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Post by wild on Sept 18, 2008 6:25:56 GMT -6
A futher observation:-To introduce an overnight halt to coordinate his arrival with Terry's was to leave the command open to discovery and counter attack or risk the village scattering.Having decided to march directly to the village he was committed to attacking without delay.Once again stray Indians or loose boxes had nothing to do with Custer's decision making.
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tatanka
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Live for today like there was no tomorrow
Posts: 125
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Post by tatanka on Sept 18, 2008 11:43:53 GMT -6
Good point, wild. But why didn't Custer keep in constant touch with Terry and time his march to coincide with that of Terry? I still think he wanted all the "glory" for the 7th.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Sept 18, 2008 14:35:29 GMT -6
Why would a dropped box be of concern when an entire regiment of men and animals were dropping manure along the entire approach route. The dropped box did not influence Custer's decision to attack nor did being spotted by a few stray Indians.He had made up his mind from the moment he left Terry to attack the moment he was within range.And he was tactically right to do so.What were the chances of marching a mile long column to within spitting distance of such an enormous village without being spotted.That he managed it is luck of miraculous proportions.Custer had to proceed as if he had or was about to be spotted.Thus speed was of the essance.The dropped box was just a good excuse to feed the likes of Benteen who woud have started questioning the early attack.
Wild, you are of course entitled to your opinion, but to state it as fact is hardly the basis for a reasonable debate. His arguments with the Crows scouts on the Crow's Nest rather disprove the notion that Custer was ready to attack come what may. On the evening of June 24th there was no certainty that the Indians had remained on the lower Little Big Horn as they could just as easily have turned south, which some of then admitted was their original intention. It is entirely feasible the Custer was hedging his bets. If the Crow's Nest recce had confirmed the Indians had taken a southerly turn, the 7th could have doubled back and gone south themselves to meet the Indians at the LBH headwaters, with Herendeen being sent to Terry with that information. If the village was on the lower LBH, then it made sense for Custer to remain where he was, even with the risk of being spotted, because whatever happened, no one in the military had the slightest doubt that the 7th could deal with any number of Indians. Herendeen could also be sent under this scenario to let Terry know Custer's revised plan in the light of developments. After all, the pre-battle comments admit that the 7th was the strike force and that a combined attack was unlikely. tatanka, the reverse is also true. Why didn't Terry keep in constant touch with Custer, especially if the use of Tullock's was a deviation from the original plan? We must also not lose sight of the distances between the two commands and the fact that at any given time neither knew exactly where the other one was. This is particularly true if Custer was entitled to believe that Terry was somewhere along the Big Horn valley. Rapid communication was impossible and apart from the 'endeavour to send a scout through' there were no arrangements for regular contact for that reason. Hunk
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Post by bc on Sept 18, 2008 16:27:00 GMT -6
I concur Hunk. If Terry and Custer wanted to communicate with each other with daily dispatches, they had the ability to do so but chose not to. Likewise with Sheridan, he could have told his 3 columns to stay in constant or regular contact or at least some contact. If only Crook would have sent messengers.
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2008 2:48:11 GMT -6
I take your point,perhaps stating it as a fact is inappropriate.
But what possible communication could Custer have sent Terry--- I wish to advise Officer Commanding field operations that it is my intention to deviate from agreed plan and follow the trail.? The odds were that the quickest way to come into contact with the Indians was to follow the trail thus ensuring that only the 7th was involved in the action.
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tatanka
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Live for today like there was no tomorrow
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Post by tatanka on Sept 19, 2008 6:33:11 GMT -6
Hunk. I see your point but the point I was trying to make was that Custer should have timed his march to coincide with Terrys' arrival at LBH. I appreciate your point about the distances involved but there must have been some way to stay in regular contact. He had Crow scouts who knew the area like the back of their hands. After all they managed to find Terry after the battle was over. bc. I don't think we can blame Sheridan. They were both experienced army officers and shouldn't need to be told to keep in contact. wild. "Ensuring only the 7th was involved in the action" I agree entirely with that statement. I don't think Custer had any intention of waiting for anyone.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 19, 2008 8:42:18 GMT -6
The premise is rather absurd. They didn't control the land between the commands, being the whole point of the mission. This was not the CW where (often, not always) telegraph or open roads could keep people in touch. A daily commute would pretty much spill the beans even if the Sioux let them go through.
Second, since Terry makes a point of not calling them 'orders' but 'instructions' and says they are NOT orders, so should we not call them orders. They became orders after the fact. In any case, as Bradley wrote and others mumbled about, it was understood Custer would have the attack and they were unlikely to be in it. Beyond mopping up groups trying to escape north.
Third, the 7th didn't go back for the dropped box because Indians might find it and 'discover' them, but because the company who dropped it needed it. Eight hundred shoed animals left a broad enough clue (they shoe mules, right?) that no CSI analysis of poop was needed. In any case, something less than short wave radar could locate the train by sound alone, and this in Wichita. Once on the move, they had to hit asap, because it was equally absurd to assume the enemy was both dumb and deaf.
Confronted with the village trail heading west, a mule train that gave gas in concept, an imagination sufficient to construct the condition of his train as it turns west on the south of the Wolf Mt.s, and an intention to stay a night (however firmly held) to allow Terry time to get closer, Custer's decisions were fine and responsible. No doubt he wanted all the credit if possible, but he wasn't a fool.
That's why it is of a piece to think that whatever happened at MTC is not reflective of Custer and suggestive that he either wasn't in command, or wounded and scurrying to reassemble, something unexpectedly not allowed them. It's not dramatic, but to the point, is in conflict with nothing on the field, and explains the bodies if proximate to where they fell.
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2008 9:28:05 GMT -6
Orders are corporate which you follow to the best of your ability.Trust placed in you is personal and you die for. Custer's action in blatant disregard for Terry's trust was a betrayal.Only a resounding victory was going to cloak the stench of treachery.
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Post by biggordie on Sept 19, 2008 9:45:29 GMT -6
wild:
You have to learn to be more open about what you REALLY think...............
Regards,
Gordie
PS Where you was these past months?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 19, 2008 11:54:43 GMT -6
There was no betrayal, that's all melodramatic nonsense inflamed afterwards by partisanship. In clear English Terry allows Custer to wander from his instructions if he alone saw need. At that point, of course and Custer understood, he was on his own hook, but it was not a stupid choice despite the evidence within a day it was probably wrong, as it happens. The train was a horror, the water was bad, the trail was clear and they had a day to rest, with Luck. Lady Luck and Custer lunched regularly, so he had reason for optimism.
The 'Indian found box, ergo we HAVE to move' tale was likely a simplification of all his myriad concerns. Any Indian crossing the trail from the Yellowstone without seeing a box would know as much, the box added nothing. The soldiers' needed it, is all.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Sept 19, 2008 12:17:14 GMT -6
I take your point,perhaps stating it as a fact is inappropriate. But what possible communication could Custer have sent Terry--- I wish to advise Officer Commanding field operations that it is my intention to deviate from agreed plan and follow the trail.? The odds were that the quickest way to come into contact with the Indians was to follow the trail thus ensuring that only the 7th was involved in the action.
That would depend on which 'plan' you have in mind. The uncertain pre-battle version based on a guess that the Indians were on the headwaters of the LBH and in which Terry said to Sheridan "I hope that one of the two columns will find the Indians" or the Terry/Hughes post-battle version, set in concrete and with absolute knowledge that the Indians would be found exactly where they were found? Alternatively, are we looking at the pre-battle idea that the 7th was the strike force of which Bradley says "it is understood that if Custer arrives first, he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent" and of which Brisbin (probably) said "It was announced by General Terry that General Custer's column would strike the blow, and General Gibbon and his men received the decision without a murmur"? Or are we using the post-battle views where Brisbin now changes his mind and says "Terry intended, if he intended anything, that we should be in that battle with you" and Terry now says "The plan adopted was the only one which promised to bring the infantry into action.."? I don't think that it is unreasonable to suggest that Terry, Hughes and others distorted the post-battle picture to distance Terry in particular from receiving any blame for the LBH disaster and whilst that is human and understandable, we must not lose sight of the fact that in doing so, they simultaneously blamed Custer for not adhering to a plan that only existed after and because of, his death. When Custer was making his pre-battle decisions on June 24th and 25th, his thinking was based on the hazy pre-battle strategy and the belief that he was free to attack "if deemed prudent." Finding the Indians on the lower LBH was a major difference to what had been predicted and he had to think on his feet. We should not judge him on hindsight knowledge that he did not have. Hunk
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2008 15:45:25 GMT -6
Gordie I thought the subject had been exhausted and got hooked on chess over on the gameknot board.
If Custer is at liberty to deviate from an agreed timetable and advance the attack by a day then he was at liberty to delay his attack by a day.Delaying his appearance on the LBH by a day without a shadow of a doubt would have seen the destruction of Terry's column.He had no reason to delay his attack just as he had no reason to advance his attack. There were two columns in the field and although moving independently they were part of the one operation and had a responsibility that the actions of one would not put the other in danger or jeopardize their goal. The direction of Custer attack was expected to be Northward so as to ensure the Indians would be trapped between the two forces.Custer action in following the trail risked him having to attack Southward thus subverting the agreed plan. Terry's advice allowed Custer freedom of action but that did not mean he was free to act without sufficent reason.This is what he is guilty of and this is betrayal.
That would depend on which 'plan' you have in mind. All good soldiers obey the last order Hunk so the plan or directions I have in mind is as relayed by Capt Ed W Smith to the officer commanding the 7th.
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Post by El Crab on Sept 19, 2008 20:25:04 GMT -6
Custer was cut loose. Gibbon half-jokingly asked Custer to wait for them. The Second's soldiers expressed dismay at not being allowed to go with Custer, since they all figured Custer was going to find the Indians first. All of these things point to Custer's regiment being expected to find the Indians and engage.
Plus, Custer only cut off his proposed route 20 miles short. A day's march or less. And he did so because the trail did not lead that way. But as we all know, when he found out the approximate location of the village(s), Custer did not intend on attacking on the 25th. He was going for a dawn attack on the 26th. His intelligence as to the approximate location of the Indians came on the 24th. If he had marched 20 miles more, Custer still would have likely attacked the village no later than the 26th. A full day before Terry arrived. And Terry's force was delayed considerably by a scout leading them through very hard country.
Custer had the larger of the two forces, it wasn't a mixed bag (infanty/cavalry/artillery), and he was outfitted with rations for 15 days. Combine that with the comments by the soldiers and officers in the Terry/Gibbon column, it would all point to Custer being EXPECTED to do what he did. Which is to say he was expected to find the Indians first and attempt to accomplish the mission.
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Post by El Crab on Sept 19, 2008 20:37:42 GMT -6
One more thing. Custer's only order in regards to staying in contact with Terry was to send Herendeen through to report on Custer's scout of Tullock's Creek. Since Custer didn't see the need to scout Tullock's Creek (the trail didn't lead there), he didn't see the need to send Herendeen, perhaps a valued asset to Custer, on a needless errand. And Herendeen was to be paid a nice little bonus for this task, and Custer might've thought he was doing the cash-strapped Army a favour by saving them some coin.
Herendeen let Custer know it was about time for him to leave, and I want to say Bouyer or one of the Crows suggested to Custer that he wait till the regiment reached a further point along the detour they were now following. That there was some kind of easier path through Tullock's they would be passing soon. But when that point came, Herendeen said it was time to go and Custer didn't say a word. So Herendeen could not leave.
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Post by mcaryf on Sept 20, 2008 1:44:54 GMT -6
I have previously thought and posted that Custer was wrong in not sending Herendeen on the 24th to the CN with the Crows so that he could continue on to Terry with early information about the location of the village etc.
I have more recently been considering the difficulty Custer had with respect to scouts with knowledge of the area. It seems that these were limited to the Crows, Bouyer and Herendeen. With the added limitation that only Herendeen and Bouyer could speak both English and Crow.
Thus once Custer decided that his column would be split into three groups he has an immediate difficulty in assigning scouting resources. This is a possible explanation as to why Benteen was given no scouts for his mission and why Herendeen was retained by Custer (rather than sent to Terry) and allocated to Reno. This would enable Custer to send Crow messengers between his column and Reno's with interpretation facilities available at both ends. In this context it is interesting to note that as soon as Herendeen rejoined Reno, the first thing Reno asked him to do was to interpret between him and the Crows.
Whilst I still think that Custer should have sent a messenger to Terry with information about the proximity of the village to the mouth of the LBH, I now think the messenger should have been one of the Crows and not Herendeen.
For those of you who like to consider "what ifs", it is interesting to speculate what alternate history might have occurred if Bouyer had chosen to accompany the Crows when they left Custer to eventually meet Benteen. He would have been able to give Benteen a much better understanding of Custer's location and possible actions. As it was Bouyer's sacrifice in staying with Custer seems to have made no material difference to the outcome.
Regards
Mike
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