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Post by mac on Apr 7, 2015 7:01:58 GMT -6
I want to learn more about how the military operate. It seems to me that many of the "mysteries" of the battle are not so mysterious when one understands how the military really works. To kick off I wonder about the much used word manouvre. I can think of three broad types of manouvre. Before action when one manouvres to (I think) establish their preferred battle space. Like Leonidis occupying the pass at Thermoylae to make the Persians fight on his terms. Second the manouvre to take advantage of a perceived enemy weakness. Third the manouvre to "force" the enemy to move in the direction you want them to take. I realise books are written on this but in short have I left some out and if so what? Also how do we accurately apply these to the LBH? I have more questions! Cheers
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 7, 2015 8:01:30 GMT -6
I want to learn more about how the military operate. It seems to me that many of the "mysteries" of the battle are not so mysterious when one understands how the military really works. To kick off I wonder about the much used word manouvre. I can think of three broad types of manouvre. Before action when one manouvres to (I think) establish their preferred battle space. Like Leonidis occupying the pass at Thermoylae to make the Persians fight on his terms. Second the manouvre to take advantage of a perceived enemy weakness. Third the manouvre to "force" the enemy to move in the direction you want them to take. Often this could be referred to as a feint.I realise books are written on this but in short have I left some out and if so what? Also how do we accurately apply these to the LBH? I have more questions! Cheers Since we have just past opening day(baseball), I would say you threw three strikes here. I only comment on one above as it is one of my favorites. Your terminology might be better and there may be a few others of note, but I will leave that to the folks that have or had metal on their shoulders.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Apr 7, 2015 8:49:14 GMT -6
Maneuver is any movement, and is designed to give you an advantage, and place your enemy at a disadvantage.
It may be either offensive or defensive in nature.
Maneuver may be strategic, but most often it is operational or tactical.
A feint is a tactic, designed to make your enemy think you are doing something you are not, and it is normally used as a cover for doing something you want to do. A feint may be something as simple as a boxer's left jab that attracts your attention away from the right he plans to aim at your chin. In itself it is not necessarily a maneuver but it may be. Look at a feint, as a planned means of deception, attempting to take the focus away from what you really intend to do.
The overall purpose of maneuver is to obtain a position of advantage where you can maximize your application of fire. Maneuver cannot be considered alone. It must be considered but one half of firepower and maneuver.
Keep in mind as you look at these things that maneuver away, may be just as decisive as maneuver toward. You are not seeking land, or terrain, you are seeking position of advantage over your enemies physical and mental state.
Tactical maneuver is a scaled down version of operational maneuver, and your objective in tactical maneuver is to hit them where they "ain't lookin"
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Post by quincannon on Apr 7, 2015 10:58:44 GMT -6
As maneuver relates to LBH Mac, everything that proceeded the crossing of the divide may be considered operational maneuver. The operational objective was to place all three columns (including that of Crook) in a place where the hostiles would be contained in one general area.
After crossing the divide you enter the arena of tactical maneuver, which was designed to finish, and be a fulfillment of the operational parameters put in place.
Operational always proceeds the tactical. The real issue with LBH though is that Custer started the tactical maneuver too early. There was more operationally that could and should have been done in my estimation.
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Post by mac on Apr 8, 2015 4:30:19 GMT -6
As maneuver relates to LBH Mac, everything that proceeded the crossing of the divide may be considered operational maneuver. The operational objective was to place all three columns (including that of Crook) in a place where the hostiles would be contained in one general area. After crossing the divide you enter the arena of tactical maneuver, which was designed to finish, and be a fulfillment of the operational parameters put in place. Operational always proceeds the tactical. The real issue with LBH though is that Custer started the tactical maneuver too early. There was more operationally that could and should have been done in my estimation.This is exactly what I am getting at. The difference between tactical and operational, taken for granted I am sure by those trained in these ways but important for the rest of us. Lest anyone think otherwise words and their correct use really do matter! So would sending out scouts be called an operational maneuver since the purpose is not tactical? Benteen's oblique is a then tactical maneuver and I would think not too soon as there exists the possibility of enemy presence in that area.(?) When do you see Custer starting too soon tactically? Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 8, 2015 4:47:19 GMT -6
Hello Mac, I don't know how helpful this site will be to you, but it has some good stuff on tactics; linkNo one has mentioned my favorite military term "Retrograde" what a fab word. Ian.
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Post by mac on Apr 8, 2015 6:15:44 GMT -6
Thanks Ian! I have read a bit of this sort of thing but that is never the same as being able to get it from conversation with experts in my experience. Give me time.. I am sure I will get to retrograde! Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Apr 8, 2015 8:14:57 GMT -6
Mac: As it relates to LBH I would consider any scouting operational. Keep in mind though, while the mission may be operational in nature, the scouts themselves are operating tactically. Their mission is to help shape battle space by clearly defining enemy location, general disposition, routes of access, and anything else that may be important to a commander in the tactical battle to come. Custer did this to a point, but then stopped, and stopped with an incomplete picture of what was facing him. That is why we see him doing things in the midst of the tactical engagement that should have been done long before hand.
The scout himself always operates in a tactical mode, for it must be assumed that there is possible enemy presence and he must govern himself in accordance with the tactical principle of stealth to obtain the information he seeks. A scout must constantly approach his work in a contact imminent mode.
I would term what Benteen did out to the left as armed reconnaissance. That is in the area of tactical employment rather than the operational. The technique is used in instances where enemy presence is unknown but may be suspected. Basically finding if there and fighting if found.
A retrograde is a maneuver away, but it generally falls under the defensive part of offensive and defensive maneuver.
Where do I see Custer starting too soon: I can't put a time on it but it has nothing to do with Terry, or attacking on the 25th instead of the 26th, the blah, blah, blah of the fan boys and amateurs. Custer, other than some intelligence of raw numbers and a very general location, had no concept of the battle space, and made no effort to learn of it or shape it. Anytime you enter battle without that basic "need to know" you have done something prematurely, thus wrong.
There was no excuse for this, including discovery or possible discovery. Longstreet was discovered at Thoroughfare Gap two days before he launched his attack on 30 August, rolling up Pope's flank. That time was spent reconnoitering and shaping the battle space he was to fight in, and he only attacked when he was ready to do so. What could those that saw Custer on the other side of the divide have said anyway. There is a large body of cavalry twenty or more miles away. Big deal, seeing does not in any way define intent.
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Post by mac on Apr 9, 2015 6:10:03 GMT -6
Great answer thanks! I especially appreciate the notion that when you have left the operational aspects unfinished you have by default started the tactical too soon.
In responding to conrad on another thread I suggested that Custer's need to be at the front of his troops and leading charges was not really the military way and that a general was expected to lead all aspects of the action not just lead a charge. Further that this aspect of his work shows a shallowness as a commander. I understand this plays well to amateur senses of the gallant commander but is it really the way of the professional soldier? Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Apr 9, 2015 7:55:36 GMT -6
A commander needs to be in the place he can exercise command. If Custer was commanding a brigade in the attack, where the brigade was all in one place attacking a single objective that is where I would expect him to be, not especially leading the charge, but close up where he could get the feel of the battle as it unfolds, and making the adjustments that are always necessary.
When the command is spread out as we see at LBH, the commander has no damned business leading a company, or two, or a battalion, his job is to command the whole, and he must place himself in a position to accomplish this. It was much more difficult to accomplish this in Custer's time than it is today, therefore that difficulty must be taken into consideration by limiting the scheme of maneuver to one that can be controlled.
Think about any organization, not especially military, that suddenly loses its leader. It is immediately followed by a period of uncertainty, a fear as to what to do, what will happen next, how do we go forward. Well it is usually figured out, but the middle of a military operation is no place for this, because battles are fought, won, and lost in minutes, and a temporarily leaderless unit in a moment of crisis is a bad place to be.
I would expect Captains to be doing what Custer was doing and Lieutenant Colonels to be exercising command. It only plays well to amateur senses, because they are amateurs, not professionals.
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Post by dave on Apr 9, 2015 9:47:01 GMT -6
Hello Mac, I don't know how helpful this site will be to you, but it has some good stuff on tactics; linkNo one has mentioned my favorite military term "Retrograde" what a fab word. Ian. Ian Great post. I have lost my ROTC manual from the 1960's and was a little weak on tactics. This site will be helpful in deciding what type of "mindset" I will have. Regards Dave
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Post by dave on Apr 9, 2015 9:54:53 GMT -6
A commander needs to be in the place he can exercise command. If Custer was commanding a brigade in the attack, where the brigade was all in one place attacking a single objective that is where I would expect him to be, not especially leading the charge, but close up where he could get the feel of the battle as it unfolds, and making the adjustments that are always necessary. When the command is spread out as we see at LBH, the commander has no damned business leading a company, or two, or a battalion, his job is to command the whole, and he must place himself in a position to accomplish this. It was much more difficult to accomplish this in Custer's time than it is today, therefore that difficulty must be taken into consideration by limiting the scheme of maneuver to one that can be controlled. Think about any organization, not especially military, that suddenly loses its leader. It is immediately followed by a period of uncertainty, a fear as to what to do, what will happen next, how do we go forward. Well it is usually figured out, but the middle of a military operation is no place for this, because battles are fought, won, and lost in minutes, and a temporarily leaderless unit in a moment of crisis is a bad place to be. I would expect Captains to be doing what Custer was doing and Lieutenant Colonels to be exercising command. It only plays well to amateur senses, because they are amateurs, not professionals. QC I am curious as to how Custer should have handle the regiment once it started with Reno's advance down the valley. Should Custer have sent a company to scout like he did all the way to LSH? Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Apr 9, 2015 10:10:40 GMT -6
Custer divorced himself from his responsibility to command the whole the moment he sent Reno into the valley, and then failed to follow.
There was nothing to scout on the bluffs.
When your advance guard advances toward the enemy it is your responsibility as a commander to follow with the main body, and by your actions respond to what the advance guard develops in the way of contact.
Hat waving from 3411 is not exercising command.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 9, 2015 10:53:44 GMT -6
Good questions, Mac, but beware the answers. There are those who feel they totally understand if they employ the jargon, terms, and manner of style and delivery of the modern military or, in 'keogh's' case at the other board, the purse lipped English of what he imagines they conversed in back in the day. Sometimes, it can be supposed they do, but rarely. It doesn't really edify, nor is designed to. They want you to feel that 'understanding' what happened at the LBH can only be granted through themselves, those initiated in the brotherhood. It's an attempted coup to install the contention that only soldiers can understand such complicated thoughts as discipline and maneuver. So bow and scrape, civilian.
In the huge campaigns of the great wars, the logistics alone are so complicated and overwhelming that most likely only those who've addressed it in real life have a real grasp. Being able to imagine in your mind the movements and supplying of millions intimidates, as it should. But the LBH is not that.
The Indians are not soldiers, nor an army absent the most vague term usage for an assemblage of armed people. They did not have officers who could order, they did not think in linear terms but in cyclic terms, and they were unable to keep armed forces in the field. Yet from the beginning, whites have tried to portray them as such. They did not train in large groups, like the Zulu, who most certainly had an army. We wanted them to have social and military pyramid structures so that one guy could surrender and sign documents.
Suspect that there are as many differences in thought between the Army of 1876 and today's that a too close correspondence misinforms, as the application of layers of pointless detail misinforms and distorts. The 'ways' of the 1876 cavalry and today's Army are hardly the same, thank the lord. Trying to retrofit the 7th of Custer to the experience of a military career a century later that may or may not include actual combat can easily distort understanding.
Beware, is all.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 9, 2015 11:41:52 GMT -6
He has given you some exceptionally good advice Mac, but I notice the he left out the warning about guardhouse lawyers attempting to pump sunshine. You must also guard against that.
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