|
Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 3, 2016 9:11:44 GMT -6
I thinks its called initiative if you are successful and failure to obey orders if not.
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 27, 2016 5:38:59 GMT -6
Steve,
I rarely look at the other board, maybe once a month I would like t contribute there, but I see no chance of having a two way discussion there.
1. Advance Guard/Main body. The battle was lost when the advance guard was cut off and surrounded, because the main body abandoned them.
2. Terrain in the valley. Some 900 Indians swept around Reno's open flank and cut off the advance guard. They were between the advance guard and Ford A.
a. Need to find a retreat route after GAC abandoned the advance guard. The US retreat had to travel over a mile through heavy brush before they could find a place to cross the LBH river.
b. The timber position is dominated by high ground all around it. I do not mean the bluffs. It is 3-5 feet lower than the valley floor. This means Indian operations in the valley can not be seen or engaged by US forces.
3. The other guy did it theory. The Innocence project is a bunch of lawyers trying to make it impossible to convict anyone of murder. They focus on 2 or more criminals who murder someone, and try to claim one is innocent because the other guy fired fatal bullet.
For LBH, this means blame Custer's subordinates for his gross incompetence.
The other board lives on a theory that the advance guard was not abandoned. Instead,, Benteen and McDougall task forces were ordered to replace the main body to support the advance guard. I have trouble arguing against this theory. Because it has no basis in fact, it is completely irrational.
It is not true, and can not be true. I get frustrated trying to argue with lunatic theories, often from posters with serious mental health issues.
3. Animal training. I saw a post from Gerry arguing that the mules were fully trained pack animals because they were on the Reno scout. Army doctrine was that it makes a year to train a pack mule. The term shave tail refers to shaving a new pack mule's tail, to make sure it was not deployed for that year of training.
I do not mean a year of an animal sitting in garrison, doing nothing. The Army had a detailed training plan for that year of training marches, with increasing weights, etc. And the bell mare. The bell mare was a horse with a bell, that the mules were trained to follow. The 7th pack train did not have a bell mare. Not sure why it had to be a female horse, can someone with personal knowledge of animals explain this?
4. Bottom line. I am not responding to the other thread, since I see the arguments there as infantile. Everything there is value laden, where emotion rules and rational thought is despised.
I wanted to sustain Darkcloud's threads on that board, but I can not find a rational argument to which I can respond. In my view, your posts on that board are as useful as Don Quijote charging a windmill.
Respectfully,
William
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 27, 2016 5:42:47 GMT -6
New hypothesis: LTC Custer lost this battle because of gross cowardice. Individual cowardice is distinct from leader cowardice.
GAC did not enter the valley because he was a leader coward.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on May 27, 2016 9:32:00 GMT -6
First time I heard that, may use it in Rapid to stir the pot. With your permission, or not.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on May 27, 2016 16:35:52 GMT -6
Pequod,
Indeed! I could probably use your expert guidance.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Aug 27, 2016 2:31:27 GMT -6
LTC Custer wrote the following about McClellan failed in the ACW:
"McClellan's greatest disadvantage was that he was thrust into supreme command of an army without having first had an opportunity to prepare himself by apprenticeship, as his successors had, by working there way up, step by step from colonels and captains to that of general commanding in chief"
Source: Custer's Trials. page 73.
An interesting observation. Custer had the same problem. He had a few weeks of experience as a 2LT in a cavalry company, and even then spent most of that time in Monroe. He never commanded a company, never had experience on regimental staff.
The time all other officers spent learning their profession in the nuts and bolts of company and field grade performance, he spent hanging around general officers and the very opulent lifestyle of the Army of the Potomoc. He learned bad lessons here that plagued him throughout his career. He learned about taking all the perqs of high command, without any responsibility. He maintained a higher standard of living for himself over his subordinates, often at their own expense, even their lives. (See 1867 court martial conviction, and the article, The West Breaks in General Custer).
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Aug 27, 2016 3:38:26 GMT -6
It is easy to be insightful into others weaknesses. It is difficult to look inward. There are many who never reach their potential, as they rely on their strengths and never work on their weaknesses. Sometimes their strengths hide/cover up those weaknesses. It happens in sports, business, and yes even in war. Custer was not a person who studied, not even his opponent. Where McClellan spent much time preparing and little time acting, Custer was found lacking with regard to preparation.
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Sept 13, 2016 8:46:03 GMT -6
Despite what deficiencies he may have had Custer seems to have been highly regarded by his superiors, both during the Civil War and later. Sherman once said of Judson Kilpatrick "I know that Kilpatrick is a hell of a damned fool, but I want just that sort of man to command my cavalry on this expedition." Could there have been an element of that in the efforts of Terry and Sheridan to have Custer reinstated for the 1876 Campaign? What other factors played into their regard for him - was it personal friendship, political influence, true regard for his military abilities, or something else?
|
|
|
Post by dave on Sept 13, 2016 9:16:57 GMT -6
jodak I have often wondered if his superiors considered Custer to be a "missile" during the War that could blow holes through the Confederates? Grant, Sherman and Sheridan knew that GAC was not a strategist but they worked around that flaw by giving him orders to attack. He never handled a company or any small unit that would have given him a better idea of how small units work within a larger command.
The quality of the troops he worked with post War was decidedly poorer and less motivated. His inept handling of soldiers during his Kansas tenure in 1867 foreshadowed his small unit command flaws. Superior officers never considered his inability to positively interact with subordinates as a regimental commander during the Centennial Campaign of 1876. He got a pass then as he had all of his career. The refusal of his supporters to accept any fault by Custer at the LBH, except the selection of inferior subordinate officers, has created an emotional argument to this event that is unwarranted and a distraction to true scholarship. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 14, 2016 8:28:19 GMT -6
So are we seeing the difference of an officer such as Benteen who suggested the regiment stay together and that of Custer.
Yesterday we had the first day of a new Northern Arizona University Park Ranger Training Program class. Closer to the end of the day we used a timer and recorded times to make two hits drawing from the holster at 12 yards. The times varied from 1.93 seconds to over 8 seconds with any particular issue. Add in magazine exchanges, and malfunctions and times went up to 30 seconds.
By the end of the class all times will be less than 4 seconds.
We had a Marine Corps precision rifle shoot that even with a miss had at time of 2.77.
We put the skills into building blocks.
Draw Sight alignment Smooth press of the trigger while focusing on the front sight Reset Trigger Fire if threat remains
The bottom line is that each student fired around 150 rounds which 7 months of 7th Cavalry ammunition and they will do it again on Thursday and Friday of this week. The total rounds will be between 1,500 to 2,000 rounds.
This is a skill that deteriorates with time and lack of practice.
Skills need to be preformed without a lot of thought process.
The choices or tactics requires a thought process but if the basics skills are not there you can not expect success.
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 14, 2016 8:33:00 GMT -6
Montrose William
Since I have no military officer experience maybe you can provide some insight of how Custer would have been considered for his particular assignment. What factors would be weighed in the decision making process?
Thanks
Steve
Cpl. USMC
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Sept 14, 2016 13:58:51 GMT -6
1. Discuss officer selection and assignment in the 1876 campaign.
2. Background. The officer assignment and promotion system is simply a fact. It can not be changed.
Officers are promoted on seniority, not merit. The Army List is published every year, so everyone knows who is senior to who. There is no medical fitness standards, so many officers physically unable to perform their duties remain for years.
The Army has two overlapping organizational designs. We focus on what we are familiar with which is Army to Regiment to Company. But the day to day reality was the territorial army. This went Army to Division to Department to Post.
Posts consisted of collections of companies. In many cases, this involved mixing companies from different regiments and branches.
3. Task organization. Companies were the building blocks of the Army. There was no organization below company. For any task requiring more than a company, temporary task forces were formed. The 1876 Army called them battalions, which confuses modern readers. Today a battalion is a permanent unit with a headquarters company of a 100 folks. The commander and CSM are selected on merit, by a high level selection board, ensuring only the top 15% percent of a branch get commands.
4. How do you game the system?
a. Company level. Use the seniority system to place competent officers in command, and neutralize the deadwood. Look at the game LTC Custer and MAJ Reno played to place 2LTs in command of companies, while more senior 1LTs were placed under CPTs.
b. Battalion level. Cut and paste groupings of companies to put the best available officer in charge of the bn. You are constricted by seniority, where the senior officer of any given BN will be in charge. But there are still games you can play, like detach a senior officer to command a depot, lead a resupply comvoy, send as a liaison or some other task.
5. The 7th Cavalry problem Sep 75 to May 76. LTC Custer left the command to pursue personal business and political shenanigans. So the acting commander was gone throughout the planning, preparation and training phase. MAJ Reno returned (Nov?) during this period, but he had been absent for two years.
6. The 7th needed field grade officers during the predeployment phase. The obvious answer is to recall COL Sturgis. The other fatal flaw was GAC should have been denied leave. If he insisted on leave, vacate his position and bring in someone new. There was a leadership vacuum in the regiment that led to multiple failures in planning, preparation and training. It is mid boggling how unready the 7th was for this campaign. In fact, it is criminal. The difference between negligence and gross negligence is a crime under the Articles of War, and modern UCMJ.
7. The attachment/detachment game. The Department and Division Commanders played a clever thing to game the system in this era. They would ask for temporary help from out of their department/area. This allowed them to ask for specific individuals. What Terry needed was a competent LTC or COL. SO ask for 4 companies of the 4th Cav, led by LTC Mackenzie. Task force that element with the 4 companies of the 2nd Cav and add in 6 from the 7th. Now your strike force is led by the best cavalry commander in the US Army.
Because of GACs seniority, he must remain with the Department commander. At no point in time should he ever be out of line of sight of Terry.
8. Sidebar. Many folks here work in or with law enforcement. It is routine for multiple law enforcement agencies to combine officers for specific tasks. As simple as a single raid, as complex as month long investigations. I have personal knowledge of the games that have been played to make sure senior officer X is not in charge, through bureaucratic games.
(Throughout his summer, I have had a certain police officer as a frequent guest on my couch, due to a zipper problem. I like his wife more than him; but have known him 9 years. He keeps being selected as raid leader on multi LEO raids. It is not his personality, or leader skills, think they busted him from SGT. It is his silver star, 2 bronze stars, a few PHs and former platoon sergeant in Ranger Regt recon company. SO they put him in charge on raids where kinetic contact likely. But they will not put him in charge of any routine event, his PTSD and anger issues outside of combat are a problem).
So my question to Steve and all law enforcement types: have you ever seen bureaucratic games to place more competent folks in charge of a task, over more senior officers with issues?
William/Montrose Call me anything, just don't call me late to dinner
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Sept 14, 2016 14:09:46 GMT -6
jodak I have often wondered if his superiors considered Custer to be a "missile" during the War that could blow holes through the Confederates? Grant, Sherman and Sheridan knew that GAC was not a strategist but they worked around that flaw by giving him orders to attack. He never handled a company or any small unit that would have given him a better idea of how small units work within a larger command. The quality of the troops he worked with post War was decidedly poorer and less motivated. His inept handling of soldiers during his Kansas tenure in 1867 foreshadowed his small unit command flaws. Superior officers never considered his inability to positively interact with subordinates as a regimental commander during the Centennial Campaign of 1876. He got a pass then as he had all of his career. The refusal of his supporters to accept any fault by Custer at the LBH, except the selection of inferior subordinate officers, has created an emotional argument to this event that is unwarranted and a distraction to true scholarship. Regards Dave Contrary to what may be the common perception, the primary role of CW cavalry was not engaging in battle as such but in conducting intelligence operations (i.e. scouting/reconnaissance) to determine what the other guys were doing and counter intelligence operations (i.e., screening) to keep the other guys in the dark as to what the home team was doing. Both functions obviously stood the chance of resulting in combat, but that was not the primary intent, and most cavalry vs. cavalry engagements were the result of one side’s reconnaissance efforts encountering the other side’s screen. Stuart fully understood that and was the master of scouting for and providing pertinent information to Lee, while the early Union cavalry commanders were more focused on battle and glory, including self-promotion, than in fulfilling their roles as scouts for their commanders. This included such notorieties as Stoneman, Pleasonton, and Kilpatrick, all of whom were sacked from the Army of the Potomac for their ineffectiveness in performing their primary role. Pleasonton, in particular, failed Hooker and Meade miserably in that regard during the Gettysburg campaign, and, although we hear so much about Stuart going missing for a while, there were mitigating circumstances to that and his failures pale in comparison to Pleasonton’s. That was the environment that Custer came of age in, and it is perhaps understandable that he acquired many of the same characteristics as the early commanders and may be why Pleasonton was instrumental in his promotion to brigade command, as he fit Pleasonton’s desired mold. However, the question remains as to why Sheridan, a more competent and no nonsense commander (although I do not personally care for him) took a shine to Custer, served as his mentor, and protected him when necessary. That was the basis of my original question – What did Sheridan see in Custer that apparently caused him to have such high regard for him. Conversely, maybe he didn’t really see what he thought that he saw, with Custer’s flamboyance and self-serving actions masking his deficiencies.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Sept 14, 2016 14:12:40 GMT -6
Observations.
LTC Mackenzie was the go to guy in this era, for field grade officers. He got all the tough jobs. Note the first person the Army brought in after the LBH disaster. He was sent in with no prior warning, no prep time, and he kicked tails and took names.
Another field grade they brought in was COL Miles. An infantry guy. He still came in and achieved more with infantry than LTC Custer achieved with cavalry. Again, it was not just bringing in the 5th In. The telegraphs showed they wanted Miles, and requesting some of his companies was how they brought him there.
You want to understand how an Army (or any organization) evaluates its talent? Look at disaster management. Hen things go to hell, who do they call.
I do not think the LBH boars understand the roles and responsibilities of the Departments. I am amused when folks compare Crook to GAC. Crook led a Department, GAC would never, ever, ever be put in such a command.
So look at Terry as Department commander, not just now, his career. He was not up to the task.
With respect to (WRT a common military abbreviation) GAC, he was intimidated by his superior combat reputation, and completely unable to control him. Sheridan and Sherman knew this, and failed to arrange the right command climate. Put GAC under Crook, and no LBH, no drama, just another insignificant court martial no one ever heard of. (Pop quiz: Who did Crook Court martial for far lesser incompetence than GAC, in 1876?)
Respectfully,
William
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Sept 14, 2016 14:16:09 GMT -6
Reynolds
|
|