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Post by George Mabry on Jun 10, 2008 15:44:28 GMT -6
How likely would it be if you put 10 men on a skirmish line that they will remain in that neat little line until they were all killed? The only way I see that happening is if they all died within seconds of one another. I know that if it was me, long before that 9th man fell, I would be someplace else.
Once the causalities start to mount, the men on the line are going to be moving, either backwards, forwards, sideways or what have you. Some will be dragging wounded. But it’s my bet that those 10 men will not grow roots where they were initially placed. In the end, when you examine the body locations of those 10 men, they are not going to be in anything close to linear formation. Spent casing would be a more likely way of locating skirmish lines if you have any confidence in who fired what, when and where.
George
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Post by conz on Jun 18, 2008 7:38:01 GMT -6
George,
I would think you would be stating the obvious, but by some comments on the board, I guess this needs to be explained.
I agree that if a skirmish line is wiped out, rarely will you find the bodies on that very line. The fact that the men all died indicates that their resistance was "broken" at some point. The "line" dissolved before they all died...that is the way tactical outcomes ("effects" we call it today) work. How many men have to die before the line breaks is highly variable, but one thing is sure in investigating military history...rarely does any organization die "to the last man" where they stood defending. This only happens once they have no place to go (like last stand hill, or in the deep gully).
So nobody should expect to use bodies as any indicator of skirmish lines, or lack thereof. If skirmish lines existed and were destroyed, the far greater percentage of the bodies of the men who occupied that line would be found away from the line, than where they had fought.
When you see a bunch of bodies that look like they died running/retreating, you have to then look to where they were probably fighting from, to get there. Look at what they were trying to do, look at the threats to them, use military decision-making to determine where they would have fought, and then see if where the markers are is a plausible place for the bodies from that fighting position.
Where they died is almost never where they fought from. Rather, it is the place where they were killed as they RAN from the place they fought from. The number of bodies actually on the fighting position is how many it took to die before the rest of them ran (but they don't always panic and run due to casualties...they could be ordered to move away and were killed, or other things, like their retreat being about to be cut off, caused them to move away rather then the number of men dying).
Is the explanation okay?
Clair
PS. Another comment I saw related to men dying on horseback. Formations that get destroyed while mounted are far, far, more dispersed in body locations than most indications on this battlefield. The Custer field is much more indicative of men dying while running on foot in may places, and not of masses of men dying mounted.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 18, 2008 15:21:08 GMT -6
Clair, I couldn't have said it better...and didn't. I was just curious about the earlier postings where attempts are made to use the marker locations to show that there either was, or was not, any control exercised by the officers and NCOs.
George
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Post by conz on Jun 19, 2008 6:52:15 GMT -6
Yeah...the locations of those markers always gives me the shivers. It is hard looking at them...don't like to do it.
It brings up visions of loss of cohesion, of men running from collapsed positions, and in some places of men dying fighting to the desperate end with nowhere to go and no hope left.
We've had plenty of these kinds of fights in the U.S. Army, but none are visualized as poignantly as LBH...part of the macabre draw of that place.
Clair
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Post by tonypag7 on Jul 2, 2008 10:06:05 GMT -6
I didn't read all the post and am coming back to this sight after a long absence. However, could it be possible that Keogh was sent to ford "B" to recon. and check for a crossing while Custer awaited Benteen's arrival. Keogh was either forced back or recalled by Custer once he realized that the warriors were massing at the ford and that warriors were coming from Weir Hill area instead of Benteen
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Post by tonypag7 on Jul 2, 2008 12:08:30 GMT -6
I have been away from this sight for a long time,but I believe Keogh and or Yates was sent to ford "B" to recon. and check for a suitable crossing while Custer waited for Benteen to show. Keogh/Yates was either pushed back or recalled by Custer once he saw warriors massing at the ford and warriors coming from Weir Hill area instead of Benteen.
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Post by conz on Jul 5, 2008 15:19:41 GMT -6
Tony,
I think that is about right. All kinds of issues to consider and decide when you look at Keogh's "mission" on this field:
- Was it Keogh, or Yates, (or both) that moved closer to the ford than Luce Ridge? IOW, who stayed on the high ground, and who moved down toward the ford?
- How close did the unit moving down to the ford actually get to it?
- Were they really trying to cross, or never intended to?
- What induced them to retreat (certainly not high casualties, but perhaps the imminent threat of high casualties)?
- In which direction did they pull back to Calhoun Hill...up Calhoun ridge, or up Deep Ravine? I hadn't even considered this one until the last couple books I've read on the battle...shows that you can STILL learn new things even with no new primary evidence! I'm leaning toward Yates to the ford, and coming back to N-C Ridge up Deep Ravine, and never going up Calhoun Ridge.
Enjoy! Clair
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Post by tonypag7 on Jul 9, 2008 8:52:09 GMT -6
Conz--I truly believe that a companuy was sent to recon. ford"B". I further think that Custer recalled them after seeing hundreds of warriors massing toward that ford. Remember Custer was on the high ground and could see oveer the tree tops lining the river and probably saw the warriors coming from the pony heards (north) to the ford. He also was looking toward Weir Hill area expecting to see Benteen coming--instead, he saw warriors. Right then he noticed for the first time something was amiss. Now some other food for thought. During a Civil War battle (name excapes me at the moment), Custer sent a company to one ford to draw the Rebs. to that ford while he crossed another further down unmolested and sucessfully attacked the Rebs from the rear. Guess who the commanding officer of the company sent to the ford was?---None other than Yates!!!--Was Custer attempting to repeat this attack here on the warriors--with somone who sucessfully was part of the Civil War movement?
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Post by conz on Jul 9, 2008 11:13:44 GMT -6
I think your postulation on Custer's motives are correct...commanders tend to repeat earlier successful performances, as they apply old lessons to new situations.
On thing you have to determine is why Custer didn't go down to the ford if you think he stayed back. To assume that Custer stayed on the higher ground automatically makes assumptions about the ford force's (lets say Yates) mission.
To wit, if the squadron was intended to cross, or recon to uncover information needed to make a decision, or do some decisive action, then Custer would probably have accompanied it. If Custer stays behind, it means that the rear position is the critical one for the commander to be at in order to make the best decisions to accomplish the mission.
To me, assuming that Custer stayed on Luce ridge, it looks like Yates' squadron (two companies, I think, based on Native testimony) was only sent down there to make a demonstration to relieve Reno...at the very most, he was sent to "develop the situation." It may have been in his authority to secure a crossing if practicable (means dismounting a force and going to the far bank), and if Custer saw this, he would follow with Keogh.
Personally I believe that Bouyer told Custer that Reno was in trouble and withdrawing, and Custer immediately sent Yates down to pull the Indians to him, and off Reno, thereby supporting, and saving, Reno's command. I don't think he knew, though, that he would be sacrificing his own command in the process, but it still worked for Reno and Benteen.
Not that they were grateful to Custer as the reason all those Natives disappeared from their front just as their goose was about to be cooked...
Clair
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Post by bc on Jul 9, 2008 15:14:03 GMT -6
Good analysis Clair. ( in replay # 38) I could buy into Yates doing an attack/recon or to demostrate at MTC and then try to decide if Custer stayed back or went forward. But if Custer stayed back, how do we account for him being with Yates at LSH and leaving Keough?
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Post by tonypag7 on Jul 9, 2008 16:07:47 GMT -6
Conz--Custer staying back on the ridges was where he was suppose to be. He sent Yates down to recon and possibly hold the ford as at that time it was devoid of warriors. Custer was awaiting Benteen arrival to give orders on an attack (either all across ford "b", or Benteen at ford "B" and Custer further north at another ford "D"). Custer would not have gone to the ford (B) and then have to ride back up the ridges to meet with Bentenn once he arrived. Everything went wrong when Custer saw all the warriors riding to ford"B" and warriors coming from Weir Hill area instead of Benteeen. Custer was waiting Benteen as he thought Benteen would be there in minutes. Now for Custer knowing Reno retreated--HE NEVER DID!-this can be verified by Martini's ride. Martini asserted that when he reached Weir or there abouts, he turned and saw Custer's troops retreating from ford "B"-which means Custer was already engaged. Martini saw Reno still in the bottom in skirmish or on the timber as he stated -and we have no reason to doubt his word (thats proven by Martini reaching Reno Hill before Reno even started to retreat--or Martini would have run right into the retreat). Martini never mentioned seeing Boyer on the bluffs because Boyer had already left-BEFORE RENO RETREATED- Deduction--Custer never knew Reno retreated--Custer only saw Reno in skirmish as proven by Derudio who saw Custer on the ridge just before Reno went into the timber.
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Post by conz on Jul 10, 2008 7:12:42 GMT -6
Good analysis Clair. ( in replay # 38) I could buy into Yates doing an attack/recon or to demostrate at MTC and then try to decide if Custer stayed back or went forward. But if Custer stayed back, how do we account for him being with Yates at LSH and leaving Keough? In my current model, I have Custer staying on the high ground of the Luce Ridge area to best observe both Yates' squadron's demonstration at the ford to draw the Indians off Reno, and towards him, and looking towards the Weir hills to see what Benteen and Reno are going to do next. If he goes down to the ford, not only does he lose the bubble on what is happening with the rest of the regiment, but he also loses immediate control of Keogh's battalion (if he was going to make a real attack at Ford B the critical command decision would be the commitment of Keogh). So whether its a demonstration or an attack, I think Custer has to stay up on the Ridge with the supporting element (which I currently believe was Keogh, Yates going to the ford, ala Native and other testimony). Now if Yates was just reconning the crossing, I think Custer would have gone with him to best gather information. But I think Custer could see plenty from Luce Ridge environs, and to make his decisions as to what the Natives would do he didn't have to make a recon to the ford. I think from Luce Custer could already see the mass of warriors in and behind the village (Crazy Horse's bunch and more), and knew he couldn't actually cross at the ford and into the tipis. I don't think he ever intended to cross at Ford B. I think his tentative plan, given the information he knew/could see at that moment, as Reno was reaching the top of the bluffs, was to gather his regiment in the vicinity of Luce/Calhoun hills, and find a way to attack the village to the north (via Ford D's). Clair
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Post by conz on Jul 10, 2008 7:29:42 GMT -6
Conz--Custer staying back on the ridges was where he was suppose to be. He sent Yates down to recon and possibly hold the ford as at that time it was devoid of warriors. Yes, but still Custer could not help but see hundreds of Warriors in the vicinity of Ford B...not yet in position there, but they could get there quicker than he could. He could easily see the end of the huge dust trail of Crazy Horse's attack into Reno, and many Warriors still catching up to that. Plenty of testimony from Warriors that were still in the village area when Custer's command came into sight on Luce Ridge. So I don't ever think Custer believed that Ford B was a feasible crossing point, due both to all the Natives in the area and the density of the village at that point (you lose control of your command when you fight in the village itself, which is okay in some situations like a surprise attack, but not in this one I think). Yes, I agree. That's why I think Custer stayed up on the ridge while Yates went down to "develop the situation." I agree...yet it wasn't so wrong that he was still confident that they could attack the Natives (he never wanted to lose the initiative and go on the defensive)...so he took Yates' recalled squadron and headed north away from Keogh, who was left to hold the central position. I think it fairly reliable to assume that Custer thought Benteen, if not Reno as well, would soon be riding to the sound of the guns. What else would they possibly be doing? He could tell there was no more fighting from over Weir hill, and they couldn't all be killed that quickly. I think this is misinterpreted. It is very difficult for any model, both timewise and terrain wise, to have Martin seeing Yates arriving at Ford B, much less seeing him fight, lose, and withdraw. Just doesn't work no matter how you cut it, if you wargame it out. A couple authors have postulated that what Martin saw was Keogh going up the ridge (part of Luce...maybe "east Luce"), and Yates headed west starting his ride towards the Ford, and it looked like he was retreating from Natives on the Luce ridge area, either north or east of the cavalrymen. So when Martin leaves, it is the beginning of Custer's deployments, not the post-Ford B action. I think that any position where Bouyer was watching both Custer and Reno couldn't be seen by Martin and his route back to Benteen. So we shouldn't be surprised at this...they were on opposite sides (east and west) of Weir hill. Some believe this, but I don't. In any event, I think Custer could tell Reno was done and running just by the noise and dust. Civil War experienced commanders could tell a lot by how the sound travels, the type and intensity of the sound, and dust evidence. Its the traditional method of "blue force tracking." <g> Some more things to think about anyway... Thanks, Clair
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walkingstar
New Member
Life is but a dream...
Posts: 39
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Post by walkingstar on Jul 23, 2008 19:45:51 GMT -6
I would like to add another choice not offered in this pole Keogh's main Mission at Calhoun Hill was:
Seeing no sign of Benteen, and hundreds of warriors on almost every flank, he placed Keogh and his three companies on the (relative speaking), high point at Calhoun Hill to act as a look out for Benteen and, to protect Custer's rear as he moved further north on Custer's ridge.
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Post by biggordie on Jul 23, 2008 21:37:00 GMT -6
walkingstar:
Your scenario is one long-favored by writers on the subject, probably really starting with Kuhlman's Legend Into History. It is as valid a theory now as it was then, which is to say, like beauty, it is in the eye of the beholder.
Gordie
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