Keogh's mission

[conz]

Trouble with this poll is that there can be more than one "correct" answer (that only God and Custer know <g>). But if we can only choose one, choose the most important reason you believe Keogh was there...or just vote more than once if able.

Clair

[wild]

Like the old soldiers refrain ..................................................
He was there because he was there.

He was there because he was 4th squadron in a line of 5 awaiting Benteen.

[pohanka]

The first three selections were very probable as a force at that location would have served all three purposes. What is a certainty is that the troops were not forced to that location. there is a substantive amount of evidence that shows that Custer traveled beyond Last Stand Hill' down Cemetery Ridge, to a location approximately near the current visitor's Center. Such actions could not have occurred if the troops were being sorely pressed by thousands of natives. Eventually, a sufficient amount of warriors did arrive, came within close proximate of trooper positions, and poured rifle fire into their ranks. then the inevitable occurred, the decimated troops broke ranks and fled.
As Conz pointed out, there is more than one "correct" answer.

[Dark Cloud]

"What is a certainty is that the troops were not forced to that location." Really. I'd think a restrained and wise view would be that nothing can be considered a certainty (absent slaughter) beyond MTC.

"there is a substantive amount of evidence that shows that Custer traveled beyond Last Stand Hill' down Cemetery Ridge, to a location approximately near the current visitor's Center." Really? What evidence to the exclusion of all other possibility and probability exists I've missed? Remember: 'to the exclusion....'

"Such actions could not have occurred if the troops were being sorely pressed by thousands of natives." Nonsense. Of course such actions could have occured - however unlikely - and given the Indians (current wisdom) were mostly on foot, the 7th could have retained some cohesion for awhile in their retreat till inundated. The description of the LSH on the 28th, much depleted from what is now indicated, doesn't look like a unit on the offensive, given the clump of officer material at the top of a hill and not in the middle of a defensive position, a conclusion falsely installed by the fence and the closely placed markers. Rather, at the tip of a wobbly arrow which officer mounts would reach first.

Note to Pohanka: no, there's only one correct answer unless the question is "What absurd excuse are you willing to align youself with for Custer failing to either attack, support, or survive that won't include the possibility of temporary incompetence that happens to just about everyone? Except Our Heartthrob..."

[biggordie]

The basic question one must ask of one's self, and of the evidence, is why was whoever wherever they were, and why would they have selected that position.

Why would Keogh have been posted in such a way that he could see virtually nothing, was not within true supporting distance of most of the other troop positions, and was at the mercy of warriors firing into his command from several directions?

Why would E Company be positioned on the "South Skirmish Line" where they also would be exposed to fire from several directions by warriors under cover?

Why would Custer have selected that knob at the end of Battle Ridge to make a defense, subject to fire from the eastern ridge, from the ravines and depressions below "his" hill and from those below Battle Ridge to the right [looking from the river]?

Why would Calhoun Hill and Calhoun Ridge be populated and defended by a mere double handful of troops, when it was arguably the best defensive position in the area?

Military men [sorry Fred and Clair] would not CHOOSE such positions. Why then were they there? "Driven " is not the word I would choose, but it is close. It is quite evident that a corrected map of the true marker locations indicates a decided lack of organized defense, and an ad hoc and visceral response to warrior pressures and interventions.

What I call "Lop and Chop."

Gordie

[pohanka]

Dark Cloud:

Note to Pohanka: no, there's only one correct answer unless the question is "What absurd excuse are you willing to align youself with for Custer failing to either attack, support, or survive that won't include the possibility of temporary incompetence that happens to just about everyone? Except Our Heartthrob..." [/quote]

---

I must admit that I find your line of rationality a bit unusual albeit I may have misconstrued your meaning. Are you suggesting that Custer did not "attack" if so how can you be "certain" that he did not do so? Secondly, military support comes in various manners. There are some who would construe the soldier approach at Ford "B" as a form of support intended to draw the warriors away from Reno which it certainly did, intended or not.

Lastly, failing to survive and, subsequently, succumbing to a horrible and violent death is not so much a "failure" as it is bad luck. I'm certain he tried his best not to die. Let us give him a little credit for that. As you say there are no "certainties" in life sans death. However, military maneuvers upon the field of battle are extremely difficult if not impossible unless the field is void of enemy forces. Thus, the military movements I alluded to, which we know occurred, only make sense if Custer was not heavily pressed, by the enemy, during said maneuvers in question. We may, therefore, be reasonably "certain" that the first three selections are perfectly logical even if we are not capable of totally substantiating them.

[AZ Ranger]

I would like someone who thinks Custer went to the river to pull troops off of Reno explain what the heck the plan was? Draw the Indians from Reno so they could join the over 1,000 warriors all ready steaming in to surround 5 companies when Custer just sent for the pack track to bring whatever thereby making it easy for the Indians to intercept it and have it to use against the troopers.

Custer failed to recognize there were more warriors than those after Reno. In my opinion there were probably only 1/3 of the warriors or less opposing Reno. The others were getting horses, preparing to fight, and waiting in ambush. There is nothing offensive in nature other than Reno's charge down the valley. Riding around on the wrong side of the river doesn't count. It would appear to me Custer was checked and never got to go on the offensive.

If only the had one Marine Recon Team to have checked things out before making a plan.

AZ Ranger

[Dark Cloud]

We can be certain of nothing, but there is no evidence for an attack. He had his chance at MTC and didn't take it for whatever reason.

No soldier, I'd still wager military 'support' comes in very few manners, not subject to confusing interpretation by participants, mostly involving taking violent actions to allow a common mission to be accomplished, perhaps by relieving pressure on a fellow unit. The support promised by Custer was to Reno's charge. An hour after waving Reno off, it's a separate action altogether.

There ARE some who "would construe the soldier approach at Ford "B" as a form of support intended to draw the warriors away from Reno which it certainly did, intended or not." Well, no, a tad late. After roughly a half hour of ominous inaction from the eastern banks while in action himself, Reno retired to high ground to reunite the command.

Apparantly it wasn't a good idea to keep someone on Weir Point who could see and signal both commands and Benteen's approach. Like in "Airplane." No. They'd be expecting that.

The supposed feint as theory falls apart because Custer would be doing so already having selected with unerring eye the worst cavalry ground to the horizon in any direction. He had to know that the feint to be successful would indeed draw an attack upon himself, requiring defense if not retreat back south. We're to believe he refined his choices and eliminate all hope in the selection of the highest ridges with no shelter and complete exposure from all sides to Sioux positions with good shelter with the same fine taste in real estate. This is akin to believing he sent sent Keogh up to the biggest headdress to do his Harry Anderson routine to keep them busy, or that he found solace in their famous long range accuracy or weapon wielding horsemanship.

"Thus, the military movements I alluded to, which we know occurred, only make sense if Custer was not heavily pressed, by the enemy, during said maneuvers in question." Again, we don't know they occurred, and you've provided no evidence they did to the exclusion of other possbilities or probabilities. There is evidence that doesn't conflict with them, but the evidence doesn't conflict with several other scenarios either, and involves no suddenly robustly competent 7th in dance line movement.

[conz]

Jun 5, 2008 18:17:04 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

I would like someone who thinks Custer went to the river to pull troops off of Reno explain what the heck the plan was? Draw the Indians from Reno so they could join the over 1,000 warriors all ready steaming in to surround 5 companies when Custer just sent for the pack track to bring whatever thereby making it easy for the Indians to intercept it and have it to use against the troopers.

I think Custer was told by Bouyer that Reno was in trouble, and Custer had Yates go down to the ford to relieve the pressure, which it did. Custer saved Reno's command.

Custer certainly had his hands full, but it was still okay, as long as Reno/Benteen came back to engage the Warriors. Custer still knew that he had the Warriors in a vice between him and the rest of the regiment. Think offensively...there were a lot of Warriors, but that is
GOOD, not bad...the more there are, the more you can kill. The only bad outcome is if they scatter. Now after you kill enough of them, they WILL run, and then you can destroy their village.

So what's the problem? <g>

Custer failed to recognize there were more warriors than those after Reno. In my opinion there were probably only 1/3 of the warriors or less opposing Reno. The others were getting horses, preparing to fight, and waiting in ambush. There is nothing offensive in nature other than Reno's charge down the valley. Riding around on the wrong side of the river doesn't count. It would appear to me Custer was checked and never got to go on the offensive.

In effect, I agree, but not in intent. Rather, my perception is that Custer never got set in a defense, and that was the tactical error that damaged the 7th so much. Custer was TOO offensive, in intent, even though, as you say, the consequences of that intent were no more than to save Reno's command by drawing the Natives to him.

As for numbers, I agree that there were so many Natives still in the village that they formed an "accidental" reserve and prevented Custer from taking his whole command across the MTC ford. I think that would have been his first choice, but that he saw too many Natives in the vicinity to attempt that, so he just sent Yates to make a demonstration.

If only the had one Marine Recon Team to have checked things out before making a plan.

You guys take too long. Now if they had been infiltrated, say, onto Wier Point, undetected, the night before...NOW you're talking!

Clair

[biggordie]

Clair:

Had Custer crossed at MTC ford, HE would have been the one caught in the vise - between the warriors from the northern camps and those who had defeated Reno.

Trapping alerted warriors would have been much like tightening a vise on a scoop of ice cream - most of it will not be enclosed between the jaws.

Custer was basically toast once he went past MTC, even if he had simply continued on north in an attempt to join Terry. His horses would never have made it very far, especially if he had come down Ash Creek at the speed which Fred thinks he did .

One USMC Recon team, twelve helicopter gunships, and four squadrons from Clair's old armored regiment [or even the modern Seventh] should do the job, with some engineers to throw a bridge over the LBH at Ford A. The Recon team could remain in situ atop Weir Point and direct the balance.

Gordie

[pohanka]

Dark Cloud
The supposed feint as theory falls apart because Custer would be doing so already having selected with unerring eye the worst cavalry ground to the horizon in any direction. He had to know that the feint to be successful would indeed draw an attack upon himself, requiring defense if not retreat back south. We're to believe he refined his choices and eliminate all hope in the selection of the highest ridges with no shelter and complete exposure from all sides to Sioux positions with good shelter with the same fine taste in real estate. This is akin to believing he sent sent Keogh up to the biggest headdress to do his Harry Anderson routine to keep them busy, or that he found solace in their famous long range accuracy or weapon wielding horsemanship.

---

Custer did not select "the worst cavalry ground" to fight, he was (eventually) trapped there. Despite your subtle inference of lunacy, Custer's intent was to cross ford"A" and capture Indian, non-combatants fleeing south on flat land, perfect for calvary. This movement was in tandem with Reno's thrust north, again on flat land. Realizing the need for additional manpower he waited upon Cemetery Ridge for Benteen who has been summoned to him. Benteen did not arrive, Company "L" is overwhelmed, panic troops rush towards Keogh's position who, in turn, are overwhelmed. Observing this implosion of soldier positions Custer moved Troops "E" and "F" to succor the remnants of troopers from Keogh's command.

---

Dark Cloud
"Thus, the military movements I alluded to, which we know occurred, only make sense if Custer was not heavily pressed, by the enemy, during said maneuvers in question." Again, we don't know they occurred, and you've provided no evidence they did to the exclusion of other possibilities or probabilities. There is evidence that doesn't conflict with them, but the evidence doesn't conflict with several other scenarios either, and involves no suddenly robustly competent 7th in dance line movement.[/quote]

---

I have provided no evidence and never will because there is no evidence for this issue. The failure to do so in no way subtracts from the rational possibility that the thesis has merit. It was certainly not my intent to exclude all other possibilities. Susch a supposition would be the height of arrogance on my part. All things are possible.

[Dark Cloud]

Pohanka, you have the affected writing style of another. Giving you the benefit of the doubt, for the moment.

1. You said originally: "Thus, the military movements I alluded to, which we know occurred, only make sense if Custer was not heavily pressed, by the enemy, during said maneuvers in question." Now, you say "he was trapped there."

2. "Despite your subtle inference of lunacy, Custer's intent was to cross ford"A" and capture Indian, non-combatants fleeing south on flat land, perfect for calvary." There's never been any accusation of lunacy. We can only assume Custer's intent. We cannot know it.

3. "This movement was in tandem with Reno's thrust north, again on flat land." No, it was not. He was puttering around Weir Point when Reno retreated, and then was still a ways from any crossing or feint.

3. "Realizing the need for additional manpower he waited upon Cemetery Ridge for Benteen who has been summoned to him." We have no evidence he was on Cemetery Ridge at all, nor do we know he was waiting for Benteen. Nor was Benteen summoned "to him," one thing we do know from the note.

4."I have provided no evidence and never will because there is no evidence for this issue. The failure to do so in no way subtracts from the rational possibility that the thesis has merit. It was certainly not my intent to exclude all other possibilities. Susch a supposition would be the height of arrogance on my part. All things are possible." Well, Wiggs, you can't claim "Thus, the military movements I alluded to, which we know occurred, only make sense if Custer was not heavily pressed, by the enemy, during said maneuvers in question" since you've said there's no evidence for that which "we know occurred" and there cannot be for those very contentions. To "know" ya need "evidence," which your supposed vast experience as a teacher, soldier, law enforcement officer provided.

[pohanka]

In both posts I clearly stated that Custer was able to maneuver for some time before "eventually" coming to a point in time when he no longer could do so. The fatalistic end of an engagement does not preclude the possibility that the beginning and middle of a military engagement was not capable of free or slightly impaired movement. Therefore, when reviewed under this context, the perception of "freedom of movement" and eventually being "trapped" do not contradict.

Your assumption, posted by you, that Custer chose indefensible ridges by choice would confirm that he was a lunatic, if it were true. Of course it is not. It is certain that one can not know the intent of Custer. If I left that impression I humbly apologize. My aim was to present logical propositions based upon reasonableness.


Capt. Henry Freeman's sketch of his observation at Custer battlefield shows cavalry action low on Cemetery Ridge. P188, fig. 11-5 Fox

Map by Capt. R. E. Johnson from testimonies taken in 1876 shows action on Cemetery Ridge. p184, fig.11-3

In 1956 John Stands In Timber, then the Cheyenne tribal historian, pointed out a ford to Don Rickey. That ford depicted on map, p.176, Fox a short distance below Cemetery Ridge.
I am not addressing "evidence" or "intent" just probabilities.

Under the circumstances Custer faced (no telephone, telegraph, satellite, or other modern form of communication, a note delivered by a trained "orderly" to a senior commander, "Come Quick", is pretty much the best he could have done. I understand Benteen's confusion as he certainly did not wish to go backward towards the pack trains when he was being urged to come forward, quickly, by his commander. If the words "Benteen. Come Quick" was not a summons by Custer, what was it?

To prove anything in life you need factual evidence. To cease discussion without evidence would bring about an extremely boring forum, would you not agree?

Your last paragraph is, forgive me, extremely convoluted. I simply do not understand your gist, honestly...

Despite your apparent annoyance, I am merely attempting to contribute and learn. As a new member of this forum, I am impressed with the knowledge and contritions by it's members, which of course includes you.

This is truly an informative group of individuals!

[biggordie]

pohanka:

The Cheyenne ford is generally known as Ford D, which is what you undoubtedly meant to say. Ford A is designated as the ford which Reno first crossed into the valley [near the mouth of Ash Creek]. Ford B is the MTC ford. Ford C is the ford at the foot of Deep Ravine [sometimes called Crazy Horse Ravine and Crazy Horse ford - not to be confused with the ford near HWY 212 which some believe - mistakenly - that Crazy Horse crossed to come at Custer from the northwest/north/ northeast]. I was introduced to Ford D in 1960 by a group of Cheyenne men.

Depending upon where you think Cemetery Ridge is/was, and the flat there upon which JSIT said that Custer stopped for twenty minutes or so, Custer would not have been in view of Benteen, should the latter actually have asked Martin where Custer had gone and had attempted to follow his trail [assuming that Reno had not retreated and was not, as he in fact was, on the bluffs in a somewhat discomfited state].

There's a convoluted sentence for you.

Regards,

Gordie

[pohanka]

Let me clear this matter up and, thank you for catcing my error. I meant to say Ford "D". Actually there were two of them, "D1" and "D2". "D1" refers to the vicinity Stands In Timber advised Rickey of in 1956. "D2" was surmised from the clark map of 1877.

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to rectify my grievous error.