A couple puzzling points

[mcaryf]

The idea of other messengers that failed to get through makes some sense if they were despatched after Martini but really a messenger to the pack train should have gone pretty well as soon as Custer went up the bluffs and decided to stay up there. At this time the route through seems fairly clear although I suppose there could have been the odd hostile lurking somewhere.

Hi Elisabeth

As usual you have come up with an interesting idea. I have always had some trouble with the thought that Custer was just waiting for Benteen's extra men before attacking. It makes more sense that he is waiting to make sure that the pack train is parked somewhere safely and at the same time add to his attack force. The two reasons together make more of a case but the extra 3 miles or so to MTC from wherever they are will add at least another hour to the pack train's journey and its possible junction with GAC. It is already late in the day so could Custer afford the delay? I suppose if he has switched strategy to herding the larger than expected numbers of Indians Northward rather than having an all-out fight then the lost daylight hours are less critical.

Hmmmm... plenty to think about.

Regards

Mike

[elisabeth]

Mike,

Good point about the time gap. He's got quite a wait before they can arrive. Losing daylight's less critical, it being midsummer -- but a lot can (and did) happen in an hour. As you say -- hmmmmmm.

[fred]

Mike--

Think about this for a second... you are a hell-bent-for-leather commander. You know what the situation is before you. You have always feared the Indians would scatter. You know this is going to be the last big round-up. You know the entire Sioux nation-- essentially-- is sitting in front of you. You are going to make one big, concerted charge through the village, gathering up old geezers and young brats along the way. You know everybody-- Indian, soldier, man, woman, child-- is going to be fighting, yelling, screaming, howling, running, shooting, riding, panicking... . You know that a big victory here is going to cement your name into the minds of everyone in this country...

... and you're worried about the safety of the packs?

Just curious.

Happy New Year Mike... (and your Benteen work was brilliant!)

Very best wishes,
Fred.

[AZ Ranger]

If Kanipe was not that messenger then who was?

Mike, I absolutely can't resist posting this answer: Nathan Short?

Happy New Year!
Billy

Or Oscar T Warner ?

Happy New Year

Az Ranger

[Scout]

I don't think any commander would send just one man out with such an important message (I'm talking about to Terry or Crook) in a land over run with Sioux and Cheyenne. What are we talking to Crook or Terry ....40 miles plus? Like Kidder's command it would have probably be small 5 to 8 man troop. What say you? Isn't this reasonable? I can see a one messenger to Benteen or Reno.

[fred]

I agree w/ you, Scout. Herendeen alone was probably not the answer. The newest manual called for squad-sized formations and while they were not in vogue, that could easily have been done.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[crzhrs]

It would be far easier if one messenger, knowledgable about the lay of the land, experienced in frontier ways, etc. to get through rather than many men (company or otherwise).

Just as it was quicker for Boston to get to his brother than the time it would have taken Benteen's command to get to Custer.

Don't forget the ride of Portugese Phillips after the Fetterman Massacre and I believe Billy Dixon also accomplished something like that after another famous battle (Beecher's Island?)

[AZ Ranger]

It would be far easier if one messenger, knowledgable about the lay of the land, experienced in frontier ways, etc. to get through rather than many men (company or otherwise).

Just as it was quicker for Boston to get to his brother than the time it would have taken Benteen's command to get to Custer.

Don't forget the ride of Portugese Phillips after the Fetterman Massacre and I believe Billy Dixon also accomplished something like that after another famous battle (Beecher's Island?)

You're betting that the horse doesn't suffer any injuries with only one messenger.

[mcaryf]

Hi Fred

The pack train obviously was an issue for Custer else why is it an important albeit ambiguous part of the last message he is known to have sent?

In commenting on Elisabeth's point about just where should the packs be put, it made me consider that parking the packs somewhere safe has a double benefit. It keeps the ammo and supplies secure and possibly frees up some additional men.

The downside is the extra lost time. Here I do not really agree with Elisabeth's post about the long Summer evening meaning it does not matter. The scouts had already warned Custer that it would take a long period of fighting to overcome the Indians. Many of the noncoms had already fled the village and the Warriors were alerted so it was not just a quick charge and job done. The earliest the packs are going to get to MTC from Boston's last report of them nearing the Morass is some time between 5 and 6pm depending on when you think Boston last saw them (John Gray about 2.35pm, my variant about 2.50) and adding at least 2hours 30 minutes for their fastest realistic transit.

The Indians are just too many and too spread out to be defeated totally in the remaining 3 hours or so of daylight. Thus even if Custer was able to achieve some initial success there would still be a large number of warriors who can compromise his victory by capturing or destroying the packs unless they have been secured. How easy would it be for the 7th Cavalry to pursue the Indians on the 26th without the train with its supplies and reserve ammo and with the need to cope with substantial numbers of wounded men. An inconlusive battle in the remaining hours of the 25th is probably mission failure for Custer especially if he has also lost his supplies. Thus it makes sense for him not to commit his main force until he knows the packs are secure.

Moving on from this, it seems to me that if Custer is really interested in getting himself, Benteen and the packs in one place on the Eastern flank of the Village then he has pretty well given up on the idea of winning the campaign on the 25th and is looking to be in a good position to resume on the 26th with the added benefit of possible assistance from Terry arriving from the North.

Regards

Mike

[wild]

Liz
Well, just a thought, and probably a daft one. But I'd be interested to hear ideas on where else he would/could/should have stationed the packs ...
At 2 .43 Custer begins his assault on the village with Reno's battalion.At that point there is no need for the packs.At 3.15 ,30 minutes later he has not come into action himself [the charge of the Light Brigade took 8 minutes]but finds himself cut off and prevented from coming into action by a twisting river and high bluffs.He has made an horrendous mistake.As far as the eye can see there is no way of crossing and forming the battalion for attack.He is now in damage limitation mode .Calling for the packs and Benteen is no more than the actions of a dead man walking.

[wild]

Thus it makes sense for him not to commit his main force until he knows the packs are secure
He could not commit his main force.Here's a man who through lack of planning places his force on the wrong side of the river and people are discussing what plans he had for the regimental silver?

[fred]

Michael--

We can go on and on about these packs-- and we have. My viewpoint regarding the packs is pretty simple. Custer wanted the men; he didn't need anything else. Yes, he would be concerned about the safety of the packs, but that-- again, to me-- would be merely an afterthought. Custer was going to end this thing today, not the 26th; no chase down the valley or through the hills; no sending columns hither and yon; now! Benteen's battalion, McDougall's company, Mathey's men (less a few to help the civilian packers guide the mules into some coulee to the east and behind the action) were all part and parcel of Custer's latest plan, a plan I believe changed from the original (when he made the turn up the bluffs), and which was evolving as he rode down the coulee system and up to Calhoun Hill.

I really do not think there is anything more to it than that. I think he had time; I don't believe he was under duress; I think he was his usual impatient self, but calculating and shrewd, nonetheless.

Incidentally, for any of you who care, there was a stunningly good article in the December 18, 2006, edition of The New Yorker magazine, titled, "Knowing the Enemy," by George Packer. It is about an Australian lieutenant colonel who has found his way into the U. S. State department-- on loan, mind you-- and who is a counter-terrorism/ counter-insurgency expert (indeed!). A great article! I would suggest trying to get a copy-- it is actually somewhat germane to the Indian wars-- and if you cannot, I saved it. Great stuff!

Best wishes,
Fred.

[wild]

I really do not think there is anything more to it than that. I think he had time; I don't believe he was under duress; I think he was his usual impatient self, but calculating and shrewd, nonetheless.
He was on the wrong side of the bluffs/river,his point battalion had just got the chop,There are thousands of Indians minutes away,his reserves are out of supporting distance,no way across the river and Fred you would have us believe he is not under duress.
I think he had time;
Time he had not.No time for his reserves to get to him.No time for him to support Reno,no time to even form a defence.
Cheers Fred

[mcaryf]

Hi Fred

This is a quote from one of your recent posts:

I really do not think there is anything more to it than that. I think he had time; I don't believe he was under duress; I think he was his usual impatient self, but calculating and shrewd, nonetheless.

I note in this that you did not say that Custer thought he had time you said that you thought he had time.

Was this a slip in typing or do you actually think that Custer did have both the possibility and time to defeat the Indians in the 3 to 4 hours of remaining daylight on the 25th?

Crook, with a larger force, fought a lesser number of Indians for over 4 hours without defeating them or coming anywhere close to defeating them.

Custer was no fool and I am sure he knew how close to real trouble he had got himself into during the Washita fight. Once he saw the true scale of the village and that they were not "out to lunch somewhere" I am sure he would have realised that there was no way he could subdue them sufficiently in the time available to create a decisive victory that evening. I doubt if he foresaw at MTC that his own command might be destroyed but I am increasingly convinced that he realised he could not win.

Regards

Mike

[fred]

wild--

You obviously have a completely different picture of what went on than I do. If you like, the easiest way for me to put this is that I am generally a subscriber to the Richard Fox theory of what happened to Custer on June 25. That is the crux of it from my point of view. Other than that, I have no idea what you are driving at. I believe the battle-- Custer's part of it-- unfolded fairly slowly, he was under no duress when he was at Ford B, he left that area under his own volition, he was not pressed when his command was atop Calhoun Hill, he left Keogh behind to await Benteen and as a reserve, and so forth. If you scoff at that, my suggestion would be to write Richard Fox, because I am not prepared to battle out his theories w/ you. It would take two volumes and we would wind up back where we began. To me, it is fruitless and I have seen enough of your theories about Benteen to know when I have met the proverbial brick wall. It would be tantamount to trying to convince Jack Pennington Custer was not mortally wounded at Ford B.

Michael--

You are correct. It should have read, he (meaning Custer) thought he had the time.

I am also not sure Custer ever fully realized what he was up against until it was too late, but again, that plays into much more than I am willing to post here again. I don't know how many times I have posted-- on other threads-- this same scenario, but it now becomes much too time-consuming. The Crook business is unfair to cite, only in that Custer did not know of it and I am not sure it is relevant because the situations were different. We are beginning to get into the realm of saying Custer's tactics were sound, therefore you or I would do the exact same thing. No! His tactics were sound to a point, then when you overload the equation those tactics are no longer sound and if he had continued up the Rosebud as Terry had anticipated, there would have been no need for those tactics anyway.

To put it in a nutshelf (sorry for the bromides and metaphors!), I believe Custer felt there was plenty of time to have Benteen and the men from the packs get to him and the whole shootin' match could then charge through the village. To ask if the day was long enough is like asking if the village was visible through the dawn's early light (!) or the dust stayed in the sky for... We are stumbling over our own minutiae.

Best wishes,
Fred.