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Post by tubman13 on Mar 25, 2014 4:31:05 GMT -6
Once again. Custer was attacking from the Divide onward. It was a forward movement with the intended purpose of engaging the enemy, therefore an attack. The only portion of the 7th Cavalry that culminated an attack, with an assault was Reno in the valley with one battalion. We use attack (any offensive operation) with the word assault (the last act of an offensive operation)as if they are interchangeable. They are not. They are two different things. If you use the word offense or offensive operation, or as Fred did above "stayed on the offensive virtually the entire time" you are attacking. You are not necessarily assaulting. Remember back to the old days Fred. From the assembly area through the attack position to the Probable Line of Deployment(PLD) you were attacking. From the PLD forward to the objective you were assaulting. The assault starts when the unit deploys into line to place maximum firepower forward. Judging by your first statement, Custer was attacking from the min. he left Ft. A.L, or at least from the time he left PRD. In reality I think he was on more of a scouting mission from the time he left the Divide, until he sees NA's "running away" at or near tepee(but were they truly running away). At that point, I think, the attack phase begins. I know I am splitting hairs here. But as we and Custer move along here, I am still looking for a battle plan to kick in. At this point of our travels, I think the embryonic beginning is starting to kick in.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 25, 2014 7:03:18 GMT -6
I think Custer had in his mind how it would play out or the beginning of a plan. Whether he communicated how to succeed is my question. I think the view from the Crow's Nest is not definitive to where the location of the village is in relation to the Reno Creek drainage. Therefore a need to send Benteen.
What we don't know is how little information that Custer had to work with. Did a scout tell him that Reno Creek was several miles from the observed activity indicating a large village?
Seems to me that Custer missed the location in Reno Creek to have all elements of the regiment together and share his plan.
I understand his sense of urgency and he should have weighed that against sharing the plan to the various separated portions of his regiment.
I guess we have different definitions of a plan. The planning I am familiar with has a pathway to result in success. For example we have a search warrant plan and a portion of it requires going to the front door. If alternate part of the plan is you go to the front door and knock then the officers should ask then what? If the answer is we will support you. Then how comes to mind. We have answers to that in the plan and what to do if something changes.
Custer recognizes that Reno would need support but Benteen is to request support if he pitches into something large and has no clue that Reno was promised support.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 25, 2014 7:05:33 GMT -6
In Indian fighting one can never expect the expected other than the Indians will run if given the chance. This is what Custer based his entire campaign on when he left on the mission. Don't let the Indians get away . . . do whatever you have to but don't let them run. Ergo to Reno (paraphrase): The Indians are running and you are to bring them to battle. His entire battle plan was to not let the Indians escape. Once the command came into contact with the sighting of Indians running, his orders to Reno were based on the phobia of Indians running. Off went Reno and off went Custer (odd no message to Benteen regarding this could mean still no actual battle plan). Once Custer was told Indians were not running but coming out to fight would that have changed Custer's entire "plan"? Whatever the intentions of probes at the Fords were met by small numbers of Indians but enough to push back the soldiers, especially if an officer was hit, indicated a possible scout of a way across the river and nothing more. I think Custer was still probing more than any real attack and again more of a fly-by-night plan. I don't think he ever had any real plan but acted more on Indian response which was slow to develop until Custer had created separation of his immediate command giving the Indians the opportunity to act before Custer did.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 25, 2014 8:16:08 GMT -6
Seems to me that Custer’s plan was falling apart the further he moved north, Reno is defeated and Keogh also finds himself in a whole heap of trouble, so all the units that stretched back from Custer/Yates on cemetery hill/ridge to Benteen moving up to Reno Hill have been neutralised, and Custer was on the verge of being surrounded, so any plan has now totally fell apart, only Custer doesn’t yet know the full extent of this failure, but he will soon find out.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 25, 2014 8:17:24 GMT -6
Tom: You are correct in that all operations subsequent to leaving the Powder River Depot were offensive in nature therefore an attack. The fact that they found no targets for that attack until the 25th is immaterial to the statement.
That last day Custer left his assembly area on the other side of the Divide and moved toward the point where he detached Benteen. I make this as the attack position, a point where elements of the whole are detached from that attacking formation to proceed by separate routes toward an objective. An attack position does not necessarily require a halt of forward movement. You can halt there but more likely it is a point you just pass through.
Both remaining elements then move forward in the attack in parallel columns, to the point where Custer ordered Reno's battalion into the lead, with Custer following. Reno crossed the river and altered his column formation into a two up one back formation for travel, until the point where he deployed all three elements on line ( The PLD)prior to an assault on the forces confronting him. He then commenced his assault, first mounted, and then dismounted to bring his most lethal weapons (the carbine)into the fight. He then continued the assault dismounted until that assault was halted by enemy action
Meantime Custer, instead of following Reno chose to move right and onto higher ground with his other two battalions. Custer moved forward offensively, still attacking, until the point where he had to find a place to crossover into the valley and continue his attack. To do this he paused the attack and in furtherance of it conducted a reconnaissance at Ford B. The choice for formations and positioning of the two battalions tell us that. Finding Ford B a dry hole he moved north, and again adopting a formation meant for reconnaissance he looked at Ford D. During this process he was counterattacked, and assaulted by the Indians, both battalions being surrounded and destroyed.
I belabor these points, not to bore or irritate, but to use the proper words in the place they belong One fellow who used to be here would constantly say why did Custer attack the fords with only eighty men. The reason was that while Custer was overall in the attack, he did not assault with eighty men, he reconnoitered as an event in a larger attack scenario. Never could get the difference through to him. He never understood and is probably saying the same thing today at other places. An attack is any forward movement whose purpose is to ultimately engage the enemy. An assault is the final phase of the attack where a fully deployed force is actually placing direct fire on an enemy while continuing to move forward, for the purpose of destruction or to remove that enemy from a particular piece of terrain.
All tactical operations when reduced to the bare minimum, are either to attack, to defend, or to withdraw. Every tactical action fits into that definition somewhere as part of those three.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 25, 2014 8:31:11 GMT -6
Chuck, we differ only slightly, I will defer.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Mar 25, 2014 8:39:58 GMT -6
Most differences here are only slight Tom, and serve to further define.
We belabor no clearly defined plan to the point of exhaustion. I believe the cause of no plan is simply no clearly defined objective. Getting those Indians is a reason not an objective. All this could have been solved by taking time for reconnaissance. I would have preferred the best part of that afternoon and evening for that purpose. It need not have been that extensive though to serve the purpose, but it needed to be. Haste may make waste, but it also makes dead.
Regarding reconnaissance. You can't always have what you want, so you take what you can get. There was time, time that was unused for the purpose.
I think I also understand what Custer must have been thinking in regards to time. He needed to bring them to battle during the daylight hours, and finish before nightfall to prevent escape. Well it was a long day, and had he allotted time to reconnoiter , not by halting the attack but by slowing the pace, and had he not commenced his final phase until around 1600 hours, there would have still been plenty of time left to deal his adversary a telling blow, for that is all he could manage with the amount of combat power available to him.
Regardless of what time the final phases of the attack started some portion of those Indians were going to escape and break up. That was going to happen regardless. It is not so much a matter of them breaking up. It is a matter of in which direction they scattered. The worst possible scenario for the Army was for them to scatter to the south and west toward the Big Horns. Scattering to the east was a neutral, and scattering to the north and toward Terry the optimum. As a result of Custer's action, there were not dealt a telling blow. They scattered to the south and west and into the Big Horns. Both campaign objectives unfulfilled and three hundred dead men to show for it. All because he was in a hurry. A complete and utter failure, when it needed not be.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 25, 2014 9:13:58 GMT -6
Dead on the mark!
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Post by fred on Mar 25, 2014 9:20:53 GMT -6
Again, it is not true to say I "discount Indian accounts," although I do contend they really aren't Indian accounts but accounts OF those accounts. Well... there may be some truth in this, but it really doesn't jibe with everything you post about Indian accounts. Your mumbling speaks volumes... Ain't no disagreement here, that's for sure! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 25, 2014 9:22:58 GMT -6
I think with proper recon., proper planning, proper communication this operation could have and would been a success. I think with the men and resources available to him he could have kept the NA's between himself and Terry. Three days hence he, Gibbon, and Terry could be slapping one another on the back saying mission accomplished. Would some of the wild rovers have gotten away, yes, sure. But the air would be just about of the tire.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 25, 2014 9:34:46 GMT -6
No, Fred, you cannot provide a single example to support that. The conditions within which I don't buy Indian accounts at face value are the same ones wherein I don't buy white accounts.
I mumble because I screwed up the meaning of 'jibe' based on crzhrs' usage. Nothing more. There are also days I am sure parent is spelled 'parant' and I cannot be moved.
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 25, 2014 10:17:19 GMT -6
I believe Custer was probing for info and was not under any immediate attack from Indians. Why else would he leave Keough by himself and send Yates to the Ford? We know from Martini's account and Cooke's note a village had been spotted and I believe Custer needed to gather more intel before making any final attack decision. Some Indian accounts say they were not sure what the soldiers were going to do but once they saw smaller groups of soldiers they felt it would be easier to counter them than the entire command. In the end I didn't think Custer had a definitive plan but whatever he was thinking was a work in progress. I believe that gave warriors the time to gather in larger numbers and to respond before the soldiers did. We may want to ask if Custer had the opportunity to hit the far end of village while it appeared to be quiet why did he wait. For Benteen, the extra ammo? The old adage "He who hesitates is lost" comes to mind.
I still think jive sounds better . . . has a certain ring to it!
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Post by fred on Mar 25, 2014 10:30:02 GMT -6
No, Fred, you cannot provide a single example to support that. DC, that isn't fair and you know it. You know very well I won't go searching around... I have neither the patience nor the intestinal fortitude to do it, so you're taking advantage of me. And wipe that damn smug smirk off your face!Excuses, excuses, excuses. You screwed up, so admit it. Quit blaming Horse. Own up man! What do you think Peyton Manning would say? Or Vince, for that matter. Besides, you owe me, so you gotta give me this one. Best wishes, Fred. the Jibeman.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 25, 2014 10:32:52 GMT -6
Spotting the village and determining an objective are two different things.
What you are in essence saying is that Custer pausing and reconnoitering gave the Indians a chance to get inside the OODA Loop. All true.
The battle was lost at that point, but it was not because of that pause for reconnaissance. It was lost previously due to a complete lack of reconnaissance all the live long day, and in particular the phase of the attack from the lone teepee forward.
Custer had no damned business up at the far end of that village. Previous reconnaissance would have shown the Indians to be in the valley, and where the Indians were was the place to bring them to battle, not some fruitless sidetrack, based upon a wish and a promise. Lewis B. Puller once remarked that there is little use for "fancy" tactics at regimental level and below. He was right. You go at them until you eat their bear or their bear eats you.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 25, 2014 10:56:19 GMT -6
I haven't covered myself in ashes and crawled around a dictionary twice counterclockwise with a lit candle, but from the outset I admitted error, and I'm not blaming crzhrs for my error. I don't have problems with being wrong. But you have stated an untruth and because you're too olde and incontinent you're somehow relieved from either stepping up to support it or apologizing? That hasn't worked out well for you in the past with me, recall.
There is no support for your accusation. Admit it, mumble sufficiently, move on.
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