Terry's Orders--When did Custer do as he saw fit?

[AZ Ranger]

It was Herendeen that decided not to go earlier I believe. If the scout says he was going to wait should Custer have said go anyway.

[mcaryf]

Herendeen pointed out that it would be best to go later, actually when they got to Davis Creek. This was when it should have happened. Herendeen claimed he went to Custer to get authorisation to go but Custer did not give it. Whether this is true or not we do not really know as Custer did not live to deny it.

Regards

Mike

[douglas]

In his Camp interview, Herendeen says it was on the morning of the 25th that he told Custer that "the head of Tullock's Creek lies just over those hills yonder" Custer said that there was now no point in scouting Tullock's Creek and Herendeen said Custer was right.

[AZ Ranger]

Just a quick search found these:


Rch post www.littlebighorn.info - Love Triangle #1 ... Weir/Libbie/GAC
crzhrs,

Girard testified at the RCOI that Custer was angry about the regiment being moved up. I believe Varnum said about the the same thing. Reno insisted he had nothing to do with the move. Reno's attorney, perhaps trying to imply that Tom Custer gave the order asked Girard if Tom Custer had some special assignment that morning. Girard supposed Tom Custer simply was in command of his company.


Dark Cloud wrote
TWC rode to his brother on CN to deliver the message about the breadbox and Indians, etc., a duty he took upon himself and not at anyone's order, so far as we know. He was not involved with any portion of the incident but felt he alone needed to tell Custer. He was up and active and probably did give the order to move, since Custer had told them to be ready by 0800. (I don't think Reno's attorney was trying to install that.)

Custer yelled at TWC as he approached, Girard said, but calmed after TWC explained the reason. Which, a reasonable guess would be that TWC often acted for his brother because he could anticipate - correctly - what Custer would do and want. The regiment had been, they thought, discovered. He was always the number two, whatever the official roles were.

It's been a favored theory that the 7th had an official and an actual chain of command, given the nepotistic makeup, and that when a Custer was hurt, the actual took over and, having different priorities, produced the counterproductive moves and actions that greatly aided the disaster.

Fred Wrote www.littlebighorn.info - June 25: The Divide to Ford A-- A Discussion


“yet it was Tom who Custer seemed piqued at when he saw the regiment moving.

Zippo proof, or possibility of same, but it is consistent with what is known and doesn't conflict with anything on the field.”

[douglas]

Hi AZ, Custer didn't know the country. Herendeen did and confirmed with Boyer that it was too soon. And Custer was supposed to overrule both of them?

[AZ Ranger]

This seems to be a non-issue to me. Herendeen tells Custer he can't leave yet and the 25th is to late.

AZ Ranger

[George Mabry]

That's the way I see it too AZ

[douglas]

The Crows were scouting ahead of the command to determine where the trail led. Custer didn't know where the trail led, so how was he to know that the scouts would be near the head of Tullock's creek and that Herendeen should go with them?

[George Mabry]

Hello Douglas,

In a nutshell, when the Indians trail turned westward, Custer would have know it was heading toward the divide because his scouts would have told him so. His scouts also told him of the high point (Crows Nest) on the divide where he could observe the valley and the area around the headwaters of Tullock’s Creek. Now as to Custer being negligent in not sending Herendeen with Varnum and the Crows when they moved up to the Crows Nest on the night of the 24th and then departing from there as soon it was light enough to ascertain that the trail went West and that Tullock’s was clear, that is just one man’s opinion. My own opinion is that that would never happen in an American army. Custer, or any other commander, would never allow a scout to go off on his own, develop information on the enemy, formulate his own opinions as to what that information means, and then leave the column and report that analysis back to the General along with his own wild ass guess as to what Custer’s actions will be. Herendeen would have to see Custer before he left. And Custer wouldn’t be likely to release Herendeen with any information until after he made his own observation of the valley. So in my opinion, the very earliest Herendeen could have been sent back to Terry was upon Custer’s return from his visit to the Crow’s Nest.

Of course, upon Custer’s return to the regiment from the Crows Nest, events started unfolding quickly and before Custer could have even formulated a message to Terry, he decided to attack. Did Custer just forget Herendeen in all the excitement? Did the report that Indians were seen on the move between Custer and Terry cause Herendeen to decide for himself to remain with the regiment? Who knows?

George

[mcaryf]

The time that Custer sent for Herendeen and suggested it was the moment for him to go to Tullock's was just after 5am on the 24th. Herendeen said that it was premature as the best place to go was a gap somewhat further along i.e. Davis Creek.

The correct time for Herendeen to be sent was probably at the halt at the E Muddy Creek or before which Gray has at about 1pm and lasting 4 hours.

The key point to remember is that Herendeen was Terry's scout not Custers. The information about the situation in Tullock's Creek needed to be with Terry by the morning of the 25th as Terry expected to have moved past there to the mouth of the LBH by the 26th.

As I have previously said it may well be that Herendeen had decided he did not really want to undertake this hazardous assignment so he might have kept out of Custer's way but these were 4 wasted hours in terms of getting important information to Terry. If Custer had been that interested in concerting his effort with that of Terry then he should have ensured that Herendeen was sent.

Some people have commented that perhaps Terry should have sent a messenger to Custer with reciprocal information. It is an understandable thought but the situations were not the same. Custer was sent to follow an Indian trail and could have been continuing up the Rosebud or indeed anywhere whilst Terry had a specific destination at the LBH. Custer would be expected to have better information than Terry and if Terry sent a messenger it would be towards the area where the Indians were thought to be and almost a suicide mission if Custer was not to be easily found.

Regards

Mike

[conz]

mcaryf said:

Thus in the case of the move up Davis Creek, I think Custer was entirely justified in what he did both in terms of what he knew and with hindsight. However, in the case of failing to send the messenger to Terry there was no justification for this at the time and we can see with hindsight that this failure could potentially have resulted in an even greater disaster.

Nicely done.

Concerning the "herding" of the Native villages, I think that the WORST case scenario is if the villages slipped EAST. That would be an operational disaster. It would be best if they could be chased north, towards Terry.

Second best, they could be chased west towards Crow land, or south, towards Crook. Either way, they remain "in play" and you'll soon catch up to them. Note that there isn't a lot of room for these people to run once they hit the divide between the Rosebud and LBH. That means that they will turn and fight...they have little choice.

But if they escape east, all bets are off, and your whole campaign is in jeopardy...you have to start all over. All kinds of room to run about between the Rosebud and the Missouri.

So if you are Custer, and you know you are within a day's march of the enemy village, and the ONE escape route you DON'T want to leave open is the eastern one....would you in such a case move to the headwaters of the LBH and leave the divide to the Rosebud open and uncovered?! That would certainly be military incompetence, and Terry's instructions would never save Custer from censure (perhaps even a courts-martial) for such an action, I believe.

As to Herendeen, I think you'll have to establish WHY Custer might not have wanted to send him to Terry. I've heard such arguments around here, but they sound petty and unconvincing.

The best explanation I have is that Herendeen refused to go, so Custer (who was not one to force a scout to do such a thing I think) just let him off the hook.

While the information would have been useful to Terry in case the village ran north, Custer probably felt that it wasn't so important as to force a scout to risk his life to get it to him.

Clair

PS...modification to add that I really like George's explanation of the Herendeen scout issue.

[mcaryf]

Hi Clair

You may be right about Herendeen refusing, obviously Custer did not survive to tell us and Herendeen would not want to reveal this.

It was, however, important that Terry should be made aware of both the proximity of the village and the state of Tullock's so it would be surprising if Custer had not tried to get one of the Crows to carry a message if Herendeen would not. After all their mission to observe from the Crows Nest was equally hazardous albeit not a solo operation.

With respect to Custer possibly wanting Herendeen to shuttle back and forth before going to Terry there really was no time for that. My proposal was that Herendeen would be with the Crows. They come back to Custer and tell him what was happening with the village whilst Herendeen would go to Terry.

I use Custer's Luck by Edgar Stewart as my main source on the movement of the Terry/Gibbon column. On page 287 he has Gibbon's column camping at 6pm on the 24th in the entrance to the valley of Tullock's Creek. On the 25th Lt Bradley with his scouts were sent early morning some 12 miles up Tullock's and the main column itself marched up the Creek for about 3 miles. Hearing nothing from Custer or the Bradley scouts the column moved up onto the Divide between the Big Horn and Tullock's and endured a disastrous march in difficult conditions along the Divide with the infantry suffering from lack of water. Eventually they moved down to the Big Horn.

Thus Terry had his troops positioned on the evening of the 24th in case Herendeen came through with a message on the 25th to say the village was on Tullock's Creek.

The time for Herendeen to go was the afternoon of the 24th anything later e.g. the morning of the 25th would be pointless as others have already posted.

Regards

Mike

[elisabeth]

Doesn't Herendeen say somewhere that before leaving the Far West, he asked Brisbin where his cavalry would be, so as to find them with the message, and was told the mouth of the Big Horn? So he might not have intended travelling all the way down Tullock's in any case, but to cut across country.

Re Curley's statement about waiting for the command at the head of Tullock's: wonder if the understanding might have been that they'd accompany Herendeen on the scout-that-never-happened.

[Dark Cloud]

mcaryf,

Data processing is rather an inflated term for what you are doing, as is 'research' for reading about. You have a love of this. In any case it's mere interpretation of long known stories. Even here, as you'll discover, virtually everything now discussed was discussed decades previous.

To the point, here is an easily findable - using those new fangled data processing search engines - posting of mine from a mere year ago on this board.

Re: Sergt. Kanipe: messenger, straggler, or skulke
« Reply #90 on Mar 27, 2007, 8:35am »
________________________________________
Gumby shares my suppositions about TWC sending Kanipe, who only goes so far as to say TWC told him Custer had given this order.

I've long contended that the logical end of Custer's nepotism was an actual command structure within the formal one and, in the former, TWC was the number 2 and often correctly anticipated his bro's needs to no comment or annoyance in such a small command, even by Benteen. I think TWC brought the regiment forward that morning on his way to the Crow's Nest, prompting Custer's anger, which was solved by TWC's explanation to which bro apparently agreed. Nobody was berated for bringing the regiment forward.

Really and truly, if you limit yourself to what was said and known before 1879's end of the RCOI, it is all of a piece with the testimony and the early photos.

Scrape away all the addenda of later years which, by the by, is perfectly normal. But adjust the timeline to have Boston with his bros before Martin was sent. It means Custer was on the Weir Point area longer, but not much. Martin may have invented the Indians attacking Custer later to explain his wounded horse which, it turned out, he never noticed. Embarrassing in the press, normal response.

I think Harris has a good grip on all this.
« Last Edit: Mar 27, 2007, 8:37am by darkcloud »
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________________________________________
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
[e-mail]
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com


Here is one, equally easily found and still up, from 2004 on the Against All Odds board.


USA
Status: offline
Posted - October 24 2004 : 10:04:59 AM
________________________________________
I don't have to speculate. And Kanipe, obviously, was not the second messenger. Ergo, it's you guys who have to explain the differences in strain apparent in the two messages, why the first is more demanding than the second, and why a deteriorated situation would suggest a less hysterical message. What had deteriorated, by the way, in those supposedly crucial 16 (not 19 minutes, page 272 Gray)? Further, the sixteen minute difference is arrival, not departure, time. Martin, with a wounded and already tired horse (his words), can reasonably be assumed to have travelled slower than the previous Kanipe, suggesting the two orders were given much closer together.

What is very odd is that Kanipe has no memory of Boston Custer, who passed Benteen an hour and ten minutes before Kanipe arrived (Gray, p. 251), a suspicious nonevent given he meets Martin later, supposedly on the same trail. Explain.

And why do you misstate the facts, although I'm used to it,now? The first message did not request the packs only. It requested the ammo packs only, to be brought as quick as possible. At least, according to Kanipe in 1905. That this was not done did not result in the train commander being court martialed for failing to obey a direct order. That could be because it actually wasn't the order or because it was acknowledged as unable to be carried out. But the ammo packs were not even separated from the others at this point. How come?

And no, Wild, my offered scenario with TWC is not ridiculous, nor remotely mutiny. It's an officer anticipating the needs of his commander based upon 31 years of co-existence, several within this regiment, and perfectly rational and, in any case, correct, since Custer did want the train. And as I say, when you read (have you?)the stuff from the Yellowstone and the Black Hills expeditions and before, if T's last name wasn't Custer you'd have a hard time explaining his presence above that of others of his rank and station, talking to Cooke as a peer.

I point again to TWC's TELLING superior officers relevant to the issue at hand that HE was going to tell the General about the Bread Box incident, something of which he had no first hand knowledge, and doing so with Calhoun, his brother-in-law who also had none, that morning. As he rode to his brother someone, hard to say who, brought the regiment forward at the same time to his brother's temporary annoyance. It was neither Reno, Benteen, nor Cooke. Who, then? Who had authority as if he spoke for the commander, of prestige sufficient he was not yelled at when Custer returned, and also unknown to the day's survivors? Tough one.


There are numerous other references, and those are only mine; others talked about it and this references only two message boards. You can take the time to look, these are not original thoughts to you. And I don't claim they are original to me.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I'm off to deliver a Presentation based upon My Theories I recently Published to the Harold Society of Ringworm, Colorado. My compelling argument that Bishop Odo's mace was clearly the key weapon, and that William's wise choice of fish that morning gave him the motivation to clobber Harold's shield wall (I reference suspicions that the Saxon shield contractors were low bidders and chose low weight over protection, Thus guaranteeing the result; and the officers who worked on the shield commission LIVED.....but I say too much...). Of course, Harold died with his receipts on him. I speak without notes, flawlessly, which inappropriate braggadicio will soon be confirmed out of nowhere by my willing shill, who will then vanish.

Be impressed. Be very, very impressed.

[harpskiddie]

Terry's move to the Tulloch Divide had nothing to do with Custer or Herendeen, although Hughes tried to make it appear that it did. Terry's intention was to get to the mouth of the Little Horn via Tulloch and then cutting over [the direct route up the Big Horn is virtually impassable]. He left the valley and went onto the divide on the advice of scout Taylor, and perhaps Doane and Brisbin. Bradley was recalled by Terry's order from his first stop on the Tulloch, and then sent ahead along the divide to Tulloch Peak.

Had Bouyer not been detached to Custer, and had LeForge not busted his collarbone [and had Terry had any faith in his Crows after their performance on the 24th], the time-costly detour would never have been taken.

Gordie
MC