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Post by montrose on Sept 14, 2016 14:24:44 GMT -6
Jodak,
Nice post.
I disagree with your ACW analysis.
The Union Army saw cavalry as a scouting element. So they scattered their force across divisions and corps. The traitors saw cavalry as a combat element, capable of independent operations. This led to CSA cavalry just stomping Union cavalry in repeated actions.
Joe Hooker reorganized the cavalry as a combat arm, both with organization and equipment. The problem is the leaders in the cavalry were used to losing, and overly careful. The promotion of 3 captains to general was unprecedented, then or now. How many MAJs, LTCs and COLS were bypassed?
Thousands. There was and is a message here, far beyond the three individuals promoted.
So 3 very junior young men were promoted to be aggressive. Attack, attack, and when in doubt, attack. The skills needed in 1863 proved an asset in the ACW. They proved a detriment after ACW.
GAC never should have received a commission in the post ACW Army, in any grade.
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Post by montrose on Sept 14, 2016 14:26:06 GMT -6
COL Reynolds, fired for far less cause than LTC Custer,
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Post by dave on Sept 14, 2016 18:32:55 GMT -6
I am completely out of my depth in this discussion. I hate horses and never cared that much about Cavalry operations of the North or South. I studied the men not the tactics and operations. I did observe that as in Infantry leaders the best Cavalry commanders had killer instincts. Both Sheridan and Forrest fought to the death and had no use for cavalier attitudes or stunts that both Stuart and Custer possessed. Custer had no compunction about killing but would moments later romp around as a kid. Jackson, Forrest, Sherman or Sheridan never looked upon war as something glorious as did Stuart and Custer. Yet Sheridan for some reason took a shine to Custer and became his Rabbi and protector and as they say opposites attract.
I have no military experience but as a bureaucrat I can relate to Montrose's comments regarding leaders who shine in the most difficult times. The old adage "the cream always rises to the top" is true in all aspects of leadership and crises. Custer's reaction to events was to attack without thinking things through as the more successful leaders did and still do today. Regards Dave
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 15, 2016 8:33:49 GMT -6
So my question to Steve and all law enforcement types: have you ever seen bureaucratic games to place more competent folks in charge of a task, over more senior officers with issues?
William/Montrose Call me anything, just don't call me late to dinner
William
Absolutely! We have operational plans with an officer selected as officer in charge. All rank is subject to command by the officer in charge of operation. It is not very secret in nature. Does it make us wiser. Who knows?
We did a case involving a large ranch and hunting with a helicopter before I retired. A field supervisor was in charge bypassing the regional supervisor position and law enforcement program supervisor position. At the briefing there were a lot of higher up observers. Myself and another law enforcement supervisor were invited there as consultants on search warrants and the scope of the search. We had a significant input on how the operation was conducted.
I don't know if it is adjudicated yet so that's about all I have to say.
What I am trying to figure out Will is did Custer know the capabilities of this particular regiment of troopers as compared to what he expected it to be capable of doing. Sgt. Ryan made an observation that even Custer would not fight these troopers mounted. Which indicates to me there had to have been some observations and communications.
What would have caused Benteen to state the regiment should keep together?
At our Regional level I knew what our officers had as far as training and experience. Yet some officer from the Tucson Region I might have no clue.
Regards
Steve
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Post by montrose on Sept 15, 2016 11:51:07 GMT -6
So are we seeing the difference of an officer such as Benteen who suggested the regiment stay together and that of Custer. Yesterday we had the first day of a new Northern Arizona University Park Ranger Training Program class. Closer to the end of the day we used a timer and recorded times to make two hits drawing from the holster at 12 yards. The times varied from 1.93 seconds to over 8 seconds with any particular issue. Add in magazine exchanges, and malfunctions and times went up to 30 seconds. By the end of the class all times will be less than 4 seconds. We had a Marine Corps precision rifle shoot that even with a miss had at time of 2.77. We put the skills into building blocks. Draw Sight alignment Smooth press of the trigger while focusing on the front sight Reset Trigger Fire if threat remains The bottom line is that each student fired around 150 rounds which 7 months of 7th Cavalry ammunition and they will do it again on Thursday and Friday of this week. The total rounds will be between 1,500 to 2,000 rounds. This is a skill that deteriorates with time and lack of practice. Skills need to be preformed without a lot of thought process. The choices or tactics requires a thought process but if the basics skills are not there you can not expect success. Regards AZ Ranger So where is the 750 round training in weapons in 7th Cav? Where is the learning which end of the horse is forward? Where is any training on the simples t elements of this profession. The 7th was badly led and badly trained compared to any other regiment on 1876. Soldiers had never zero'd or qualified in their weapons. Hundreds had no training in mounted operations with a horse, just riding, not combat. Over a hundred soldiers had ZERO ZERO ZERO experience on a horse, they deployed to combat on foot. Would you allow any soldier in the 7th to conduct police patrols? Lawsuit waiting to happen. A regiment of that Zimmerman dude from Florida. The 7th Cav had severe issues. These issues are as they compared to the other 34 regiments of their Army, in their era. The 7th proved that amateurs in action is a failed theory. Professional soldiers meet professional standards, then and now.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 16, 2016 6:39:36 GMT -6
William
So is the bottom line incompetence regarding a failure to train, not recognizing current abilities, and a failure to incorporate within a plan the current condition of the 7th cavalry?
My opinion regarding the actual movement to contact is that Custer believed he only had to make contact before they left and therefor the scouting was limited to finding the "Big Village" with no consideration on what to do when he got there.
Regards
Steve
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Post by wild on Sept 16, 2016 15:23:24 GMT -6
Terry's weak leadership is mainly responsible for the shambles.
For all practical purposes there was no way that the two columns could have coordinated there movements over that distance and unknown terrain so as to be able to present a united force. Crooks infantry was his fire base and cover group [if you will] that sustained both his defensive and offensive efforts against the Indians. Terry's strategy left both his columns unbalanced and he would have suffered the same fate as Custer if his force had stumbled accross the Indians first.
His [Custer]was an attack force incapable of articulated action. He had but two options ; attack in unison or attack [as he did ]in detail. Benteen was ordered to pitch in , Reno was ordered to pitch in and we can take it that his rallying cry of finishing off the enemy and returning to his station was tantamount to committing his own force to attack. Custer has to be judged by contempory standards and practice. Cavalry don't do tactics they do charges. Simple shock is their stock in trade. The blunder was Terry's in having the covering force a days march away and out of position. Hurrah
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Post by dave on Sept 16, 2016 16:00:58 GMT -6
Wild I am going out on a limb here but you are correct about Terry being a weak leader especially with Custer. Custer was like a 8 year old kid racing around without directions or limits. He performed best when Sheridan was in command because he insured Custer was focused and on target with his strong leadership.
I gather if montrose had been in command of the 7th, Custer would have been placed in charge of mucking the stables prior to his being transferred from the regiment to the Navy! Regards Dave
If he were with the Buffalo Bills his arse would have been fired.
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Post by montrose on Sept 16, 2016 17:28:16 GMT -6
Wild wrote; "Benteen was ordered to pitch in , Reno was ordered to pitch in and we can take it that his rallying cry of finishing off the enemy and returning to his station was tantamount to committing his own force to attack."
Benteen was ordered to flank a template village located at the intersection of Reno Creek and South Fork Reno Creek.
Reno was ordered to attack a template village located just across from Fprd A.
Custer saw the village and enemy dispositions at 3411. He had some intention to do something, though we can only speculate. He scattered hi regiment across the prairie, and never attacked anthing. He never massed forces for an attack anywhere except Reno's attack in the valley.
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Post by edavids on Sept 16, 2016 17:36:54 GMT -6
Wild I am going out on a limb here but you are correct about Terry being a weak leader especially with Custer. Custer was like a 8 year old kid racing around without directions or limits. He performed best when Sheridan was in command because he insured Custer was focused and on target with his strong leadership. I gather if montrose had been in command of the 7th, Custer would have been placed in charge of mucking the stables prior to his being transferred from the regiment to the Navy! Regards Dave If he were with the Buffalo Bills his arse would have been fired. . The Navy would have likely keel-hauled him then sent hom back to Sheridan.
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Post by dave on Sept 16, 2016 18:05:25 GMT -6
I was thinking of being flogged then keelhauled! Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Sept 17, 2016 3:28:11 GMT -6
He scattered hi regiment across the prairie, and never attacked anthing. He never massed forces for an attack anywhere except Reno's attack in the valley.
Agreed Colonel but unfortunately the target was also scattered across the prairie . He had an area target to his front not a point target . Do you mass against a target measuring at least 1 mile by 1.5 miles? An area greater than the field at Waterloo. It was Custer's job to lead his regiment into battle . He had no command and control facility thus ala Light Brigade he simply pointed his regiment at the enemy and pitched in. Crooke directed because his was a multiunit force allowing for a more complex tactical operation . Custer was a one trick pony. Best Regards Richard
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Post by jodak on Sept 17, 2016 6:56:36 GMT -6
I think that Terry's forte was more as an administrator than a field commander, and that may not necessarily have been a bad thing for a departmental head. Terry likely realized that himself, hence his intention of directing operations from HQ while Gibbon exercised field command. That may have turned out better for all concerned, as Gibbon was a very experienced and competent officer in the field. However Sheridan ordered Terry to take personal command of the expedition, ostensibly to keep an eye on Custer, which some might argue that Gibbon would have had a hard time doing. However, Terry didn't control Custer either, so things could have been no worse and possibly better with Gibbon in command.
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Post by dave on Sept 17, 2016 8:47:34 GMT -6
jodak Interesting concept regarding the possibility that Gibbon could have handled and directed Custer than Terry. John Gibbon trained and commanded the famous "Iron Brigade" then later took over Hancock's Second Corps on the 1st day at Gettysburg. The man was a fighter not a staff officer so he would have handled Custer in a firm manner and the outcome would have been different. Regards Dave
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 17, 2016 8:52:32 GMT -6
Wild, mentioned pitching in, something GAC never did. GAC knew what the situation was when he viewed the valley, (Reno, village, and terrain) he had choices, he chose poorly!
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