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Post by Beth on Apr 19, 2015 21:18:50 GMT -6
- it doesn't take a military genius to recognize that the timber was an excellent defensive position, as Benteen, and others said. Benteen saw it, saw the force they faced, knew the capabilities of the command, you, with all due respect didn't. He said, and reiterated, that the timber was an excellent defensive position. - Benteen and his three companies crossing at Ford A would have made a difference. - if Benteen/Reno had fought in the valley as ordered, GAC would not have been overrun. He could have crossed into the valley or gone south to reunite. Never was an option when Reno lost his composure, panicked and retreated. Regards Mark And I suppose you WERE there, and thus were in a position to see what Benteen saw, and you came to the same conclusion he did. You keep saying Benteen was ordered to go into the valley and support Reno. Will you please, please, show us the documentation that backs that statement up, in black and white please, not your assumption of what Martini's note meant. Any eyewitness testimony to what Custer told Benteen about going into the valley after Reno would do, if you can show where that testimony came from. I find myself wanting to find a timber along a western high plains river, stick Johnny-One-Note and around 100 of his friends in it with their limited ammo--while 1000s of people armed with paintball guns circling the outside. He can decide then how defensible it is. Beth
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Post by quincannon on Apr 19, 2015 21:23:37 GMT -6
Justify a flanking maneuver to me Beth. What are you going to accomplish by splitting your regiment to try and get behind people that you probably have your hands full facing square on. The terrain is not with you. You know Terry is approaching the confluence of the Big Horn and Little Big Horn Rivers. You keep driving them if you can, and if they some how miss Terry they are not going to miss the Yellowstone further north, and they are not going to get across that river.
You might want to mention in your justification how any flanking maneuver to the right and up onto the bluffs at MTC would have any different outcome than what did happen. It was the same terrain. You might wish to consider how that huge horse herd would impede any movement around the Indians from Custer's left flank. Of course that works both ways
I pointed out a day or so ago that a tactical commander plans not only for the battle at hand but looks at the next and the next, and if need be the one after that. Each battle sets the stage for what is to follow, just like chess movements require you to look two three or four moves ahead, by accessing reaction options.
The only one on God's green earth that though 600 men could subdue 2500-3000 warriors and round up a population of 10 to 12 thousand souls in one battle was an idiot named Custer.
When your efforts drive them out of their villages, without their infrastructure they are already dead, their war making and sustaining potential gone.
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Post by Beth on Apr 19, 2015 22:09:08 GMT -6
I can't. I was trying to think how Custer might have handled it with his 'the 7th can handle it' mindset. I suspect he would feel a need to get ahead of the main body like someone trying to contain a cattle stampede. If they are trying to move all those NA, it will be slow going and it might be possible to get ahead. Big might. I personally would go via the bench and not the bluffs.
If I had been in charge I wouldn't be sitting at Fort A a day early and not knowing anything about what I was facing. If I was suddenly transported to that day and time (hopefully before Benteen was sent on his scout). I would send Benteen's battalion onto the bench with the Indian scouts to scatter the pony herd and hopefull block any movement down all the ravines and creek beds to the west. Then I would send Reno first and then Custer's to leap frog down the valley to allow one always pushing while the other could be in back to perhaps rest a bit and clean up (I don't have the military terms to explain it) l would have the mules bring up the rear, with a smaller guarding force and place the extra Benteen. Oh and before any horse put a hoof in Ford A, the ammo would be distributed around.
Custer knew that Terry should be approaching the confluence but if Custer reached it first, those Indians would have been able spread out and fled. There is never a nice box canyon around when you need it.
Of course my military knowledge comes from too many war movies and sibling wars. I imagine my plan would get everyone just as dead as Custer.
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Post by Beth on Apr 19, 2015 22:14:48 GMT -6
The only one on God's green earth that though 600 men could subdue 2500-3000 warriors and round up a population of 10 to 12 thousand souls in one battle was an idiot named Custer. When your efforts drive them out of their villages, without their infrastructure they are already dead, their war making and sustaining potential gone. On those two points I totally agree. I think the whole campaign should have spent with all three divisions traveling in smaller groups following Indian trails to prevent them from hunting, gathering and grouping. Unfortunately I understand the US military didn't have the ability to easily supply that type of campaign. If they had set up a series of depots like Terry did perhaps it would have helped, though. Beth
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 20, 2015 4:40:43 GMT -6
Beth your military analysis is better than the HRSF combo, to me I think that they should have added a cavalry brigade to each of the columns, that would make six regiments in total out of the ten available, it would take time to assemble the many companies that were scattered around the country on frontier duty and replace them with infantry but if you want the job done then you need the tools.
The timber was a death trap, if Benteen’s three companies had been trapped there then I am sure he would have changed his views as he probably saw the place after the battle and not when it was in full flow.
The big question that I would put to the HRSF combo is this; if they thought that Reno and Benteen made mistakes that day then do they think that Custer made none whatsoever? If they do think that Custer made mistakes then what’s the big deal with hammering the other two officers, I personally think that events took their toll on the day and without a proper recon mistakes were going to happen.
Who mentioned Vulcan! Do they mean that village that is a few miles from my town? Apparently there was a foundry in Vulcan that during WW2 produced Matilda Tanks.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 20, 2015 5:22:17 GMT -6
I can't. I was trying to think how Custer might have handled it with his 'the 7th can handle it' mindset. I suspect he would feel a need to get ahead of the main body like someone trying to contain a cattle stampede. If they are trying to move all those NA, it will be slow going and it might be possible to get ahead. Big might. I personally would go via the bench and not the bluffs. If I had been in charge I wouldn't be sitting at Fort A a day early and not knowing anything about what I was facing. If I was suddenly transported to that day and time (hopefully before Benteen was sent on his scout). I would send Benteen's battalion onto the bench with the Indian scouts to scatter the pony herd and hopefull block any movement down all the ravines and creek beds to the west. Then I would send Reno first and then Custer's to leap frog down the valley to allow one always pushing while the other could be in back to perhaps rest a bit and clean up (I don't have the military terms to explain it) l would have the mules bring up the rear, with a smaller guarding force and place the extra Benteen. Oh and before any horse put a hoof in Ford A, the ammo would be distributed around. Custer knew that Terry should be approaching the confluence but if Custer reached it first, those Indians would have been able spread out and fled. There is never a nice box canyon around when you need it.
Of course my military knowledge comes from too many war movies and sibling wars. I imagine my plan would get everyone just as dead as Custer. Beth, there was a box canyon, if you think it through. Terry was pretty much directly north, Crow territory was north west, terrain to the east precluded moving the village in any manner but disarray. Also as Chuck mentioned earlier, the Yellowstone would have acted as a slowing, blocking impediment. Custer obviously did not think that through either.
The high ground just southwest of the village would have been an interesting option for deployment, had proper scouting been done. Chuck mentioned this in an earlier post. To have simply deployed there would have put the NA's in a pickle. They could either move north or attempt to dislodge the 7th from what looks to be defensible ground.
Custer allowed circumstances beyond his control to dictate how he prosecuted the battle. Instead of allowing the battle come to him on his terms, he took the battle to the NA's on their terms, and he did that very poorly.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 20, 2015 5:33:57 GMT -6
Beth your military analysis is better than the HRSF combo, to me I think that they should have added a cavalry brigade to each of the columns, that would make six regiments in total out of the ten available, it would take time to assemble the many companies that were scattered around the country on frontier duty and replace them with infantry but if you want the job done then you need the tools. The timber was a death trap, if Benteen’s three companies had been trapped there then I am sure he would have changed his views as he probably saw the place after the battle and not when it was in full flow. The big question that I would put to the HRSF combo is this; if they thought that Reno and Benteen made mistakes that day then do they think that Custer made none whatsoever? If they do think that Custer made mistakes then what’s the big deal with hammering the other two officers, I personally think that events took their toll on the day and without a proper recon mistakes were going to happen. Who mentioned Vulcan! Do they mean that village that is a few miles from my town? Apparently there was a foundry in Vulcan that during WW2 produced Matilda Tanks. Ian. Custer's big mistake was separating the command. Some secondary mistakes were not waiting for Benteen to come, sending Reno across Ford A a little too early. Recon was a mistake but we know he intended to hold up an extra day but felt he had to attack because they had been sighted. The biggest fear was the village fleeing, so once sighted he had no real option other than to attack. With limited recon conducted, he should have played safe, kept the command together and crossed into the valley united. The reason I give Reno and Benteen such a hard time is because their actions compounded the situation. Reno’s ridiculous retreat handed victory to the NAs. That is not to say the 7th could have won that day, at best they could have got forced a stalemate until Terry arrived. Regards Mark
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Post by Deleted on Apr 20, 2015 5:40:44 GMT -6
And I suppose you WERE there, and thus were in a position to see what Benteen saw, and you came to the same conclusion he did. You keep saying Benteen was ordered to go into the valley and support Reno. Will you please, please, show us the documentation that backs that statement up, in black and white please, not your assumption of what Martini's note meant. Any eyewitness testimony to what Custer told Benteen about going into the valley after Reno would do, if you can show where that testimony came from. I find myself wanting to find a timber along a western high plains river, stick Johnny-One-Note and around 100 of his friends in it with their limited ammo--while 1000s of people armed with paintball guns circling the outside. He can decide then how defensible it is. Beth 1,000s?!? Testimony suggests Reno faced less an one thousand, something in the region of 900. So we have 100 men with rifles and pistols, plenty of ammo and reinforcemets on the way. My options are to hold the excellent defensive position and threaten the village or turn tail and retreat risking the lives of many and abandoning the mission...... Regards Mark
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 20, 2015 6:03:33 GMT -6
SF, as I said events played a big part in how decisions were made, Custer must have thought that himself and Reno could do the job with eight understrength companies, so he sends Reno off with three to charge the village, so when he views the situation from the bluffs he sees that this village is massive and he requires more than the eight companies deployed to take it on, so if he saw Reno fighting on foot then any chance of charging that village has gone, so if you still think that Reno should have charged on regardless then why didn’t Custer do the same, he had 60-70 more troops than Reno and a hell of a lot of the warriors had gone to fight in the valley, hmmm..don’t you think that the fact that it was huge play a part in that?
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 20, 2015 11:36:55 GMT -6
"The attack into the valley was a reconnaissance in force" ---- Herosrest 11:40 Hours MDT, 19 April 2015
Let us revisit one of his more ridiculous posts for a moment.
Any military operation that contains the word reconnaissance (Recon in Force, Recon Patrol, Armed Recon etc.) has the PRIMARY purpose of gathering information. All of these terms, every one, gives the option to the reconnoitering commander to withdraw at will (hopefully after obtaining the information desired).
Let us look then at the military definition of Reconnaissance in Force (RIF). Other type reconnaissance definitions are similar.
"A Reconnaissance in Force is a military action used specifically to probe an enemy disposition. By mounting an offensive with considerable, but not decisive, force the commander seeks to elicit a strong reaction by the enemy that reveals its strength, deployment, and other data of tactical value. The Reconnaissance in Force commander retains the option to withdraw with this data or expand the conflict to a full engagement at his discretion."
So if HR is correct and Reno was performing a reconnaissance in force, Reno was WELL WITHIN HIS RIGHT, to withdraw, as outlined in the cited definition of an RIF. NO DISOBEDIENCE of orders was involved.
If Reno in the exact same situation disobeyed an order then it was NOT a reconnaissance in force.
Either way what HR said becomes nonsense.
HR I do wish that when you set out to make a complete ass of yourself you would remember that I have the book on my desk (ALWAYS), that I can read, that I do understand what I read, and that I am not bashful in sharing the contents of that book with all assembled.
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Post by Beth on Apr 20, 2015 14:06:48 GMT -6
Beth your military analysis is better than the HRSF combo, to me I think that they should have added a cavalry brigade to each of the columns, that would make six regiments in total out of the ten available, it would take time to assemble the many companies that were scattered around the country on frontier duty and replace them with infantry but if you want the job done then you need the tools. The timber was a death trap, if Benteen’s three companies had been trapped there then I am sure he would have changed his views as he probably saw the place after the battle and not when it was in full flow. The big question that I would put to the HRSF combo is this; if they thought that Reno and Benteen made mistakes that day then do they think that Custer made none whatsoever? If they do think that Custer made mistakes then what’s the big deal with hammering the other two officers, I personally think that events took their toll on the day and without a proper recon mistakes were going to happen. Who mentioned Vulcan! Do they mean that village that is a few miles from my town? Apparently there was a foundry in Vulcan that during WW2 produced Matilda Tanks. Ian. I'm not sure if saying I have a better military analysis that HRSF is damning me with faint praise. Here I was worried about my reference to Birmingham would be taken to mean the one in the UK. I didn't know that there was a village named Vulcan in the UK. Cool name for a town with a foundry. Does it mean the foundry came first and then the village was built up around it? It does gives people fair warning what to expect if they live there. Beth
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Post by Beth on Apr 20, 2015 14:53:12 GMT -6
Beth, there was a box canyon, if you think it through. Terry was pretty much directly north, Crow territory was north west, terrain to the east precluded moving the village in any manner but disarray. Also as Chuck mentioned earlier, the Yellowstone would have acted as a slowing, blocking impediment. Custer obviously did not think that through either.
The high ground just southwest of the village would have been an interesting option for deployment, had proper scouting been done. Chuck mentioned this in an earlier post. To have simply deployed there would have put the NA's in a pickle. They could either move north or attempt to dislodge the 7th from what looks to be defensible ground.
Custer allowed circumstances beyond his control to dictate how he prosecuted the battle. Instead of allowing the battle come to him on his terms, he took the battle to the NA's on their terms, and he did that very poorly.
I am afraid that my reference to a box canyon was more thinking about genocide than as a corral. I would like to think that the 7th was there to corral the hostiles and return them to the reservation but based on the attitudes of a few Generals higher in the chain, I can't eliminate the possiblity that their goal was mass murder. I see what you are saying about a geographical box but I am unsure how much of a barrier the Crow territory would have been if a large number of determined of Sioux and Cheyenne wanted to move across it. The Yellowstone would have been a natural . I was more thinking that the village would break up in the smallest components possible like family groups and simply melt away along the way towards Terry via all the ravines and coulees. I would think that it would be very difficult for the few members of the 7th to police such a large numbers of NA. Beth
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Post by dave on Apr 20, 2015 15:05:49 GMT -6
Ian The beginning of the Vulcan saga started the other day with this post by the HR himself.
HR
Dave - I have never been to Bozeman.
I'll bite. What are you referring to with the above statement?
Regards
Dave
Ducemus
First contact with the Vulcans.
As you can see this is where Beth started talking about the Vulcan statue in Birmingham, Alabama. Now you have a Birmingham and Vulcan like we do, you copy cats!
Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Apr 20, 2015 15:41:44 GMT -6
Ian The beginning of the Vulcan saga started the other day with this post by the HR himself. HR
Dave - I have never been to Bozeman.
I'll bite. What are you referring to with the above statement? Regards Dave Ducemus
First contact with the Vulcans.
As you can see this is where Beth started talking about the Vulcan statue in Birmingham, Alabama. Now you have a Birmingham and Vulcan like we do, you copy cats! Regards Dave And HR's reference to Vulcans and Boseman refered to Star Trek canyon that the Vulcans (as in Mr. Spock) first made contact with the human race in Boseman MT in the year 2063. Beth
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Post by mac on Apr 20, 2015 16:19:18 GMT -6
QC Thanks for that definition, it is exactly what is needed on this thread. Can I add that given that scenario then it would be good if when Reno withdrew he actually knew where his commander was going to be so that he could report his findings. Cheers
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