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Post by Colt45 on Mar 24, 2014 15:59:26 GMT -6
crzhrs says it well when he says it was a fly-by-night plan at the separation point. Custer most likely intended Reno's attack to start the non-coms running north, and he would then proceed around the village flank to intercept and capture them, as he had done in battles in the past. But lacking any idea of village true size, distance to go before being able to ford and execute the capture, plus the time involved to do all this, and the lack of knowledge of what Reno was really going through, meant that he was relying on reaction to events as his plan. He was being dictated to by events instead of dictating the action himself. He also must have had blinders on to keep trying to press the capture idea when evidence was mounting to show that he isn't going to be able to capture anybody. After ford b the ndn pressure on his unit was building, and continuing to diverge forces only further assured failure of his desire to capture the non-coms. Everything that happened after the separation indicates to me a "let's just go with things and see what happens" type of plan. As QC indicated earler, once the battle starts you can pretty much rest assured the initial plan is now garbage, especially if you don't have coordination and communication.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 24, 2014 16:20:34 GMT -6
Put in other words Colt when you start dancing to the tune their fiddler is playing, and them not dancing to yours, it is time to kiss all the girls and say goodnight. Good, easily followed statement of the facts as we know them.,
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Post by fred on Mar 24, 2014 17:17:55 GMT -6
The problem I have with Custer's so-called flanking movement as "a plan," is that I believe it was an after-thought, something unintended at the beginning.
As they moved down Reno Creek, the only thing in Custer's mind was speed. Get there quickly. If Custer's mind was trying to formulate something-- and I certainly believe it was!... I mean, you have to believe that!-- then it was attack down the valley, surprise being his key ingredient. I doubt very seriously he had any intention of going into those hills.
As they approached the lone tepee, Custer called Reno over to his side of the creek and issued his attack orders. He supplemented those orders with the promise of support. In 1876 Indian fighting, support came from the rear, not from some unknown, off-flank, downriver-who-knew-far attack. The idea of Custer following behind Reno (as the promised support) is valid, insofar as it was a good tactical maneuver, a one-two punch so to speak. Sending Cooke to the ford behind Reno and in all likelihood the sending of Keogh to the river, somewhere just below Reno's crossing point, supports this argument.
And that was the last of Custer's "plan." He had not communicated this to Benteen because when he sent Benteen off to the left, he hadn't yet devised how he would attack.
The Gerard/Herendeen news of Indians returning back up the valley changed everything. The only thing left of Custer's plan was Reno's gallop downriver. From the moment Custer broke from the trail, everything he did up to Cemetery Ridge was a reconnaissance. If he formulated a plan, it was a quickie on top of Calhoun Hill and obviously, it never worked. There is irony in all this as well. Despite the fact Custer was on the offensive virtually the entire time, he never attacked. The closest those five companies came to an attack was Harrington's move off Battle Ridge/Calhoun Hill, and that was more of a defensive attack than anything else. How ironic: offensive: no attack; defensive: attack.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 24, 2014 17:37:24 GMT -6
I look forward to the book, and here's why:
"Despite the fact Custer was on the offensive virtually the entire time, he never attacked. The closest those five companies came to an attack was Harrington's move off Battle Ridge/Calhoun Hill, and that was more of a defensive attack than anything else. How ironic: offensive: no attack; defensive: attack."
That reads oddly, and it might be suggested that if there was never a sign of a Custer attack, he wasn't on the offensive whatever. We can have no idea about Harrington's doing squat, it can only be a guess and not based on evidence exclusive to other scenarios.
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Post by mac on Mar 24, 2014 17:40:36 GMT -6
Fred When Custer leaves Keogh there must be some kind of plan as to what happens next in terms of re uniting and perhaps being joined by Benteen. Brenda has suggested that Keogh was to move to join Custer in the North. We know of course this was overcome by circumstance but was Custer heading back to Keogh or was Keogh to go on and join Custer? From my maps I cannot be sure that Keogh could see Cemmetry but perhaps he could. (?) Cheers
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shawn
Junior Member
My sons and I...Reno Hill June 26th 2006
Posts: 98
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Post by shawn on Mar 24, 2014 17:56:17 GMT -6
Fred,
There are so many scenarios...but I do believe that Custer did have some sort of stupendous plan...but he was either mortally wounded or even killed so very early in the battle that it all fell apart...
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 24, 2014 17:57:40 GMT -6
Quick question, did not several of the officers, in statements at the RCOI mention that Custer did not believe there was a village where the scouts told him it was while he was on Crows Nest? I think he told them that at the officers call in the AM of 6/25/76. Trying to come to grips with plan.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 24, 2014 18:11:55 GMT -6
It’s time for me to turn in, but before I go I want to ask one last question;
If Keogh’s mission was only to hold the area on a temporary basis in view of reuniting with Custer then why when his position became under pressure did he take on any form of offensive action?
He had the advantage of a huge track of land between himself and the river, so why didn’t he disengage Calhoun’s men and occupy Custer Ridge with his full Battalion, this would also give him more distance between himself and the Indians, if he did place one third of his strength in skirmish line and sends another third into an advance, then he has now gone from temporary to permanent, in other words he is now fixed and has lost any chance of pulling out and reuniting, therefore disobeying any orders that Custer may have given him.
If this has taken us off thread then I apologise.
Sweet dreams: Ian.
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Post by fred on Mar 24, 2014 18:52:10 GMT -6
When Custer leaves Keogh there must be some kind of plan as to what happens next in terms of re uniting and perhaps being joined by Benteen. Exactly. That's what I meant when I said if there was a plan it was a quickie devised on Calhoun Hill. The problem was that he told no one other than those immediately with him. So for all practical purposes, there was no plan. Instructions to Benteen were vague and there is absolutely no indication from anyone that Benteen would know which way to go: follow Custer's trail or follow Reno's. We can assume Martini was to tell him, but Martini never did. Now... did Cooke assume Martini would tell him? So it stays the same: there is no plan if you don't tell anyone. Anything you do that way is by the seat of your pants. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Mar 24, 2014 19:00:29 GMT -6
That reads oddly, and it might be suggested that if there was never a sign of a Custer attack, he wasn't on the offensive whatever. We can have no idea about Harrington's doing squat, it can only be a guess and not based on evidence exclusive to other scenarios. Offensive posture can include a lot more than an attack. In this case it is the posturing to position oneself to attack. Custer wasn't looking for a way out; if he was he had plenty of chances, yet he grabbed at none. And you can have plenty ideas about Harrington's move, from the ID'ing of bodies-- such as it were-- to the accounts of Indians. And I know you discount Indian accounts, but I do not. Translations and translators be damned, as well as when these tales were told. You can piece together enough over an extended period of time, by all sorts or translators-- half of whom were Indians themselves-- from all sorts of people in all sorts of locations that jibe. If the conditions continue to vary, i. e., time, people, distance, places, and the results are the same, I pretty much can accept those results. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Mar 24, 2014 19:05:41 GMT -6
... did not several of the officers, in statements at the RCOI mention that Custer did not believe there was a village where the scouts told him it was while he was on Crows Nest? I think he told them that at the officers call in the AM of 6/25/76. Correct. Then again, if he didn't believe them, why did he go down Reno Creek? The trail obviously led that way, so he had a simple choice. Once at the river he could go right or left. The thinking at the time was left... at least the thinking back at the Yellowstone. By the time they reached the lone tepee, it would have taken an imbecile to decide the village was anywhere but right. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Mar 24, 2014 19:19:57 GMT -6
...but I do believe that Custer did have some sort of stupendous plan...but he was either mortally wounded or even killed so very early in the battle that it all fell apart... Well... the problem here Shawn, is that you have to connect the whole thing. By that I mean if Custer had not relayed any "plan" to his subordinate commanders, then he could hardly have had a plan, could he? Think about it... Custer gave Benteen instructions. Then what? He gave Reno instructions... then what? What were they to do, (a) if they finished; and (b) if they couldn't finish? Where was Custer going? What was he going to do? So my feelings are that if you do not communicate your thoughts/ideas/plans, you have no plan. It is sort of like some of Reno's comments at the RCOI. Remember? He told the court he pulled out of the timber, eyeing the hills so he could put himself in a position to help and be helped. Do you believe that? If so, Reno told no one else at the time, so it was all in his head. Ergo, no plan. If you cannot believe Reno had that as his plan, essentially you can't believe it of Custer either. Also, I do not believe Custer was wounded early in the fighting, but regardless, if he had been wounded at Ford B, the wounds were such that he probably wouldn't have lived long enough to make it to LSH... and if they were that severe, why wouldn't he have been left behind on Calhoun Hill, ordering his officers to continue on? I have come to accept someone being shot at Ford B, but I believe it was Algernon Smith. Logic almost dictates it. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 24, 2014 19:20:26 GMT -6
Once again. Custer was attacking from the Divide onward. It was a forward movement with the intended purpose of engaging the enemy, therefore an attack. The only portion of the 7th Cavalry that culminated an attack, with an assault was Reno in the valley with one battalion.
We use attack (any offensive operation) with the word assault (the last act of an offensive operation)as if they are interchangeable. They are not. They are two different things.
If you use the word offense or offensive operation, or as Fred did above "stayed on the offensive virtually the entire time" you are attacking. You are not necessarily assaulting.
Remember back to the old days Fred. From the assembly area through the attack position to the Probable Line of Deployment(PLD) you were attacking. From the PLD forward to the objective you were assaulting. The assault starts when the unit deploys into line to place maximum firepower forward.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 24, 2014 19:24:50 GMT -6
Again, it is not true to say I "discount Indian accounts," although I do contend they really aren't Indian accounts but accounts OF those accounts. I apply the same cruelty to white and Indian sources. My procedure jibes across racial lines. Frcoksojdm......mumble........
And Custer never had a complicated or stupendous plan, ever. He was nuts and bolts and no innovator. Inventing a Custer new to history isn't reasonable, but I do favor his being hurt in the process of moving all five units down to the village, and this because it was there, Shock and Awe, now or never. Oh, and he said he'd support Reno, long engaged.
I suspect he was wounded, never ceded command, and attempts to stem the groups following resulted in dismounted firing lines and fiasco all the way to LSH.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 24, 2014 19:37:40 GMT -6
Shock and Awe are the bullshit invention of some press agent. The terms are Shock Action and Shock Effect. They too are different but have meaning that some bullshit phrase does not convey. Actually they were not press agents, but they might as well have been because Wade and Ullman who invented the term and sold that particular bill of goods, that included such gems as perfect situational awareness, led us down a fifteen year garden path that we are just now starting to recover from at the cost of untold lives. We believe this bullshit because of our fascination with the whiz bang, and we were dead wrong. Nearly everything in that publication by the National Defense University has been shown as a pipe dream in the world of 21st Century Warfare.
Shock and Awe as used here is completely incorrect by definition. The definition of Shock and Awe are overall and complete battlefield dominance. Where was that at LBH?
Shock Action refers to the speed , weight, and velocity of the attack, particularly in the assault phase, while shock effect is its aftermath, the result of unhinging, disrupting, and dissipating the enemy position due to the aforementioned speed, weight, and velocity. I don't think we see any great evidence of that at LBH either although the fleeing of refugees is often mistaken for it.
Them Thar definitions are important DC and Fred, just like the numbers on the players backs at a Rockies or Yankees game. You can't tell the players without the numbers,and you cannot be correct and understood by all in these discussions if you do not know AND use the proper term with associated definition..
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