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Post by quincannon on May 3, 2014 21:00:59 GMT -6
Looks to be the same place/ Close enough anyway.
WO: Give me interior lines and I will beat the snot out of all comers. People who rail about conventional tactical terms being applied to fights like this really have no idea. In this instance the interior lines, a gift of both nature and the wise selection of camp site meant that the Indians could react, before Custer and his minions could act. Terrific advantage.
To illustrate what I mean here, for those not immediately grasping my meaning. Let's say Custer recons Ford B, and meets basicly camp guards and a few who happen to be in the area by happenstance. Unlike history he decides to make a crossing and calls up his deep cover battalion (Keogh) from their overwatch on Nye-Cartwright. Chances are by the time Custer can deploy those five companies and prepare to conduct the river crossing and assault, there will be one hell of a lot more Indians there than he could ever imagine. Same with Ford D. All the surprise he had from the start is gone. The cat out of the bag. He has exposed himself. He dropped his drawers with the recon. Those opposed to him by virtue of time-distance-interior lines, have beaten him to the punch. You can't recover from stupid.
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Post by mac on May 4, 2014 2:12:48 GMT -6
I actually understand interior lines thanks to a previous lesson. In fact I think I referred, at least obliquely, to it in the Indian Movement thread. My thought is, looking at these images, that even in 1876 a commander on the East side of the river should realise rather quickly that this is going to be a problem and will make access to the village extremely difficult. Is this so, or could this realisation be part of what all the recon is about? In other words, from Custer's perspective how quickly should this geometry be visible (3411, Calhoun etc)? Cheers
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Post by tubman13 on May 4, 2014 3:48:18 GMT -6
This will really help with the trip in June. It will make for more understanding of lost/changed terrain. This is nearly as radical as the changes in the sand bar hook we find along the east coast. Is the gravel pit to the left of the old river bed bend depicted here? Just looking at this I would rather defend inside that river loop than attack it equipped the way the 7th was. Goes back to pre-scouting, the first attack point(Reno) was by far the best, and that with the entire command.
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on May 4, 2014 4:01:52 GMT -6
I actually understand interior lines thanks to a previous lesson. In fact I think I referred, at least obliquely, to it in the Indian Movement thread. My thought is, looking at these images, that even in 1876 a commander on the East side of the river should realise rather quickly that this is going to be a problem and will make access to the village extremely difficult. Is this so, or could this realisation be part of what all the recon is about? In other words, from Custer's perspective how quickly should this geometry be visible (3411, Calhoun etc)? Cheers Mac, I don't think he could envision the enormity of his problem until he crossed back over the ridge at about the end of his ride. Maybe it was at this point that he realized that all the little controlled burns be had started were too many and too spread out, so when the wind changed he had a full blown conflagration on his hands.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 4, 2014 7:12:15 GMT -6
Hey you guys are really progressing, I will join you all later for a catch up, but first; Chris here is a link my friend, knock yourself out. linkIan.
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Post by Deleted on May 4, 2014 8:31:51 GMT -6
Thank you Ian. Best, c.
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Post by quincannon on May 4, 2014 8:41:49 GMT -6
Mac: I knew all the regular cadre would understand it, as we have discussed it before. The illustration was for the hundreds who visit bere and may not be as up on either the term, or its significance. It also goes to something deeper.
All battles take a regular form, be they with organized armies or in this case native tribesmen. There is always a flank, always a rear. These are more of position and geography, than organized application of tactical practice. In battle you deal with what geography gives you on both sides. There is always key terrain, the possession of which give the possessing side a key advantage. Most think of it as high ground, and most times it is. In this instance though the fords were the key terrain, made so by a combination of river and bluffs. All assaults are in some shape or form frontal assaults, in that you must form front to enable you to conduct the assault. All formations have a flank regardless of being deployed in regular lines or an amoeba like blob. There is always a side, made so by your adversaries direction of focus.
I am intrigued by those who refer to what Custer did as an attempt at a flank attack. As Custer got to B the hostile flank was a mile to the south oriented on Reno. Neither was it an envelopment, although it resembles one when just portrayed on a map with no notes explaining the move. To be so there must be a previously clearly defined objective in the rear, the possession of which or even the threat of possession would cause the enemy to unhinge their position. No such predetermined objective existed here.
This was just a botched attack conducted without previous reconnaissance, that was as screwed up as Hogan's Goat.
Tom: Put a funnel on the top of an empty milk bottle. Then attempt to pour the milk back into the bottle by holding the container that now contains the milk back into the bottle. You must either tip the container over in an attempt to pour it back in the bottle. If you do you will get more milk on yourself then you ever get in the bottle as it will back up and spill because of the lower narrow confines of the funnel. The other alternative is to carefully, and slowly pour it in. You will get it in without spilling, but the pace of the pour will be slower, much slower. Neither are acceptable in a deliberate attack. You must build momentum fast and wide. Neither are possible assaulting that loop in the river at Ford D. Another like Ford B, dry hole for Goldilocks. The old expression look before you leap comes to mind, along with its tactical appendage, make sure no one knows your looking.
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Post by welshofficer on May 4, 2014 8:55:49 GMT -6
Ian,
Quick query, as you are our topographical expert, is my purple "x" a potential other route up/down the bluffs in 1876....?
G
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Post by quincannon on May 4, 2014 9:08:08 GMT -6
Don't know who you were asking, but yes it is. A potential route though does not mean it was a potential military route offering advantage. In this instance it is but one west to east. From east to west you are canalized, meaning you must past through a defile, and you must do so in column not in an assaulting line. What this particular one is then is a very good route eastward offering both cover and concealment, as long as the bad guys don't have a cork in the bottle. If they do, go somewhere else, because the same place is easily defended on the east side.
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Post by welshofficer on May 4, 2014 9:20:09 GMT -6
I am intrigued by those who refer to what Custer did as an attempt at a flank attack. As Custer got to B the hostile flank was a mile to the south oriented on Reno. Neither was it an envelopment, although it resembles one when just portrayed on a map with no notes explaining the move. To be so there must be a previously clearly defined objective in the rear, the possession of which or even the threat of possession would cause the enemy to unhinge their position. No such predetermined objective existed here. This was just a botched attack conducted without previous reconnaissance, that was as screwed up as Hogan's Goat. QC,
The problem with this battle, when categorising, is that GAC's attack via the eastern bluffs never led to any assault. GAC moved from hound to fox, succumbing on LSH.
If you accept that Reno was the frontal assault down the valley, there must have been a "hammer and anvil" in GAC's mind because he first ascended the bluffs. The problem was that GAC had no real idea of the terrain or the size of the NA village/s. Any crossing at Fords B or C would be a right flank attack, whereas a crossing at Ford D is a rear attack. There was certainly no left flank attack by Benteen, so no envelopment.
The second major problem, after ascending the bluffs in ignorance of the terrain (including crossing points) and enemy strength, was GAC not communicating his thoughts to Reno or Benteen.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on May 4, 2014 9:33:04 GMT -6
Don't know who you were asking, but yes it is. A potential route though does not mean it was a potential military route offering advantage. In this instance it is but one west to east. From east to west you are canalized, meaning you must past through a defile, and you must do so in column not in an assaulting line. What this particular one is then is a very good route eastward offering both cover and concealment, as long as the bad guys don't have a cork in the bottle. If they do, go somewhere else, because the same place is easily defended on the east side. QC,
Something went wrong with that post (now amended). It was meant for Yan, but thanks for answering! Baton passed.....
My interest in the defile is:
(1) It is another source of NA penetration, unless defended/blocked, and another risk factor for E company;
(2) It is close to where you say Kellogg's body was found, so was GAC taking a look there and that was as close as he got to Ford D before pulling back to the cemetery area? Just throwing out ideas for thought...
Not a route down through which GAC would ideally choose to attack, for the reasons you have outlined for the uninitiated. Just wanting to ensure that the defile wasn't created by a subsequent bluff collapse from erosion and wasn't even there in 1876!!
All thoughts, as always, very welcome.
WO
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Post by quincannon on May 4, 2014 9:36:07 GMT -6
WO: If you are speaking of crossing at B or C as a flank attack on the village, then I agree it was to the flank or side of the village. What it was not though is a flank attack into those confronting Reno, and in support of Reno.
Envelopment means passing around, and into the rear of an enemy body. The only way this thing was a textbook envelopment was to set up a hammer and anvil. If Reno is considered the hammer, he was a tack hammer, where a sledge was required. If Custer is to be considered the hammer then Reno cannot provide a sufficient base for the hammer to strike. In either instance the distance was much to far between the two. Either way the hammer looses both power and momentum.
Custer could only be assured of the control of one ford. He sized it by surprise. He failed to take advantage of both seizure and surprise. He tried to be cute, and his pigtail got dipped in the inkwell.
I think that is the place Gibbon crossed. Not completely sure.
Montrose often says - The Indians were in the valley. The fight was in the valley. To that I would add you go where the fight is as fast as you can, and with as much power as you can muster. You don't tinker around the edges. It is always where it is, not where you wish it would be.
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Post by welshofficer on May 4, 2014 9:54:32 GMT -6
WO: If you are speaking of crossing at B or C as a flank attack on the village, then I agree it was to the flank or side of the village. What it was not though is a flank attack into those confronting Reno, and in support of Reno. Envelopment means passing around, and into the rear of an enemy body. The only way this thing was a textbook envelopment was to set up a hammer and anvil. If Reno is considered the hammer, he was a tack hammer, where a sledge was required. If Custer is to be considered the hammer then Reno cannot provide a sufficient base for the hammer to strike. In either instance the distance was much to far between the two. Either way the hammer looses both power and momentum. Custer could only be assured of the control of one ford. He sized it by surprise. He failed to take advantage of both seizure and surprise. He tried to be cute, and his pigtail got dipped in the inkwell. I think that is the place Gibbon crossed. Not completely sure. QC
I wouldn't really be happy calling it an envelopment unless Benteen was also active on the left flank (not "valley hunting infinitum"), but I could not agree with you more that it was seriously flawed as a "hammer and anvil". Even if GAC crossed at Ford B/MTC, he would still have been a long way to the rear of Reno's adversaries for a true "flank attack" on them and he is half way down the village/s for a "rear attack" with NAs still to his rear if he proceeds towards Reno. It would still all have been a bit of a dog's breakfast, really. Ford D was the only place to cross for a rear attack, and then assaulting southwards would place the river to GAC's rear in the event of a retreat.
WO
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Post by quincannon on May 4, 2014 10:05:54 GMT -6
Were Benteen active on the left and Custer on the right with Reno where he was it would or could be a double envelopment. Those are preferable, in that they take away yet another enemy option.
My, admittedly rather narrow definition of a flank attack is one that cuts into meat, not air, and peals away the flesh.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 4, 2014 11:58:03 GMT -6
Chuck/Justin, could the ravine in question maybe be cemetery ravine? That would place the Ford C crossing point between the two ravines (Deep & Cemetery).
I would think that this ravine would be a candidate for Indian infiltration, as it lies at the northern end of the village, it would be a quick and easy crossing point to use as it also gives you cover of movement.
Reading the last couple of posts, you can get the feeling that once Custer arrived at the mouth of MTC, he was faced by a village so large that he probably couldn’t make out the end, would this have appealed to his curiosity and he had to find the northern end so he could formulate his next move.
Ian.
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