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Post by Beth on Jul 12, 2015 18:51:55 GMT -6
Let me answer my own questions. Keogh would have done what Benteen did. Benteen would have either fallen back on Custer, found a better place to defend, or died in situ. Death would have probably have been dealt in at least two of Benteen's options. Regards, om What area do you consider more defensible? Should Keogh have selected one place and concentrate his power so he did not spread everyone so thin or do you think Custer dictated placement?
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Post by jodak on Jul 12, 2015 18:53:37 GMT -6
I have mixed emotions about Keogh. When was he shot, was he trying to control the entire situation on top of that ridge? Did the command collapse upon itself after he was moved to the rear. I have seen his ACW record, he was not a schulb. Then again, did his bad day coincide with that of his boss. Benteen and Keogh were closer than Benteen was with most other officers. Keogh was the outlier with Custer that day. Custer was close with Weir and Moylan, Keogh's time in grade put him where he was! Regards, Tom It was Keogh's turn in the normal rotation to be officer of the day on the 25th, part of the responsibilities of which were to command the rear guard. I suspect that Custer, knowing that action was imminent, felt that he needed Keogh, his third most senior subordinate, as a battalion commander and consequently replaced him as commander of the rear guard. I also believe that the fact that the majority of those with Custer were members of the so called Custer clique was purely happenstance. The army had prescribed procedures for assigning companies to battalions based upon the seniority of respective commanders, and Custer was said to have been a stickler for those type things, so the commanders/companies ended up where they did just because that was what the "formula" called for.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 18:57:46 GMT -6
WO/Tom What responsibility if any does Keogh bear for the "Gap" between him and Custer? Regards Dave Dave,
As Keogh was about to be overwhelmed from Ford B (primarily) and from Ford C, his responsibility was to evacuate and get to GAC.
There was no significance to the terrain he was holding about 4pm. Once GAC turned north at Ford B about an hour earlier, nobody from the rest of the regiment was coming after about 10-15 mins of that event.
What we will never know is what orders GAC gave Keogh at Calhoun Hill, before he went on his northern excursion towards Ford D.
WO
Wrong again. Keogh responsibility was to follow his orders. Perhaps he was told to hold the ground to the last man. You have no idea what his orders were, yet, as is typical you condemn him to further your whacked agenda.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 18:58:47 GMT -6
WO, Love your questions. What would have Benteen done in Keogh's place, if wounded? What would have Keogh done in Benteen's place if he had come upon Reno! I know it is not polite to answer a question with a question. Forgive me. Regards, Tom Tom,
Do you seriously see Benteen getting thrashed on Battle Ridge defending pointless terrain...?
I don't see Keogh doing much differently to Benteen at Reno Hill. He may have been less inclined to take decisions, I guess, given the more hierarchical relationship between Reno and Keogh.
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 18:59:14 GMT -6
I have mixed emotions about Keogh. When was he shot, was he trying to control the entire situation on top of that ridge? Did the command collapse upon itself after he was moved to the rear. I have seen his ACW record, he was not a schulb. Then again, did his bad day coincide with that of his boss. Benteen and Keogh were closer than Benteen was with most other officers. Keogh was the outlier with Custer that day. Custer was close with Weir and Moylan, Keogh's time in grade put him where he was! Regards, Tom It was Keogh's turn in the normal rotation to be officer of the day on the 25th, part of the responsibilities of which were to command the rear guard. I suspect that Custer, knowing that action was imminent, felt that he needed Keogh, his third most senior subordinate, as a battalion commander and consequently replaced him as commander of the rear guard. I also believe that the fact that the majority of those with Custer were members of the so called Custer clique was purely happenstance. The army had prescribed procedures for assigning companies to battalions based upon the seniority of respective commanders, and Custer was said to have been a stickler for those type things, so the commanders/companies ended up where they did just because that was what the "formula" called for. Good post. No agenda like the rest of the bozos on this site.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 12, 2015 18:59:41 GMT -6
Beth,
1.To the west there would have been a better field of fire for the carbine. But truth be told, everything happened too fast.
2.My guess, Custer suggested/ordered location.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 19:00:18 GMT -6
WO, Love your questions. What would have Benteen done in Keogh's place, if wounded? What would have Keogh done in Benteen's place if he had come upon Reno! I know it is not polite to answer a question with a question. Forgive me. Regards, Tom Tom,
Do you seriously see Benteen getting thrashed on Battle Ridge defending pointless terrain...?
I don't see Keogh doing much differently to Benteen at Reno Hill. He may have been less inclined to take decisions, I guess, given the more hierarchical relationship between Reno and Keogh.
WO
Most likely Benteen would have disobeyed his orders. He had a track record for it.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 19:03:12 GMT -6
WO/Tom What responsibility if any does Keogh bear for the "Gap" between him and Custer? Regards Dave Dave,
As Keogh was about to be overwhelmed from Ford B (primarily) and from Ford C, his responsibility was to evacuate and get to GAC.
There was no significance to the terrain he was holding about 4pm. Once GAC turned north at Ford B about an hour earlier, nobody from the rest of the regiment was coming after about 10-15 mins of that event.
What we will never know is what orders GAC gave Keogh at Calhoun Hill, before he went on his northern excursion towards Ford D.
WO
What an idiot you are proving to be. Hammer Keogh but then say "we will never know". Are you shooting for the class clown title from Queeniecannon?
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 19:04:18 GMT -6
I have mixed emotions about Keogh. When was he shot, was he trying to control the entire situation on top of that ridge? Did the command collapse upon itself after he was moved to the rear. I have seen his ACW record, he was not a schulb. Then again, did his bad day coincide with that of his boss. Benteen and Keogh were closer than Benteen was with most other officers. Keogh was the outlier with Custer that day. Custer was close with Weir and Moylan, Keogh's time in grade put him where he was! Regards, Tom It was Keogh's turn in the normal rotation to be officer of the day on the 25th, part of the responsibilities of which were to command the rear guard. I suspect that Custer, knowing that action was imminent, felt that he needed Keogh, his third most senior subordinate, as a battalion commander and consequently replaced him as commander of the rear guard. I also believe that the fact that the majority of those with Custer were members of the so called Custer clique was purely happenstance. The army had prescribed procedures for assigning companies to battalions based upon the seniority of respective commanders, and Custer was said to have been a stickler for those type things, so the commanders/companies ended up where they did just because that was what the "formula" called for. Jodak,
I agree with you over officer of the day. Keogh outranked all of the captains, except Benteen.
I think, upon further delving, you will find that GAC structured that command on 25 June 1876 to bring much of the clique within the 2 battalions he personally commanded and led to disaster.
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 19:04:53 GMT -6
Beth, 1.To the west there would have been a better field of fire for the carbine. But truth be told, everything happened too fast. 2.My guess, Custer suggested/ordered location. So now we are down to simply "guessing"...,,a bastion of knowledge.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 19:06:25 GMT -6
It was Keogh's turn in the normal rotation to be officer of the day on the 25th, part of the responsibilities of which were to command the rear guard. I suspect that Custer, knowing that action was imminent, felt that he needed Keogh, his third most senior subordinate, as a battalion commander and consequently replaced him as commander of the rear guard. I also believe that the fact that the majority of those with Custer were members of the so called Custer clique was purely happenstance. The army had prescribed procedures for assigning companies to battalions based upon the seniority of respective commanders, and Custer was said to have been a stickler for those type things, so the commanders/companies ended up where they did just because that was what the "formula" called for. Jodak,
I agree with you over officer of the day. Keogh outranked all of the captains, except Benteen.
I think, upon further delving, you will find that GAC structured that command on 25 June 1876 to bring much of the clique within the 2 battalions he personally commanded and led to disaster.
WO
And here we have a prime example of furthering an agenda. Jodak states fact, you introduce spin.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 19:21:07 GMT -6
Beth, 1.To the west there would have been a better field of fire for the carbine. But truth be told, everything happened too fast. 2. My guess, Custer suggested/ ordered location. Tom,
It's a horrible one to face up to, isn't it? Was Keogh too afraid to move north and avoid disaster? Or was he wounded and the battalion command collapsed?
We know the Keogh battalion was awfully weak on command and control, with practically nothing in the way of leadership if anything happened to him.
Reno knew he had French and Moylan, Benteen knew he had Weir. What did Keogh have? Diddly squat.
WO
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Post by mac on Jul 12, 2015 19:23:55 GMT -6
I have always leaned to the idea that Keogh was hit just as he was preparing to move. Not a good thing. This would explain the move of C off the ridge as a preparatory clear out that went terribly wrong. I also wonder when Keogh personally was wounded as this would have a bearing on things. Put the two together?? Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 19:31:43 GMT -6
I have always leaned to the idea that Keogh was hit just as he was preparing to move. Not a good thing. This would explain the move of C off the ridge as a preparatory clear out that went terribly wrong.I also wonder when Keogh personally was wounded as this would have a bearing on things. Put the two together?? Cheers Mac,
If that happened. and it is a big "if", wouldn't it take us back to the title of the thread?
What caused a leadership vacuum? Was it too many junior officers in the wrong place, or was the entire ethos of this regiment compromised?
Why did the battalion quickly collapse and take another battalion down with it?
There were no hostiles further down the valley. There were no hostiles to the east.
WO
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Post by jodak on Jul 12, 2015 19:32:21 GMT -6
I have always leaned to the idea that Keogh was hit just as he was preparing to move. Not a good thing. This would explain the move of C off the ridge as a preparatory clear out that went terribly wrong. I also wonder when Keogh personally was wounded as this would have a bearing on things. Put the two together?? Cheers Keogh's wound was a serious leg wound that shattered the bone. Not fatal in itself (unless it bled heavily) but certainly debilitating. The fact that this wound appeared to have coincided with a wound in his horse's side has led some to conclude that he was wounded while mounted, which was likely the case only very early in the engagement.
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