A couple puzzling points

[harpskiddie]

Billy:

I'd shoot you anyway, just to get the toadie job, provided you made it an interesting shot, EXCEPT that my daughter made me promise a couple of years ago that I would stop shooting people.

Gordie

PS Stop with the adioses, or you'll have us worried that you've sprained more than your wrist.

[AZ Ranger]

No AZ the idea of all this is to achieve the goals as set out by their employer Uncle Sam.
Are you having me on or are your replies serious?
I've learned from the best.

In all seriousness I believe there was no way to win that day for the 7th cavalry. Therefore you don't want to squander Uncle Sam's resources when it can't be won. I believe Benteen did the right thing by going to Reno and that was involvement. Maybe not what you wanted but it was involvement. He could have gone to the pack train and taken another hour or so.

Maybe if you can explain to me how they could have won after Custer sent Martin to Benteen and did whatever after that I could see your point. I can see they might have either lost more lives or maybe saved a few at most and retreated but I do not see victory for the 7th. What could Benteen have done to make it a win. Do you really believe they could have won?

AZ Ranger

[wild]

AZ
Do you really believe they could have won
The situation at 4.10 when Benteen arrived at Reno's position only indicated the defeat of 25%of the force.With Benteen pulling the plug on Custer ment the defeat of 100%.
This was Benteen's contribution to the day's work.
To word it more clearly unlike Reno and Custer he contributed nothing to the attempt to win

[mcaryf]

Hi Wild

I think you are using both hindsight and a narrow definition in your condemnation of Benteen's actions as not contributing to a possible win.

The object was to win the campaign rather than achieve a victory on a specific day and in particular the 25th June. As a result of the decisions that Benteen took the bulk of the 7th Cavalry was still in the field after the 25th. After all in the campaign plan it was intended by General Terry that he would be moving up the LBH on the 26th. Thus by choosing not to throw away the remaining intact Battalion of the 7th, Benteen could have reasonably judged that he might be contributing to some sort of winning outcome in the following days. With hindsight we know that this did not happen but this knowledge was not available to Benteen.

It is also possible to argue some degree of success for the Battle of the LBH. It demonstrated to the Indians that even if they all banded together they could not avoid the risk of army attacks on their villages. The successful defence of Reno Hill also demonstrated that they could not overwhelm a well managed substantial US Army force without risking unacceptable casualties. In many ways their "victory" at LBH would have been more worrying for them than the "draw" at the Rosebud.

Most serious students of the battle judge that the 7th was doomed to defeat on 25th June once Custer took the decision to move beyond Weir Point regardless of what Benteen and Reno might or might not have subsequently done. Thus it is only fair to judge whether Benteen's actions resulted in the defeat incurring more or less casualties. In my judgement I would assess that Benteen's actions did result in fewer casualties.

Thus on both the narrow objective of containing the scale of the day's defeat and the broader objective of keeping the prospects for the campaign intact I think your criticism of Benteen is unjustified.

Regards

Mike

[AZ Ranger]

Wild I would have to agree with Mike. There was no Uncle Sam mandate to win by June 25, 1876. Also when Benteen charged the Indians on Reno Hill he demonstrated that the troops had regained composure and were willing to fight. That involvement allowed other to fight another day to accomplish the mission. Those that died never did get a win.

As far as tactics I believe the training was insufficient to win on June 25 and agree with Benteen's assessment. Also my feeling is the cavalry was transitioning to mounted infantry but was being run by cavalry tactic thinking officers. Reno demonstrated that transition by charging then forming a dismounted skirmish line. It wasn't a full cavalry charge and they didn't have rifles like the infantry.

As far as what a officer has as an obligation to the mission or to men fighting with him, I leave that to those that have been an officer. I have my opinion but was not trained to make decisions as an officer. My thought was always to serve my country and stay alive. I never had to order groups of marines to do something that would get them killed. I applaud those officers that had to make those tough decisions.

AZ Ranger

[fred]

azranger said:

As far as what a officer has as an obligation to the mission or to men fighting with him, I leave that to those that have been an officer. I have my opinion but was not trained to make decisions as an officer. My thought was always to serve my country and stay alive. I never had to order groups of marines to do something that would get them killed. I applaud those officers that had to make those tough decisions.

Ranger--

That is as fair, as proper, and as decent an answer as could possibly be expressed. I will tell you this... when I arrived in Vietnam and found out I was to be a company commander in the 1st Infantry Division, the first thing I did after taking command was to gather the entire company together and tell them who I was. The division had built a "barrack-type" building where large meetings could be held and I got most if not all the 225 or so men into it. I told them my first responsibility was to accomplish whatever mission we would be assigned. My next priority was to get every one of those men home in the same condition as they were when they left. I succeeded in my first goal; I failed in my second. Forty years later, I still think about it and I can tell you the names of each man I failed. Once in a while I visit them in Washington. Their names are on a wall. Thanks, Steve.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[wild]

Hi Mike
Well argued reply.

I think you are using both hindsight and a narrow definition in your condemnation of Benteen's actions as not contributing to a possible win.
Agreed it's a narrow definition but I have been careful not to apply hindsight.Hindsight pardons Benteens actions.

The object was to win the campaign rather than achieve a victory on a specific day
Campaigns are the responsibility of the force commanders and the Force commander in this case took the decision to attack.It was Benteen's duty to support this attack.

Thus by choosing not to throw away the remaining intact Battalion of the 7th,
You see Mike this is hindsight

It is also possible to argue some degree of success for the Battle of the LBH.
Yes that's true.

Most serious students of the battle judge that the 7th was doomed to defeat on 25th June once Custer took the decision to move beyond Weir Point regardless of what Benteen and Reno might or might not have subsequently done. Thus it is only fair to judge whether Benteen's actions resulted in the defeat incurring more or less casualties. In my judgement I would assess that Benteen's actions did result in fewer casualties.
Casualties are the price of victory not the determining factor.

Thus on both the narrow objective of containing the scale of the day's defeat and the broader objective of keeping the prospects for the campaign intact I think your criticism of Benteen is unjustified.
The issue in a nutshell is if you believe your CO is wrong are you obliged to obey him?An army is not run on accountancy principals.It functions on loyalty ,patriotism and much higher ideals dismissed as melodramatic by some here.But officers are entitled to make what at the time appear to be wrong decisions.Custer was intitled to make wrong tactical decisions and expect total loyalty from his officers.

AZ,Fred I acknowledge very interesting and thought provoking posts.

On an unrelated matter I had occasion to offer apologies to 2 posters hereabouts.One was to a soldier the other to a civilian.The apology to the soldier was really a half arsed apology but the soldier immediatly and with much praise and graciousness acknowledged it .I offered an unequivocal apology to the civilian who neither accepted nor responded.
I would say to the soldier I salute class where ever I find it.
To the civilian no comment.
Slan

[fred]

wild--

Do you ever check your "personal messages"?

Best wishes,
Fred.

[mcaryf]

Hi Wild

I note you sign your posts Slan - do you prefer to be called by that name or your board identity?

When I suggested you are applying hindsight, what I meant was that you are using your knowledge that Custer's defeat and Terry's non-arrival obviated the possibility for a victory the next day to condemn the decisions Benteen took on the 25th. At the time he could have reasonably supposed that preserving his force for the next day might yield the best chance of a win.

Whilst I do not actually think Benteen disobeyed the order he received from Custer I do think there are occasions when subordinates should disobey orders. These are typically when they have good reason to beleive that they have extra information not available to their commander.

Here are two such cases. During the Battle of Jutland the British Navy failed to take a number of opportunities to destroy the High Seas Fleet because various admirals and captains in contact with the enemy blindly followed orders to turn away even when they had a better knowledge of the situation than the person (e.g. Jellicoe) who was giving those orders but who could not see the enemy himself. The subsequent comment by the British First Sea Lord was that any damned fool can obey an order. Adm Nelson built part of his reputation by disobeying an order when he could see better than his commander at the Battle of Copenhagen that the enemy were about to crack. This was the famous "I see no signal" occasion.

Thus I personally accept a military tradition that a subordinate can choose to disobey an order if he has good reason for thinking the situation has changed since the order was given or that he has better knowledge. I freely admit, however, that the subordinate takes his own career or even life into his own hands by so doing.

Your main argument seems to be that Benteen should blindly follow an order that was obviously issued by Custer prior to many key events. In particular when Custer despatched Martini he was not aware of Reno's defeat or the true scale of the Indian strength and motivation and Martini said the Indians were skedaddling. Thus it is not always a question of beleiving your CO is wrong but of the situation having changed since the order was given.

In any event I do beleive that Benteen was still following Custer's orders on Reno Hill but we have previously debated this and I do not want to go back over that because I know we disagree.

The point you did not address in your answer was whether there was anything Benteen could have realistically done to improve the prospects of victory after Custer had chosen to continue beyond Weir Point and Reno had been defeated. If you do not think there was, then it seems to me you are merely calling on Benteen to sacrifice his men needlessly. He had already chosen not to do that when he saw Reno's remnants being slaughtered on the valley floor so his decision then was not hindsight but rather a reasoned judgement at the time - remember he did not know that the force being defeated was not Custer's.

Regards

Mike

[wild]

I note you sign your posts Slan - do you prefer to be called by that name or your board identity?
I was reading Son of the Morning Star and how Keoghs I company took on some of their commander's wild characteristics and were known as the Wild I.So took Wild I as a user name though I lost the the "I" somewhere.However It was pointed out that in fact Wild was a trooper in Keogh's company and that Connel just got the story mixed up.
But Slan is not a name but gaelic for cheery bye,toodlepip,cheeryho.

Now to work.
If you say subcommanders can disobey orders for their own reasons you introduce an element of doubt into the workings of the military.Commanders making tough decisions would have no certainy that their subcommanders would respond.
You give two examples of illustrate your point of view.Jutland and Copenhagan.Jutland was a failure of the control system.A massive fleet of fast complex fighting ships but a faulty control system.The remedy for this was not to introduce another fault ie disobedience.That's a recipe for chaos.Igive you Nelson he got away with it.
On the law of averages subcommanders disobeying orders will get it wrong 50% of the time.This is far too high an average of failure to accept the weaking of subordinates obligation to obey orders.
As regards Benteen's position he made a strategic decision based the local tactical situation.He did not know Custer's position which "could" have been very favourable.

Your main argument seems to be that Benteen should blindly follow an order that was obviously issued by Custer prior to many key events.
On a fast changing battle field the system often calls for subcommanders to act blindly.The "blindly "element is if the system is working correctly covered at higher echlons.Even at the LBH the "blindly"part of the order was covered by HQ.

The point you did not address in your answer was whether there was anything Benteen could have realistically done to improve the prospects of victory after Custer had chosen to continue beyond Weir Point and Reno had been defeated.
If I did not know Custer's situation,if I had no knowledge of the overall tactical situation there is only one course of action open and that is to comply with Custer's order.
Slan

[AZ Ranger]

If I did not know Custer's situation,if I had no knowledge of the overall tactical situation there is only one course of action open and that is to comply with Custer's order.

Benteen did not know of the split of Reno and Custer. After receiving the great intel from Martin that the Indians were skedaddling I am sure he was a little more cautious about freely moving around a battlefield rather than cleaning up behind running Indians.

Wild, I would like your take on what Benteen was to do about "bring packs".

AZ Ranger

[wild]

Wild, I would like your take on what Benteen was to do about "bring packs".
What was Benteen's take on"bring packs".He did not even send Martin back with the message.He did not give the pack guard commander or the pack commander the opportunity to respond.Time was possibly wasted by this inaction.
The bring packs order obliged Benteen to ensure that the packs reached Custer as quickly as possible.It did not place an obligation on him to personally accompany the packs.
Slan

[crzhrs]

Kanipe reported to the pack train and gave his orders from Custer. Martini supposedly reported to the train (never confirmed?) to report the orders.

The pack train was fully aware of the orders and was not Benteen's responsibility. If Benteen took the time to go back and get the packs he may not have been able to even save Reno.

[wild]

Kanipe reported to the pack train and gave his orders from Custer. Martini supposedly reported to the train (never confirmed?) to report the orders.
No friend we can only support contentions with confirmed actions.

The pack train was fully aware of the orders and was not Benteen's responsibility.
Benteen was ordered to bring the packs.

If Benteen took the time to go back and get the packs he may not have been able to even save Reno.
Was it beyond Benteen's intelligence to follow this order so that no time was lost.Everyone [Tony excepted I think]believes Benteen summed up a very difficult tactical situation and took the right action when he arrived at Reno's position.Can we not assume that the packs problem was no great challenge to him.
Slan

[mcaryf]

Hi Wild

Thank you for the linguistic clarification.

I tried and failed to get you to answer the question as to whether you thought any possibility of a "win" existed after Custer's decision to continue past Weir Point. Personally I do not think there was. Your criticism of Benteen failing to contribute to the attempt to win is therefore a criticism of him for not making a futile gesture as no "win" was then possible.

You argue that it is only with hindsight that we know that no win was possible and that Benteen did not know this at 4.10pm when he might have elected to continue past Reno to go towards Custer.

Let us consider what Benteen knew at about 4.10pm. He had seen for himself 900 or so well armed Indians on the valley floor. He knew that Reno's command had been comprehensively beaten and was in a shattered state. He knew that Custer was somewhere with just over 200 men but he did not know precisely where as Martini had suggested to him that Custer would already have charged through the Village. He knew that many Indians were still on the valley floor - they started to move back towards the Village at around 4.20 to 4.25 but their apparent initial movement was towards Ford A where Benteen could assume the pack train to be. He knew that when Custer sent him the message the situation had been very different. He knew that Custer had expected him to come quick but to bring the packs and that Martini had been told to return alone if there was no danger which suggests that Benteen was expected to be delayed somewhat presumeably by the need to bring the packs.

From this set of information and orders you draw the conclusion that Benteen should have proceeded along the bluffs to where, with hindsight, you know Custer to have been.

Are you suggesting he does this immediately, leaving the packs to be captured by the Indians who were still on the valley floor? What do you think the benefit of Benteen travelling round the bluffs might be if at this time Custer is attacking the village or has already attacked as Martini suggested from the North or East?

When the Indians start to move back to the North surely the inference is that Custer is attacking from the far side, thus should Benteen not have resumed the attack on the Village from the South? Remember Benteen has no scouts with whom he can communicate that know the lie of the land along the bluffs so for all he knows it could require a detour of several miles, after all if Custer is only now attacking might it not be because he has had to travel a substantial distance to find a ford?

Personally I think that if Benteen was going to do anything based on the knowledge he had it should have been to resume the attack on the Village. However, I think he had seen the scale and effectiveness of the opposition, he knew that Custer had made a serious error in splitting the command and he was not going to compound that by splitting it again. Thus he did not move until the 7 companies were reunited , which was certainly within the letter of his orders. I think he had already formed a view that no win was possible on the 25th following Custer's earlier decisions and therefore he would do his best to preserve the forces in his immediate vicinity to fight the next day when Terry might arrive. I suspect he thought that Custer had attacked or at least been spotted and repulsed as Reno had been. There would be no great advantage and much hazard in attempting to consolidate the two forces in face of such a strong enemy presence.

Weir's sally along the bluffs has two effects. First, it makes any decision to return to the valley floor more difficult and second Benteen could assume that Weir would send a message (he had his orderly with him) if there was anything that Benteen could usefully do. Weir sent no message and I am not aware of any clear indication of what he actually saw. Thus I think Weir's sally is the final factor that ensures Benteen stays on Reno Hill until the packs come up.

To summarise, I think Benteen realised as soon as he saw the valley floor action that there would be no win that day. His orders from Custer were sufficiently ambiguous that he could interpret them to mean he should wait on Reno Hill for the packs. I think this fitted in with his own assessment that it was best to consolidate the forces there. As far as Custer was concerned I suspect that he initially assumed that Custer had already attacked and been repulsed and that subsequently Custer might be engaged in a defensive action somewhere similar to that which his own command was about to endure.

Personally I would not criticise the principle of what Benteen did. In terms of detail I think he should have sent a scouting party to Weir Point to observe but Weir preempted that, and I think he should have sent a message to the packs to tell McDougall what was happening and to hurry him along. In practice I do not think either of these omissions had any impact on subsequent events.

I find your criticism of his "failure to attempt to win" somewhat disingenuous. You yourself know that there was no chance of a win at that stage and Benteen, a very professional soldier, knew that as well. It was a case of preserving as much of the regiment as possible and that is precisely what he did.

Regards

Mike