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Post by conz on Jun 7, 2008 10:53:16 GMT -6
Clair: Had Custer crossed at MTC ford, HE would have been the one caught in the vise - between the warriors from the northern camps and those who had defeated Reno. Aye, and he could see this, which is why he didn't do it, I'd surmise. As those Natives were pulled to the MTC ford, he might have wanted to get around them to the north (the proposed northern ford foray). Tactics say that if you hit an enemy from two directions, he is more likely to try to break contact (run)...or at least he may back off his main attack. Even in Germany in the 80s, waiting for the Russian hordes to attack, we presumed to conduct a fighting withdrawal against the point of their attack (like Reno should have been doing), and make counter-attacks against their flanks until we broke them...and that being outnumbered five to one in the combat area...what were Custer's odds? True, but while they are doing this they aren't overrunning your positions. Sometimes just getting them in a vise makes them run, but not this bunch that day...the cavalrymen would have to kill quite a few with their dismounted skirmish lines before they would "break." I disagree because there was no expectation that Custer's command could have been much hurt. You could say that you think his mission was blown by this point, but I wouldn't make that judgment call...I think it was still possible to destroy the village and hurt enough Warriors to cause them to surrender that fall. But tactically I don't think it is right to think that Custer's command had a good chance of being annihilated...there was very little chance of that. It did happen, of course, but that was a VERY LUCKY THING. Shoot, we could overrun Iran and destroy Tehran with that force... Clair
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Post by biggordie on Jun 7, 2008 19:49:18 GMT -6
Clair:
That is our main point of disagreement, and my main disagreement with most everyone else. While there might have been "no expectation" of Custer's being wiped out [by the military], in the circumstances as they were, he had no hope. His horses were only in good enough shape to get him to where he thought he had a chance of success [at Ford D] and part way back to where he had come from.
The warriors he thought were running as part of the fleeing village were in fact racing to get to the fords in the Ford D area before he did, and they beat him there. I don't think that it was a "very lucky thing" that these warriors defeated him in such a fashion. There were more than enough of them, and well enough armed, to do the job.
If you wanted to argue that Custer was unlucky in erring in his interpretation of what he saw from SSR; in having the warriors beat him to the fords; in having a number of returning hunters, augmented by warriors already across on his side of the river blocking his path to the north beyond Custer Hill; in having his ability to retreat to Blummer or back to Weir disappear because Reno had freed up more warriors to block his passage; and etc etc etc and blah blah blah - then I would tend to agree with you.
Of course, when I say that Custer was toast, that is in retrospect, and given what I know happened after he did cross MTC and head toward Ford D. Certainly he did not think he was going to be annihilated, or even beaten. He could probably never envisage such a thing as five companies of cavalry, commanded by anyone, especially himself, suffering such a disaster. Neither could any of his officers [except Reno and his lieutenants], and of course Benteen, who knew everything. If I'd been one of his officers, I'd probably have thought the same as he likely did.
Gordie
PS I wouldn't be too eager to attack Iran with that force. Iran is not Iraq, and their warplanes are not necessarily buried in the desert for protection. You'd need air cover, I'd think, not being a military man my ownself.
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Post by biggordie on Jun 7, 2008 19:59:46 GMT -6
pohanka:
Your "error" was a slip of the fingers on the keyboard obviously, and hence hardly grievous, and I did not mean to imply that it was. As you are a new member here, I could not know your level of expertise. I was merely attempting to be helpful with some additional information, which you probably already had. Who knew?
There were actually several "usual" fords in the general area known as Ford D, at least four. Since the course of the river has been altered over the years, it is rather difficult to be exact as to where they all were. The fact is that one could cross that section of the river just about anywhere, but some crossings were easier in the getting in and getting out [banks not so high].
If you Google Earth that area, you can easily pick out the old river channel.
Regards,
Gordie
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 8, 2008 9:56:08 GMT -6
I'm relatively sure pohanka is the former realbird is Wiggs. If so, apportion your energy accordingly.
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Post by pohanka on Jun 8, 2008 11:17:32 GMT -6
Thanks Gordie, my thanks were sincere and remain so.
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Post by pohanka on Jun 8, 2008 13:07:10 GMT -6
With all respect Dark Cloud, I've observed past threads involving you and Wiggs and I desire no part of it.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 9, 2008 6:42:07 GMT -6
That would be at the 90 percent confidence level of who it is.
AZ Ranger
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Post by conz on Jun 9, 2008 8:40:48 GMT -6
His horses were only in good enough shape to get him to where he thought he had a chance of success [at Ford D] and part way back to where he had come from. Do you mean you don't think the horses were in good enough shape to go any further? If so, I don't get that sense at all. Most weren't fresh enough to outrun (or catch) the Indian ponies that day, but they certainly were still "combat effective" for military purposes. I don't think the condition of the horses had anything to do with the outcome at Custer Ridge. "To do the job" requires explanation, I think. If you mean that there were enough to eliminate any chance of Custer's battalions surviving, I think that is a gross misread of military theory. If you mean that there were enough to take advantage of Custer's mistakes when the opportunity arose for a decisive move, then I think you are correct. But all the Sioux in Christendom couldn't have destroyed Custer's unit if the officers had made decisions to prioritize the safety of their own units. Now that is a military judgment call, but tempered by the study of history, and the theory of warfare, especially in regard to the importance of numbers on a battlefield. Yes, that is very much what I mean, except that it was not a "numbers" judgment that was in error, per se, but rather a judgment as to the Native deployments and their imminent danger to his command if he was caught out of position. That is an error both in misreading the Native deployments and numbers in those deployments, and underestimating their capability for taking quick advantage of a mistake. Custer was not being "careful" enough. Go figure. <g> Aye, but again, I'd like to rienforce the idea that by military terms, Custer should not have been destroyed on that ridge. He should have been able to defend himself just fine, as Reno did, and caused more Native casualties than he took. That this did not happen, is the guilt of Custer and his command. He gets no excuse by saying that the numbers made anything he did irrelevant, once he crossed the MTC. So true...we tend to take control of the skies for granted in the American Army. <g> Clair
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Post by biggordie on Jun 9, 2008 9:18:35 GMT -6
Clair:
What I meant to imply by my mention of the horses' conditions was that they were not in good enough shape to break out from the troop positions, either toward the north or toward MTC, and get very far. You and I obviously disagree on how the troops came to be where they were, and on the part played in the whole thing by military doctrine and deployments, and I rather doubt that I could convince you otherwise, which is why I don't debate theories.
I don't think that Custer or any other of his officers had the time to consider the NDN deployments when attempting to make their own, or that they were given much time at all to make any meaningful military deployments.
You have to reconstruct the correct death sites of the troops by studying the reports, accounts, and placement of spurious markers, and once you go through this exercise, you will find that military deployments are most noticeable by their absence.
If you do that, you will - I guarantee it - come to the conclusion that there were few, if any, military dispositions made in that fight. I know that it is hard to swallow that for a military man, but that is one of the problems with attempting to arrive at the truth of what happened - everything that happens in a fight such as this one does not necessarily follow military rules and prescriptions/proscriptions.
I don't think that the numbers alone made anything he did irrelevant. It was a combination of factors, including his misinterpretation of what he saw before he moved north across MTC.
Warrior casualty numbers are a horse of a different color, and have been debated ad nauseum on this forum, and the other one as well. If you backtrack on those particular threads, you will find that I believe the NDNs suffered casualties in excess of 300 [give or take]. I realize that I am a chorus of one on this subject, but there you go.
Lop and chop, my friend. Lop and chop.............*
Regards,
Gordie
* I may change the title of my book. LOL.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 9, 2008 10:55:51 GMT -6
BigGordy,
By "casualties," you mean just dead, wounded, missing, and captured, right? Not just dead?
AZ,
Eee-yup.
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Post by bc on Jun 9, 2008 11:20:52 GMT -6
Guess I'm with Clair on the horse depletion issue. I don't think they were depleted to the point of combat inefectiveness. Benteen's horses were pretty much on the move (except for a drink at the morass) with him covering a lot more territory than Keough and Benteen's horses weren't considered depleted, I don't think. Weir and him managed to move on to Weir point without a horse problem after their ride. I say that, whether I buy into the theory that they walked most of the way or moved quickly down Reno Creek depending upon which theory and timeline that is believed. I suspect they moved quickly but there are too many who follow Wallace's timeline and say they walked and I'm still studying the issue.
Regarding soldier death sites, my thoughts are that along with a scattering of the horse holders, you wouldn't necessarily find them on a line or a military looking deployment. And except for the soldiers picked off while in skirmish line order, I suspect that when the NA mass wave attack (a la the chinese in Korea) broke through there was enough hand to hand fighting and some withdrawal away from the skirmish line (note that I'm not saying panic) that there may not remain much of a delineation of bodies after all the head bashing and stripping of bodies. I also believe that they were basically flanked and surrounded when killed and the flanking movement by the NAs would cause the disintegration of any skirmish lines and create a haphazard array of bodies. Any frontal breakthrough of a skirmish line by the NAs would only have happened after the lines were outflanked and then disintegrated by the flanking action. Troops are trained to maintain a fire discipline to the front but roll up their flank and you have a different story.
If I were to study the body locations, I would want to consider their location against where the cartridge evidence shows they were on a skirmish line. Then try to determine which flank movement (assuming only one but they may have been outflanked from a number of directions) caused the troop movements to their death sites (assuming those are accurate or reasonably close).
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 9, 2008 12:03:26 GMT -6
1. "If I were to study the body locations,...." You mean markers, indicative of initial burial, probably near where corpse was found. Since we have photo evidence and testimony, why wouldn't this be the first thing, given its surety is above else?
2. "... I would want to consider their location against where the cartridge evidence shows they were on a skirmish line." There is no such evidence, nor could there be. All that is sure is manufacture date and location found. What decade fired, what direction, by whom at whom, no clue whatsoever. There is evidence that is not incompatable with your wishes, but no more. You want there to have been skirmish lines, so all evidence must so conform.
3. "Then try to determine which flank movement (assuming only one but they may have been outflanked from a number of directions)...." Outflanked from a number of directions? You mean "surrounded"?
4. "...caused the troop movements to their death sites (assuming those are accurate or reasonably close)." You mean marker site, which is only, absent testimony, indicative of general area where body was found, not necessarily death site.
5. You say "too many" follow Wallace's time line. What would be just right? What is you criteria for this decision?
We don't know which are the spurious markers, but it makes no difference. When you place the bodies where photos and testimony place them, remove any 10 markers from the remaining, you have a thready, thin grouping with many officers at the bulge at the hill top, not surrounded by a defense which we're to think they commanded. It looks very much like they were shot off their mounts on arrival at the hill top enroute to somewhere beyond, followed by their men as best they could.
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Post by biggordie on Jun 9, 2008 16:03:16 GMT -6
dc:
In terms of the NDN casualties, I mean killed or died of wounds, on the field or later. Wounded and subsequently recovered, I have no idea of the numbers involved, except that it probably was large or largish or a bunch.
All:
When I finished my initial research on the markers and their locations , there were 252 markers on the Custer battlefield portion of the National Monument, and I figured that there should have been an absolute maximum of 197, so that there were at least 55 spurious markers [slightly more than 20% of the total]. Not all of Custer's 210 died within the boundary fences.
After comparing maps and photographs and etc etc etc and blah blah blah, I arrived at revised locations and numbers as follows:
2 Northwest of Custer Hill 10 Top of Custer Hill 32 Slope of Custer Hill 44 South Skirmish Line and stragglers 9 String between South Skirmish Line and Finley Group 11 Finley Group 5 String between Finley Group and Calhoun Hill 9 Calhoun Hill 12 String between Calhoun Hill and Keogh Group 19 Keogh Group 29 Mid Keogh Swale Group 8 North Keogh Swale 9 River side of Battle Ridge
199 Total corrected number of markers
I did not eliminate the other two [minimum], since I had no basis, in my mind, upon which to do so.
Except for the South Skirmish line, there is nothing remotely resembling a formed skirmish line at proper intervals. The reported "skirmish lines" on Calhoun Ridge and Calhoun Hill were figments of someone's imagination, unless you believe that five bodies strung out over more than 200 yards is evidence of a skirmish line.
But as I wrote to conz above, I hold out no hope whatsoever of convincing anyone of anything, which is why I merely post information and let people continue in their beliefs, which is what most everyone seems to do [and of course they're entitled and welcome to do so].
Hell, if I converted everyone, I'd lose my potential audience for my marvelous book, when it eventually is finished - in as Captain Brittles was fond of saying "ten or twelve years."
Gordie
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Post by bc on Jun 9, 2008 16:54:17 GMT -6
Gordie, regarding the cav horse depletion issue, I think they could always break out until such time as the NAs took out the horse holders and scared them off. I agree that in a horse race, the NAs would outrun the cav in their condition. However, an organized withdrawal with covering fire (a la Godfrey) may still have been possible up until the horses were run off which may have been early or later in the battle(I don't know). I also don't believe most of the NAs had their ponies but were actually on foot.
I'm not disputing your theory regarding the marker dispositions and your assertion regarding a military deployment. I don't know enough to do so. Just making commentary is all which I assume you will consider whenever you publish said information. I can't really make an assessment until such time as I see your marker/burial map overlaid is military and NA dispositions and movements. Only then can I develop a theory regarding the markers and how everything fits in. The markers and placement is just another piece of the puzzle regarding that battle that all needs to be tied in and I'm not privy to the info you have and don't have the time to do the research. Good luck.
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Post by conz on Jun 10, 2008 6:58:21 GMT -6
I can't disagree with anything bc said above.
Gordie's point about lack of evidence for skirmish lines is okay...maybe there weren't any. But I think that to be improbable. As bc said, the evidence does not indicate that there were no skirmish lines any more than that there were...it simply isn't a good indicator of their presence or lack thereof.
I don't believe the evidence can tell us anything about skirmish lines here, so we are left with theory. And theory says that skirmish lines were there, to be sure.
Here's my take, by theory, on your body counts:
Reg't'l HQ and F Co: 2 Northwest of Custer Hill 10 Top of Custer Hill 32 Slope of Custer Hill
E Co: 44 South Skirmish Line and stragglers
C Co: 9 String between South Skirmish Line and Finley Group 11 Finley Group 5 String between Finley Group and Calhoun Hill
L Co: 9 Calhoun Hill 12 String between Calhoun Hill and Keogh Group 19 Keogh Group
I Co: 29 Mid Keogh Swale Group 8 North Keogh Swale
Mix of all above (smooths out the numbers): 9 River side of Battle Ridge
And these groupings correspond to the areas they fought in, of course, either a defensive position, falling back from a position, or in the attack.
In theory <g>... Clair
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