|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 13, 2015 5:06:27 GMT -6
Keogh may have initially placed his battalion in a horseshoe shaped defence with L company at the head in skirmish and his other two companies mounted on both flanks, if this was the case then this would be a text book way of temporally holding an area.
But the land mass was simply too much to cover especially with the terrain being what it was with many places concealed by natural folds and dips.
I agree with the notion that Keogh should have re-mounted L company as soon as his western flank got compromised, and when greasy grass hill/ridge became occupied by the Indians, he should have moved back, but again the terrain may have made L company place their mounts in the only available cover, and this cover was too far behind for them to simply disengage and run.
As we have discussed before, C company may have been covering for L when they gave up their position on the high ground, this advance may not have been on the scale of the Pratzen Heights, but it may have unlocked Keogh’s hold on the area.
Ian.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 6:12:03 GMT -6
Keogh may have initially placed his battalion in a horseshoe shaped defence with L company at the head in skirmish and his other two companies mounted on both flanks, if this was the case then this would be a text book way of temporally holding an area. But the land mass was simply too much to cover especially with the terrain being what it was with many places concealed by natural folds and dips. I agree with the notion that Keogh should have re-mounted L company as soon as his western flank got compromised, and when greasy grass hill/ridge became occupied by the Indians, he should have moved back, but again the terrain may have made L company place their mounts in the only available cover, and this cover was too far behind for them to simply disengage and run. As we have discussed before, C company may have been covering for L when they gave up their position on the high ground, this advance may not have been on the scale of the Pratzen Heights, but it may have unlocked Keogh’s hold on the area. Ian. Jan, you agree with the premise that he should have remounted?!? So you discount that he was mortally wounded and his horse injured?? Or are you just ignoring that simple fact?
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 6:14:42 GMT -6
Beth, Compare with Reno, if he had been incapacitated. Another 3 company battalion, but he had 2 subordinate captains and an adjutant to issue interim emergency orders. What was the structure around Keogh at ILC battalion, compared to Reno at MAG battalion? Even Benteen's "lean" HDK battalion had a seamless transfer to Weir. Thanks for the link to the Baker Fight. Comedy gold. WO It is a darn shame Reno wasn't incapacitated. Perhaps then the panicked retreat would not have happened. Comedy gold is right. Keep it up.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 6:17:45 GMT -6
Tom/Colt, Out of interest, which of the available plausible explanations would you lean towards? (1) GAC gave Keogh stupid orders to hold pointless terrain leading to disaster? (2) Keogh stupidly complied with such stupid orders leading to disaster? (3) Keogh had an unfit for purpose battalion, in that command and control disastrously collapsed when e.g. Keogh got wounded? (4) Keogh had an unfit for purpose battalion, in that e.g. Harrington disastrously attacked without Keogh's orders? (5) Keogh disastrously disobeyed orders or lost tactical sense in failing to move northwards long after reinforcement was no longer a viable option having lost confidence in the move away from supporting Reno as promised (and away from Benteen)? WO You forgot the real answer skippy. Reno drank himself stupid, panicked and retreated disobeying orders. This freed every last NA to converge on Keogh. Throw in Benteen and his disobedience and the disaster is set in motion.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Jul 13, 2015 6:18:38 GMT -6
The first thing I did when I became interested in this topic was acquire a map. At first glance one can easily see that as soon as Keogh et al set up on that hill they will easily and quickly be surrounded by infiltration from the village. After that it is simply a matter of time before any attack on multiple axes will bring them into close combat and the cavalry will be quickly dealt with. I would think this should be easily seen from Calhoun hill. The presence of Fred's gap makes this that much easier. When the gap was sighted Keogh should have known the jig was up and moved. Maybe he tried too late....ok charitable of me. Cheers But what way should he move--to plug the gap or to a more defensible position? Sometimes I wonder if they didn't realize they were on the defense until it was way to late to do anything about it. I mean if Keogh was placed so he could be seen by Benteen, then he was like a beacon saying 'attack me.' He was shot and out of the battle. Boy you are a very slow learner.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Jul 13, 2015 9:32:29 GMT -6
When I visited the Little Big Horn Battlefield, the first thing I noticed was the complete lack of cover. One could see for miles in any direction. Custer was born in Michigan and raised in Ohio neither of which has much barren landscape. His experience in the War was all in the east mostly in areas of forests except for the Shenandoah valley. He had never encountered the great western plains. He had 1 battle---or would it be a skirmish?---the Battle of Washita River and a little contact on the 1873 expedition. That being said, how much a factor did the terrain play in this battle? Did the vast distances of the LBH area affect GAC's ability to manage his forces? or was he just done in by poor strategy regardless of the terrain? Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 13, 2015 9:53:27 GMT -6
Dave I think you are correct about the terrain and lack of cover, at least cover in the places Custer in particular chose to array those under his direct command. There is plenty of cover and concealment (a different but related factor). The problem for those directly under Custer is that they would have to get low on those ridge tops for what little cover getting low could bring, but in so doing they magnified the Indian advantage of both cover and concealment, especially during the initial infiltration phase of the conflict using Deep Coulee, Calhoun Coulee and Deep Ravine. As I told Mac many moons ago, there are places where you can get to within 50 meters of that ridge top (BR) without being detected. Fred's last excursion to the battlefield validated that point.
The pitfalls of terrain can be overcome. Poor tactics can not.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 12:59:30 GMT -6
Beth, Compare with Reno, if he had been incapacitated. Another 3 company battalion, but he had 2 subordinate captains and an adjutant to issue interim emergency orders. What was the structure around Keogh at ILC battalion, compared to Reno at MAG battalion? Even Benteen's "lean" HDK battalion had a seamless transfer to Weir. Thanks for the link to the Baker Fight. Comedy gold. WO I had to pull out my handy-dandy cheat sheet because I never remember what officer goes with what Company. It appears that Calhoun would be next in line but he was pretty far away from Keogh and then Jame Porter followed by two dewy cheeked 2nd LT's Harrington and Crittenden--(who hopefully was placed correctly on the line to make up for being blind on one side.) Not a wealth of experience to draw on there since all 4 junior officers (That is the right term right?) joined the army post ACW. I have never understood why Custer needed so many officers with him--at least at that battle. What should have been their purpose and did Custer use them effectively? Beth,
There was nothing GAC could do about 2 absent majors and 4 absent captains.
Take a look at how GAC structured 4x3 company battalions (McDougall detached as the rear guard) on the day and away from the left/right wing.
(1) Yates was basically the "flag" battalion with the RHQ, so you have GAC, Yates and TWC, with Cooke as GAC's adjutant.
(2) Reno had 2 captains, Moylan and French, plus Hodgson as adjutant.
(3) Benteen had Weir.
(4) Who did Keogh have, once TWC rides with his brother as an "ADC"...?
Now what would the 25 June 1876 have looked like if he had maintained the 2 wing structure?
(1) Reno would have taken the 5 massacred companies and B, and 3 under Keogh would have undertaken the left oblique.
(2) Benteen would have commanded the wing under GAC, minus 1 company detached to the pack train.
WO
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Jul 13, 2015 13:54:23 GMT -6
Consider this.
The normal procedure for expeditions in the 1870s was to form the battalions before leaving home station. This allows the battalions to form a habitual relationship and establish standard operating procedures.
In this campaign, the 7th kept reorganizing. In fact, the Bns established on the day of battle matched no previous organization.
In the period 1866-1898 I know of no other campaign that showed so much confusion and indecisiveness in task organization. One of the things I like to examine as an analyst are tasks that units do that are consistent with other units of that era, and tasks that are unique.
LTC Custer either did not understand the dynamics of how companies operated (remember his company level experience was 5 weeks), or he did not care. It is probable that his elimination of the previous wing structure was due to his desire to dominate and humiliate the non Custer clan factions. The 7th had very severe internal factions based on favoritism and nepotism. No one will argue that officer assignments and treatment was based on personal relationships, and not professional or tactical ability.
It is my opinion that the main causes of the LBH outcome were NOT any decisions made on 24 and 25 Jun 76. The 7th Cavalry was a badly trained and poorly led unit, to a degree far outside the other 34 regiments of the Army. Other regiments had an ability to compensate for an incompetent tactical leader. But the 7th had a core of yes men who blindly followed orders with no ability to understand when and how to respond to local changes. (Anyone not know my opinion of CPT Keogh?)
My question of the day: Was the LBH outcome inevitable for any of the 35 regiments in the Army, or only possible with the 7th Cav?
Fred has waffled on this question.
Respectfully,
William
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 13, 2015 14:09:47 GMT -6
Montrose, going on how the same Indians defeated Crook is the only real source we have on how other units may have performed, I think the weapons systems in carbine/pistol were ineffectual too and should take some of the blame.
Surprise was main ingredient for me and they never really took advantage of it, but having said that these mounted troopers had no real answer to combating large amounts of warriors and that showed not only at the BLBH but at the Rosebud and even earlier with Fetterman.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 13, 2015 14:10:42 GMT -6
For 34 it was possible but not probable to the point of highly unlikely.
For 1 it was probable to the point of both possible and very likely.
Adverse command climate can destroy what could otherwise be good units.
Ian, who held the ground at the end of the Crook battle? Who withdrew? Crook went back because of a supply problem, otherwise his force was for all intents and purposes combat capable.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Jul 13, 2015 14:29:11 GMT -6
Chuck, Crook, also recalled the advance he sent out to find the hostile village, why someone smelled a trap, had he would have lost severely late in the day. Somebody discerned, the peculiar way the NA's were withdrawing. A second group of warriors awaited to ensnare all who followed the attacking group.
REGARDS, Tom
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 14:33:50 GMT -6
Consider this. The normal procedure for expeditions in the 1870s was to form the battalions before leaving home station. This allows the battalions to form a habitual relationship and establish standard operating procedures. In this campaign, the 7th kept reorganizing. In fact, the Bns established on the day of battle matched no previous organization. In the period 1866-1898 I know of no other campaign that showed so much confusion and indecisiveness in task organization. One of the things I like to examine as an analyst are tasks that units do that are consistent with other units of that era, and tasks that are unique. LTC Custer either did not understand the dynamics of how companies operated (remember his company level experience was 5 weeks), or he did not care. It is probable that his elimination of the previous wing structure was due to his desire to dominate and humiliate the non Custer clan factions. The 7th had very severe internal factions based on favoritism and nepotism. No one will argue that officer assignments and treatment was based on personal relationships, and not professional or tactical ability. It is my opinion that the main causes of the LBH outcome were NOT any decisions made on 24 and 25 Jun 76. The 7th Cavalry was a badly trained and poorly led unit, to a degree far outside the other 34 regiments of the Army. Other regiments had an ability to compensate for an incompetent tactical leader. But the 7th had a core of yes men who blindly followed orders with no ability to understand when and how to respond to local changes. (Anyone not know my opinion of CPT Keogh?) My question of the day: Was the LBH outcome inevitable for any of the 35 regiments in the Army, or only possible with the 7th Cav? Fred has waffled on this question. Respectfully, William Montrose,
One of the first things that GAC did, after returning from Washington DC, was to abolish the 3x4 company battalions established by Reno. GAC was back and making sure the regiment knew he was in command, I guess. But abolishing his own 2 wing structure on the eve of battle was madness.
Where you and I part company is that, for all the poor leadership and training of that regiment, I believe that a positive outcome could have been achieved if it had been competently handled by its CO between 22-26 June 1876.
WO
|
|
|
Post by Beth on Jul 13, 2015 14:58:40 GMT -6
Beth,
There was nothing GAC could do about 2 absent majors and 4 absent captains.
Take a look at how GAC structured 4x3 company battalions (McDougall detached as the rear guard) on the day and away from the left/right wing.
(1) Yates was basically the "flag" battalion with the RHQ, so you have GAC, Yates and TWC, with Cooke as GAC's adjutant.
(2) Reno had 2 captains, Moylan and French, plus Hodgson as adjutant.
(3) Benteen had Weir.
(4) Who did Keogh have, once TWC rides with his brother as an "ADC"...?
Now what would the 25 June 1876 have looked like if he had maintained the 2 wing structure?
(1) Reno would have taken the 5 massacred companies and B, and 3 under Keogh would have undertaken the left oblique.
(2) Benteen would have commanded the wing under GAC, minus 1 company detached to the pack train.
WO
WO it's frustrating because I almost understand what you are saying but I suspect what I am missing has to do with my lack of military training or familiarity with things like structures of regiments and how they are expected to work. However when I think were I was a year ago (I joined this board in Aug. 15) I have come a long way so please be patient. First--Flag battalion. Does that mean that even though Custer was in Command of the entire regiment, you would expect to find him during a battle with his flag battalion? What is the difference between an adjutant and a ADC? I know that there is probably a tradition for Custer to have both by his side but would a wiser commander say to either TWC or Cooke--I need you with Keogh. (Probably TWC because that is where his company was) Or should Custer put C with Reno and either Moylan or French's company in it's place. If Custer had put C under Reno would TWC been required to stay in the valley or would still have been by GAC's side. I hope I haven't confused everyone with my questions. Those are interesting possibilities to think about. However just because Custer had different people in different locations, I don't know if it would make a difference in the battle--we would just have different bodies in different places. Personally I think that one of the biggest problems of the battle was Custer's leadership. Tell me is there any logical reason that Keogh was left where he was? Was he covering Custer's movements as Custer headed further north? Or is there the possibility that Custer saw a number of Companies were starting to lag and just sort of parked them to wait for Benteen. Beth
|
|
|
Post by Beth on Jul 13, 2015 15:11:30 GMT -6
Montrose,
One of the first things that GAC did, after returning from Washington DC, was to abolish the 3x4 company battalions established by Reno. GAC was back and making sure the regiment knew he was in command, I guess. But abolishing his own 2 wing structure on the eve of battle was madness.
Where you and I part company is that, for all the poor leadership and training of that regiment, I believe that a positive outcome could have been achieved if it had been competently handled by its CO between 22-26 June 1876.
WO
I think one of the things that comes glaring through history is Custer might have been a brave fighter but he didn't understand working with people. Custer insulates himself with his clan,. by isolating himself behind a curtain of friendly faces, Custer as as little contact as possible with anyone he finds difficult--which only makes the us and them problem worse.
|
|