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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 3, 2013 5:53:04 GMT -6
Hello Richard, yes I agree that anything beyond MTC is open to conjecture, but if GAC tried the same tactics that had served him well in the past then these tactics may have been carried out by full strength Companies or near full strength, four out of the five Companies that GAC had with him had around 38 men, one had 46, so if you place each one of these units in an area with and hundred or so yards to the next friendly unit then they had no chance, on average each unit had the strength of 38;
2 x Officers 1 x 1st Sgt 1 x Black smith, Saddler or Farrier 2 x Sergeants 2 x Corporals 2 x Trumpeters 28 x Privates
Now if you place these men in skirmish line and count only the privates, you are left with 28, if the Officers and 1st Sgt stay out of the firing line along with the two Trumpeters (maybe one of the trumpeters was holding the company Guidon) then you could thicken your line with the remaining four NCOs and the Blacksmith, you would then have a total of 33 men in action, now take this line of 33 men and place them on a featureless hill about 100+ yards from any support, now place in front of them a couple of hundred warriors, now I am not a betting man but if I had to choose which side I would put my money on it would be the warriors.
Oh yes I forgot to take out the horse holders, so if we keep it at 8 sets of fours (32) and take out one man out off each set as a horse holder then we have a line of 24 men, so dot these small units all over the place and we can see why they got over run, that’s if it happened this way (got that one in before Jag reads it).
Ian.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 3, 2013 6:11:36 GMT -6
Fred
I think it is safe to say that Boston did not average in the range of 15-20 mph over a 14-15 mile distance. As a benchmark Pony Express riders averaged around 12.5 mph over approximately that distance per horse (15+).
Regards
Steve
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Post by fred on Jan 3, 2013 21:03:07 GMT -6
Fred I think it is safe to say that Boston did not average in the range of 15-20 mph over a 14-15 mile distance. Thanks, Steve. That re-confirms some of my work. Hope you can be there in June. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 3, 2013 21:05:19 GMT -6
Ian—
Almost everything in this event is open to conjecture; it is raising the percentage of likelihood that really matters. While I agree to a certain extent with DC’s suspicions regarding Indian accounts and how they were translated, one must attach a certain credibility to accounts referring to an event when they are similar, given by two or three or five Indians, all from different tribes, at different times, in different locations, with different translators. There is some difference between an equivocating red man and a mendacious white man, yet we are quick to accept Daniel Kanipe’s fables, or Martini’s constantly changing story providing it fits with our prejudices and stultified versions of events.
I have compiled the accounts of more than 80 Indians who were there or who knew those who were there, e.g., Eastman, and a tremendous amount of information is available in their accounts, especially when we combine them with what troops heard, or the time it took for the survivors to accomplish certain things. I find no less difficulty in deciphering the Indians’ accounts than I do trying to figure out what happened on Reno Hill and Weir Peaks according to sterling-silver-plated accounts of men like Varnum, McDougall, Davern, Ryan, Edgerly, Godfrey, Benteen, and a host of others. Eschewing the Indian accounts is the same mistake John Gray made and if you disregard those accounts you will forever wade in the murk and mire of conjecture… which seems to suit some know-it-alls on these boards.
Don’t fall into that trap, Ian. DC—the great doubter—hasn’t… but then he is a damn sight smarter than those who wish only to record blather, dictate opinions, and provide no more proof or support than a warm breeze.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Jan 4, 2013 4:27:10 GMT -6
Ian, Good breakdown of company strenght.As you point out they could put 33 men on the line armed with a single shot carbine.And our resident military would have these units placed unsupported on exposed hilltops? ? As regards Indian accounts.They are not witness accounts but participant accounts and as such are distorted,Not only that, they are" losing" participant accounts.They are blurred through the passing of time,translation and culture,together with the inability to count or record time and any knowledge of formal military tactics. Of course accounts will agree.Slaughter on one hill is the same as slaughter on another hill. If the accumilation and distilation of these accounts produce a tactical horror [ford D]should we not go back and just run it through once more. You can see what can be done with "deciphering"if his Dark Eminence can be wheeled out in support of the Ford D theory.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 4, 2013 5:27:35 GMT -6
Hi Richard, I agree over the unsupported scenario, when you hear the term Company or Troop you would expect to see a body of men around the 80 to 100 mark, but here we see an average of 38, it reminds me of Hitler looking at his maps in 1945, and saying to his Generals, move this division here and counter attack, but in reality this so called division was a shadow of its former self, same here at the BLBH, say for instance Custer orders E Company to defend Cemetery hill, nothing wrong with the order but when E Company deploys it can only place 24 men in the skirmish line.
Hello Fred, I must say that you have done more work on this subject than anyone else I know on this board, you always have a source to back up your theory’s and you are willing to not only help people with you knowledge but share your hard work too, I have said before that your theory concerning the battle after MTC is a valid one, and one that I agree with, and I agree with it because you have taken the time to explain in detail what you think happened after MTC, not only that you also provide accounts to back it up.
Ian.
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Post by wild on Jan 4, 2013 5:49:00 GMT -6
Hi Ian Naw !you can have a debate/discussion but you cannot have a nice debate/discussion.It can be civilized but ya got to check your" nice" when you get involved, it just blunts the arguement/search for truth.
You support the following [part of the ford D theory]
“Myles, you stay back here; watch; protect my rear. If anything comes down this coulee, [MTC] open up on it. Also, watch the coulees off to the left [Middle Coulee, West Coulee]; we saw Indians along the ridges.“Smith, you head back down into that coulee [MTC] and protect my flank. I am going to ride this ridge to the end and get as close to the river as we can. You form frontal protection along the river
And then you post it reminds me of Hitler looking at his maps in 1945, and saying to his Generals, move this division here and counter attack, but in reality this so called division was a shadow of its former self, same here at the BLBH, say for instance Custer orders E Company to defend Cemetery hill, nothing wrong with the order but when E Company deploys it can only place 24 men in the skirmish line. Do you see the conflict? If you want to be serious ya got to bite the bullet, See how DC is kept in the tent with platitudes?Ya don't want that boyho outside the tent pissing in. Regards
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 4, 2013 9:56:48 GMT -6
Good afternoon Richard, I am trying to see the point you are making here, yes I think that something along those lines could have happened, I have always followed the notion concerning Keogh being left in situ and Custer moving north, I know that this is a tender spot with some posters but we all have our views, now the second quote you posted about Hitler and such, has nothing really to do with the separation of both GAC and Keogh, I used the Cemetery hill area to show how ineffectual a weak Company of Cavalry were when place out in the open isolated, there are two separate topics here. One concerning the separation and one concerning the under strength units taking on a job more suited to a Battalion never mind a Company at full strength.
Ian.
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Post by wild on Jan 4, 2013 11:18:49 GMT -6
Hi Ian there are two separate topics here. I don't think Ford D is an ala carte theory.I think you either buy into it or you do not .If the theory calls for the dispersal of the companys in penny packets ala Smith you head back down into that coulee [MTC] and protect my flank.Which you suggest is as per Hitler moving non existent divisions ?Well it kinda undermines the whole theory.You see the Ford D theory requires two massive tactical blunders.The first as you observed is the dispersal of Keogh's companys the second is the officer commanding exiting stage left. Regards
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Post by herosrest on Jan 4, 2013 22:37:10 GMT -6
In essence, the idea of a significant element of Custer's five companies moving to fords beyond LSH is the Washita II attack on the valley. A delay must be worked into it and then an abort and return upriver.
The balance of the command is at Nye Cartwright, with a variation perhaps placing a unit towards Calhoun Hill, as the movement towards the river at the mouth of Deep Coulee or North MTC occurs.
As a scenario many questions are raised, particularly a wait of up to 20 minutes.An ignored aspect of the battle is the ride by Stab taking a message to Custer and returning to join the pony stealers on the bluffs. The idea is great to play around with but there are too many taboo's involved for it to be taken seriously. Custer wasn't shot at that ford, he was shot at the other one, is a nice starter.
My point previously ignored because Luce Ridge is ingrained into current thinking about maneuver, is that Freeman showed how troopers deployed onto Nye Cartwright to skirmish.
Aside ~ Until Mrs. Custer joined her husband, any discussionn or broadening of debate was severly handbagged by feminine skills and all credit to the lady. Curtis's investigation was sidelined. This type of cencorship and partisanship is significant when contemplating the battle. Even Walter Camp was hamstrung by respecting the various incumbent opinions.
Custer was on Calhoun Hill when the fighting and threat became serious. Walter Camp new this and did not disparage or deny Curley's information. Ignore where Custer was and matter's are hopeless to resolve. It may be that they should not be resolved. That does happen.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 5, 2013 5:45:19 GMT -6
Good morning Richard, I think there was only one tactical blunder which resulted in more errors later, the main one was separating in the first place, I suppose it’s easy for me to say this in hindsight but if GAC wanted the support of Benteen and the packs he should have moved to weir peaks and waited, but I know by reading the history of the battle that this was a large village, too large in fact for the 7th to take by force, especially when they attacked in penny packets, and more importantly the Indians did not run.
I think the decision made by GAC to split his command into two wings caused two major blunders, the first being the way Capt. Keogh placed his force around the so called Keogh sector, three units (two of them containing only 38 men) spread out over a large area, no wonder two of his Company commanders got there commands shot from beneath them.
The second was another separation, this time involving the Yates wing, his two Companies were defeated in two separate places, why would you divide you small command into two, each Company (again containing only 38 men each) fighting and dying in different areas.
But then we have the theory concerning GAC getting forced away from Ford B, would this mean that the whole command were in fact running with the warriors hot on their tails, if this happened why were there not more men from Keogh’s wing found on LSH, did Keogh sacrifice his men so that GAC could get away.
I remember DC saying that the amount of brass found around Custer on LSH looked like they were blown off their mounts when they reach the summit, but maybe this group of officers died in the same way the group of NCOs died around Keogh, cut off and surrounded.
The major factor here is small understrength Companies left isolated and being overwhelmed by superior numbers, virtually five units dying in five places.
HR, If GAC was on Calhoun Hill watching this serious threat unfolding before his very eyes, why would he separate into two groups and distance himself in such a way.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 5, 2013 10:16:11 GMT -6
Ian: I for one follow your point, and it reinforces something I have said both here and on the other board a number of times. Custer had no real experience commanding in the field below the brigade and division levels. He never commanded a company, battalion, or regiment during the Civil War. His experience therefore at the regimental and below level was quite limited. Now why, one might ask, was this important? It is important because of the capabilities of units at different levels and the proper application of tactics to employ those units. Look at this battle scenario of Fred's as being just one example. Substitute those understrength companies, squadrons, and battalions with regiments and brigades in a division structure. Everyone of his moves makes a heck of a lot of sense if you are commanding a division, not so much if you only have a half strength regiment, of twelve platoon sized elements. Think about it
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 5, 2013 11:45:06 GMT -6
Your right on the money Chuck, GAC moved his units around the area of battle as if he was commanding a Brigade (similar to the Hitler point in an earlier post), using understrength Company’s to either take or hold a strategic point would soon find themselves Warmly challenged, they are also susceptible to warriors moving round there flanks, Custer should have known this, his Company Commanders must have seen this, but the Indians knew this and once a skirmish line was place in an isolated position with nothing to cover their flanks they would succumb, and they did.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 5, 2013 12:25:45 GMT -6
Ian: I just can't wait for some on the other board, and perhaps this one as well to yell Yellowstone and Washita at the top of their lungs. Yes he did command a regiment at those places, rather poorly I might add. But, the point is that the numbers the hostiles could field made all the difference. What you might be able to get away with earlier had no bearing on LBH. Numbers of the enemy mean something and if you are going to employ a six hundred man regiment like it was a three thousand man division, you are going to get your ass whipped good and proper. METT-T is meant as a limiting factor on how you employ your assets as well as a checklist of the overall situation.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 5, 2013 13:07:42 GMT -6
Good morning Richard, I think there was only one tactical blunder which resulted in more errors later, the main one was separating in the first place, I suppose it’s easy for me to say this in hindsight but if GAC wanted the support of Benteen and the packs he should have moved to weir peaks and waited, but I know by reading the history of the battle that this was a large village, too large in fact for the 7th to take by force, especially when they attacked in penny packets, and more importantly the Indians did not run. I think the decision made by GAC to split his command into two wings caused two major blunders, the first being the way Capt. Keogh placed his force around the so called Keogh sector, three units (two of them containing only 38 men) spread out over a large area, no wonder two of his Company commanders got there commands shot from beneath them. HR, If GAC was on Calhoun Hill watching this serious threat unfolding before his very eyes, why would he separate into two groups and distance himself in such a way. Ian. Custer's command were overwhelmed during maneuver or retreat from the mouth of Deep Coulee, that's it. Nothing else to understand. They were surrounded and fixed in place and then shot to pieces. The blunder which wiped out the five companies was retreat from the valley. The blunder which caused defeat was Custer believing the regiment could handle Sitting Bull as it had in 1873. The orders from Custer sent Benteen to the Big Village and nowhere else. There is no interpretation other than that is where Custer intended to be ~ when the orders were sent. Here revolves one of the battles confusions. Due to the retreat from the valley by Reno, were Benteen's orders redundant. Benteen explained that they were to Terry, who accepted that and stated so in his report of 27th June. The arguments about Benteen being slow, relate to delay and competance at Reno Hill before marching towards the sound of the guns. These seperate matters are confused and argued in confused fashion. Benteen's route to the Big Village quickly was across Ford A but Reno's retreat negated that order and Benteen declined to renew the attack across Ford A. Should Benteen have charged across Ford A where Reno had already failed to press. Company C horses were few and far between according to Benteen and that is why they died as they did. Godfrey was of informed opinion that the gray horse troops were at neither Calhoun Hill or Last Stand Hill, and l accept that becaise his source was Gall who saw the troopers fighting. It was over quickly. attack?
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