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Post by montrose on Jul 10, 2011 11:34:02 GMT -6
Steve,
I am glad Special Forces decision making is useful to you. It is a process that has saved countless lives in our community form Vietnam to today.
The concept applies to any field, not just military and police work. When conditions change, both sides have to assess data and react. The side that has preplanned reactions have a huge advantage.
This is short cycle decision making, meaning all real time. It applies in long term decision making as well. Too hard to explain yet, my last effort took 228 pages.
Dan,
I have issues with your post that officers decide and enlisted folks act. War has become too complicated for that. One private being stupid is on CNN and global media within hours.
We teach tactics in the Special Forces Qualification Course. One of the challenges in teaching our instructors/evaluators is breaking them of the "how to do" philosophy. We do not teach how to do in the Q course.
We teach "how to think". Everyone needs to know what the primary, alternate, and contingency plans are. If a private sees that the conditions of Plan A just changed to Plan F, he needs to call the audible to change the plan, not tell his team leader to tell his squad leader to tell his platoon sergeant to tell his platoon leader to tell the company commander. Battles are lost in these delays.
How do you trust some private's judgment? Because you have trained alternate and contingency plans. You learn by building motor muscle memory. Doing a rock drill is great. Doing a rehearsal is better. Time is our enemy, do what you have time for. So call it a progression from verbal plan, to written plan, to verbal rehearsals, to rock drill, to live rehearsals.
A rock drill is where we create a terrain model of the action area. All participants are present. We then go through mission step by step moving friendly and enemy icons on terrain model. (Normally using rocks for units, capiche?) At each step we get to discuss friendly and enemy action and reactions.
In my opinion, as people focus on friendly and enemy actions, they lose sight of reality. They focus on I do this, they do that. But fight in a noncombatant filled environment and you get flaky results.
For example, SEALs had a very bad day at Padilla Airfield in Panama in 1989. SEALs changed primary plan from an assault from a parking lot right beside target to a sea infiltration to far side of airport a mile and more away. So what went wrong?
Drug dealers used this airfield. When they marched down runway, they ran into drug cartel guards protecting their own planes and warehouses. Surprise was lost. The force actually got engaged in loud verbal arguments, shove fests, and fisticuffs. This woke up the sleeping guards at the target.
All the confusion with drug cartel guards caused next lethal error. They lost track of what hangar was the target. They were on line walking past the real target, because they thought they were not there yet. So when a guard shot at them, he was shooting down their extended line. So if he missed A, could get B, or C,or D, etc. This lone guard kicked our butts. Killed one of the finest officers I have ever known.
Casualties far outweighed any benefit. Noriega's two guards did serious damage. But this wasn't because they were better combatants than the SEALs. They were the beneficiaries of a badly flawed plan.
Back to Steve, next training cycle: Don't just discuss planning. Create a training exercise where you build a PACE plan. Then do a live run where you pop some of the ACE side. Have the leader be shot right away. Have the communications fail/jammed. Have some news crew get between police and bad guys. (I recommend shooting the media to clear fire lanes to bad guys, just my opinion). (If you end up in Leavenworth prison, maybe Billy will visit you).
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Post by montrose on Jul 10, 2011 15:56:53 GMT -6
Steve,
I am glad Special Forces decision making is useful to you. It is a process that has saved countless lives in our community form Vietnam to today.
The concept applies to any field, not just military and police work. When conditions change, both sides have to assess data and react. The side that has preplanned reactions have a huge advantage.
This is short cycle decision making, meaning all real time. It applies in long term decision making as well. Too hard to explain yet, my last effort took 228 pages.
Dan,
I have issues with your post that officers decide and enlisted folks act. War has become too complicated for that. One private being stupid is on CNN and global media within hours.
We teach tactics in the Special Forces Qualification Course. One of the challenges in teaching our instructors/evaluators is breaking them of the "how to do" philosophy. We do not teach how to do in the Q course.
We teach "how to think". Everyone needs to know what the primary, alternate, and contingency plans are. If a private sees that the conditions of Plan A just changed to Plan F, he needs to call the audible to change the plan, not tell his team leader to tell his squad leader to tell his platoon sergeant to tell his platoon leader to tell the company commander. Battles are lost in these delays.
How do you trust some private's judgment? Because you have trained alternate and contingency plans. You learn by building motor muscle memory. Doing a rock drill is great. Doing a rehearsal is better. Time is our enemy, do what you have time for. So call it a progression from verbal plan, to written plan, to verbal rehearsals, to rock drill, to live rehearsals.
A rock drill is where we create a terrain model of the action area. All participants are present. We then go through mission step by step moving friendly and enemy icons on terrain model. (Normally using rocks for units, capiche?) At each step we get to discuss friendly and enemy action and reactions.
In my opinion, as people focus on friendly and enemy actions, they lose sight of reality. They focus on I do this, they do that. But fight in a noncombatant filled environment and you get flaky results.
For example, SEALs had a very bad day at Padilla Airfield in Panama in 1989. SEALs changed primary plan from an assault from a parking lot right beside target to a sea infiltration to far side of airport a mile and more away. So what went wrong?
Drug dealers used this airfield. When they marched down runway, they ran into drug cartel guards protecting their own planes and warehouses. Surprise was lost. The force actually got engaged in loud verbal arguments, shove fests, and fisticuffs. This woke up the sleeping guards at the target.
All the confusion with drug cartel guards caused next lethal error. They lost track of what hangar was the target. They were on line walking past the real target, because they thought they were not there yet. So when a guard shot at them, he was shooting down their extended line. So if he missed A, could get B, or C,or D, etc. This lone guard kicked our butts. Killed one of the finest officers I have ever known.
Casualties far outweighed any benefit. Noriega's two guards did serious damage. But this wasn't because they were better combatants than the SEALs. They were the beneficiaries of a badly flawed plan.
Back to Steve, next training cycle: Don't just discuss planning. Create a training exercise where you build a PACE plan. Then do a live run where you pop some of the ACE side. Have the leader be shot right away. Have the communications fail/jammed. Have some news crew get between police and bad guys. (I recommend shooting the media to clear fire lanes to bad guys, just my opinion). (If you end up in Leavenworth prison, maybe Billy will visit you).
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Post by wild on Jul 10, 2011 16:10:05 GMT -6
We teach "how to think". Everyone needs to know what the primary, alternate, and contingency plans are. If a private sees that the conditions of Plan A just changed to Plan F, he needs to call the audible to change the plan, not tell his team leader to tell his squad leader to tell his platoon sergeant to tell his platoon leader to tell the company commander. Battles are lost in these delays How to think is no good.What ya got to teach is how to think the same at the same time.
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Post by benteen on Jul 10, 2011 16:27:07 GMT -6
Montrose, Yes sir I agree with you. Thats why this morning when I looked at my post again I deleted it. I screwed up my thoughts completely. Probably under the influence Be Well Dan
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 11, 2011 3:58:50 GMT -6
Thinks have changed for the good in the military, the communications are excellent and the troops are trained to a high standard, in WW2 the normal squadie didn't know what was happening at the best of times, his Platoon commander probably kept what he knew to himself and the Platoon Sergeant, I wonder if in 1876 this lack of communication was a major factor in what happened at LBH. Regards Ian.
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Post by wild on Jul 11, 2011 5:40:00 GMT -6
in WW2 the normal squadie didn't know what was happening at the best of times It's the worst of times that's the problem.Who is going to tell the rankers that they are the rearguard or the forlorn hope?
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 11, 2011 8:06:56 GMT -6
I went out and bought Blink a while back because of the enthusiasm here for it. I'm embarrassed because I didn't get out of it what others have. It strikes me that, in summation, he is saying that the first impressions and first reactions of trained individuals are the result of that training and study and are not, really, mere innate animal reactions and deserve far more regard than mere random optional choice. This because they statistically tend towards being the better end of possible actions to take. Those who admire the book more than I don't recognize this summation whatsoever, so I'm at a loss. At least for my part it was how rapid of a decision can be made and what could influence it to be wrong also. I believe Custer was processing something different than what we can detect in hindsight. I don't see Blink as a training manual rather insight to rapid decision making. The judgment decision boils down to blink or think and knowing when to do it. It fascinates me because the law enforcement officer lives in the blink choice for lots of situations. AZ Ranger
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 11, 2011 9:34:53 GMT -6
I'm very weak on this, obviously.
One of things I recall from riding back in the day - and not with the huge groups at issue here - is that there is a strong sense of group momentum that whoever is leading has to factor in so that the line doesn't come to an unexpected halt and bunch up. On narrow, touristy trails, or in MTC, that's an issue more than on the plains. Still....
Obviously, this sense is stronger than with just the same people on a foot hike, although it's there as well.
In combat or near it, that sense must be way heightened. It's not foremost, maybe, but it's there and colors the opinion of alternatives. That was one thing that registered with Blink for me as I tried to apply my own limited experience riding to Custer's officers processes, because it seemed to blend with my current scenario. Coincident only.
People who don't ride or never have at speed in groups would be deprived of that recalled sensation which would be part of the cavalry officer's weighed issues in making a split second decision. Riding at the front of a group at a gallop or even slower for an experienced cavalryman, his bag of options would appear at least different and perhaps WAY different to those deprived of that experience.
To be specific, the experience I mean is riding at the head of a relatively narrow column with The Big Momentum at speed and where direction and speed changes require foresight and thought. It's different from a charge in line, as well as from infantry, or from what civvies like myself might imagine.
"Charging" or advancing into combat in column strikes me as providing a unique set of problems and options if the narrow front is blunted for any reason, and the geologic surroundings do not allow much slow spreading out to absorb the momentum. The options would be to keep moving at an altered heading.
Say to the north up Deep Coulee.
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Post by wild on Jul 12, 2011 0:10:28 GMT -6
DC "Charging" or advancing into combat in column strikes me as providing a unique set of problems and options if the narrow front is blunted for any reason If Custer's column streches for 5/600 metres and the head of that column comes under fire [at ford B]and Custer veers away from the irritant we could assume that Keogh would not be stupid enough to blindly follow Custer through the point of contact but will break away himself.This will cause a temporary split to occur between the two components. Custer's direction of veering will be influenced by the contours of the terrain as you point out Say to the north up Deep Coulee.keogh will try to close up but by a different route. This event shapes and places the command in the death configuration in which it was found. The scenario is yours I'm not trying to steal your thunder just tidying up your suggestion.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 12, 2011 3:54:45 GMT -6
I wonder how Officers could keep there men together in such a situation, when the panic sets in and men either run or bunch, an Officers job is impossible, I wonder what horror went through those men's minds when faced with the prospect of being over run and certain death, it was a large battle field by the looks of it, and I bet the sense of being vulnerable and alone was terrifying. Regards Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 12, 2011 8:36:26 GMT -6
DC: Advancing in column is the normal formation. You advance in column which is the easiest formation to control until you reach what we called (presumably still is called) the PLD (Probable line of deployment), where the column moves into a line for the assault. These are fairly well drilled practices.
Now nothing precludes a force from advancing in multiple columns side by side. For instance the main attack and supporting attack would be in column until reaching the PLD, while the reserve would continue to remain in column until it to is deployed to either reinforce, exploit, or guard a flank.
Column is for control. Line is for maximum effort forward.
The trick is do not get caught by your adversary while in column. When the Old Guard attacked at Waterloo they were in column. They expected to maintain this column formation until they reached the topographical crest of the hill and start down the other side. As they got to the top they found that Wellington was not retreating as they expected but rather was in line of battle on the reverse slope and hidden from view. Wellington's troops in line got up and fired volley after volley into the Old Guard which they could only return from the front rank of the column. The massive fire from Wellington prevented the OG from deploying into line and after a few moments the OG collapsed upon itself.
I believe the OG was in column of companies. In other words a company front in line, with all of the following companies in line behind them. The whole looked like a huge moving box. The formation was used to intimidate. Intimidation is no substitute for firepower.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 12, 2011 8:49:09 GMT -6
I agree Chuck, to be caught in column means you are bunched up and make an easier target, it was a good tactic then to smash your way through a line of troops who only had a limited time in musket drill, Napoleon probably used it in good effect against the Prussians, Austrians and Russians, but the British musketry at the time was far superior, and they payed the price, going back to Custer, if he was moving through hostile country, wouldn't he of had out riders or scouts to alert him to any ambush, if he didn't this was bad form and would have left his command open for the Indians to rush them from the numerous gullies that were all over the Battle field. Regards Ian.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 12, 2011 8:57:19 GMT -6
But in plains Indian warfare attacks were not made in line against villages, primarily because the line would break instantly against the lodges, which would go down easy, yes, but horses would easily get broken legs and there would be chaos, and not of the good kind for the Army.
From what I understand, they rode into the villages in column with pistol and saber and achieved their desired goal. The stomped down the lodges, yes, but they didn't hit them in force, given that the poles could be four to six inches at base and often green and strong. Stronger than a horse's bones, anyway.
Curley is pretty persuasive that they stopped and tightened saddles and rode down what is assumed to be Cedar Coulee to MTC and headed west-ish. A detail that serves no purpose if not true. The column could not be more than four across and probably in twos at spots till it broadened out in the delta area of the MTC before the ford.
Intimidation by formation needs to be seen in bulk, and in a gorge, even that was denied the 7th.
In WCF, there is a pic of cavalry under Godfrey on the field of about 200 men, and you get a good visual of what that might look like in MTC. The back end has no possible clue what's going on ahead. Those ahead have an awareness of what's coming at speed behind, and then their T is crossed by minimal Indians, perhaps Wolf Tooth's group, perhaps augmented by a few others.
This is where I might understand Blink's thesis clicks in: the selection of alternatives that immediately occur are not the best because they did not prepare for this. And 'this' is a wounded Custer, who couldn't be left behind if they hit the village, who could not go with them into the village, there is no time to stop - or ability with the Big Mo behind - so the column is bent to the right and north. Keogh pulls his group out in back. Neither defies the momentum, but channels it in different directions and it misleads them.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 12, 2011 9:10:52 GMT -6
I am sorry guys, I think I am off the pace here with what you guys refer to as ''blink'', I haven't a clue what you mean. Regards (and puzzled) Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 12, 2011 9:26:54 GMT -6
DC: There are always exceptions to every rule.
I don't know if you have ever seen the movie "We Were Soldiers". It portrays Moore's (1-7 Cavalry) fight at LZ XRay. After that fight Moore's battalion was extracted from that LZ, while the battalion that reinforced Moore (2-7 Cavalry) marched overland to LZ Albany for extraction. On the way they were caught in battalion column of companies in column. They were strung out quite a ways and ran into an L shaped ambush. The small bar of the L halted the head of the column while the long axis tore into the flanks. Another bad day for the 7th Cavalry. Very bad day. I envision this being just about what happened to Custer. Not exactly of course, but in overall flow.
Moore's book "We Were Soldiers Once and Young" goes into it, but the better book is "Pleiku" by Coleman
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