Post by fred on Jan 5, 2007 14:15:49 GMT -6
dcary--
I checked your profile before I decided to write this, so unless you are not an American you should be fairly familiar w/ the American military and how it works.
Darkcloud seems to be fighting this battle alone, but to his credit, I believe he is generally correct. I am a rather strong supporter of Reno and an extremely (there! I've said it!) strong supporter of Benteen. I believe Reno was a good officer-- maybe even a damned good officer-- and despite his penchant for the juice, I believe he was a good man. I refuse to believe the man was drunk at the LBH and I believe most of his actions during the valley fight were the actions of a very competent officer.
There is one exception to that: his move out of the timber. I think it bordered on the disgraceful. There are-- and were-- ways to move from the timber to the river, cross the river, climb the bluffs, and consolidate one's forces. Those ways are designed to minimize casualties, and generally speaking, they work. If nothing else, they maintain discipline which is key to maintaining morale. All is lost if morale is lost. That intangible-- not accounted for in any of the manuals-- is a key to any victory. Without it, victory is problematic. Reno chose the wrong way. As a former army officer and a combat veteran who has seen such hopelessness on the battlefield-- heard it on the battlefield-- I tell you, morale is important. Reno's move risked that and I would venture to say only Benteen's arrival saved his command.
Does that make Reno a bad officer. No; not in my book. He did too many things that day that were responsible for saving those men and his casualties would have been far greater than they were if he hadn't performed as well as he did. This will obviously drive me into the "darkcloud" camp-- much to the chagrin of many-- but we must be fair. Even Reno's decision to leave the timber was a good military decision; it was his method that we question and should be questioned. He was pinned, surrounded, and greatly outnumbered. Who the hell in this entire "club" wouldn't have opted to get out of there? Only a very foolish person. Again, it was Reno's "technique," not his decision-making, that was so bad.
"Darkcloud" has put everyone into a corner and he knows it, because there is no one who can give him definitive figures or results if Reno had done things differently, just like no one can tell him precisely how many horses had been killed up to the arrival on Reno Hill or even exactly how many men had been killed by that time (although this latter is a do-able exercise). Certainly no one can tell him how many wounded there were when Benteen arrived, so the whole thing is like peeing into the wind: you get some relief, but the consequences may not be welcome.
The worst part about the Reno "retreat" is that if it had happened today, in Iraq, or even a number of years ago in Vietnam, the man's career would be over. If the army didn't court-martial him, a letter would be dropped into his 201 file, and he might just as well call it quits. Recruiting duty or the CO of some obscure reserve post.
A quick story to illustrate the point. I ran a convoy to a very hot area in Vietnam, late-1966 or so, and we stayed up that night listening to our radios because we knew there was some action going on. We were in the 25th Infantry Division operating area, supporting some of their units. In those days, the army had this hot idea of putting together a thing called a "light infantry brigade," I guess rather like the German Jaeger units. The army organized several of them and they were usually commanded by a brigadier general and they were used to support divisional operations. This particular night, one of these brigades was working w/ the 25th and some of their units got in a serious firefight w/ the NVA; ambushes galore. We picked up a lot of the chatter on our radios and even heard a U.S. platoon overrun and its lieutenant actually die on the radio. The odds-- or circumstances-- were so great against the U.S. units that they were obliged to withdraw and wound up leaving several of their wounded behind! You don't do that in the American army. Our division CG (1st Inf. Div.) had an inordinate amount of pull and even though that brigade commander was not in his chain of command, our CG had him fired from Saigon. I do not think that exercise was anything close to what Reno put his men through. If it was 1966 or 2007 instead of 1876, Marcus Reno's career would have ended shortly thereafter.
I think Reno panicked, but I think he had cause to panic and I am certainly in no position to condemn the man under circumstances we cannot even imagine. And I also think that when he had time to regroup, he performed admirably once again. And one other thing. Despite the panicked rout, Reno still got those men to the bluffs and they survived. When it was all over, that was what counted. Custer failed; Benteen and Reno did not. That comment alone will bring enough opprobrium on my head, so I better quit. Let me just say that the commander led his men into a quagmire; Reno and Benteen were able to salvage what they could; they salvaged their commands. Their commander left them on a limb with no orders, with broken promises, or with contradictory orders that are still being debated today. Reno had a mission; Benteen had a mission; Custer was free to do what he wanted, go where he wanted, yet he was the one who could not extricate himself.
Let the fur fly.
Best wishes,
Fred.
I checked your profile before I decided to write this, so unless you are not an American you should be fairly familiar w/ the American military and how it works.
Darkcloud seems to be fighting this battle alone, but to his credit, I believe he is generally correct. I am a rather strong supporter of Reno and an extremely (there! I've said it!) strong supporter of Benteen. I believe Reno was a good officer-- maybe even a damned good officer-- and despite his penchant for the juice, I believe he was a good man. I refuse to believe the man was drunk at the LBH and I believe most of his actions during the valley fight were the actions of a very competent officer.
There is one exception to that: his move out of the timber. I think it bordered on the disgraceful. There are-- and were-- ways to move from the timber to the river, cross the river, climb the bluffs, and consolidate one's forces. Those ways are designed to minimize casualties, and generally speaking, they work. If nothing else, they maintain discipline which is key to maintaining morale. All is lost if morale is lost. That intangible-- not accounted for in any of the manuals-- is a key to any victory. Without it, victory is problematic. Reno chose the wrong way. As a former army officer and a combat veteran who has seen such hopelessness on the battlefield-- heard it on the battlefield-- I tell you, morale is important. Reno's move risked that and I would venture to say only Benteen's arrival saved his command.
Does that make Reno a bad officer. No; not in my book. He did too many things that day that were responsible for saving those men and his casualties would have been far greater than they were if he hadn't performed as well as he did. This will obviously drive me into the "darkcloud" camp-- much to the chagrin of many-- but we must be fair. Even Reno's decision to leave the timber was a good military decision; it was his method that we question and should be questioned. He was pinned, surrounded, and greatly outnumbered. Who the hell in this entire "club" wouldn't have opted to get out of there? Only a very foolish person. Again, it was Reno's "technique," not his decision-making, that was so bad.
"Darkcloud" has put everyone into a corner and he knows it, because there is no one who can give him definitive figures or results if Reno had done things differently, just like no one can tell him precisely how many horses had been killed up to the arrival on Reno Hill or even exactly how many men had been killed by that time (although this latter is a do-able exercise). Certainly no one can tell him how many wounded there were when Benteen arrived, so the whole thing is like peeing into the wind: you get some relief, but the consequences may not be welcome.
The worst part about the Reno "retreat" is that if it had happened today, in Iraq, or even a number of years ago in Vietnam, the man's career would be over. If the army didn't court-martial him, a letter would be dropped into his 201 file, and he might just as well call it quits. Recruiting duty or the CO of some obscure reserve post.
A quick story to illustrate the point. I ran a convoy to a very hot area in Vietnam, late-1966 or so, and we stayed up that night listening to our radios because we knew there was some action going on. We were in the 25th Infantry Division operating area, supporting some of their units. In those days, the army had this hot idea of putting together a thing called a "light infantry brigade," I guess rather like the German Jaeger units. The army organized several of them and they were usually commanded by a brigadier general and they were used to support divisional operations. This particular night, one of these brigades was working w/ the 25th and some of their units got in a serious firefight w/ the NVA; ambushes galore. We picked up a lot of the chatter on our radios and even heard a U.S. platoon overrun and its lieutenant actually die on the radio. The odds-- or circumstances-- were so great against the U.S. units that they were obliged to withdraw and wound up leaving several of their wounded behind! You don't do that in the American army. Our division CG (1st Inf. Div.) had an inordinate amount of pull and even though that brigade commander was not in his chain of command, our CG had him fired from Saigon. I do not think that exercise was anything close to what Reno put his men through. If it was 1966 or 2007 instead of 1876, Marcus Reno's career would have ended shortly thereafter.
I think Reno panicked, but I think he had cause to panic and I am certainly in no position to condemn the man under circumstances we cannot even imagine. And I also think that when he had time to regroup, he performed admirably once again. And one other thing. Despite the panicked rout, Reno still got those men to the bluffs and they survived. When it was all over, that was what counted. Custer failed; Benteen and Reno did not. That comment alone will bring enough opprobrium on my head, so I better quit. Let me just say that the commander led his men into a quagmire; Reno and Benteen were able to salvage what they could; they salvaged their commands. Their commander left them on a limb with no orders, with broken promises, or with contradictory orders that are still being debated today. Reno had a mission; Benteen had a mission; Custer was free to do what he wanted, go where he wanted, yet he was the one who could not extricate himself.
Let the fur fly.
Best wishes,
Fred.
