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Post by wild on Sept 17, 2016 10:11:33 GMT -6
Hi Tom With 3 companies committed the die was cast . Custer had crossed the Rubicon ant the only option was to continue with the attack. You don't call off an attack in mid stream you aggressively push it home. There was no organised opposition holding the MTCF crossing ; the village lay open. He still had surprise and was obliged to support Reno .
Cavalry are a weapon not a maneuver/ tactical asset. Terry deployed this weapon and on his sholders must rest the responsibility for the disaster. Best Regards Richard
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2016 8:07:31 GMT -6
Further At Ballaclava the Brigadier [lord Cardigan I think]led the brigade from the front to it's target ; the gun batteries covering the valley. Having charged the guns Cardigan simply turned his horse and returned back up the valley in spite of the fact that his brigade was heavely counter attacked by Russian cavalry and cossacks.But Cardigans job was done ; he had no means of control and therefore could not in anyway influence the outcome. Custer's cavalry was not far removed from the Light Brigade in it's nature and functionality. An operation such as Ford D with it's complex maneuvering and timings required a standard of control and direction which the 7th did not possess. Terry placed Custer at that locationat, at that time on the LBH river as surely as if it was a movement on a sandtable . And Custer could only do what was expected of him ; attack.
Now you can al go back to sleep again.
PS For too long this arguement has had but two dimensions ; Custer V Reno. Both were victims of Terry.
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2016 15:47:46 GMT -6
Even further It would appear that we burden our heros with responsibility based on distance from the fan. Custer gets the biggist share because he's right there when the guano hits. In second place is Reno being a bit further back.Benteen escapes most being even further back and Terry being over the horizon comes out smelling of roses.And as for Washington well .......
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 19, 2016 16:13:56 GMT -6
There were more than enough mistakes to go around, but from the move to the Divide on, the dominoes were initially pushed by GAC.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 19, 2016 16:27:16 GMT -6
I think Custer should have stayed on the Rosebud. He had Herendeen with him who knew the route from Lodgegrass and down SFRC. He would have discovered the movement of Indians without the infrastructure along. That trail was fresher than the one he followed I believe.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 20, 2016 4:12:07 GMT -6
Steve, What you will find below has some to do with what we have discussed over the last couple of years. All, The avowed purpose of the 1874 Bozeman expedition was the search for gold in the Big Horn-Rosebud watershed of Montana. However, another motive, in the words of historian Merrill G. Burlingame, was to “stir up a ruckus [with the Lakota] in the Yellowstone.” The Lakota and Cheyenne harassed the prospector’s in their unsuccessful quest for precious metal. “We had three different fights before we made them quit,” Little Big Horn survivor George Herendeen recalled. Following the last fight, near Lodge Grass Creek in the Little Big Horn Valley, another participant asserted that the Indians “were completely demoralized, and molested us no more, although a few were seen for several days after.” Herendeen may have contributed to the over confidence of the 7th Cavalry when he showed Custer the site of one of the expedition’s battles during the regiment’s march up Rosebud Creek two years later. We thank French MacLean tor sharing these insights, which may be forwarded or otherwise distributed to all interested persons and parties. Please refer to the web link below for information on his book on the Bozeman expedition. Lee & Michele Noyes, Past Editors CBHMA Battlefield Dispatch CLeeNoyes@aol.com www.custerbattlefield.org www.schifferbooks.com/sitting-bull-crazy-horse-gold-and-guns-the-1874-yellowstone-wagon-road-and-prospecting-expedition-and-the-battle-of-lodge-grass-creek-6060.html Such a lopsided victory [by the 1874 Bozeman expedition] had a drastic effect on both sides involved in the conflict. It caused such unrest among the Indians that they became highly resistant to all white men within their declared territory. White men became more and more antagonistic toward the Indian. The white man also became over-confident about his ability to whip the Indians into submission and onto the reservation. Don L. Weibert -----Original Message----- From: MacLean.LLC <maclean.llc@comcast.net> To: cleenoyes <cleenoyes@aol.com> Sent: Wed, Sep 14, 2016 3:51 pm Subject: Re: The Story of the Gatling Gun Lee, yes this is one of those red herrings of the Little Big Horn. I talk about it in my new book Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Gold and Guns: The 1874 Yellowstone Wagon Road and Prospecting Expedition and the Battle of Lodge Grass Creek that just came out from Schiffer. In somewhat of a parallel discussion, the book talks a great deal about the two cannon the 1874 expedition had with it and how they really did save the day. In the conclusion I posit that these two small cannon, actually ones like them, COULD have fairly easily kept up with the cavalry, at least with the mule train as they weighed a whole lot less than Gatlings. They would not have save Custer and his wing, but would have made Reno Hill really dangerous for the warriors to attack. As Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Hump (although after he was wounded at the LBH he wouldn't have been thinking much about tactics) and Gall were present, in my opinion and I hope supported by my research, and earlier had fought the [Bozeman] wagon train and saw the guns in action, might have urged leaving Reno Hill much earlier. Even if a reader does not buy that argument, the book really helps set the stage for the LBH in many respects. French MacLean
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 20, 2016 5:51:50 GMT -6
Thanks Tom
I have been aware of the new and will purchase it. I have Don Weiberts book and it is a good read. That expedition was like sending precision rifleman to act as decoys and then shooting the enemy until they quit.
I think that since Herendeen was along he could have given information to Custer about Reno Creek and SFRC. I suspect it was a reason to send Benteen with a battalion so that he could pitch into something found there. It is certainly not a quicker route to the LBH and the Indians could move south before Benteen could reach it.
Regards
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 20, 2016 6:04:31 GMT -6
Got it on Amazon for 33.
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Post by wild on Sept 20, 2016 10:13:27 GMT -6
It has been suggested that any other regiment other than the 7th would have won that battle. I think that any other lone regiment of equal strenght as the 7th would have met a similar fate. The battle was a horse fight and you don't commit cavalry to a horse fight.
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Post by benteen on Sept 20, 2016 13:52:20 GMT -6
It has been suggested that any other regiment other than the 7th would have won that battle. I think that any other lone regiment of equal strenght as the 7th would have met a similar fate. The battle was a horse fight and you don't commit cavalry to a horse fight. Richard, I agree. I dont think any regiment would have beaten these Indians, on this day, at this location. However, I think under a different commander there would not have been the massacre that there was. a loss, yes, but the slaughter of the troops, no. Be Well Dan
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 20, 2016 13:54:16 GMT -6
Wild, We are divergent here, I see it as a dog fight. Some dogs are smarter than other dogs, besides it is not the size of the dog in the fight, but the amount of fight in the dog. One dog spent way to much time smelling trees, when he should have gotten right into the fight from the get go(as in support Reno in the valley, increase the firepower, calling Benteen to a designated place from the get go).
Regards, Tom
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Post by montrose on Sept 20, 2016 19:21:43 GMT -6
It has been suggested that any other regiment other than the 7th would have won that battle. I think that any other lone regiment of equal strenght as the 7th would have met a similar fate. The battle was a horse fight and you don't commit cavalry to a horse fight. Richard, Nice try, nearly got past me. Many military analysts hold that theory to be valid. But I don't feel like scrolling through sources, I will go with my own analysis. 1. The 7th Cav was a weak regiment. They did not train to the same degree as their peers. Their campaigns were up and down. The 1867 was one of the most disgraceful performances in the US Army of this era, surpassed only by the poor performance of the same unit in 1876, and the 3rd Cav in 1876. 2. Long term systemic problems. So there were long term problems in the 7th in leadership, collective and individual training, well documented. Some of these include Congressional hearings trying to prove other units had issues, in an effort to cover over the 7th. This is the 7th compared to the other 34 regiments, not just that this was a problem ridden Army as a whole, which it was. 3. Campaign planning and preparation. I have gone in great detail into the cluster puck of campaign planning, organization, preparation and training of the 7th Sep 75 to May 76. It is unique. No other regiment in the West ever failed in this phase as disastrously as the 7th for this campaign; over the period 1850-1900. I am deliberately including ACW, which had its moments. Just at the individual level, soldiers did not know how to fire their weapons or ride their horses. 4. The easiest example of this train wreck. Cavalry units on hard campaigns end up having soldiers march back because hard conditions kill horses before men. The 7th DEPLOYED with over 100 useless cavalrymen, sent out on foot due to bad planning and preparation. The remount officer was COL Sturgis, who provided Crook and Gibbon with hundreds of animals due to proper planning in those units. 5. Your theory fails completely because we had another battle that very same campaign. The Rosebud battle had the US force caught by surprise. Indians had the initiative and ability to dictate battle. AT LBH, this was reversed. SO any commander in the US Army, but one, would have produced a minimum of an indecisive Rosebud outcome. ANy Mackenzie, Miles, Carr would achieve vastly superior results. 6. Again, we can see hard evidence of other commanders performing in the SAME conditions. Both Miles and Mackenzie came out to whip these same Indians, in this very area. And Miles outperformed the 7th Cav,.....with 5th Infantry. 7. The argument that any regiment in the Army would fail at LBH is an emotional argument. It fails the null test. It rests on three major hypotheses: a. First. That the preparation phase Sep 75 to May 76 was irrelevant. Any changes in this period would and could have no outcome on the battle. b. Second. That tactical decisions made on 25 Jun 76 had no impact on the outcome. c. Third. That command and control on 25 Jun 76 had no impact on the outcome. This means location of the brain (HQ element or elements), the system to gather feedback on what friendly and enemy forces are doing, and the ability to send adjustments to subordinate units in a timely manner. And the whole synchronization of forces and means to achieve desired outcomes. 8. Steve and I have been discussing 7 c for several years. I think very productive discussion for the two of us. Maybe we failed to explain these concepts for the wider audience here. We can, but it may bore you. I have been volunteering at a special vet center, that helps out vets going to college, I deal with the PTSD cases. I learned a weird acronym. TLDR. Too Long Did (not) Read. This means our short attention span next generation sees a long text and skips to the bottom. 9. TLDR: The theory that any regiment in the US Army would have the same outcome as the 7th cavalry has no merit, and is counter factual. Glad to see you getting ornery, Richard. Very respectfully, Montrose
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Post by wild on Sept 22, 2016 11:30:23 GMT -6
With respect Colonel
5. Your theory fails completely because we had another battle that very same campaign. The Rosebud battle had the US force caught by surprise. Indians had the initiative and ability to dictate battle. AT LBH, this was reversed. SO any commander in the US Army, but one, would have produced a minimum of an indecisive Rosebud outcome. ANy Mackenzie, Miles, Carr would achieve vastly superior results.
The Rosebud saw the US forces deployed and engaged by means of central direction.The 7th operated a simple inarticulate follow the leader system.. And unlike at the LBH, the Rosebud saw a mix of US units employed; infantry , cavalry and Indian auxiliaries [in an independent role] Custer at the head of his wing was actually isolated and making decisions on what was happening in his immediate front .He had no idea what was happening with Calhoun a km back at the tail of the column.And Calhoun had no authority to take independent action. The 7th went into battle with a rigid limited control system, totally unsuited to dealing with a superbly mounted and highly mobile enemy. It was a battle where the individual was superior to the formation. Where speed and agility trumped tactics.
My case deals only with the single cavalry unit. Even if the 7th was well trained and competant horsemen ,the regimental system, leadership system and weapon rendered them easy pickings for any 2000 warriors.
And on the issue of Terry ; it was his responsibility to know the operational state of his units.
Agreed Dan I will correct a "similar outcome" to a "negative outcome"
200 Texas rangers with big horse revolvers and balls to match would be my choice of unit.
Best wishes Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 22, 2016 12:02:42 GMT -6
Richard
I would choose those individuals that participated in the 1874 expedition and several hundred more like them.
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 22, 2016 12:25:21 GMT -6
Richard
I would choose those individuals that participated in the 1874 expedition and several hundred more like them.
Steve
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