A couple puzzling points

[mcaryf]

Hi Fred

It seems to me that there were three or four occasions that we know about at the LBH where 7th Cavalry officers had the opportunity to put to the test the theory that a hundred or more cavalrymen could charge through and defeat any number of Indians. On every occasion the officers concerned did not go through with the test.

The first occasion was Reno approaching the Village, the second occasion was Benteen seeing troopers being ridden down on the valley floor and electing not to join them, the third occasion was a decision by Custer not to attack across MTC Ford and the fourth was when Weir, French and others decided to withdraw from Weir Point. Obviously the officers concerned had not already been alerted by the Crook or Custer defeats because they were unaware of Crook's battle and Custer's defeat was then in progress.

At this distance in time it is not really possible for us to know how much the officers and men really beleived their own propaganda about their superior fighting abilities versus the Plains Indians. The incidents described above suggests that they may not have been as convinced of their own superiority as we sometimes imagine. The US Army had after all lost the previous formal war versus Red Cloud and, as I discussed in a previous post, Custer must have realised that his Washita success could easily have turned out differently. Thus it is quite possible that Custer realised, as did Reno, Benteen and others, that there were too many Indians with too many guns for there to be any hope of success with grand cavalry charges.

This does not mean that Custer would have felt under immediate threat of attack himself as the Army was more used to the Indians fighting defensively or from ambush when confronted by a significant force. Thus it is entirely possible that Custer was able to manoeuvre about for a while (e.g. to Ford D etc), possibly intending to spook the Indians into running away when they might hopefully become more vulnerable. However, this activity would not be inconsistent with Custer recognising the futility and risk of a grand charge into an alerted Village from which most of the noncoms had already withdrawn.

I guess most people posting on this board would judge that Custer had little chance of mounting a successful opposed river crossing with the force he had available versus the forces and weapons against him. Why should we be surprised if an experienced cavalry leader such as Custer came to the same conclusion.

Custer had put himself into the right place if the Indians were intending to run away but very much the wrong one if it turned out that they were prepared to stand and fight. Once it became clear to him that they were going to stand, then his only real option was to try to get them to withdraw after all by manoeuvering on their flank. I think the real surprise for him was that not only did they stand but they also came across the river themselves to fight him.

Regards

Mike

[wild]

You obviously have a completely different picture of what went on than I do.
Perhaps not Fred.The military situation was dire but that would not necessarly put him under duress.And yes he had time to endulge in whatever convoluted manoeuvering forces outnumber 10 to 1 think might ameliorate their predicament.[There you see I'm not such a brick wall.]
That the military situation did not cause him any duress ment that the danger of possible annihilation went unnoticed and the time Fox and those who worship at his alter would have us believe he spent on elaborate decoys and rearguards and reunions make him seem even more pathetic.
Slan

[fred]

mcaryf said:

It seems to me that there were three or four occasions that we know about at the LBH where 7th Cavalry officers had the opportunity to put to the test the theory that a hundred or more cavalrymen could charge through and defeat any number of Indians. On every occasion the officers concerned did not go through with the test....

At this distance in time it is not really possible for us to know how much the officers and men really beleived their own propaganda about their superior fighting abilities versus the Plains Indians. The incidents described above suggests that they may not have been as convinced of their own superiority as we sometimes imagine. ... Thus it is quite possible that Custer realised, as did Reno, Benteen and others, that there were too many Indians with too many guns for there to be any hope of success with grand cavalry charges.

This does not mean that Custer would have felt under immediate threat of attack himself as the Army was more used to the Indians fighting defensively or from ambush when confronted by a significant force. Thus it is entirely possible that Custer was able to manoeuvre about for a while (e.g. to Ford D etc), possibly intending to spook the Indians into running away when they might hopefully become more vulnerable. However, this activity would not be inconsistent with Custer recognising the futility and risk of a grand charge into an alerted Village from which most of the noncoms had already withdrawn.

I guess most people posting on this board would judge that Custer had little chance of mounting a successful opposed river crossing with the force he had available versus the forces and weapons against him. Why should we be surprised if an experienced cavalry leader such as Custer came to the same conclusion.

Custer had put himself into the right place if the Indians were intending to run away but very much the wrong one if it turned out that they were prepared to stand and fight. Once it became clear to him that they were going to stand, then his only real option was to try to get them to withdraw after all by manoeuvering on their flank. I think the real surprise for him was that not only did they stand but they also came across the river themselves to fight him.

mike--

We do not disagree here except possibly on very small issues. I do feel Custer wanted to round up the fugitives, but I do not think he felt he could not win an overwhelming victory providing Benteen & the entourage arrived. Your view would be more correct-- and I would be wrong-- if we knew for certain if Custer understood what he was up against. My hesitation here is that I do not believe he fully realized the vastness of the encampment until it was too late. There is a density situation here that few people realize or understand and it was first picked up by Boyer on the moves up the Rosebud. Unlike the Washita, the various tribes were not spread out thereby increasing the population density within the 1 1/2 mile area. I don't know that Custer ever realized that. Custer's moves-- a la Fox-- belie that understanding or are just too stupid.

I think an arrogance permeated this man to such an extent that he felt he could whip almost anything put in front of him. Certainly, 1,500 Indians were no problem! And I would imagine the man was stunned when he did realize they were coming for him rather than scattering. As for the others and the test you mentioned in your first paragraph, the simplicity of action and understanding is shown by just putting yourself-- again-- in Weir's place atop the hill. What would you do? Arrogant or not, conceited or not, sure of myself or not, certain those Indians would only scatter-- or not-- I would have gotten the hell out of there. That doesn't, however, change what everyone thought regarding how Indians fought. It was back to the drawing board, not dissimilar to the gist of the article I mentioned, the one appearing in The New Yorker magazine.

Your last paragraph also agrees w/ my feelings that Custer's tactics were sound, up to a point. The point being 800+ Indians, but not a lot more, and certainly w/ the mind-set of scattering.

So, in summary, either we are agreeing here or a lot is being lost in the "inflection."

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

wild said:

Perhaps not Fred.The military situation was dire but that would not necessarly put him under duress.And yes he had time to endulge in whatever convoluted manoeuvering forces outnumber 10 to 1 think might ameliorate their predicament.[There you see I'm not such a brick wall.]
That the military situation did not cause him any duress meant that the danger of possible annihilation went unnoticed and the time Fox and those who worship at his alter would have us believe he spent on elaborate decoys and rearguards and reunions make him seem even more pathetic.

wild--

C'mon, you're being unfair. I've read the Fox book 7 times and I cannot recall any attempt at decoys, nor sarcastic rearguards and reunions. You obviously believe Custer was pressured from some point and you do not buy Fox' theories. That's the brick wall, because I do. There is an evenness and a flow to Fox' theories that are consistent w/ what was seen at the battlefield shortly after the fighting. It also makes sense from a combat perspective and the amount of time that elapsed from the various sightings of Custer to the finality of the downstream firing.

Combat operations of this nature tend to be fairly simple and flow w/ a rationale, a simplicity generally unaffected by outside influences. This was not grand strategy. I was a company-grade officer in Vietnam in 1966 and 1967 and I saw it first hand, from a tactical level. Plus, between the schooling and reading over another 40 years, you get something of a feel for it. When the enemy is at "Point A" there is only so much you can do, i.e., head-on attacks (the general philosophy of American attritive combat operations), or flank maneuvering (more in the German or European style of combat). Well, the Sioux and Cheyenne were at that "Point A" and their modus operandi was thought to be known. Custer acted accordingly. The whole regiment, from early morning on the 25th, through the end of the battle, was treated the same way: divided, reserves set up, reconnaissance; textbook stuff, only the rules had changed and no one told Custer or Reno or Benteen. Custer found out when it was too late.

The problem I have always had w/ what Fox calls the "fatalistic theme" is that Custer is moving away from his support. While I think he made numerous mistakes, I refuse to believe the man was a fool and only a fool would continue to head in that direction-- north-- while his support (whatever it may have been) was in the opposite direction. If it was me, I would have beat the hell back to Reno/ Benteen/ McDougall any way I could, and that wouldn't be north. I also don't buy into the, "Well, Terry was north..." Yeah... and so was my mother!

Anyway, wild, I think that's the rub. You have good ideas and you are certainly firm in your convictions, but I think I am beginning to bore too many people w/ my ramblings. I do not think we are getting to anything new here, just re-hashing old theories.

Best wishes, my friend.
Fred.

[mcaryf]

Hi Fred

I am away on business for the next few days so will not reply again for a while.

I guess the difference between us and probably between me and RA Fox might be a judgement on the extent to which Custer was still in offensive mode. My own view is that after he saw the alerted village from the East he probably was no longer expecting to attack into the village himself during the rest of 25th June. His further manoeuvering would have been to deter the Indians from attempting to escape to the East.

Martini's accounts suggest that Custer's initial view of the Village gave a misleading impression that there were not many warriors present. Thus my thinking is that Custer only becomes aware of the true scale of potential resistance when he is already to the East.

I do not think he was waiting for Benteen and the packs before mounting his attack as I think he had already decided not to attack but rather to contain the Indians. As with most theories about Custer's intentions we can only judge them by his actions. If he was still wanting to attack, it seems to me that waiting one to two hours for Benteen and the packs is the poorer option as compared with the possible benefits of surprise and Reno still being in the field. The placing of some of his force in a prominent position whilst manoeuvering with the remainder could be interpreted as either a preliminary to an attack or an attempt at containment so is inconclusive. Thus I fall back on the view that waiting for the extra men is insufficient reason for sacrificing both surprise and the already engaged Reno and I conclude that Custer no longer intended to attack. I do not think he yet thought he had to defend or else he would have moved back towards Reno Hill and his support. Thus in my view his tactics were neither offensive nor defensive but rather had evolved into those of containment.

Regards

Mike

[fred]

Mike--

Your ideas are well thought-out, yet I must still beg to differ. Don't get me wrong. I don't believe Custer intended to find a northern ford, then charge down the valley to attack the village from that direction. I don't believe that at all. You would be much closer to the mark w/ "containment" than I would be w/ any northern attack theory. Maybe I have been leading you astray and that's my fault.

There is something wrong w/ the Martini testimony about having caught them "napping." It may not be Martini, but in the way we interpret his words. The rub has always been Martini did not understand English very well, yet it would be ironic if it was us-- not you and me, but historians through the ages-- who did not understand Martini.

I believe Custer felt he had achieved a certain element of surprise, but I think it may have been more along the lines of, "Most of the warriors are out fishing," rather than, "They never saw us coming." I think Custer went to the high ground north of MTC & viewed what he could of the village, then preceeded down toward Ford B, never really getting a solid view of the whole thing. From there he assessed that the camp was in extreme turmoil, people fleeing hither and yon, & that was when he fully decided he had to attempt to gather them up as best he could. Since so many had already moved north and west, Custer felt he had to find a crossing below the preponderance of fugitives. In his search for a Ford D, Custer's plan at this point was to gather up as many people as he could and hopefully that threat would break the back of the Indians' resistance.

So your containment theory and my "gather them up" theories are rather similar after all. The additional men would only help Custer achieve what he wanted to achieve: “If the Indians proved recalcitrants [sic], and could be induced to proceed peacefully back to the reservation, as they had been ordered, he [Terry] would permit no violence against them….” [Willert] That was an acceptable victory.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Tony]

Fred--don't disappear--your post are much too important. The only point I wanted to make is that once Benteen arrived with Reno, he could have quickly rendered any assistance necessary and than immediately followed Custers orders and advanced to the firing. There were no worriors in his front--they had all ridden downstream to the firing as well. I just think Benteen "hung" around too long with Reno.
If the second wave on Omaha Beech went in and stood with the 1st wave to render assistance and not gone on ahaed---they would all still be on that beach.But instead, they helped as quickly as they could and then moved forward--as Benteen should have.

[Dark Cloud]

Why should Benteen have done that? Was his responsibility to Custer or to mission and regiment? Setting aside whether or not he could disobey Reno, at what point does this become Saving General Custer at risk of regiment and mission?

I'm puzzled by the lust for WWII analogies, especially weak ones like D Day. The second wave knew exactly where the first wave was and its condition, due to presence and total control of the air. Nobody scuttled the mission until every wearer of brass air-dropped in earlier was accounted for and 'saved.' Quite the opposite. As well, we knew the enemy's location and numbers and had gargantuan advantages in every area. Benteen knew nada about Custer and not much more about the foe, other than there seemed to be a passing impressive number of them.

Unless you are prepared to say in writing (so people who've been in combat can see and comment) how many wounded men and mounts there were at Benteen's arrival, how many of Reno's men were able to function, and so how many needed to be assigned to protect the wounded and the arriving train a mere brisk walk from a huge enemy encampment, and how many were available to head north into unknown territory and enemy numbers, and explain why this ends in better result, Benteen shouldn't be damned. Those are the factors they had to deal with. As does anyone who disagrees with what they did.

It's superfluous to point out that Custer himself demonstrates none of the inclinations Benteen is damned for not exhibiting.

[wild]

In his search for a Ford D,
That's the point I'v been making.The battle depends on Custer being able to find a ford.The man is on the wrong side of the river and not having detailed local knowledge of the meanderings of the river/bluffs is unable support Reno or attack.A river crossing can only be attempted unopposed and then time is required to form the battalion for attack.In a word he is snookered.
Surprise is gone and the action will take place on his side of the river.It is very difficult to find any evidence of preparation for this showdown in the final disposition of his forces.

[crzhrs]

Edgerly regarding Reno's command (RCOI): "About the same time I saw Lt. Varnum . . . he was excited and crying . . . telling us about what had occurred . . . Capt. Moylan came up and said 'For God's sake give me some water.' He said he had about 25 wounded dying of thirst."

Godfrey (RCOI): "Lt. Hare came up and said 'they had a big fight and got whipped like hell."

I believe Reno stated to Benteen (paraphrase) "For God's sake Benteen, I've lost half my command, help me."

-----------------------

It must have been very obvious, not only to Benteen, but to many others of his command that Reno was in dire straights, with many casualties, dead, wounded, and missing, and needed immediate assistance.

Custer who promised Reno support should be coming back to join the command . . .

[crzhrs]

As for trying to attack a village from high, rough ground, then cross a river . . . then get reorganized . . . it should have been known right from the start that the Indians were in a better position for defending the village than it was for cavalry to attack it.

[fred]

wild--

Custer had Boyer; Boyer knew where there was another ford or at least knew the area well enough to be able to point one out.

Tony--

I am heading nowhere, my friend. I travel a lot-- a perk of my age-- so at times, I get off this thing for a while. And thanks for the kind words. I hope you enjoyed Christmas and I wish you the happiest, healthiest, and most prosperous of all New Years! And you know I do not agree w/ you about Benteen.

Very best wishes,
Fred.

[wild]

DC
at what point does this become Saving General Custer at risk of regiment and mission?
It never was saving Custer.

at risk of regiment and mission
He has to allow Custer to make that decision.Custer knew Reno was in difficulties when he sent Martin.

Unless you are prepared to say in writing (so people who've been in combat can see and comment) how many wounded men and mounts there were at Benteen's arrival, how many of Reno's men were able to function, and so how many needed to be assigned to protect the wounded and the arriving train a mere brisk walk from a huge enemy encampment, and how many were available to head north into unknown territory and enemy numbers, and explain why this ends in better result, Benteen shouldn't be damned.
If an army has a philosophy of individuals stopping during an offensive action to assist wounded comrades then that forward movement is in danger of stalling and resulting in a far greater loss of life.The same goes for units engaged in an attack.One unit dropping out to render assistance to another leaves a gap which can be exploited and result in defeat.
As a basic military principle units do not turn aside from their mission unless ordered to.
If Benteen had no order from Custer then he was free to do as he saw fit in this situation.
The military situation he found was this.3 Troops defeated,5 troops situation unknown but probably engaged.Decision .....halt and take 7 troops out of action or advance and have 9 troops engaged.
With or without a direct order there was no military reason for stopping.

[Dark Cloud]

Blather, Wild. Armies DO have "a philosophy of individuals stopping during an offensive action to assist wounded comrades" and some insist on it, and I'd imagine it not wise to turn your back upon and leave scared wounded with their weapons. But that isn't the relevant issue at LBH any more than DDay syllogism attempts are. This is a small unit action, not the Western Front. What was the exact mission of the 7th that day? Kill lots of Indians? Take the village? Hostages? Keep everyone engaged until Terry arrives? Nobody agrees, much less knows, and that includes Custer's subordinates. That's his fault.

How many of Reno's soldiers were unwounded, mounted on undamaged horses, and able to join Benteen? How many dead, wounded, infantry? There were not seven troops available, regardless.

How many would be needed to protect the train in sight of and brisk walk from this huge village? Everyone they had, as it happened.

I suppose it possible, but I doubt Boyeur or anyone had memorized every ford on the LBH, which changed yearly on most rivers anyway. You seem to think it a good idea and standard for cavalry to form a line to charge lodges, which they would avoid like leprous eunuchs. Crossing this river isn't a big deal and could be done pretty quick. Especially when you had some surprise and momentum and cover from trees on the western side. It was MTC or nothing.

[wild]

Blather, Wild.
Oh joy I thought you were ignoring me.

Armies DO have "a philosophy of individuals stopping during an offensive action to assist wounded comrades"
No that's what they use the Gunga Dins for.

This is a small unit action, not the Western Front.
The military system is set and does not change to conform to the size of the action.The tactics of the smallest unit the "section" are replicated right through battalion brigade up to devision level.
I agree though it was not the Western front and what can change in lesser situations is the mind set of the leaders.Nothing at stake here other that Custer's hide and reputation.

What was the exact mission of the 7th that day? Kill lots of Indians? Take the village? Hostages? Keep everyone engaged until Terry arrives? Nobody agrees, much less knows, and that includes Custer's subordinates. That's his fault.
I don't think bad briefing permits officers to ignore orders.

You seem to think it a good idea and standard for cavalry to form a line to charge lodges
So did Reno.If you form a line everyone can shoot not just the lucky ones on the outside of your mob.Two or three lines would be preferable makes the process more articulate.[ya'd never make a cavalry commander DC]

Crossing this river isn't a big deal and could be done pretty
quick.
Can only be undertaken on a very narrow front and if opposed the front troopers would be slowed down and a queue would form behind them.Not to be recommended.

Really what you are describing as the ideal force for the LBH campaign is a kind of paramilitary force devoid of such troubling additions such as orders and formations.