldbe placed in a logical and believable location for his mother--so, he was almost certainly placed with his company. He wasn't put down in Deep Ravine somewhere. It could be argued that that would be inconvenient and unnecessary for Mrs. Sturgis' visit, I suppose, but then why wouldn't his marker have been put on Custer Hill if ease of visit was the deciding factor? It would appear that shortly after the battle it was known where to go to find E Company, at least in general terms.
Ok, that's enough of a ramble for now!
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Post by conz on Nov 18, 2008 15:09:33 GMT -6
Good ramble! Thanks...
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Nov 20, 2008 20:52:21 GMT -6
I'll second Gordie's commendation and welcome. And 'll offer in response... Eyewitness accounts make two things clear: E Company was dismounted, and was NOT making a charge. Indian accounts make this pretty clear; 40 men on foot shooting pistols in the air, arms flailing, "so scared they didn't know what they were doing"...this is not the bugle-blaring cavalry charge of a John Wayne flick. Unlike the C Company charge of mounted men who subsequently dismounted to fire into Calhoun Coulee, the E company movement lacks any discernible objective beyond a possible relocation towards LBH River. Indian accounts simply say they started towards the river (which, of course, was also in the direction of a large, hostile Indian encampment that would offer neither escape nor replenishment for a cavalry troop under duress). Best guess is that the E Company men were forced from their original position, and were not following orders at this point...they were running AWAY from something, not so much running TOWARDS something. That is the only reasonable explanation, since Indians obviously occupied Deep ravine...a fact that E Company troopers were unable to appreciate in their stampede away from perceived danger. Seeing E Company swept from Cemetery Ridge with a foe in hot pursuit, Custer and his men shoot their horses for cover. I'm not sure we can rule out that the E Co movement from the cemetery into the "Deep gully" wasn't an offensive movement ordered by Custer. This is what I believe, because, 1) I don't think a panic would go AWAY from F company...I would think the men would naturally join F Co. Especially if Warriors occupied Deep Gully, why would panicked men go towards them? Normally, a panic would likely send troops to perceived safety - I concur, F Company would have been the next reasonable haven for a panicked E Company fleeing up Cemetery Ridge towards LSH. But, I believe E Company was cut off from F. Bear in mind, when E Company moved from CR, it was dismounted. Under pressure from (mounted?) warriors from the North, it is not inconceivable to imagine E Company panicking and running away from Custer's position atop Last Stand Hill. The fact that warriors occupied Deep Ravine is perhaps what sealed E Company's fate; I suspect they were chased from their position towards the river, and in turn were forced towards the ravine. Also, I believe E Company lost horses at or around the time the right-wing disintegrated, which means they were without their horses at one of the most critical periods of the battle - the last half hour to 45 minutes of it. 2) Native testimony does allow for a controlled, E Co charge due south. A close reading of various Indian accounts does allow for an initial deployment that was not motivated by panic. But more often than not, Indian account DO say more about the disposition of the soldiers after leaving their destination (which, to reiterate, I suspect was Cemetery Ridge). They describe them as intoxicated, shooting guns in the air, too scared to know what they were doing. Indian accounts also say these men were largely carrying pistols. What's more, is that the archeological record in SSL closely resembles the Keogh sector (which I believe was a general melee). Lots of bone scattering, a paucity of Cavalry carbine cases, and a lot of Indian bullets. Cavalry bullets also riddled the area (particularly in the flats), but this was probably E Company firing from skirmish line before it moved into the sector. Of colt pistol cases found on the battlefield, a significant portion were found in SSL sector. It all points to a close-combat, moving fight that just doesn't seem like much of an offensive charge to me. I think the fact that E Company bodies were found together only proves they operated as a discrete unit until they panicked; and when they did panic, they were unable to access friendly units. 3) If you put yourself in Custer's place, and he is watching a stream of Warriors coming up Deep Ravine into Keogh's rear over battle ridge, wouldn't you order an attack into their flank to cut them off, and save Keogh's command? With 40 dismounted troopers, most certainly not! It breaks a fundamental tactical rule. The cavalry trooper's mobility, and hence, ability to survive, rested on his mount. E Company had lost their horses by the time Keogh was collapsing - what would 40 dismounted men, with pistols drawn, do to confront a horde of warriors who were clearly better at close combat? Plus, the problem with the E Company thrust is that it moves FROM higher ground, into lower, secluded terrain. High ground was preferred ground in military doctrine...still is. The only reason E Company gave that position up was not to rescue another unit, but rather, because it was under duress. That all being said, I suspect things unraveled too quickly for Custer to make a coordinated attack on warriors in DR. 4) Had E Co been ordered to do such, while F Co maintained a defensive position on LSH, they would have run into Deep gully, where they were found...fell right into it, literally. Many men would have stopped before going in, and if not able to easily get around, would dismount and jump into the gully for cover as Warriors closed in on the western flank of their charge, and from behind (where perhaps the "suicide boys" rode them down...from behind). Here again I must beg to differ, because Indian accounts suggest E Company was dismounted. I believe Wooden Leg's account of 40 mounted men moving from the East part of the ridge refers to C Company, as per Fox's theory. I do believe some men may have retained their mounts (those lucky few that were close enough to reach their mount before it was scared off), but without a doubt men moving in their boots and cotton shirts were running for their lives, and the ravine happened to be the only place to go. At any rate, might consider this possibility. I think so, too. Great analysis, all around...keep it up and share! Thanks for the great feedback!! Clair
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Post by conz on Nov 21, 2008 7:23:53 GMT -6
Think boxing...Custer's battalions would be in tight, intact perimeters, almost untouchable, if they had kept their hands up near their heads and elbows in.
But that isn't these aggressive cavalry officers...Keogh jabs out with C Co toward GGR, and Custer jabs out with E Co into Deep Ravine. What happens when a boxer does this? If your punch isn't strong enough, they take it and counter-punch because you left your body open now. It is such counterpunches that usually land the knockout blow, not hits against the defender's gloves against his head.
That's what Crazy Horse did to Custer...he led the main counterpunch that took advantage of the C and E Co jabs that got inside Custer's and Keogh's defenses and knocked them out...the cavalry couldn't recover from that.
That's why you don't see neat little perimeters on this battlefield...the 7th "went down swinging."
Clair
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Nov 23, 2008 18:38:15 GMT -6
That's a very interesting idea, Clair. Do you think that E Company would have been used in such a capacity, in the later stages of the fighting ? If we look at Two Moons account for example, it just seems like such a futile move. On the one hand, I suppose they didn't have much to lose - in fact, it may have been their only real option - not to mention a chance to get couriers out. I see Keogh's move with C Company in the exact same light as you do; "boxing." But the E Company move just seems absurd! 40-45 dismounted men, lunging off of the hill, running towards the river. The reason I have such difficulty imagining it was an attack or offensive move is because, at this point in the battle, LSH is largely surrounded. Why would 40 men, having discarded their single shot carbines, attempt to melee with Indian warriors who are arguably the best horsemen on the continent and equally formidable at hand-to-hand combat? Indian accounts do not really describe much of an attempt to create a skirmish line, and if troopers were armed with their colts, they were fighting an enemy that was up-close. Even a 19th century cavalry unit would have avoided such a foray with Indians, I would think! Even if the audacity succeeded in making warriors back off temporarily, they couldn't have seriously intended to stop hundreds of warriors, following the loss of right-wing units. And why make a run to the river? For drinking water? To find a better place to hold out? Again, at that phase in the battle, they are so hopelessly surrounded, I can't imagine men running in their boots and frock coats, in sweltering heat, trying to fight their way through gullies and hillocks which were teaming with concealed warriors, who popped up only long enough to shoot at the troopers.
I think E Company's unexpected route was what compelled Custer to order F Company to shoot its mounts on the western slope of LSH. If E Company was operating as a discrete unit (without other units on CR), I think the fact that only E Company bodies are found in DR is not necessarily proof that there was tactical stability.
I still suspect these troopers originated from Cemetery Ridge...far closer of a run to Deep Ravine. Custer and F Company left E to its own defense, and moved up the basin to LSH, covering its own withdrawal, to receive right-wing survivors. I think warriors were accumulating against left-wing units in Deep Ravine and probably further North of Battle Ridge - in the vicinity of Ford D. Warriors at Henryville and Greasy Grass Ridge, as well those warriors following Crazy Horse were exploiting right-wing instability. But I think something compelled E Company to run off of the ridge, and that's when they ran towards Deep Ravine. I think E Company lost its horses, and the line eventually broke on CR, causing men to spill into today's SSL sector. Archeology shows a running fight, with very little evidence of a protracted defense on the part of the troopers. Lots of Indian bullets, lots of cavalry bullets (probably from LSH defenders), but few expended shell casings. These men may came under close-combat, and sought cover or were forced into the ravine. Once in the ravine, they may have attempted to make towards the river, but only found warriors moving up the Ravine towards the lower SSL from the Flats.
If, as your theory goes, E Company were meant to stop warriors in DR from assaulting Keogh on the East side of Battle Ridge, where exactly was E Company attempting to establish a position when they moved from CR/LSH? In lower SSL?
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Post by lutherhare on Nov 23, 2008 19:59:25 GMT -6
I doubt that a last minute E Company push out of LSH happened, but neither do I really see the evidence of a rout stemming from Cemetery Ridge. Granted, if we accept the markers as being fairly accurate (which I more or less do), it's not that big of a stretch to imagine a line of bodies from CR down to Deep Ravine. But at the end of the day the Indian accounts and archaeological evidence leads me to think that E Company indeed did have an established defensive position. I just can't really place the Indian movement that would crush a Company E rout from CR. Conversely, there's a good argument to be made that Co E was smashed down there in the basin by the Cheyennes. I disagree somewhat on your characterization of the archaeological evidence. While certainly subject to interpretation, and as much as Richard Fox would like the SSL finds to go away, there's a lot of evidence to suggest that quite a bit of fighting occurred in the SSL area. Certainly much of it was at close quarters, but I see a difference between the finds in the Keogh "running fight" area and the SSL. To quote Sandy Barnard: "artifacts along this sloping area below Custer Hill provided bountiful evidence that the soldiers waged a ferocious defense here. Detecting crews uncovered hundreds of shells, scored slugs, tunic buttons, and other evidence of a fight. Several excavations were sunk at markers along the trail, and most revealed bone materials and evidence of the determined defense."
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Post by shan on Nov 24, 2008 5:51:25 GMT -6
It seems to me that the augment as to whether E company came down from Cemetery Ridge or LSH hinges to some extent on whether you believe in the Ford D scenario in the first place.
When I first became interested in this battle many years ago, the standard riposte to the question 'why didn't Custer attack the village immediately, whether it be at MTF or elsewhere, was that he was waiting for Benteen to arrive'. The fact that part of his command, i.e. Reno, was in dire straits didn't seem to impinge on this belief, nor indeed did Custers apparent impatient nature. Looking back it seemed to be the easiest way to account for the mystery, although it never felt an entirely comfortable one. There is little talk of that idea any more, and I would hazard a guess that there are few who post on this board who continue to subscribe to it.
Now of late, a similar belief has arisen in that the movement to Ford D by Custers immediate command seems to have become somewhat set in stone, and yet as far as I can see, there is very little concrete evidence to support the idea. Yes I know that John Stands in Timber alludes to the movement, and that he seems to imply that Custers command returned from the ford and waited around on Cemetery ridge or nearby, for some 20/30 minutes. Setting that aside for the moment, where is the evidence on the ground? If there has been anything found that proves there was such an occupation, or indeed proves that the maneuvers that are currently being talked about, stemmed from that region, then I must have missed them.
With regards to JSIT's evidence, anyone who has read any of my posts will know that I would be the first to use Indian evidence where ever possible, believing that if nothing else, there may well be the bones of some truth lying beneath all the rectoric, and subsequent adaption and tidying up that was done by many of the interpretors. Now that's not to say I would accept everything an Indian had to say; White Cow Bulls account being particularly problematic, so yes, there are cultural and historical differences that one has to take on board when trying to untangle what is being said, but because of the frustration many people find in these accounts, I think that it is often forgotten that these are people just like us, with all the same foibles that we all have; a propensity to forget and then make up something to fill the hole, a need to look good in the eyes of others, the wish to say what we think the other person wants to hear and so on. All of which is a long winded way of saying that it is interesting that many will take up and use JSIT account when they are generally inclined to dismiss most of the other Indian accounts. Is this because his account fits in with what is the current theory, in other words it affirms the new model of the battle?
If so, what we may be seeing is that in order to incorporate the Ford D theory, there is an inclination to move the fighting that was previously believed to have occurred at MTF, to Ford D, and to move what may have been a move on the part of E company from LSH to one from Cemetery ridge.
Now I'm not totally persuaded that there was any movement from Cemetery ridge, or indeed that there was any occupation of that particular site, but; and here I am playing Devils advocate, in JSIT's account, many of those killed in what is loosely termed the South skirmish line, were killed trying to move up, yes up, towards LSH which was occupied by warriors who were firing down on them. It was during this fighting that the so called Suicide boys appeared and ran off E companies horses, causing them, according to the account, to flee every whichway, including towards Deep Ravine.
Cat amongst the pigeons? Well maybe, but whichever way E company moved, I would have to say that my general reading of Indian testimony gives me the impression that they are talking about two groups leaving LSH, as to whether one was a tactical move is hard to say, but I would think the second movement occurred because those that were left up there had no other alternative.
Shan
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