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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 15:44:28 GMT -6
Montrose,
One of the first things that GAC did, after returning from Washington DC, was to abolish the 3x4 company battalions established by Reno. GAC was back and making sure the regiment knew he was in command, I guess. But abolishing his own 2 wing structure on the eve of battle was madness.
Where you and I part company is that, for all the poor leadership and training of that regiment, I believe that a positive outcome could have been achieved if it had been competently handled by its CO between 22-26 June 1876.
WO
I think one of the things that comes glaring through history is Custer might have been a brave fighter but he didn't understand working with people. Custer insulates himself with his clan,. by isolating himself behind a curtain of friendly faces, Custer as as little contact as possible with anyone he finds difficult--which only makes the us and them problem worse. Beth,
GAC certainly liked a circle of "yes" men, but be careful about this pro and anti-Custer factions. There was not an "anti-Custer" faction. Benteen clearly harboured doubts over GAC's competence. Benteen and Reno were not great buddies. The two closest officers to Reno were probably Edgerley and Moylan, and the latter was considered "clan" and the brother-in-law to Calhoun. That regiment was never together until this campaign. 2 companies missed the 1873 expedition. Pre-campaign in 1876, McDougall, McIntosh and Godfrey were in Louisiana, Benteen and French were at Fort Rice, Calhoun and Smith were at Fort Totten. Only Yates, Keogh, Moylan, Weir and Harrington were at Fort Abraham Lincoln. The problem was nepotism, not factions.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 13, 2015 16:00:52 GMT -6
Tom: Only mentioned Crook in response to Ian's comment on ineffectual weapons. A single shot weapon would not have been my preference when better we available, but the weapons were not the proximate cause. Both Crook and Custer fought over similar terrain, so there must be some other factor involved in that Crook maintained his position (near run - but maintain he did) while Custer did not. The point being here you must look at someplace else for the answer.
When anyone voluntarily leaves the immediate battle space, they only leave for two reasons - 1) you beat them and they have had enough, or, 2) They are trying to suck you in somewhere else.
WO: I don't believe you and Montrose are parting company at all. IF, is the biggest word in the English Language.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 16:02:22 GMT -6
WO it's frustrating because I almost understand what you are saying but I suspect what I am missing has to do with my lack of military training or familiarity with things like structures of regiments and how they are expected to work. However when I think were I was a year ago (I joined this board in Aug. 15) I have come a long way so please be patient. First--Flag battalion. Does that mean that even though Custer was in Command of the entire regiment, you would expect to find him during a battle with his flag battalion? What is the difference between an adjutant and a ADC? I know that there is probably a tradition for Custer to have both by his side but would a wiser commander say to either TWC or Cooke--I need you with Keogh. (Probably TWC because that is where his company was) Or should Custer put C with Reno and either Moylan or French's company in it's place. If Custer had put C under Reno would TWC been required to stay in the valley or would still have been by GAC's side. I hope I haven't confused everyone with my questions. Those are interesting possibilities to think about. However just because Custer had different people in different locations, I don't know if it would make a difference in the battle--we would just have different bodies in different places. Personally I think that one of the biggest problems of the battle was Custer's leadership. Tell me is there any logical reason that Keogh was left where he was? Was he covering Custer's movements as Custer headed further north? Or is there the possibility that Custer saw a number of Companies were starting to lag and just sort of parked them to wait for Benteen. Beth Beth,
(1) However much GAC divided his command, the small regimental headquarters/headquarters detachment was going to be riding with at least one of the combat battalions. GAC clearly wanted to ride with Yates, and don't let anybody else tell you otherwise. If GAC had maintained the 2 wing structure, Reno would still have expected the independent command and Benteen would have ridden with GAC. That would have placed Yates and Keogh, and much of the "clan", with Reno. It would also have given GAC the pleasure of Benteen's company....
(2) At the time, an adjutant was the commander's administrative/operations officer, although Cooke definitely leaned towards the former. See his dreadful note to Benteen via Martini. Reno had Hodgson acting as his adjutant. An ADC is a personal aide, and there was no need for GAC to have one. It was just an excuse for TWC to ride with him rather than command his company.
(3) Replacing Yates with Benteen would be whiffing par excellence, and I will leave that for QC. But yes, I see GAC as the problem 22-26 June 1876. He was well "off his game", and I hold him in higher overall regard than others. Organising a regiment was never his strong point, and surrounding himself with "yes men" was positively dangerous.
(4) There was logic to Keogh's initial deployment. It had already become too late to expect Benteen/McDougall to join them through that surrendered battle space north/east of Ford B, but it assisted the Yates recon. The million dollar question is why Keogh long overstayed his welcome and did not timeously vacate northwards towards GAC and Yates...?
WO
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Post by Beth on Jul 13, 2015 17:19:52 GMT -6
I think one of the things that comes glaring through history is Custer might have been a brave fighter but he didn't understand working with people. Custer insulates himself with his clan,. by isolating himself behind a curtain of friendly faces, Custer as as little contact as possible with anyone he finds difficult--which only makes the us and them problem worse. Beth,
GAC certainly liked a circle of "yes" men, but be careful about this pro and anti-Custer factions. There was not an "anti-Custer" faction. Benteen clearly harboured doubts over GAC's competence. Benteen and Reno were not great buddies. The two closest officers to Reno were probably Edgerley and Moylan, and the latter was considered "clan" and the brother-in-law to Calhoun. That regiment was never together until this campaign. 2 companies missed the 1873 expedition. Pre-campaign in 1876, McDougall, McIntosh and Godfrey were in Louisiana, Benteen and French were at Fort Rice, Calhoun and Smith were at Fort Totten. Only Yates, Keogh, Moylan, Weir and Harrington were at Fort Abraham Lincoln. The problem was nepotism, not factions.
WO
I will adjust my thinking--family relationships make everything more complicated--but isn't the Custer clan also made up of family aa well as close friends. I've never really thought of an anti Custer faction though, just the Custer Clan and everyone else. I know that some of the companies didn't arrive at FAL until just before they left on the campaign. It must have made it difficult to have any sort of cohesion with the regiment, especially if Custer was changing things around a lot. As far as the enlisted men were concern at least I would think that a lot of the officers were pretty much strangers and perhaps vice versa with the officers to the enlisted men--but I don't know if that is important. Custer was related or related through marriage to Tom Custer, Calhoun and Moylan--were their others? And of course at LBH there was also Boston Custer and Autie--who had no business being were they were in the battle. Duh, Unless you mean nepotism beyond the Custers--then you have to look at Sturgis and Crittenden--Crittenden IMHO shouldn't have been there and probably wouldn't have if it hadn't been for his dad. McDougall is also 2nd generation 2nd Lt William Reily has a lot of naval connections between fathers and step fathers. Was the 7th significantly different from other Regiments or is the problem that Custer had too many relatives and relatives of relatives on the payroll Beth
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Post by Beth on Jul 13, 2015 17:31:31 GMT -6
WO it's frustrating because I almost understand what you are saying but I suspect what I am missing has to do with my lack of military training or familiarity with things like structures of regiments and how they are expected to work. However when I think were I was a year ago (I joined this board in Aug. 15) I have come a long way so please be patient. First--Flag battalion. Does that mean that even though Custer was in Command of the entire regiment, you would expect to find him during a battle with his flag battalion? What is the difference between an adjutant and a ADC? I know that there is probably a tradition for Custer to have both by his side but would a wiser commander say to either TWC or Cooke--I need you with Keogh. (Probably TWC because that is where his company was) Or should Custer put C with Reno and either Moylan or French's company in it's place. If Custer had put C under Reno would TWC been required to stay in the valley or would still have been by GAC's side. I hope I haven't confused everyone with my questions. Those are interesting possibilities to think about. However just because Custer had different people in different locations, I don't know if it would make a difference in the battle--we would just have different bodies in different places. Personally I think that one of the biggest problems of the battle was Custer's leadership. Tell me is there any logical reason that Keogh was left where he was? Was he covering Custer's movements as Custer headed further north? Or is there the possibility that Custer saw a number of Companies were starting to lag and just sort of parked them to wait for Benteen. Beth Beth,
(1) However much GAC divided his command, the small regimental headquarters/headquarters detachment was going to be riding with at least one of the combat battalions. GAC clearly wanted to ride with Yates, and don't let anybody else tell you otherwise. If GAC had maintained the 2 wing structure, Reno would still have expected the independent command and Benteen would have ridden with GAC. That would have placed Yates and Keogh, and much of the "clan", with Reno. It would also have given GAC the pleasure of Benteen's company....
(2) At the time, an adjutant was the commander's administrative/operations officer, although Cooke definitely leaned towards the former. See his dreadful note to Benteen via Martini. Reno had Hodgson acting as his adjutant. An ADC is a personal aide, and there was no need for GAC to have one. It was just an excuse for TWC to ride with him rather than command his company.
(3) Replacing Yates with Benteen would be whiffing par excellence, and I will leave that for QC. But yes, I see GAC as the problem 22-26 June 1876. He was well "off his game", and I hold him in higher overall regard than others. Organising a regiment was never his strong point, and surrounding himself with "yes men" was positively dangerous.
(4) There was logic to Keogh's initial deployment. It had already become too late to expect Benteen/McDougall to join them through that surrendered battle space north/east of Ford B, but it assisted the Yates recon. The million dollar question is why Keogh long overstayed his welcome and did not timeously vacate northwards towards GAC and Yates...?
WO
Point 2--didn't Custer justify an ADC based on his brevat rank? Point 4--Where they aware that they had lost the battle space at the time Keogh and Custer separated? Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 17:47:28 GMT -6
Beth,
No Lt Col requires an ADC, and certainly not if it leaves his company in the sole custody of a 2nd Lt.
They clearly didn't appreciate the extent of the hostiles build-up via Ford B.
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 18:18:04 GMT -6
Beth, No Lt Col requires an ADC, and certainly not if it leaves his company in the sole custody of a 2nd Lt. They clearly didn't appreciate the extent of the hostiles build-up via Ford B. WO They certainly did. GAC warned of it. Shame Reno and Benteen chickened out and disobeyed orders.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 18:19:43 GMT -6
Beth,
(1) However much GAC divided his command, the small regimental headquarters/headquarters detachment was going to be riding with at least one of the combat battalions. GAC clearly wanted to ride with Yates, and don't let anybody else tell you otherwise. If GAC had maintained the 2 wing structure, Reno would still have expected the independent command and Benteen would have ridden with GAC. That would have placed Yates and Keogh, and much of the "clan", with Reno. It would also have given GAC the pleasure of Benteen's company....
(2) At the time, an adjutant was the commander's administrative/operations officer, although Cooke definitely leaned towards the former. See his dreadful note to Benteen via Martini. Reno had Hodgson acting as his adjutant. An ADC is a personal aide, and there was no need for GAC to have one. It was just an excuse for TWC to ride with him rather than command his company.
(3) Replacing Yates with Benteen would be whiffing par excellence, and I will leave that for QC. But yes, I see GAC as the problem 22-26 June 1876. He was well "off his game", and I hold him in higher overall regard than others. Organising a regiment was never his strong point, and surrounding himself with "yes men" was positively dangerous.
(4) There was logic to Keogh's initial deployment. It had already become too late to expect Benteen/McDougall to join them through that surrendered battle space north/east of Ford B, but it assisted the Yates recon. The million dollar question is why Keogh long overstayed his welcome and did not timeously vacate northwards towards GAC and Yates...?
WO
Point 2--didn't Custer justify an ADC based on his brevat rank? Point 4--Where they aware that they had lost the battle space at the time Keogh and Custer separated? Beth You a have knack of asking the dumbest questions. Did they know they had lost the battle space before they separated?!? Think about that for a minute....
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Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 18:32:13 GMT -6
Consider this. The normal procedure for expeditions in the 1870s was to form the battalions before leaving home station. This allows the battalions to form a habitual relationship and establish standard operating procedures. In this campaign, the 7th kept reorganizing. In fact, the Bns established on the day of battle matched no previous organization. In the period 1866-1898 I know of no other campaign that showed so much confusion and indecisiveness in task organization. One of the things I like to examine as an analyst are tasks that units do that are consistent with other units of that era, and tasks that are unique. LTC Custer either did not understand the dynamics of how companies operated (remember his company level experience was 5 weeks), or he did not care. It is probable that his elimination of the previous wing structure was due to his desire to dominate and humiliate the non Custer clan factions. The 7th had very severe internal factions based on favoritism and nepotism. No one will argue that officer assignments and treatment was based on personal relationships, and not professional or tactical ability. It is my opinion that the main causes of the LBH outcome were NOT any decisions made on 24 and 25 Jun 76. The 7th Cavalry was a badly trained and poorly led unit, to a degree far outside the other 34 regiments of the Army. Other regiments had an ability to compensate for an incompetent tactical leader. But the 7th had a core of yes men who blindly followed orders with no ability to understand when and how to respond to local changes. (Anyone not know my opinion of CPT Keogh?) My question of the day: Was the LBH outcome inevitable for any of the 35 regiments in the Army, or only possible with the 7th Cav? Fred has waffled on this question. Respectfully, William Montrose,
One of the first things that GAC did, after returning from Washington DC, was to abolish the 3x4 company battalions established by Reno. GAC was back and making sure the regiment knew he was in command, I guess. But abolishing his own 2 wing structure on the eve of battle was madness.
Where you and I part company is that, for all the poor leadership and training of that regiment, I believe that a positive outcome could have been achieved if it had been competently handled by its CO between 22-26 June 1876.
WO
A positive outcome was achievable had Reno laid off the booze and not acted like a coward. Had Benteen followed orders and not dawdled and then sat on a hill removing his command from battle, the result would have been quite different.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 18:33:36 GMT -6
Beth, No Lt Col requires an ADC, and certainly not if it leaves his company in the sole custody of a 2nd Lt. They clearly didn't appreciate the extent of the hostiles build-up via Ford B. WO You should address him as General Custer.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 18:34:50 GMT -6
Beth,
GAC certainly liked a circle of "yes" men, but be careful about this pro and anti-Custer factions. There was not an "anti-Custer" faction. Benteen clearly harboured doubts over GAC's competence. Benteen and Reno were not great buddies. The two closest officers to Reno were probably Edgerley and Moylan, and the latter was considered "clan" and the brother-in-law to Calhoun. That regiment was never together until this campaign. 2 companies missed the 1873 expedition. Pre-campaign in 1876, McDougall, McIntosh and Godfrey were in Louisiana, Benteen and French were at Fort Rice, Calhoun and Smith were at Fort Totten. Only Yates, Keogh, Moylan, Weir and Harrington were at Fort Abraham Lincoln. The problem was nepotism, not factions.
WO
I will adjust my thinking--family relationships make everything more complicated--but isn't the Custer clan also made up of family aa well as close friends. I've never really thought of an anti Custer faction though, just the Custer Clan and everyone else. I know that some of the companies didn't arrive at FAL until just before they left on the campaign. It must have made it difficult to have any sort of cohesion with the regiment, especially if Custer was changing things around a lot. As far as the enlisted men were concern at least I would think that a lot of the officers were pretty much strangers and perhaps vice versa with the officers to the enlisted men--but I don't know if that is important. Custer was related or related through marriage to Tom Custer, Calhoun and Moylan--were their others? And of course at LBH there was also Boston Custer and Autie--who had no business being were they were in the battle. Duh, Unless you mean nepotism beyond the Custers--then you have to look at Sturgis and Crittenden--Crittenden IMHO shouldn't have been there and probably wouldn't have if it hadn't been for his dad. McDougall is also 2nd generation 2nd Lt William Reily has a lot of naval connections between fathers and step fathers. Was the 7th significantly different from other Regiments or is the problem that Custer had too many relatives and relatives of relatives on the payroll Beth Finally we agree on something. You should adjust your thinking.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 18:35:07 GMT -6
Any potential new members thinking of joining...unless you plan to agree 100% with the close minded clowns on the board, I would suggest looking elsewhere. These people are not in favor of open dialogue and the sharing of ideas.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 18:35:17 GMT -6
Keogh may have initially placed his battalion in a horseshoe shaped defence with L company at the head in skirmish and his other two companies mounted on both flanks, if this was the case then this would be a text book way of temporally holding an area. But the land mass was simply too much to cover especially with the terrain being what it was with many places concealed by natural folds and dips. I agree with the notion that Keogh should have re-mounted L company as soon as his western flank got compromised, and when greasy grass hill/ridge became occupied by the Indians, he should have moved back, but again the terrain may have made L company place their mounts in the only available cover, and this cover was too far behind for them to simply disengage and run. As we have discussed before, C company may have been covering for L when they gave up their position on the high ground, this advance may not have been on the scale of the Pratzen Heights, but it may have unlocked Keogh’s hold on the area. Ian. Jan, you agree with the premise that he should have remounted?!? So you discount that he was mortally wounded and his horse injured?? Or are you just ignoring that simple fact?
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Post by mac on Jul 13, 2015 18:35:35 GMT -6
WO it's frustrating because I almost understand what you are saying but I suspect what I am missing has to do with my lack of military training or familiarity with things like structures of regiments and how they are expected to work. However when I think were I was a year ago (I joined this board in Aug. 15) I have come a long way so please be patient. First--Flag battalion. Does that mean that even though Custer was in Command of the entire regiment, you would expect to find him during a battle with his flag battalion? What is the difference between an adjutant and a ADC? I know that there is probably a tradition for Custer to have both by his side but would a wiser commander say to either TWC or Cooke--I need you with Keogh. (Probably TWC because that is where his company was) Or should Custer put C with Reno and either Moylan or French's company in it's place. If Custer had put C under Reno would TWC been required to stay in the valley or would still have been by GAC's side. I hope I haven't confused everyone with my questions. Those are interesting possibilities to think about. However just because Custer had different people in different locations, I don't know if it would make a difference in the battle--we would just have different bodies in different places. Personally I think that one of the biggest problems of the battle was Custer's leadership. Tell me is there any logical reason that Keogh was left where he was? Was he covering Custer's movements as Custer headed further north? Or is there the possibility that Custer saw a number of Companies were starting to lag and just sort of parked them to wait for Benteen. Beth Beth,
(1) However much GAC divided his command, the small regimental headquarters/headquarters detachment was going to be riding with at least one of the combat battalions. GAC clearly wanted to ride with Yates, and don't let anybody else tell you otherwise. If GAC had maintained the 2 wing structure, Reno would still have expected the independent command and Benteen would have ridden with GAC. That would have placed Yates and Keogh, and much of the "clan", with Reno. It would also have given GAC the pleasure of Benteen's company....
(2) At the time, an adjutant was the commander's administrative/operations officer, although Cooke definitely leaned towards the former. See his dreadful note to Benteen via Martini. Reno had Hodgson acting as his adjutant. An ADC is a personal aide, and there was no need for GAC to have one. It was just an excuse for TWC to ride with him rather than command his company.
(3) Replacing Yates with Benteen would be whiffing par excellence, and I will leave that for QC. But yes, I see GAC as the problem 22-26 June 1876. He was well "off his game", and I hold him in higher overall regard than others. Organising a regiment was never his strong point, and surrounding himself with "yes men" was positively dangerous.
(4) There was logic to Keogh's initial deployment. It had already become too late to expect Benteen/McDougall to join them through that surrendered battle space north/east of Ford B, but it assisted the Yates recon. The million dollar question is why Keogh long overstayed his welcome and did not timeously vacate northwards towards GAC and Yates...?
WO [/font] [/p][/quote] The possibility that occurs to me is that he had orders that specified a time to stay at that position. (This links to my suggestion on the Custer plan thread). The near synchronous return of Custer to Cemetery and the over run of Keogh may be linked in that Keogh overstayed as he had a time to leave to meet Custer. Such a time would suggest the Keogh position is more than just some kind of defense, in fact perhaps not defensive at all. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 18:50:28 GMT -6
Consider this. The normal procedure for expeditions in the 1870s was to form the battalions before leaving home station. This allows the battalions to form a habitual relationship and establish standard operating procedures. In this campaign, the 7th kept reorganizing. In fact, the Bns established on the day of battle matched no previous organization. In the period 1866-1898 I know of no other campaign that showed so much confusion and indecisiveness in task organization. One of the things I like to examine as an analyst are tasks that units do that are consistent with other units of that era, and tasks that are unique. LTC Custer either did not understand the dynamics of how companies operated (remember his company level experience was 5 weeks), or he did not care. It is probable that his elimination of the previous wing structure was due to his desire to dominate and humiliate the non Custer clan factions. The 7th had very severe internal factions based on favoritism and nepotism. No one will argue that officer assignments and treatment was based on personal relationships, and not professional or tactical ability. It is my opinion that the main causes of the LBH outcome were NOT any decisions made on 24 and 25 Jun 76. The 7th Cavalry was a badly trained and poorly led unit, to a degree far outside the other 34 regiments of the Army. Other regiments had an ability to compensate for an incompetent tactical leader. But the 7th had a core of yes men who blindly followed orders with no ability to understand when and how to respond to local changes. (Anyone not know my opinion of CPT Keogh?) My question of the day: Was the LBH outcome inevitable for any of the 35 regiments in the Army, or only possible with the 7th Cav? Fred has waffled on this question. Respectfully, William
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