|
Post by fred on Jul 21, 2014 15:59:15 GMT -6
Colt,
I have no real issue with what you propose, but as a former troop commander I am not risking a single soul without knowing what is going on. Let's not forget now, two major points: Benteen knew they were tackling something big because he could read the signs. This was reinforced by Cooke's note. So, the exercise here is to put yourself in Benteen's place. Personally, I don't send anyone into a dust-shrouded valley until I know what's going on. In reality, Benteen didn't... maybe that was why his men loved him so much.
Also, Benteen still had no specific mission outlined to him other than what was in that note: be quick and bring the packs; so to me, at this point in the event, the prudent route is caution.
By the way, I should have added as well, to that list...
(9) Where does the note say to hurry or bring the "ammo packs"?
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by mac on Jul 22, 2014 1:12:47 GMT -6
The "be quick" is what everybody hangs their hat on to say Benteen needed to rush/hurry forward. If you are Benteen, noting all Fred has so clearly explained, the "be quick" can only relate to the "bring packs". So he brought up the packs as quickly as possible in the circumstances. If I am Custer and I want Benteen to bring me ammunition or men as fast as possible I am not sending a note saying something as bland as "come on" there would be far more urgent terms used. I might even send someone who spoke English! Cheers
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 22, 2014 5:51:14 GMT -6
Regardless of the true nature of Kanipe's going to the rear he created an impression of what was going on and what was needed. That Benteen sent him to McDougall insured in Benteen's mind that he complied with the note since he knew that there was nothing between him and the pack train. So the need to go back is diminished. No one was going to make that pack train suddenly move very fast.
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by fred on Jul 22, 2014 7:06:15 GMT -6
If I am Custer and I want Benteen to bring me ammunition or men as fast as possible I am not sending a note saying something as bland as "come on" there would be far more urgent terms used. I agree, Mac. The only issue I may have with what you said is that no one-- especially Custer-- would believe you could hurry the packs any more than they were already being hurried. Mathey had done this before. That is another reason I do not believe Kanipe was sent back. The "be quick" part pertained to Benteen. "Bring packs" put the pack train under Benteen's command, just as he said it did. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Jul 22, 2014 9:50:40 GMT -6
As far as Benteen having to be quick about bringing packs . . . I believe the packs were on mules and were led by packers. There is no way the mules are going to be quick because of their temperament and just how fast would the packers want to go into the unknown? The only option would be for Benteen to send a company back (eliminating manpower) cut the packs off the mules and load them on to horses or some other way to carry them which could open a can of worms for all concerned. Benteen is still fuming about cryptic messages, having to be quick and bring packs and not knowing exactly where he should be heading and who he should be reporting too . . . which of course unbeknownst to Benteen had been fragmented. That fact was proven when Benteen arrived only to see soldiers being chased up a hill by hundreds of Indians. What was Benteen to think about that?
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 22, 2014 10:36:21 GMT -6
Crzhrs, I am sure I read somewhere that Benteen’s initial reaction was to send a company into skirmish mode, I don’t know if they engaged any hostiles or even fire a shot, but I am certain he went through this procedure.
After he met Reno his hands were tied, he had to hang around and help, the area had turned into a war zone and Benteen had Reno’s beat-up command plus a vulnerable pack train to worry about.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Jul 22, 2014 13:29:33 GMT -6
Benteen stated at the RCOI that he was riding 400-500 yards in advance of the battalion with Weir. "I showed Weir the note and asked him no questions nor did Weir volunteer advice." When the command came up he ordered a trot and went on ahead to the crossing at the LBH at ford "A". He saw an engagement and "supposed it was the whole regiment." He went up to a bluff and was met by Maj. Reno. He stated "I did not consider it necessary for me to go back for the packs as it was coming and the Indians could not get to it except by me." There were no engagements with Indians while Benteen was coming back and did not send out any skirmishers except once at Reno Hill. Benteen had no idea of any attack orders let alone any inkling that the command (Reno) had been repulsed and fell back in panic until his arrival on Reno Hill. Up to that point Benteen did what any good, professional officer would have done and advanced with necessary caution but still at a pace that would get to where he was ordered (which by the note was who knows where?)
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Jul 22, 2014 14:47:01 GMT -6
Fred, you and I are on the same page basically. Maybe the disconnect is the assumption of where Benteen is on the map at the point where we all play "Benteen". I assume he is past the point where he has the note from Martin and is still in the area where he can see tracks leading to ford A and tracks going up the bluffs where the scouts are indicating he should go. He sees something in the valley going on, obviously where action is occurring. This is the decision point as to which way to go. We don't know what he could see given the dust, smoke, distance, etc., but if we assume he sees conflict, it is prudent to determine exactly what that is before going there. This is what I am saying by getting the proper intel before going into the valley. Only way to do that is to send a small party out in that direction to determine just what is actually going on. Since he needs to bring the packs and they are trailing him, he could halt the battalion right there to wait on the packs briefly while the scout party ascertains what is happening. Like you, I would not send the whole unit down there until I knew exactly what was going on, but getting that info requires someone to get a look-see. Instead of halting, he could even continue moving the direction the scouts indicated, but at a fast walk in case the intel indicates he needs to cross at ford A and get to Reno, so he doesn't have to backtrack too much. If the intel says no-go on the valley, pick up the pace up the bluffs to eventually get to the defensive site, as actually happened.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 22, 2014 15:55:36 GMT -6
Thanks for clearing that up Crzhrs, I thought I was going to be left high and dry on that one.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Jul 23, 2014 11:03:12 GMT -6
Fred, you and I are on the same page basically. Maybe the disconnect is the assumption of where Benteen is on the map at the point where we all play "Benteen". Colt, You are probably correct here, though I see little if any disagreement between us. Essentially-- just to put these distances in perspective-- Benteen joined the main trail. The morass was about 1/4 mile from where Benteen turned onto the main trail; then, a little over 3 miles from the morass to the lone tepee; another 1/2 mile to Kanipe; another 1/2 mile to Martini; and finally about 3/4 mile to the river. That is how I have these distances measured. To simplify it: 1/4 mile from No-Name turn-off to the morass. 3.05 miles from the morass to the lone tepee. 1.7 miles from the lone tepee to the river. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Jul 23, 2014 11:31:03 GMT -6
Fred, What we really need to "see" what Benteen saw is the timing as it relates to his position vs. Reno's position. Like you, I believe the timing is everything in trying to put together a reasonable picture of what happened. At time x, where was Benteen and what was he doing, and where was Reno and what was he doing at time x, same for Custer and the hostiles. Your are undoubtedly the expert on the timing aspects and I can't wait to read your new book. I am convinced that book will help solidify, at least in my mind, what happened on 25 Jun 1876 and dispel some theories and support others. Is the book available now? The MacFarland site seems to indicate it isn't available yet.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Jul 23, 2014 12:14:43 GMT -6
What we really need to "see" what Benteen saw is the timing as it relates to his position vs. Reno's position. Like you, I believe the timing is everything in trying to put together a reasonable picture of what happened. At time x, where was Benteen and what was he doing, and where was Reno and what was he doing at time x, same for Custer and the hostiles. Colt, You are being way to kind, but I'll accept the plaudits nonetheless. First of all, I agree with you 100% here, so why don't you do this: give me the precise details of one of those three figures. In other words, if you choose Benteen, from what point to what point. I will give you the times, locations, and goings on of the other two. Don't get too carried away, because if you do buy the book and read it, you need to start from the beginning of the timing and not form opinions too early... if you get my drift. You can order the book now... I haven't checked lately to see if it is on Amazon yet (probably too early)... from McFarland & Co., but it probably won't be released until late-spring 2015. They just got all 12 maps today and later this afternoon I will be e-mailing them a professionally scanned picture of the cover art. That will complete my responsibilities until they ask me to re- re-index the damn thing. That is always a two to three week project. Anyway, it is nice of you to be interested; I appreciate it greatly. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Jul 23, 2014 13:59:02 GMT -6
Fred, I'll go ahead and order and hope for delivery in early 2015. I really can't wait. In the meantime, just for fun, let's see what we get if we place Benteen at the point where he could either follow the trail across ford A, or continue up the bluffs. Again, this is where I think his decision has to be made based on the note indicating to go to Custer, plus the scouts indicating to go to the bluffs, against what he sees or hears going on in the valley. At that point in time, what was happening with Reno? Was he still advancing, on skirmish line, or in the timber, or heading for the bluffs. I would speculate Custer was probably somewhere past 3411 enroute to ford B.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 24, 2014 10:27:59 GMT -6
I still think the note was more of an exhortation than a formal order, informing Benteen they had the village and for him to hustle to participate, not to go to Custer or Reno or Cleveland, but to come on the scene asap and he'd know what to do. If Custer had wanted something specific, the note would indicate it. It doesn't beyond being sure to bring the packs.
How could it? The time between waving goodbye to Martin and Benteen's approach would be sufficient for much to change. Custer had no clue what he himself would be doing, so just get the packs protected into the neighborhood and pros would know. They did.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Jul 24, 2014 12:23:11 GMT -6
<I still think the note was more of an exhortation than a formal order . . .>
Therein lies the crux of the note: How do we interpret it? One could say yes it's an exhortation: "Hurry up and join in the fun!" OR "Hurry up I need your help ASAP!" The note could be the closest thing to the debating of the 2nd Amendment.
|
|