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Post by herosrest on Jan 5, 2013 13:25:54 GMT -6
Until it went pear shaped with Reno's attack, Custer would have expected to unite his battalions at the village which he attacked. I believe that his battalion commanders understood that and it is time that everyone else did. Benteens quickly route was FordA to the Big Village.
Gentlemen, we are going to attack and capture Pasadena. One battalion will maneuver to Seattle. Another is to make a scout towards Orange County but keep in touch as to their progress. Two battalions will accompany me, one of those will be dispatched to Chicago.
The enemy will be asleep when we march up in broad daylight and allow them time to flee the battle.
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Post by wild on Jan 6, 2013 11:15:51 GMT -6
Hi Ian From previous posts I gather that you are something of a tanker [yes with a t].Well BBC 2 has what appears to be a very good documentary on outstanding tankers of WW2 at 6 this evening.Just thought you might be interested. Regards
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 7, 2013 4:40:56 GMT -6
Hello HR, I hope your Regiment is at full strength when you attack Pasadena, I hope you don’t have only 140 men to take Seattle with another 120 available to scout around Orange County, and your main force containing two Battalions of 80 and 130 respectively, don’t forget to ask for the Gatling Guns and the extra Companies offered by the 2nd Cavalry because you are certainly going to need them.
Oh yes what about the pack train.
Good morning Richard, I missed the show last night, me and Sue watched Mr Selfridge on ITV 1, it is available on the I Player though, so I will catch it tonight.
Funny enough I watched an episode of the Trench Detectives on Saturday (Man & Horse), it showed how in WW1 a German soldier could stop a tank by reversing a standard 7.92mm round so that the pointed end was in the cartridge leaving the flat end to hit the target, the idea was first used by snipers when there opponents started using armoured shields to protect them from counter fire, the program showed how lethal this type of improvised round could be, it could at short range penetrate the armour of the British Tanks and splinter to maim the crew.
Ian.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 10, 2013 15:23:45 GMT -6
The duration of fight by Custer's command is assessed in various ways by applying strict criteria to the time that elapsed between Custer and Reno seperating to attack the village, and the arrival of Capt. Weir to peaks named aftre him. Various estimations of elapsed time commence Custer's fight after that of Reno's retreat because there is supposexly little evidence showing any other way that the battle evolved. Linked here www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Reno_Exhibits.pdf are the exhibit documents of the Reno Court of Inquiry, inckuding at page 5 the actual map onto which those giving testiomony marked varios information. At 8 Trumpeter Martin marked the route taken with the note handed to him by Lt. Cooke, and he commenced that march at the mouth of MTC near Ford B. There is no confusion about what Martin indicated and it helps considerably to assist in understanding his testimony to the inquiry. He stated the ride covered 5 miles and he met Benteen between a quarter and a half mile beyond where Custer's five companies watered horses. All evidence indicates Custer's advance to MTC was rapid, this is confirmed in Martins testimony and upon reaching high ground during the ride to Benteen, Maj. Reno's command were seen fighting in the valley and warriors in the village were seen swarming towards Ford B to engage Custer's command. A period of 10 minutes is introduced to the equation by Martin stating it was that period of time before Cooke actually wrote the note. The journey to a point from which Reno's command could be seen by Martin was about two miles. Looking back during his ride, Martin saw Custer's command heading toward the battlefield, which would be the march told of by Curley to the hills to the north on either flank of Deep Coulee. Very much analysis of the battle stretches time, but as should be obvious from study of Martin's testimony to the RCoI and the map showing his route, things happened more quickly than people are yet ready or willing to accept. Warriors were moving from the village to attack Custer before Martin reached a position on the bluffsfrom where he saw Reno's command. That does not embarrass Reno or his situation. Why there should be so much poor analysis of Martin's testimony and the map is a bigger mystery than what happened to Custer's command; and prevents any serious study of what Company C and what happened to them. Locations at which they fought are known and observations made by officers indicatevery few Company C horses were found on the battlefield and were therefore run off stampeded or released, and Company C's horses were not held with others of the command. A small number of Company C animals were found dead near Custer forming a barricade. This might suggest that Company moved from where it's sergeants Finley and Finkle lay dead, towards LSH, but another of its sergeants lay dead with Capt. Keogh's company. That really is what is known. Archaeology has identified a weapon that was near Ford B as having progressed towards Calhoun Hill with various inferences that this is perhaps connected with Company C. Until it is realised by students of the battle that Custer's fight was underway while Reno battled in the valley, no one is ever going to work out what took place with Custer's command. No one yet in modernity, can define where or how the companies deployed and few seem to have any clue as to how soldiers actuall fought, which speaks volumes about study of events because the majority of early study was conducted by the army and they arrived at several not unmutual theories, none of which provided for a prolonged or stubborn resistance. The companies were overwhelmed in short order. Many people remain unable to accept that, and that is a very large part of the history of the battle. If your interest is actually that single company, the place to begin study is with who led it into battle and the place to begin is with Sgt. Kanipe. Then question wheter or not Tom Custer led HIS company into battle. Many experts, historians and writers tell that he did not but company C had no place near Company F with which George Custer rode, and Tom Custer rode just ahead of Sgt. Kanipe. This is known because that is what Kanipe said. It seems Reno and Tom Custer did not get on too well, and George Custer kept one from the other. Both men had short fuses and were a little too brave, which is also a criticism of the Lt. Col. Be that as it may, with Reno elsewhere, why exactly wouldn't T.W. Custer decide to earn his pay. Going over the bluffs to Ford B and in the advance to skirmish in the valley, the men and officers were up for it. The link www.nps.gov/mwac/publications/pdf/tech94b.pdf is to 'Archeological mitigation of the Federal Lands Highway Program plan to rehabilitate tour road, Route 10, Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, Montana' which includes a decent backgrounding to aspects of the battle's various more recent though not immediate theories, besides the cataloguing and work of archaeology. There is a decent grounding in the complications technical study brings to the theory of the battle. Have fun and enjoy the battle. Added ~ The weapon from Ford B area MTC moved to Calhoun Hill, and a weapon at Finley Finkle went towards LSH. This is the map form Walter M. Camps notes, rather than one he used for formalised interviews.htt5bd895e3307b60d0c5523a9ddd814915.gif
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Post by scottbono on Jan 26, 2014 16:16:51 GMT -6
Ian: I for one follow your point, and it reinforces something I have said both here and on the other board a number of times. Custer had no real experience commanding in the field below the brigade and division levels. He never commanded a company, battalion, or regiment during the Civil War. His experience therefore at the regimental and below level was quite limited. Now why, one might ask, was this important? It is important because of the capabilities of units at different levels and the proper application of tactics to employ those units. Look at this battle scenario of Fred's as being just one example. Substitute those understrength companies, squadrons, and battalions with regiments and brigades in a division structure. Everyone of his moves makes a heck of a lot of sense if you are commanding a division, not so much if you only have a half strength regiment, of twelve platoon sized elements. Think about it Your statement just answered about ten questions I've had floating in my mind for quite some time. Thanks for that insight.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 9, 2014 19:12:56 GMT -6
"Halfway down the slope of the hogback toward the river, about forty soldiers of C Company mounted their sorrel horses and broke out of encirclement. Charging west, they came galloping toward the deep gulch held by most of the Cheyennes and many Ogalalas and Brules. The Indians fell back drawing them on. When the troopers reached a low ridge just vacated by the Indians, they halted and dismounted [Greasy Grass]. Down in the gulch, Lame White Man, the Southern Cheyenne chief who had to fight because he had no son, rallied the warriors. "'Come on!' he shouted. 'Now we can kill them all.!'" Custer's Fall, p. 143. This is the charge spoken of by Kate Bighead and Wooden Leg, but it came off Calhoun Ridge not Battle Ridge. Keogh's battalion was described as posted along Battle Ridge and Calhoun Ridge in an upside down, reverse L: I Co. L Co. ------ C Co. Tactically, L Co. occupied the middle of Keogh's battalion, and the situation was not such that Keogh could have been holding C Co. in reserve. HQ, Co. E & F were in the vicinity of, if not on, LSH and the two units were not in contact. Then the fighting became "furious" and all five companies were rolled up within half an hour. Note that Two Moon later took credit for the charge led by Lame White Man, but I doubt very much that he had got there from the valley fight when the LWM charge occurred. Two Moons led another attack at the same time which carried him towards LSH, encircling the entire command. ~
Ideas of events change over decades and centuries and are endowed increasingly with improving modern techniques used to enhance or redefine thinking. As the battle becomes what the current generation and its society wish it to be, the ancient study and record is progressively diminished by those who reinvent interpretations of events.
It is worth presenting some of the old stuff which tells the old story and contemplating how that became...... this.
From page 13 is an account of the field a little over one year on. docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:vSPinoD4d9MJ:www.okgenweb.org/~okchero2/adjul74.doc+sept+1877+cherokee+advocate+custer&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgoHcPFfVF0DPcUeB0jxyi5_y_uLKsur3E_MzOwETPqodhfG0r9FTnllwlp9GnU_emqdi9-OYUNNYzAdflt7ZPCNcqUl_HecUDBXqKDgPz7h2_lRZaAQARZZDVrKkBMjYVIanAe&sig=AHIEtbT2pPHUzKlz7XuvGK5BhXnAWNUXwQ it is gratifying to know that the Wild I marker board and Keogh monument existed then, to influemce thinking such as where monuments and the cemetary were.
It's an interesting read, particularly identifying where the journey onto the field commenced.
Walter M. Camp devoted some time to gathering a broad insight of events which has never been pulled together in entirety and is scattered through various collections. Bottom, is link to some of it.
Bottom is relevant to the battle in several contexts, for example, from William Cross's interview by Lt. Bourne at Powder River on July 4th 1876, the world first learnt that Custer was shot there. Making his progress towards terrain upon which the obelisk stands to be quite miraculous. This of course is not for serious modern consideration.
Published 11th July ~ THE INDIAN MASSACRE.; THE SIOUX CAMPAIGN. MOVEMENTS PRELIMINARY TO CUSTER'S ADVANCE THE START OF THAT UNFORTUNATE FORCE NEWSPAPER EXAGGERATIONS. select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50A11FF395E137B93C3A8178CD85F428784F9&action=click&module=Search®ion=searchResults%230&version=&url=http%3A%2F%2Fquery.nytimes.com%2Fsearch%2Fsitesearch%2F%23%2F1876%2Bcuster%2Ffrom18760707to18770101%2F
Published July 13th ~ GEN. CUSTER'S LAST FIGHT.; THE PART OF MAJOR RENO'S TROOPS. THE STORY RELATED BY A HALF-BREED SCOUT HOW MAJOR RENO CHARGED RIGHT IN THE NUMBER OF INDIANS ENGAGED NINE HUNDRED LODGES REPRESENTED BRAVE UNION SCOUTSKILLED. AN EYE-WITNESS OF THE MASSACRE. THE SCOUTS WHO WERE KILLED. select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F6091EF73F5B137B93C1A8178CD85F428784F9&action=click&module=Search®ion=searchResults%230&version=&url=http%3A%2F%2Fquery.nytimes.com%2Fsearch%2Fsitesearch%2F%23%2F1876%2Bcuster%2Ffrom18760707to18770101%2F
Bottom of the pile, is where record and account of events given by Custer's scout Curley is consigned by modernity, ignored as revelation after revelation of scientific interpretation unfolds. His work with Walter M. Camp who is robustly important to the locating and investigations of many Plains battle sites is given here ~ americanindian.net/custer/files/page_155.html explaining entirely how thw retreat was conducted and overcome along the way ~ fighting to front and rear as it moved onto the higher ground.
Camp is today broadly criticised for the mountains of data gathered by his questionaires. His real failing was the broad misnomer applied to the size and therefore location if the village when Custer's command were opposite across the river.
What befell Company C is today as great a mystery as that of Smith's troop whom Godfrey, and therefore Gall, located fighting between Custer and Calhoun. O.J. Sweet and R.B. Marshall found them to have been engaged and fallen below LSH and towards the mouth of Deep Ravine. It is almost as though they witnessed an entirely different scene and envisioned a completely different flow of events but of course, Marquis had not then brought his painstakingly trivial investigations to conclusion in the drivel of Wooden Legs hugely misunderstood, slow fighting during some ninety years and Kate's leisurely parade around the suiciding ranks of desolate troopers. Bang! Bang! Bang! They shot themselves. Heaven forbid it was in fact, simply..... Foley! of Company C. Recently roped into the marketing exercise earning $2 million for Tom Custer's guidon.
History, history, upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b1/Histrionicus_histrionicus_drake_Barnegat.jpg/800px-Histrionicus_histrionicus_drake_Barnegat.jpg beckons.
William Cross
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Post by noggy on Jun 12, 2018 14:58:23 GMT -6
√ Liddic uses a different scenario for the beginning of the Calhoun Ridge/Finley Ridge fighting. He has a “squad” of C Company still in their position, “a few hundred yards west of Finley Hill.” These were the troops Liddic claims covered the pullback of “Keogh’s” men from Ford B. He also has more C Company men—under the command of 1SG Bobo—on Finley Ridge. [ Vanishing Victory, p. 150] • Then he has Crow King leaving the Reno fight, riding through the village, and crossing the LBH at Deep Ravine, then moving up “a branch of Deep Ravine, to the southeast, which brought them very close to ‘C’ platoon’s right flank.” [ Vanishing Victory, p. 150] Best wishes, Fred. Like whisky, threads age well. Michno also has C Company divided in two platoons or units, with one staying closer to I Company. For those of you who are (to put it mildly) well read and have the overview, is this view supported by many battle scholars? What do eople here think? It seems to me that the most accepted variant by far is that C Company as a whole advanced to check the Indians gathering closer to the river. I admit that I took this for a fact, actually. Sending (for example) half of a already under strength company doesn`t seem logical. But plenty things don`t. All the best, Noggy
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Post by herosrest on Jun 13, 2018 3:19:55 GMT -6
Taking some of the earliest record, Benteen had no idea what happened to Company C because very few of their mounts were found dead on the ground to offer clues. That is, the horses were stampeded. DeRudio indicated that a few C Company animals lay at the last stand area. Reno offered some thought on events as well. Current thinking is rooted in Marquis's work and specifically the Kate Bighead account of soldiers charging the Indians and being wiped out. That provides a supposed timing for the destruction of Harrington and Company C. It is realistically a matter of very thin ice and theory extrapolated beyond justifiable reason. However it is a popular and much practiced theory and like the Emperor's new suit, very few care to see through it. Linked below are interviews undertaken by Walter M. Camp. Check out the stuff from page 153 onwards. Fascinating and little referenced or used by modern scholars who prefer to pooh pooh the Indians because the evidence doesn't suit their theory. Camp interviews.Little known of interviews with 7th Cavalry ScoutsRegards, be well.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 13, 2018 4:57:48 GMT -6
Participant account - When Custer withdrew from the ford, he proceeded down the river for some distance and then struck out for higher ground in columns of fours, going direct to the point where markers are found at the southeast point of the battlefield (at Sergeant Finley's marker). Before they got to this point, Mitch Bouyer lost his horse. Indians were now in front and in the ravines on both sides, and a strong force of Indians were coming up in the rear. Curley says the command was being driven like a herd of horses, and the only thing that could be done was to charge the enemy in the direction that was thought to be most advantageous to go and then only to have them close in on all sides. The front was driving the Indians and the rear was being driven. In ascending to the elevation now marked by slabs for Calhoun and Crittenden, an attempt was made to cover the retreat until some kind of a stand could be made. Men were left at the Finley marker, and some of the troops dismounted just beyond this, Curley staking his horse with the rest. The dismounted men then tried to drive the Indians from the gulch ahead, but the men left in the rear were quickly killed, and the advance of the Indians from that direction was hardly checked at all. (Hammer, 1976, p158) E.S. Curtis - The North American Indian - curtis.library.northwestern.edu/curtis/toc.cgi?sec=nai.03.book,&psec=#nai.03.book The Teton Sioux - Historical sketch - curtis.library.northwestern.edu/curtis/viewPage.cgi?showp=1&size=2&id=nai.03.book.00000080&volume=3#navCurtis battle map - linkEdward S. Curtis's father knew and served with Myles W. Keogh during ACW.
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Post by noggy on Jun 14, 2018 13:48:09 GMT -6
I appreciate the concern. And, I appreciate you vast amount of links. Really. As for the bug... It has kind of happened. Yet I try not to let it get a hold. As I`m too inteerested in many other historically events. (Rant incoming) Apart from my regular job, I do some writing when I have the time for a military history magazine in Scandinavia. Apart from German Military History, I`ve always had an interest in the Indian-US wars and Native American history/culture. So in the past I have written about the Apache wars and the Powder River war. Then some timeago I was asked to write about LBH. I thought it would be easy, as I knew the basics and; "Hey, how difficult can it be since it`s o well documented"? Istarted reading, ordered books, stalked this and others sites before joining. Now, 3 years after, I`m just digging more and more. My article seems just like an impossibility. It was to be 20 pages, I got it up to 35 the last time I spoke with the publishers. It could have been done years ago, but I refuse to write stuff I can`t stand by. Still books keep popping up in my mail box. I keep reading here in old threads. It would actually be nice to say "that`s it". But I don`t want to. And it`s weird, because we all discuss things within a small area. try tracking German Schutztruppe Companies in the uncharted jungles of Mozambique...I did! Now THAT`S more difficult that this and that ridge along the river. Believe me. Yet, I guess a combination of the bug and me wanting first to write a correct piece has now turned in to me basically wanting to know more on a personal level. Maybe it never ends. I do not know if this makes sense. 2 beers too many today. In short, the bug is there somewhere. All the best, Noggy
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Post by herosrest on Jun 15, 2018 8:36:29 GMT -6
Sense and sensibility always follows one beer (Einstein). Two might be pushing it. An interesting aspect of the battle, is the battle's history. It is evolving and how that is happening is the history of history which is fascinating. Theories, theses, fictions, fantasies and scientific research. I will mention an example of the history which might upset a few and fly by most. The Cheyennes wanted their dead honoured. They wanted the resting places marked. The first request dates back to 1925ish if I remember correctly. The National Monument was not their monument and they determined to change that in their way. A part of the process and people involved led to the John Stands in Timber revelations which have brought back, and advanced the modern Ford D theories. Good luck to those publishing their ideas and theory. Here's a flip to the coin. In 1926, 7th Cavalry rode up to Last Stand Hill from the western D fords and they were attacked by several thousand Indians amongst whom were warriors that had confronted Custer in 1876. Besides that confusion with what happened when - John Stands in Timber knew Marquis and Kuhlman. I mean, he looked into their eyes and chatted with them. Not a word or inkling from either student of this battle about Ford D theory and when Timber knew them, his family and tribal contemporaries were the men who fought the battle before he (Timber), was born. I ask you to imagine a very large North sea fish. Now find a large stick and whack the fish. Regards. Be well
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Post by battledetective on Jul 20, 2018 14:07:38 GMT -6
Company C is another one of the big puzzles IMO... Common opinion is that it was part of Keogh wing and was deployed between L and I companies facing west. But some maps show most of the bodies on Cemetery ridge between E and F. Is that true? How did they get there? Could have it been with Custer wing instead? And could it be that there was no probe to the northern ford? Like in my attachment (just one of the various possibilities that I can think of, I'm not saying it's the likeliest or even likely).
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Post by noggy on Jul 20, 2018 14:55:50 GMT -6
Company C is another one of the big puzzles IMO... Common opinion is that it was part of Keogh wing and was deployed between L and I companies facing west. But some maps show most of the bodies on Cemetery ridge between E and F. Is that true? How did they get there? Could have it been with Custer wing instead? And could it be that there was no probe to the northern ford? Like in my attachment (just one of the various possibilities that I can think of, I'm not saying it's the likeliest or even likely). Could this thread be of interest? Hope you are surviving the Scandinavian summer. All the best, Noggy
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Post by battledetective on Jul 24, 2018 15:23:16 GMT -6
Thank you Noggy! Btw, I'm not in Scandinavia now. I've read about the fires, hope they will stop:(
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