jag
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Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
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Post by jag on May 17, 2013 10:52:45 GMT -6
Thanks again for all your comments...
In the previous I stated... ...to add time for Benteen to go down to near where Custer ordered Reno off to his attack, couldn't have taken any longer to there than what Reno's entire time in that valley was. If you add time to Benteen's return to that point, some claim 2 hours+ here, then you have to have Reno going to, fighting and then being seen by Benteen that two hours later. Of course the reverse is true also. That being if you have Benteen closer to where he saw Reno's men in retreat, the less time it took for Reno's total time (going to his SL, fighting and then being in retreat) in the valley. The crucial point here being the gaps between all the columns that would eventually swamp Custer and his men. The less time you give Custer in this equational process the more ignorant he seems, by all appearances. What I'm questioning here are those gaps. And those gaps shouldn't be minimized any more than what they were that day. And the first appearance of any gap was that one with Benteen where Custer allowed through design or direct order to pursue his mission until what they found much later on the bluffs changed all that. Therefore the question, was Custer's primary reason, no not the only one, but the primary one for that 'be quick' instruction/order because he needed that gap filled and quickly.
Now some people don't like to engage in the what ifs here. But they really are more simple than any other. I believe Benteen's participation in that attack was enabled and expected by Custer's orders/instructions to him. What those orders meant is whats important here, not that Reno stopped him, we all know that in hindsight. Lets keep Reno in that 'fixing' position. Lets let those orders recieved before he ever sighted Reno retreating and find out what those orders meant. Forget what Benteen and Reno did after that, that's all hindsight speculation.
Quite simply. Wouldn't Custer have expected Benteen to march to the sounds of the battle (gunfire, hollerin' and a whopping etc.). Would he have expected anything less from him? On the course Benteen was when Custer last should have known where he was, as he climbed or topped those bluffs and surely looked back to see where he was, if for safety if nothing else, he sends that message back to Benteen. Benteen, come on, big village, be quick, bring pacs, ps bring pacs. The 'come on' is of course, the battle is on. Custer knew that because he had sent Reno in. The big village might have been and likely was a big surprise to him, else why telegraph in such a short message anything about the condition of that village? The 'be quick' meant he wanted Benteen to close the gap that had opened, and would open between not just his command, but Reno's command as well. There was no instruction for Benteen to 'pitch in' here or there. The reason why is Custer expected him to independently determine where for himself. If that meant following his, Custer's path, on downstream, which it easily and likely could have been, and was the reason I postulated the Benteen notion that Custer was supposed to come back to him, then that gap would have closed between not just Custer's column but Reno's as well. It still didn't matter if Benteen had gone to the sound of Reno's guns and charged into that battle there. Anywhere was better than no where at all, just as long as Benteen joined and closed the gap between at least one of those commands engaged.
Now to the question. There was that chance of opening up a fatal gap between the two wings that were and would be engaged in that battle. The chance of being isolated and far away from any support where contact and communications between the separate wing commands and any kind of reserve and supply source should be maintained. Custer had to have realized this when he kept the march going further down stream. Losing contact wasn't an option then, just as it isn't an option today in any battle anywhere by any army anywhere at any time since Joshua stormed the walls of Jericho and long before. Was that little phrase used by Benteen, so often overlooked today, that one and only connection to the reality posed by Custer furthering his distance from all of them - with the all to familiar chance of being isolated and cut off, not just his wing but Reno's as well, which we know in hindsight did happen, that this one little expected event that was expected to close that fatal gap that day, he, Custer going back to Benteen was what was supposed to happen... that didn't and couldn't?
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Post by fuchs on May 17, 2013 11:06:14 GMT -6
Okay, my take on this:
Forgetting for a moment all the minutiae of time lines, movements and horse speeds (where I am out of my depth anyway), I would like to try a broad strokes approach.
The are some points that I cannot entirely make to fit with much what is posted here:
1. The packs.
"Come on! Be quick! Bring packs!!!!"
I would like to argue that the emphasize was more with the packs than with any additional firepower Benteen could have provided in the short run, i.e. in time to provide a useful support for the village attack.
If I understand Fred correctly, from the moment Custer dispatched a messenger towards Benteen, he could not have realistically expected that it would take Benteen less than about an hour until he could engage in the battle. Especially when tasked to drag the mule train along with him. And when the messenger was send on his way, Reno was already engaged.
2. How much, and how good of a plan there was. And on which kind of mental frame of reference it was based.
A few weeks ago Fred told me that at the early stages of the campaign there was no masterplan of taking the field in winter, to defeat the non-treaty winter-roamers around Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse before they could get re-enforced by the summer-roamers.
I read up a bit on it since then, and now I think I either misunderstood Fred, or he was not correct in this assessment.
A decisive winter campaign was apparently planned since 1875, to be set in motion the moment a casus belli could be constructed. To strike the "Hostiles" in their small, scattered winter camps by overwhelming force, intimidating the treaty Indians into signing away the Black Hills after all, after the failed attempt in 1875, failed in no small parts due to the influence of the non-treaty "Hostiles".
Which was the objective of the war, as for political reasons a purely military conquest would not do, there had to be at least the pretense of acquiring them legally, by "agreement" (There weren't any treaties anymore with the Indians at the time).
But due to various delays, in parts due to politics, in parts because the Army wasn't the well-oiled war machine it would have liked to be, the only meaningful action before summer would be the Reynolds fight, which accomplished nothing more than driving home the message to the "Hostiles" that indeed the Whites meant war, and safety was to be looked for in numbers.
The plan was sound, but when things turned out to go not along as planned, it was set in motion delayed, into an environment it wasn't entirely fitting anymore.
And in such a situation there might arise the problem, that although a plan might have been overtaken by the events on the ground, it still lingers in the back of the head, and might lead to cognitive dissonance in play when decision have to be made, decisions that might be in part based on obsolete assumptions.
3. Every officer on his own private learning curve.
Assuming Custer had a plan of sorts, and that any plan would be based primarily on his own experiences and recent fights. Further assuming that any plan would be sound, from the point of view of an Army officer with Custer's experience and knowledge.
So, what was that experience?
a) Kansas, Yellowstone Campaign: If Indians know you are after them, and they do not want to fight, you will not be able to get them to fight.
b) Washita, Reynolds fight: If you surprise an Indian camp, they will primarily be concerned with getting away, rather than stand and fight. But, after that they might regroup and/or get reinforced, and might come after you again.
Even a battle that was won might turn into an PR disaster (or at least leave a dark spot), if you neglect to tie up all the loose ends.
The one realistic objective in fighting Indians is capturing their camp and destroying their property. Even if attacking with overwhelming force, the majority will likely get away. The initial fight for the camp will be over in minutes rather than hours.
The Indians will try to go for Horses and/or Mules.
c) Civil War Custer's Luck. If I understand it correctly, Custer's actions in the Civil War involved quite a lot of Hussar-ism, lots of gambles where his command came out on top (if one disregards the appalling losses) against bad odds. If you keep pressing the offensive, even inferior numbers of Cavalry can achieve devastating results.
So, taking all that together, what might follow for the reasonings behind that message to Benteen?
The point of emphasizing that the pack train had to be brought up might have been twofold: - get it out of danger, avoiding a possible second order defeat (along the line of Elliot) and/or loss of critical supplies (Mules, ammunition) - what I consider more likely is that Custer thought he might need the additional ammunition, and the additional firepower of both Benteen and the train escort. Not in the short run, but to consolidate his hold on the camp, and weather possible counterattacks until re-enforced, by Terry and Crook which he must have assumed to be not far away.
This scenario would have been in Custer's mind when he dispatched the message, even if it would fall apart under the flow of events that developed, but for this moment in time it makes some sense to me.
-It allows for Custer being aware that there were indeed an awful lot of Indians there. Apparently he expected up to 1500 warriors, which might have been close to what he ultimately had to face. Either in place, or strung out in several camps. And he might have had his hand full of dealing with them, so even capturing most of the camp would be an ambitious goal, forget the body count.
No matter the numbers, an uncoordinated and surprised gaggle of warriors would give way before a coordinated, two pronged attack by a disciplined military force. First they would try to get as many of their families out of danger as possible, before trying to counterattack.
This gives Benteen time to move up AND bring the ammo, which might be sorely needed in the case of counterattacks.
And it makes Custer looking less like an arrogant fool who completely disregarded Indian warrior numbers and/or fighting prowess. Just someone who had a, in his mental frame of reference, reasonable plan that failed because he badly overestimated the temporary advantage he had as a attacker with surprise on his side.
And if it had worked, he could have destroyed the camp at his convenience. The alternative, rolling up the valley with a compact, massed force might give most of the more distant lodges time to pack up and vanish.
On the other hand, which would be a possible scenario where Custer would have need of Benteen ASAP, but the ammunition not so much?
If the Indians run and keep running, no need of either.
If Benteen was expected to join Custer before he started the flank attack, he would still take much of the tempo of the battle, which sounds entirely not like Hussar Custer.
If he joined the fight after Custer started the flank attack, wouldn't it be more logically that Benteen either reinforced Reno, or forms up a third wing of the attacking force?
As a reminder, these are all suggested motivations for the "Come on / Be quick / Bring packs" note, not for Custers actions after that.
But even then, the idea that Custer thought Benteen AND the packs would arrive at his position above the camp in time to contribute meaningful to the battle appear somehow strange to me. Unless he expected that it would develop into a slow moving, conventional fighting style set piece battle. But if he wanted/expected something like that, wouldn't be a concentrated, brute force attack through the valley with all the companies he had right now not make more sense?
Now, I have no military experience to speak of, and I am possibly utterly wrong in most of this. In which case, could someone propose a battle plan that makes more sense given the circumstances and the knowledge/preconceptions Custer's had back then, up to this point in time, under which the message to Benteen makes sense? Framed in a way a Civilian can understand it?
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Post by quincannon on May 17, 2013 11:23:00 GMT -6
If a military communication forces the receiver of that communication to assume anything it is a poorly conceived written or verbal communication. Such is the case with Cooke's written message to Benteen.
First one assumes "Come on" means come to Custer. No matter how you parse the words or insert what you might think the meaning is, it is still an assumption. One could point to the bearer of the note, and say it came from Custer that's where I should go. Is that so? Did Martini know Custer's intentions? Could Benteen ask him what he meant by "come on"? Would anyone expect an answer?
Be quick: Be quick relative to what? Be quick and bring packs are mutually exclusive. Do you have more responsibility to be quick, indicating a rapid movement, or does your primary responsibility concern the safe passage of the pack train to a forward location? If you decide (assume) it is the latter, then your rapidity is based upon the best speed of the packs, even less because you must cover their movement and that may entail delays longer then the speed of the packs transit.
There is a reason that message is enshrined at West Point, as an object lesson of what not to do. I had that impression as a young officer when I first saw it there. I have had no reason to change my mind about it since.
Think about this Benteen shows up three or more hours after the message is sent and says to Custer. Here I am. To which Custer replies What in hell are you doing here? Here is not where I wanted you. There is where I wanted you. And the conversation continues. You said Come on. Cooke where the hell are you. Can anyone honestly say that exchange "could not" have taken place, "based exclusively" on the words contained in that message?
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 17, 2013 11:55:57 GMT -6
Hi Chuck and a good day to you sir.
Richard, that’s why I said really disobeyed orders, if Reno or Benteen for that matter really disobeyed orders then wouldn’t the RCOI have found men guilty, as far as I know no one was charged with anything after the inquiry.
Hello Fuchs, I agree with you; I myself have done no military training, (apart from six months in the Army Cadets in 1972) so there are times when I just like to sit back and let the ex-Military boys take over, and when they are done I enjoy reading the end results, there are a number of ex-Military men on this board, Chuck, Dan, Fred, William and AZ, even Richard did a stint in the Éire Militia, so I will give them the chair concerning Jags questions, because they can give better answers then I can on things of this nature.
Ian.
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Post by benteen on May 17, 2013 14:18:37 GMT -6
Fuchs,
I think the main problem with trying to figure out what was in Custers head when the order was sent to Benteen is that we dont know what Custers orders were. All we have is what Cooke wrote. And what he wrote , to be polite, made no sense what so ever.
Be Well Dan
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Post by fuchs on May 17, 2013 14:35:50 GMT -6
Fuchs, I think the main problem with trying to figure out what was in Custers head when the order was sent to Benteen is that we dont know what Custers orders were. All we have is what Cooke wrote. And what he wrote , to be polite, made no sense what so ever. Be Well Dan Okay, I get it that is was about as badly formulated as a military order can be. But nonsensical? What if it indeed was meant to indicate to bring up the packs as fast as possible? What would rule out my speculation that Custer might have expected a sharp, short initial fight, over to quickly for Benteen to influence it anyway, so he should at least make sure the pack train closes up as fast as possible? How long did it take on the Washita from the end of the initial fight until the warriors from the other camps showed up in force?
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jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
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Post by jag on May 17, 2013 14:50:40 GMT -6
Thanks to one and all for replying.
Well it seems the fight has been taken to olde jag here instead of answering the questions, its a fight for parsing the words in the message sent back, after all what else could there have been?
One supposes that I was wrong, please say that again jag, I WAS WRONG. Yeah, that bastard doesn't know is arse from a hole in the ground and admitted to it, now go blow your nose jag at someone else because we're tired of hearing it.
At least I'm not as big an Ahole as some, not many, just a privileged few and mostly in government anyway, who wont admit that. This when I made that 'come on' statement and parsed if far beyond the pleasurable ears that take issue with two words and not address the rest.
Dammit, there I go off on some damn tangent because of little buggers like this taken more of a hard look at than the overall questions I did ask. Drives me batty.
I guess one does suppose that the whole message, you know, 'come on. big village. be quick. bring pacs shouldn't be taken to mean anything but that, could be, how the hell does anyone know if they don't try. It's kind of like that Fuchs thing about village size, number of warriors and parsing words over what they hell all that meant.
Question. Should be no doubt about this small one without giving thought about what might be behind the questioners question as some dumb a$$ed thing they don't want to admit to and then have some idiotic solution shoveled down their throat by old jag here. Even when I said I wouldn't do that and promised the same to Fred. So old jag must be getting at something that's wrong, so we'll take this one to the bar and see if he'll drink it.
All taken together, as one statement (lets try parsing them all at one time), this one, 'come on. big village. be quick, bring pacs... Did Benteen know from these words that the attack was on, that it had been made before he ever recieved that note? And if he didn't, why not? You wanna talk about that damn note, do it. It hasn't solved anything, and it still wont no matter how many 'I do's', head nods or knee jerk reactions you get out of someone.
Started out fine. But there had to be some dumb reason I was doing all of that. Nope not one iota. Just asking question after question to see how far it would go before someone took small issue with something I said and make it personal. And that should have been self evident when I let one and all answer to their hearts content without comment from me. I had no interest or intent on making comment on others posts whether I thought them right or wrong and didn't. And I still wont.
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Post by benteen on May 17, 2013 15:20:46 GMT -6
But nonsensical? What if it indeed was meant to indicate to bring up the packs as fast as possible? What would rule out my speculation that Custer might have expected a sharp, short initial fight, over to quickly for Benteen to influence it anyway, so he should at least make sure the pack train closes up as fast as possible? quote] Fuchs, I say it made no sense because you cant be quick and drag along 100 mules at the same time. My point was we dont know what Custers orders were, just what Lt Cooke wrote. Could he have meant as you believe that he wanted the packs up as quickly as posible, sure he could have. But there are theories that whatever plan Custer had he was counting on Benteens arrival at a certain time. There is no way Custer could count on the arrival of 100 mules in any set time. It would mean he wasnt counting on Benteen to get there before he attacked, or whatever he planned to do against this masive objective. As for thinking it would be a short quick fight......He was right, it was. Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on May 17, 2013 15:33:24 GMT -6
Hi Dan Benteen did this and I believe his decission saved the rest of the regiment.What action did Benteen take to aquaint himself with the situation so as to make the decision to halt his battalion. Richard, I honestly dont know what you mean by your question. What more did Benteen need to know to aquaint himself with the situation, other than being there and seeing first hand what the situation was. Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on May 17, 2013 16:30:38 GMT -6
Hi Ian Richard, that’s why I said really disobeyed orders, if Reno or Benteen for that matter really disobeyed orders then wouldn’t the RCOI have found men guilty, as far as I know no one was charged with anything after the inquiry. Really disobeyed orders?There are no degrees of disobeying orders.
The inquiry was at Reno's request and only ruled on his conduct. A big can of worms here which has never been discussed.
even Richard did a stint in the Éire Militia, Yes my friend true but also in the regulars for 4 years but not as a coy clerk as DC&CO would have you believe.Military cartography and mortars being my forte. Regards
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Post by wild on May 17, 2013 16:47:51 GMT -6
Hi Dan I honestly dont know what you mean by your question. What more did Benteen need to know to aquaint himself with the situation, other than being there and seeing first hand what the situation was.He needed to know Custer's situation. What the board officers have avoided telling us is that command and control is a two way street. The recipient of an order is obliged to report mission accomplished. How would that sound from Benteen? All forward movement halted until further notice'Joined up with defeated unit.Reserve ammo and 330 troops[approx.]will not be available for attack. Regards
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Post by benteen on May 17, 2013 16:48:13 GMT -6
Richard, Not to get away from the LBH , but as you were in mortars, when I watched "Saving Pvt Ryan" Capt Miller and Pvt Ryan were banging mortars on a rock and throwing them, can you actualy do that.
Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on May 17, 2013 17:05:15 GMT -6
Dan If a round was being fired from a tube there was a shot gun cartridge in the base of the bomb; this hit a firing pin in the base of the tube as the bomb was droped into it and depending on the range explode a number of cartridges in the fin assemblage.The resultant gas propelled the bomb upwards and this upward momentum fused the bomb. Maybe bashing the base of the bomb off a rock fused it but I would not recommend it.
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Post by mac on May 18, 2013 4:50:05 GMT -6
Happy to defer to all those, and there are plenty, with more military training and knowledge BUT: When Benteen arrives at the Reno position he has seen, by his estimate I recall, about 900 warriors kicking the butts of the cavalry. He comes across Reno and says "Where is Custer". In my view he is following orders and attempting to report to Custer. No one knows where Custer is!! If he rides into the 900 warriors looking for Custer leaving Reno in disarray would he be meeting the expectation of his commanders? Surely not! We would be saying what was Benteen thinking blindly going of into the jaws of the enemy looking for Custer. Anytime I have discussed this with qualified people, admittedly not in the 1870's, I have been told two things. Orders must be carried out in detail to the best of your ability. If you change your action for the prevailing circumstance you better be able to support that decision completely. The best way is to have actually achieved sucess. I lean to the view that Benteen satisfied these requirements and was perhaps the levelest head present on the occassion.
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Post by wild on May 18, 2013 4:59:02 GMT -6
Further The fact that Benteen left his post without orders and at a time when Reno was not present should be taken into account when judging his attitude to Custer's order. From the time he met Kanipe to the time he retreated from Weir point he, as our late lamented comrade Geordie posted.sleeped walked through an unfolding disaster. Montrose posted Benteen in his advance to Weir Point set the command up to be defeated in detail. His conduct was to say the least ambiguous.
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