Terry's Orders--When did Custer do as he saw fit?

[crzhrs]

Following is Terry's orders in a nutshell. How many did Custer follow and at what point did he do as he saw fit?

Take your force up the Rosebud.
Scout the trail.
Scout Tullock's Creek.
Go to the Little Bighorn headwaters.
Meet me in 15 days in the LBH Valley.

Things might change so I give you the authority to deviate from all above orders if you believe there is sufficient reason to do so.

[alfuso]

wellssir, Terry didn't say "meet" him in 15 days. He said report to me in time rationed for. Report to me can mean send a courier.

Would seem Terry wasn't too concerned about Custer taking care of himself - basically, sashay down the rivers that thar way and feel around' cause there's Injuns out there somewhere, thattaway, maybe. So go find 'em and bring 'em in.

Lotsa latitude in that "sufficient reason" line. The arse covering seems to be hinted at even then.

alfuso

[elisabeth]

The structure of the order is quite interesting. It's not do this, do that, followed by a "however, deviate if you see sufficient reason", covering everything preceding it, which really would be carte blanche; it's deviate if you see sufficient reason followed by "He thinks, however ...". Meaning, you'd jolly well better have "sufficient reason" before you deviate from this. He then moves rapidly from "he thinks" (advisory) to "he desires" (imperative) for the latter elements of the order. "Desires" is attached both to scouting Tullock's and to reporting in 15 days, giving both equal weight.

The logic of reporting "not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed" is that Terry intends Custer to return in person in order to reprovision if necessary, though it's true that from the way it's worded, Custer could choose to read it as merely "communicate". It seems he did go for the latter meaning, as there's that story of Godfrey's about carrying extra salt -- "as we may not see the supply steamer again". And Godfrey also quotes Custer as saying, on the 21st, that they'll follow the Indians to Nebraska if necessary. Willert's LBH Diary quotes the New York Tribune as saying that "General Terry was to supply General Custer from the mouth of the Big Horn, should his pursuit of the Indians lead him that way. Otherwise, General Custer may go to Fort Fetterman for supplies". No mention of this in Terry's order. So ... was this something that had been agreed officially? Or was Custer already embroidering in his own mind on what had been said at the conference? Not sure where the Tribune would have got its info: whether from Custer, or from a source on Terry's staff. If the former, this could be a sign that Custer's already preparing to "cut loose" as early as the 21st.

Makes one wonder, actually, whether Terry's written order wasn't an afterthought designed to rein him in by prescribing limits that had not been formally set in their discussions on the Far West. In fact, could this point to the "official actions" Custer complained had been criticised behind his back, at the officers' call on the 22nd? If one or two officers had a fair understanding of Terry's intentions, and then saw Custer showing every sign of haring off wherever he liked regardless, said officer(s) might have tipped Terry off and warned that something needed to be spelled out on paper to prevent a Nebraska/Fetterman diversion?

Curious that despite the "15 days", there seemed to be a general understanding in the Terry/Gibbon command that they were due to meet up with Custer on the 27th or thereabouts.

[George Mabry]

The “15 days” is one of the more meaningful parts of Custer’s orders. Custer did not have to look for an opportunity to cut loose from Terry. Terry cut Custer loose when he sent him off with the instructions to report back to him within 15 days. That, to my way of thinking, is a very long time to be on the prowl.

I don’t believe Terry necessarily intended Custer to report back in person within 15 days. Had Custer been on anything like a hot or major trail, he would have been expected to stay after it. But had Custer only made sporadic contact with small groups of hostiles here and there, Terry would have wanted to sit down with Custer and maybe rework their plans. The “meet up on the 27th” is a Monday morning kind of thing and had no play in Terry’s or Custer’s minds. Terry was wisely giving Custer a reference point only with that information.

Terry, like Custer, was concerned with the hostiles escaping. Terry expected Custer to find the Indians and jump them. Had the Indians been where Terry thought they would be, he wanted Custer to do it in such a way that the only avenue open for the hostiles to flee was in Terry’s direction. That would incorporate the rest of Terry’s command into the equation and is only common sense. Given the option, why jump them in such a way that allows escape routes to the south or east where any support was dubious at best?

In summary, Terry basically gave Custer carte blanche. Custer didn’t have to take it. Terry had developed as good a plan as one can under those circumstances and he did an excellent job of communicating that plan to his subordinate. Any confusions or misunderstandings are a product of the CYA factor following a major, military disaster.

[Dark Cloud]

I agree, and further this is pretty boilerplate and not something that is unique to the LBH or Custer. Terry first announces these are NOT orders but instructions as to what HE THINKS should occur, but Custer being on the ground was free to integrate new info and do what he thought best. It is understood that should Custer deviate from the instructions Terry is off the hook and Custer on it, which is reasonable.

In 1914, for one of many examples, the British admiralty was trying to corral the Goeben, a new German battlecruiser. Among the many mistakes the Admiralty made - including its assumptions on what the Goeben's mission was - it assigned ships to tail her and bring her to battle but to avoid "superior force."

Well, what the hey was "superior force?" Admiral Milne decided it was the Goeben although he had numerous smaller ships. It sounds stupid today, but back then the British - inventors of the battlecruiser type - had proclaimed this exactly to be what the BC was for. Able to outrun what it could not outfight, and accurately destroy ships at distance. The result was the Goeben made Turkey and, for complicated reasons, Turkey abandoned its traditional friend England and joined Germany and Austria.

The idiot who wrote avoid 'superior force' was Churchill, and he was referencing the Austrian navy, which was thought powerful at that point, but could barely float. Out of this fiasco came Lawrence and Gallipoli and the fall of the Ottomans and a new front against Russia, England's ally.

An Admiral Custer would certainly have attacked the Goeben in force; to what end unknown because the Goeben WAS a powerful ship of the time.

On the Eastern front that same month, the German Col. Hoffman thought two Russian generals would not support each other because of animosity from the Russo-Japanese war. He was right, but for the wrong reasons. If evidence had vanished the annihilation of an entire Russian army might have been blamed on this animosity, which existed but was not part of either Russian general's thinking, both of whom were patriotic warriors of the Czar.

[mcaryf]

If you look at the orders that Terry gave to Gibbon earlier in the campaign, you will see the same style of Terry thinking that Gibbon should do this or desiring that he should do that. Clearly this was Terry's style of giving orders to senior officers - Reno was not at this level so orders given to him were more obviously prescriptive. Thus we cannot judge that Terry's communication to Custer was anything other than orders except that he did give him reasonable freedom to act as circumstances dictated.

I have previously thought that Custer did not have sufficient reason to deviate from Terry's orders/desires as Terry had correctly forecast that the Indian trail would turn West towards the LBH. Thus there was no "new" information that would justify Custer's move up Davis Creek. However, there was new information that Custer did not know when he moved West, which was that the village had moved down the LBH rather than up it. This potentially placed the village just where Terry wanted it to be, between his two columns. My previous thought was that Custer should have camped somewhere around Busby whilst his scouts determined precisely where the village had gone. Once they had seen it heading down the LBH then Custer would have been fully justified in deviating from Terry's plan. In fact, this could have brought success to the whole venture with the village moving closer to Terry so that both columns could fight it on the 26th. However, it is probable that Custer's presence would have been detected. I guess if he had been detected, there would probably have been an indecisive Rosebud style battle somewhere along Reno Creek and the village might well have got away up the LBH.

The reason why I say my "previous" thought is because my latest research/analysis has suggested to me that Custer genuinely wanted his troops to remain undetected some 4 or 5 miles from the Divide whilst his scouts determined the position. This would have left him the option to follow Terry's plan by returning to the Rosebud if the village had gone upstream or to have driven the village towards Terry if it had gone down either Tullocks or the LBH. I used to have some doubt as to whether it might always have been Custer's intention to attack on the 25th regardless. There was the business of lighting cooking fires and Red Star's account of Reveille being sounded and the move right up to the Divide all of which suggested Custer might have wanted the excuse of being detected to justify him attacking without waiting for Terry.

The latest research, with which I have been involved and I hope to publish in a few weeks, has suggested that it was Tom Custer (after the lost pack incident) who moved the column up to the Divide against Custer's express wishes and orders (note for various good reasons I now think John Gray was wrong in discounting Girard's evidence on this point). This effectively took the decision for Gen Custer that he would have to attack that day regardless of where the village might or might not have gone. I should note that if the village had moved upstream then an attack on its rear by Custer would have driven it further away from Terry and that of course was why Terry wanted Custer to consider travelling further along the Rosebud before crossing to the LBH.

Having stated above that Custer was justified with respect to his move West, I have to add that he clearly was not with respect to his orders (and these clearly were orders to which the discretion clause did not apply) that he should endeavour to send Herendeen to Terry with news of Tullocks Creek. The point of this is that Herendeen was Terry's man, attached to Custer's column with the purpose of informing Terry as to whether Tullocks was clear. It is irrelevant as to whether Custer might or might not know where the village was, the key was Terry needed to know about Tullocks to decide his own route. Terry started up Tullocks with his whole force so that he was ready to take action if the village was up there. Thus he was depending on Herendeen as a messenger. When Herendeen did not arrive Terry's column disastrously marched for a period on the Divide between Tullocks and the Big Horn and eventually crossed to the Big Horn and the mouth of the LBH.

If Custer had taken care to follow his orders he would ideally have sent Herendeen with the Crows to the Crows Nest on the afternoon of the 24th. The Crows Nest overlooks the headwaters of Tullocks and would be an excellent starting point for a scout travelling down it. Custer's disregard for informing Terry was even more marked when he did not send Herendeen with Varnum's party instead of, or as well as, Charlie Reynolds. If Herendeen had gone with the Crows during the afternoon of the 24th, then there was plenty of daylight and night time for him to have travelled down Tullocks to meet with either Bradley's scouts or Terry's main column early morning on the 25th.

This would probably have made no difference to Custer's actual defeat but it might have saved Terry from a potential disaster or helped clinch a glorious victory both of which possibilities Custer ignored.

We know about Custer's intentions for the attack on the village as he described these to Girard. His goal was to drive the village down towards the Yellowstone.

Thus if Custer is successful a great mass of Indians would be surging down the LBH. Equally if he is held off or defeated, the likelihood would be for a substantial force of warriors to head in Terry's direction. Thus Herendeen should have taken vital intelligence to Terry, first that Tullocks is clear so Terry should choose an effective crossing point to get to the LBH and second that the Indians are very near so that Terry should concentrate his force. As it was Terry strung out his command in a desperate attempt to get to the mouth of the LBH by 26th June and could easily have had his column chewed up in detail.

I cannot explain or justify Custer's failure to send Herendeen unless perhaps Herendeen himself had got cold feet about travelling on his own after seeing signs of so many Indian. Extraordinarily Custer even sent Herendeen with Reno which resulted in him being on the opposite side of the village to the direction of Terry's command. Clearly Custer had no intention to send him to Terry and this could have caused a disaster.

Thus in the case of the move up Davis Creek, I think Custer was entirely justified in what he did both in terms of what he knew and with hindsight. However, in the case of failing to send the messenger to Terry there was no justification for this at the time and we can see with hindsight that this failure could potentially have resulted in an even greater disaster.

Regards

Mike

[gary]

Very Interesting, Mike. I look forward to seeing your research when it is published.

I have always thought that Custer had "sufficient reason", if only because the terms of the orders (if that's what they were) were so permissive. For ease of reference, I have reproduced the orders below.

I have approached the question from a legal point of view. Had Custer been court martialled, could he have been convicted of failing to follow orders? I think not. I am not familiar with the burden and standard of proof that would have been applied at a US court martial in the 1870s, but I presume that the burden was on the prosecution to prove any allegation beyond reasonable doubt.

By inserting the words "sufficient reason" in the orders, it seems to me that that in judging Custer, a court martial would have had to apply what lawyers call an objective subjective test. In other words, Custer's subjective actions would be judged objectively. This would not involve judging whether his actions were faultless, but whether they fell within a spectrum of actions that would be reasonable for an officer in his position. When judged by that standard, it seems inconceivable to me that he could have been convicted of failing to follow orders.

The other issue that I have alluded to above is whether these directions actually amounted to orders in any event. I suspect that they were viewed as orders (the last sentence of the letter refers to Custer proceeding on the basis outlined "unless in the mean time you receive further orders"). On looking at the letter however, the only unequivocal direction or order is to "proceed up the Rosebud [as soon as the regiment is ready]."


The order:

Headquarters of the Department of Dakota (In the Field)

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory June 22nd, 1876

Lieutenant-Colonel Custer,

7th Calvary

Colonel: The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them.

He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank.

The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's command.

The supply-steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks of the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the mean time you receive further orders.

Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,

E. W. Smith, Captain, 18th Infantry A. A. J. G.

[elisabeth]

On the legal front, it may be interesting to look at Custer's 1867 court-martial. On the charge of deserting his command and taking an unauthorised journey, he brought in evidence a statement of Sherman's that had given him discretion to go anywhere he liked. ("To hell or Denver", I believe were the words used.) It didn't get him off.

The only real point of doubt in the above is whether the Indian trail would indeed turn towards the Little Big Horn. A certain amount of discretion has to be included to allow for the possibility that it didn't, which would amount to "sufficient reason". I'm tempted to think (as per Mike's "previous thought") that this was the only eventuality Terry saw as bringing the "sufficient reason" clause into play. If all circumstances prove to conform to Terry's expectations, the orders stand.

Mike, your point about Herendeen: the big surprise is that he didn't volunteer to join the Crow's Nest trip of his own accord. He says he was great friends with Bouyer, so must surely have known the trip was happening; you'd think he'd have gone along as resident conversationalist for Bouyer, just as Reynolds did for Varnum. So your "cold feet" diagnosis is an attractive one. He shows something of the same on the 26th, according to Varnum (Carroll, Custer's Chief of Scouts, p. 94). Varnum's trying to get someone to go with him to get help: "I suggested I would try and get away during the night if I could get a good man to go with me & carry the news & try to get relief. I talked to Herendine [sic], but he thought it too risky" -- after which a sergeant volunteers. Not saying that Herendeen's cowardly, exactly, but not exactly gung-ho either.

The only witnesses he mentions to his exchange with Custer about Tullock's are Custer himself, and Bouyer -- both conveniently dead. Maybe he just kept his head well down throughout the march, and didn't mention Tullock's at all?

[gary]

But his journey was not in the course of his duties. He abandoned those duties to go running after Libbie. Indeed, according to a letter written by Libbie (quoted in Burkey's "Custer, Come At Once!") he knew that he was disobeying orders when doing this.

[elisabeth]

True, but his defence was that it was -- that he was legitimately pursuing Hancock to get his latest orders. The court saw through it. But his defence was that he was entitled to go anywhere. Despite the "proof" he advanced to that effect, they didn't buy it.

Agree, LBH is different: wherever he went, it was going to be in the course of his duties and not for frivolous reasons. Just saying that the "discretion" defence might be much the same.

[harpskiddie]

The determinative phrase is not "unless there IS sufficient reason" but rather "unless YOU SHALL SEE sufficient reason." Those are two markedly different phrases, legally and otherwise. It was Custer's judgment, for better or worse, that was to apply, and it was Terry who gave him that latitude.

Whether or not there would have been sufficient darkness remaining for Herendeen to have gone with the Varnum party to wherever they went [depends on what Crow's Nest one accepts as the one actually reached] and then to have gone to the mouth of Tulloch's, or even halfway down, is debatable - and if you all want to get into the sunrise, civil versus military twilight, angles of declension and etc etc, well have at it.

Herendeen, if he had been truly as experienced a frontiersman as portrayed, would never have traveled when there was ANY possibility of being spotted, particularly after it had been determined that the camps were in fact dead ahead. I have been over that country on horseback more than he ever was, and I would never have attempted such a ride in any kind of daylight. The country over to and down Tulloch's is much rougher than the route up Davis Creek. He would not have got far before having to hole up.

It seems to me that the Varnum party was at the Crow's Nest, wherever one thinks it was, for about an hour and a bit, before the sun came up to the extent that objects, such as a lone rider, could be seen [perhaps looking as big as an elephant].

Or not.

Gordie
MC

[Dark Cloud]

mcaryf,

We've been claiming that Tom Custer brought the regiment forward to the Divide and for those reasons you mention on this board alone for some years. Sorry you missed it. Oddly, nobody felt the need to declare it the work of 'research' and rush to publish it. In this case, it's been up on message boards and covered by whatever signatory power and dating validation that the medium provides. You noticed, right?

New research generally implies new evidence, of which there is none.

[elisabeth]

There's been supposition. Not evidence.

[Dark Cloud]

mcaryf's definition of 'evidence' has not been giggle proof in the past; in any case, there is no new evidence.

[mcaryf]

Hi DC

I do not think I used the expression "new evidence" in my post, rather I am talking about further analysis and correlation of previous evidence. We are fortunate that the ability of data processing to do this gives us an advantage as compared with some of the researchers who have gone before us.

If you can point me towards previous threads that determined Tom Custer lead the column forward I would be interested to see them.

Hi Gordie

The most sensible use of Herendeen would have been to send him with the Crows the first time they went to the Crows Nest. This would have given more than enough time for him to travel down Tullock's Creek. I concede it is a moot point as to whether he would have found Bradley or Terry but the attempt should have been made.

Regards

Mike