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Post by fred on Nov 15, 2007 20:46:40 GMT -6
In all likelihood, C Company was posted between Calhoun Hill and the southern portion of Battle Ridge. They looked west toward the river and Greasy Grass Ridge... [Finley Ridge, taken from Calhoun Hill.][Calhoun Coulee, with Finley Ridge to the left.]They waited... Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 6:56:58 GMT -6
√ Indians east and southeast of Keogh remained at a distance because the barren terrain in that area did not afford them the cover that the broken terrain and coulees north, west, and northwest gave other infiltrating warriors. Infiltration up a small, broad coulee (Calhoun Coulee) began to pose a threat, especially to the cavalry horses, and Keogh sent Company C (2LT Harrington), mounted, to confront it. • Until Company C undertook this mission into Calhoun Coulee, the command—as a whole—rode on the offensive. • Company L’s horses were probably held just to the west of Calhoun Hill, in a little notch between it and Custer Ridge. • Company C rode about 500 yards down a draw. • Soldiers pulled up and dismounted at a low ridge, just north of the deep gulch, where the Indians had been.
** This action was a unit action and therefore had a specific purpose, i.e., to drive infiltrating Indians from this ridge and coulee where they posed a threat to the cavalry horses and to Calhoun Hill. ** Their dismounting probably indicated the soldiers’ intent to occupy the upper reaches of the coulee. • No evidence of a skirmish line set up in Calhoun Coulee. • Brief activity. • Soldiers were also fired on from Greasy Grass Ridge. • Warriors initially backed off, then counterattacked when they saw the soldiers dismount, driving the company up to Calhoun Ridge in disorder.
** The closeness of Company C to numerous Indians in the coulee played a crucial role in undermining company unity. Once the soldiers were routed, the nearness of the Indians east and south of Calhoun Hill allowed them to respond quickly to the developing confusion (as Indians were prone to do during moments of weakness and indecision). • Evidence indicates Indians and soldiers occupied this area, Indians, totally, after soldiers moved to Calhoun Ridge. • There are 3 cavalry markers on the coulee ridgeline and another 4 in the coulee—1 near Calhoun Ridge—and clear-cut evidence of a cavalry position there. Markers in the upper reaches show where some soldiers died during the charge.
√ Once on Calhoun/Finley Ridge, there was little soldier firing. • Heavy Indian fire from Greasy Grass Ridge and from the east and south as well. • Evidence suggests soldiers traversed ridge very quickly, did not stop, but took a number of casualties. Severe: 12 cavalry markers on this ridge (Company C, only). At least 19 Company C dead at this time (out of 36 EM), well in excess of 50% casualties. • In essence, no soldier resistance on this ridge. Evidence of “bunching” with some soldiers on foot, some mounted.
√ Liddic uses a different scenario for the beginning of the Calhoun Ridge/Finley Ridge fighting. He has a “squad” of C Company still in their position, “a few hundred yards west of Finley Hill.” These were the troops Liddic claims covered the pullback of “Keogh’s” men from Ford B. He also has more C Company men—under the command of 1SG Bobo—on Finley Ridge. [Vanishing Victory, p. 150] • Then he has Crow King leaving the Reno fight, riding through the village, and crossing the LBH at Deep Ravine, then moving up “a branch of Deep Ravine, to the southeast, which brought them very close to ‘C’ platoon’s right flank.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 150]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by erkki on Nov 19, 2007 9:35:20 GMT -6
"Halfway down the slope of the hogback toward the river, about forty soldiers of C Company mounted their sorrel horses and broke out of encirclement. Charging west, they came galloping toward the deep gulch held by most of the Cheyennes and many Ogalalas and Brules. The Indians fell back drawing them on. When the troopers reached a low ridge just vacated by the Indians, they halted and dismounted [Greasy Grass]. Down in the gulch, Lame White Man, the Southern Cheyenne chief who had to fight because he had no son, rallied the warriors.
"'Come on!' he shouted. 'Now we can kill them all.!'" Custer's Fall, p. 143.
This is the charge spoken of by Kate Bighead and Wooden Leg, but it came off Calhoun Ridge not Battle Ridge. Keogh's battalion was described as posted along Battle Ridge and Calhoun Ridge in an upside down, reverse L:
I Co. L Co. ------ C Co. Tactically, L Co. occupied the middle of Keogh's battalion, and the situation was not such that Keogh could have been holding C Co. in reserve. HQ, Co. E & F were in the vicinity of, if not on, LSH and the two units were not in contact.
Then the fighting became "furious" and all five companies were rolled up within half an hour.
Note that Two Moon later took credit for the charge led by Lame White Man, but I doubt very much that he had got there from the valley fight when the LWM charge occurred.
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 3, 2007 0:05:23 GMT -6
"Halfway down the slope of the hogback toward the river, about forty soldiers of C Company mounted their sorrel horses and broke out of encirclement. Charging west, they came galloping toward the deep gulch held by most of the Cheyennes and many Ogalalas and Brules. The Indians fell back drawing them on. When the troopers reached a low ridge just vacated by the Indians, they halted and dismounted [Greasy Grass]. Down in the gulch, Lame White Man, the Southern Cheyenne chief who had to fight because he had no son, rallied the warriors. "'Come on!' he shouted. 'Now we can kill them all.!'" Custer's Fall, p. 143. This is the charge spoken of by Kate Bighead and Wooden Leg, but it came off Calhoun Ridge not Battle Ridge. Keogh's battalion was described as posted along Battle Ridge and Calhoun Ridge in an upside down, reverse L: I Co. L Co. ------ C Co. Tactically, L Co. occupied the middle of Keogh's battalion, and the situation was not such that Keogh could have been holding C Co. in reserve. HQ, Co. E & F were in the vicinity of, if not on, LSH and the two units were not in contact. Then the fighting became "furious" and all five companies were rolled up within an hour. Note that Two Moon later took credit for the charge led by Lame White Man, but I doubt very much that he had got there from the valley fight when the LWM charge occurred. I must concur for the most part with Erkki's model presented above. Very well described and fits very nicely with warrior statements, the nature of the ground and the sequence of events as they unfolded.
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Post by herosrest on Aug 5, 2012 18:02:28 GMT -6
There is not one iota of evidence, let alone proof, that significant elements of 7th Cavalry under Custer's immediate command, depioyed to the locale of Blummer's ridge. Certainly not from Medicine Tail, or even , as indicated by Freeman, from the divide between Medicine Tail and Deep Creek. What can be reiled upon is method, as given in Custer's account of the 1873 fighting. One officer and twenty men, protecting the column,s six to the east. Henry B. Freeman shows how they got where they were. He indicated the route of march.
Which company deployed men is moot, no bodies were found.l
There was no reason to move down river from the mouth of Deep Coulee, non-coms - the women and children ran west across the valley. The retreat from the mouth of Deep Coulee was a fight, all the way. Custer's recount of how that was done is part of his report and srticle aboit 1873. It was Company E who were pushed into Calhoun Coulee from Battle Ridge, although it wasn't a ridge in 1876. The dead, eighteen men in six piles reported by Cherokee Advocate and Lt. Maguire (1877 & 1879) are not acurately available from the archeology.
The fighting began in the bottom and that is from where The company's retreated. For an idea of what took place, consider Reno,s manuever of his skirmishers through ninety degrees, into the timber. How different was Revo's situation to that of Custer's command once large numbers of warriors east of the river, threatened left flank and rear once released from Reno,s front. The scout Curley gave detailof this, although popular wish is that he had left by then and not returned.
The 1873 account and report tell what took place on Nye Cartwright ridge,a platoon guarding the rear and heavily engaged after driving off initial attacks which brought about their deployment to the east.An account by Two Eagles indicates the troops on Blummer,s ridge left it, when the main body went to the mouth of Deep Coulee.
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Post by montrose on Aug 5, 2012 18:29:16 GMT -6
Hero,
I don't understand what you are tryig to say.
Who wrote a report in 1873 explaining what happened on L/C/N ridge in 1876?
Captain Nostradamus?
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Post by plainsman on Aug 5, 2012 19:01:17 GMT -6
Custer's recount of how that was done is part of his report and srticle aboit 1873.
I'm pretty new here, so help me to understand—
Why does a board devoted to history and the slow. careful uncovering of truth in the spirit of mutual scholarship continue to deal with this drivel-merchant? Taking him seriously and continuing to respond to him calls us all into question.
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Post by rosebud on Aug 6, 2012 1:01:45 GMT -6
Why does a board devoted to history and the slow. careful uncovering of truth in the spirit of mutual scholarship continue to deal with this drivel-merchant? Taking him seriously and continuing to respond to him calls us all into question. plainsman xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Another personal attack.....Who are you going to blame it on this time? Me? I see you have no intention of practicing what you preach
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Post by Diane Merkel on Aug 9, 2012 19:42:58 GMT -6
plainsman, I have always advised people to ignore those who irritate them. (That's why I'm ignoring rosebud at the moment.) If you see herosrest has started a new thread, don't even open it. I haven't bothered to read anything he's posted, but I'm not going to get rid of him because he hasn't done anything wrong and someone invariably mourns the loss of even the most obnoxious poster.
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Post by plainsman on Aug 9, 2012 22:40:21 GMT -6
Thank you, Diane. They are both on my Ignore List.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 25, 2012 17:30:49 GMT -6
There is a useful website linked in here, l hope this is ok with the protocol. americanindian.net/custer/files/page_120.htmlAll study of LBH is subjective opinion that attempts to explain something that a huge audience found and find troubling. Each and every 'detailed' account must resort to supposition to explain defeat of the 7th Cavalry and consider the validities of the scape goating which subsequently took place. First example of this human trait was offered by Frederick Whittaker by the christmas of 1876 and in various open and covert fashion has continued since with perhaps the most concerted and uncivilised thrust being enduring campaign to rebuff criticism of Marcus A. Reno, which was completed during the aftermath of the Watergate scandal. The entire saga of the triumvrate that is the Custer, Reno, Benteen saga has become so overblown that it is no longer ridiculous, it is simply sinful viscitudes that people enjoy. It is a ridiculous cause that has misled the public and vilifies the innocent. Sinners are Saints and those who had nothing but honesty to offer in an unknown tongue were and are martyred in pathetic cause. An aside ~ the Crow scout Curley did not speak or grasp the English language and that defence outweighs entirely the mud heaped against him by foes and the supposed friends he served dutifully. What the Arikara held against him, no-one will ever fathom now but he was with Terry's column all the the time and way from LBH 27th June 1876 until the first news article attributed to him publshed a few weeks after the battle. His is perhaps the worst of the scape-goating that took place and which endures today. Soon after Benteen joined Reno on hill, Capt. Weir started to open up communication with Custer, and the troop marched out along bluff until came to a jumping-off place from which could look down upon the hollow of Medicine Tail coulee. Men dismounted and put horses behind Edgerly peaks and behind hill to east, and men formed line over this hill from east to west. Seeing many horsemen over on distant ridge with guidons flying, Weir said, "That is Custer over there," and mounted up ready to go over, when Sergt. Flanagan said: "Here, Captain, you had better take a look through the glasses; I think those are Indians." Weir did so and changed his mind about leaving the place. Accordingly the men were dismounted and the horses led behind the hill. The Indians soon came up in great force, and the men were mounted up and started back along the ridge in column of twos on a walk. After going some distance the Indians had arrived on Edgerly peaks and opened up a hot fire. Corpl. Wylie had a ball shot through his canteen, the staff of the guidon he was carrying was shot off, the flag dropped, and Vincent Charley was shot and fell off his horse. Wylie got down to pick up the guidon. At the same time Edgerly was stooping over Charlie and told him to lie quiet and he (Edgerly) would return and rescue him. Here Edgerly had difficulty in mounting his horse. This was some distance south of Edgerly peaks (and probably about opposite the ravine on east side of bluffs in which the cedar trees are growing). Says no other troop got as far in the advance as D troop. Does not recall seeing Corpl. Foley ride down pursued by Indians and never heard of it. This refers to what Flanagan told me. On his line on the hill Benteen had, besides his own company, men from all the other companies drawn from details with the packs. On Reno hill Liddiard, Co. E, was killed while taking aim at some Indians that Benteen was pointing out to the men. There were several men there talking, and Liddiard, who was a good shot, lay down to take aim talking at the same time. It was noticed that he had stopped talking, and seeing his face turned down and the blood running around the rim of his hat was the first intimation that he was dead. On Custer ridge the body of Trumpeter John W. Patton lay across Keogh's breast when first found. Wylie had opportunity to see only a few bodies around Keogh and was then sent out as vidette to watch for Indians. Walter Mason Camp, Lilly Library. George W. Wylie. From the moment Custer observed the village on the bluffs until as stated above, was the duration of the Custer fight. The gunfire heard by Varnum on Reno Hill was heard by the officers of the approaching pack train and until Whittaker published his attack on Reno and Benteen, the commands of the two officers had united at about 2:30 pm on Reno Hill. Varnum then went down the bluffs and met Herendeen's party in the bottom moving to rejoin the command. What happened once Custer arrived in MTC remains the stuff of historical fiction in spite of the best that modern science can achieve and l ask what soldiers are expected to do when their are no articles of surrender, weapons are jammed and ammunition has been shot off. Ammunition was called for twice by the Custer's. One man carrying the message is today in recent publications labelled a deserting altzheimers victim and the other is mocked as a pizza salesman and his vital account of events is mocked. That is truly abnoxious, l feel. All study of Custer's battle at LBH is supposition based upon guesswork, no matter how educated or experienced because so much that is truth and fact is ignored. It is all personal interest and much is completely fumbled because not even basic military practice is considered by those who don't know what happened and look ever deeper at their challenge.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 26, 2012 7:08:48 GMT -6
One man carrying the message is today in recent publications labelled a deserting altzheimers victim and the other is mocked as a pizza salesman and his vital account of events is mocked. That is truly abnoxious, l feel.
Now you know how we feel.
AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Dec 28, 2012 14:10:06 GMT -6
The Cherokee Advocate publication detailing the journey over the battlefied is reproduced here docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:vSPinoD4d9MJ:www.okgenweb.org/~okchero2/adjul74.doc+sept+1877+cherokee+advocate+custer&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgoHcPFfVF0DPcUeB0jxyi5_y_uLKsur3E_MzOwETPqodhfG0r9FTnllwlp9GnU_emqdi9-OYUNNYzAdflt7ZPCNcqUl_HecUDBXqKDgPz7h2_lRZaAQARZZDVrKkBMjYVIanAe&sig=AHIEtbT2pPHUzKlz7XuvGK5BhXnAWNUXwQThere are some other interesting takes on the 'then' rumours prevalent to Sitting Bull. The battlefield article must have been seriously contemplated by historians and despite a lack of records of burials there is little better than information given. For example, the group of eighteen in six piles and marked by tepee poles can be taken as worthwhile, indicating the a platoon of threes fighting on foot in skirmish, died where they fought. Accepting the reporter crossed at the lower ford as described, he rode onto the field from the west flank of Deep Coulee, near its mouth. There is a relevance to the given fight by Company C in that terrain. IT is difficult to understand why such a ducument is broadly ignored today. Criticisms implicit toit would not have been populat with the army then and opinion is opinion, but The observations must be considered to be valid. There was no reason to make them up. There were reasons to sideline the article's importance in 1877 because it criticised the army and its hierarchy in what was a delicate and embarrassing annoyance and Sheridan was moved to gain funds to imprive the battlefield. It is great history being shoveled into the dirt. Sorry for the poor link above, cut and paste should hit it. I was a huge fan of the tablet revolution underway but have been slowly disenchanted by the mickey mouse nature of the entire software expeience and it gets worse rather than better, to the point it is impossible to actually do anythingwell, proper, or serious.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 28, 2012 14:51:28 GMT -6
Contemplating the 18 dead, noted by the Cherokee Advocate's correspondent, opens interesting lines of enquiry and a most obvious target for sustained intensive archaeological investigation of that area. The fighting by C Company as understood and developed today, derives greatly from the Marquis records and his obsessions with self termination. It is a matter which is awkward and one l find difficult unless those involved were seriously wounded and without hope.
Was that position a flank of reaguard. Why if Marquis got ut correct, did troopers deploy to that terrain from the north (l assume). Since warriors were already present, was the movement a rescue or relief effort that arrived too late. There is a great deal to consider besides the buffalo hunt theory that early, on the flanks of the command.
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Post by brenda56 on Dec 31, 2012 7:38:11 GMT -6
Assuming a thirty to forty minute period from Custer's departure from the Calhoun location and Keogh Position until the arrival on scene of Benteen a five hundred yard move, in light of an already fractured unit, seems significant. Basically you watch about a third of your unit on horseback trotting off, or otherwise, for a couple of minutes. A bit worrying for some regardless of the correctness of the decision.
It may have been technically the thing to do but at the same time it was probably a manouevre welcomed by the Indians, I think.
It would be interesting to note whether the five hundred yard manouevre was at the front end of the thirty to forty minute period or at the later part of that same time period ?
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