Benteens orders

[Gumby]

I agree with Mike about the disobedience of orders argument against Benteen. He had the option of waiting for the pack train at Reno's location. It was as good as any other. The bring packs order can't be shunted aside because it is inconvenient. If Custer didn't want them then he shouldn't have asked for them. And Cooke really shouldn't have put the emphasis on bringing the packs.

I believe that Benteen threw in the argument that he believed that Custer had probably been killed by the time Martin reached him to end any such argument against him. Very clever because nobody can prove that he wasn't dead. We even have some today that believe Custer was killed at MTC and carried to LSH. Either way, I don't believe Benteen disobeyed orders. He simply interpreted the vague & contradictory orders based on the information he had available at the time.

I used the Ryan argument as just one example of the mutual distaste between Custer and Benteen. There are others. Benteen to make the leap to hatred until years after Custer was killed.

[michigander]

I believe that Benteen threw in the argument that he believed that Custer had probably been killed by the time Martin reached him to end any such argument against him.
There was the sound of fire, when he reached the Reno hill and 200 men more than Custer. I think too, however that Benteen didn't wanted to disobey orders intentionally. He thought probably that Custer and his men could have manage the battle. Was him too a victim of the Custer's luck idea?
The distaste was public only for Benteen: he never lost an occasion to dismiss his commander, while Custer in reports always praise him for his braveness and professionality - see Washita and other reports.

[jag]

wild made comment on this yesterday. I thought it relevant enough to re-post it here.

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Re: How many warriors were at LBH?
« Reply #416 Yesterday at 3:11am »

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There are those who continually say the Cooke note says "Come quick." It says "Be quick." People say it means the same thing. It does not, and they know it. That's proven by the insistent use of 'come'. If it meant the same thing, they'd use 'be.' They know it doesn't, and want people to think Benteen was told to come to Custer. He was not.
Time out
This hoary old perennial has all the attributes of the common daisy.
Ya just cannot get rid of it.Well that is until DC himself came up with the counter measure in that he described the message as an "exhortation".
Now back to counting moccasins

============================================

I didn't have time to address this as I wanted to. So....

I think to fully understand this we really need someone schooled in the fine art of military tactics. And the first question I'd ask them is this:

When one looks at the entire battlefield, Reno's, Custer's and all those familiar terrain marks between, what it looked like was an attempted attack on the southern flank of the village and another attack on the northern flank of the village. Would this basic premise be true?

You up for this QC, Fred or any other military person so persuaded to answer the questions I or others might want to ask concerning Benteen's orders?

[quincannon]

JAG Were someone to plot out movements on a map, and assuming that I had never heard of LBH, Custer and the rest, and where I asked to tell this person what type of maneuver I thought was being attempted I would answer:

Reno was making a holding attack in the south, and Custer was attempting to envelop the eastern flank and place his main force in the enemies rear. Assuming that map showed a movement to Ford B, and a subsequent movement north, it would suggest to me that Custer initially thought that "rear" was in the vicinity of Ford B, and he discovered that it was not, but rather further north. That is the story told only by lines on a map. Nothing else.

Military orders must be complete, clear, and consise. If the Cooke note to Benteen could be categorized as such, there would be no need to argue, theorize, translate, or otherwise discuss this matter for the last 130 odd years.

[benteen]

[quote author=quincannon board=basics thread=914 post=89073 time=1368736956

Military orders must be complete, clear, and consise. If the Cooke note to Benteen could be categorized as such, there would be no need to argue, theorize, translate, or otherwise discuss this matter for the last 130 odd years.[/quote]

Colonel,

That is my thought as well. Although Cooke was a fine Officer I think as Colonel Montrose would say he "Screwed the Pooch" on this one. If Custer wanted anything besides Benteen it would be just the ammo. Cookes note was almost an oxymoron, you cant be quick and drag 100 orniry mules with you. But he said" bring packs not once but twice" add to that Sgt Knipe with a message to the packs (Or at least he said he did) plus his statement "Hurra boys we got em" Then Martini saying the Indians were "skeddadling" and I think it is perfectly reasonable for Benteen to have thought that 8 Companies of US Cavalry had successfully charged through an Indian village and Custer wanted the packs up to persue them

Be Well
Dan

[jag]

May 16, 2013 14:42:36 GMT -6 quincannon said:

JAG Were someone to plot out movements on a map, and assuming that I had never heard of LBH, Custer and the rest, and where I asked to tell this person what type of maneuver I thought was being attempted I would answer:

Reno was making a holding attack in the south, and Custer was attempting to envelop the eastern flank and place his main force in the enemies rear. Assuming that map showed a movement to Ford B, and a subsequent movement north, it would suggest to me that Custer initially thought that "rear" was in the vicinity of Ford B, and he discovered that it was not, but rather further north. That is the story told only by lines on a map. Nothing else.

Military orders must be complete, clear, and consise. If the Cooke note to Benteen could be categorized as such, there would be no need to argue, theorize, translate, or otherwise discuss this matter for the last 130 odd years.

QC
Thanks. Wasn't sure how this would go. And no, there is no personal ulterior purpose or motive for asking the questions I do other than looking at this in a... well more simpler manner than heretofore has been done. And this more from a military perspective without all the gall, glitz, and slam that has came with it before.

When Custer ordered the overnight - early morning march in the late evening of the 24th, what advantage could he have been thinking (tactics wise) that called for such an action? This knowing from his scouts that they couldn't cross the divide before daylight and be discovered. OR making that maneuver - basically what would be considered a forced march, knowing if they did hold up somewhere considered safe, that they would have been discovered anyway. Either way Custer knew they were going to be discovered no matter what they did by advancing, this by what his own scouts told him. He was discovered, we know that. So too did his scouts, so I don't think he was surprised when he was told that they had been discovered. What I'm getting at here is that march looked intentional, a tactic to gain some kind of advantage. What could that have been other than gaining a few miniscule miles on his foe? After all it took him well into the 2 hour range to cover the 12 mile distance from the divide to the river. Two hours that the squaws could have taken down the lodges in a half hour - and then been an hour and a half or more away, spread all over the place, from where Custer found them. In other words, I don't see it as a mile for mile trade off - getting closer, when they did what they did.

This night march, was it something more than this, tactics wise?

[quincannon]

JAG: All good tactical approaches to a problem are simple and straightforward. Execution of the simple and straightforward is hard enough. Throwing crap into the game by complicating maneuver, makes them all the more hard.

If you're asking my personal opinion of a night march on the 24th into the 25th, I think it was a bad idea. The time to make that march was after sundown on the 25th into the morning of the 26th, even if you had to walk and lead your horses all the way. The time, again my opinion, to launch the attack would be an hour after dawn on the 26th, most probably just after the hostiles had breakfast and were preparing to move, if move was their intention. I think discovery late on the 24th and during the daylight hours of the 25th was a risk worth taking. That does not mean I would not have scouts out, and probing though.

None of this addresses mind sets and pre-conception. It was not meant to. Only tactics.

Dan: All things done in great haste, leave something to be desired.

If an order does not contain Who-What-When-Where-Why-How, it ceases to be an order and falls into the category of jibberish. So yes the message from Cooke was a form of fornication with a member of the canine world. Had the message contained all the essentials, you could have sent it via a baboon and it would still be easily understood as to intent and further actions required.

[wild]

Who- You Benteen
What- Come on,be quick,bring packs
When- Now
Where- To me
Why- we are engaged
How You're a Colonel figure it yourself

The message comes from Custer,not Reno but Benteen reports his command to Reno.A defeated Reno mind.
What is the commanders intention.This is the over riding consideration by which Benteen must be guided.
So for some here Come on, be quick, bring packsequates to stop and join routed unit.
In our Ford D discussion the board military have Custer knowingthat Benteen is on his way regardless of Reno's condition.
Further Benteen is not at liberty to relinquish command of his battalion.This is what he does when he meets Reno.
Benteen does not even bother to send a rider to report his action to Custer.A little insurance to cover the suggested confusion?Maybe just maybe his CO might have a plan depending on his arrival?

[jag]

May 16, 2013 16:13:31 GMT -6 quincannon said:

JAG: All good tactical approaches to a problem are simple and straightforward. Execution of the simple and straightforward is hard enough. Throwing crap into the game by complicating maneuver, makes them all the more hard.

If you're asking my personal opinion of a night march on the 24th into the 25th, I think it was a bad idea. The time to make that march was after sundown on the 25th into the morning of the 26th, even if you had to walk and lead your horses all the way. The time, again my opinion, to launch the attack would be an hour after dawn on the 26th, most probably just after the hostiles had breakfast and were preparing to move, if move was their intention. I think discovery late on the 24th and during the daylight hours of the 25th was a risk worth taking. That does not mean I would not have scouts out, and probing though.

None of this addresses mind sets and pre-conception. It was not meant to. Only tactics.

Dan: All things done in great haste, leave something to be desired.

If an order does not contain Who-What-When-Where-Why-How, it ceases to be an order and falls into the category of jibberish. So yes the message from Cooke was a form of fornication with a member of the canine world. Had the message contained all the essentials, you could have sent it via a baboon and it would still be easily understood as to intent and further actions required.

QC

I like your approach to this. Keep it that way. I'm not asking you to dig into the mind of Custer, lord knows what he was thinking. But as a military man who's commanded a great number of troops, well I assume that, may be wrong, don't know, but to get to a Colonel's grade you had to have led some troops somewhere at some time. And no, I'm not asking you to provide evidence of any of that. To much time wasted on that maneuver alone would make for an interesting personal exchange were we to meet for a brew or two, but not here.

Simple and straightforward is what I'm looking for here. Nothing fancy, no talk like on Custer's battlefield where that company went here or there, was ordered verbatim etc... where we don't know.

But I do think we've left something behind here. Think about this. Custer took off about the time the moon set that evening. The moon wouldn't rise until about 8 am on the 25th. Even if it had been in the sky that night, which it wasn't, its light would have been about 7% of its total light on a full moon night. Benteen himself said that it was so pitch black that he had to follow the clanking of a bell on one of the pack animals. Custer forced marched that regiment, there's no other conclusion. And to do that he fatigued the men and the horses in the attempt, this right before he would have to go into battle the next day.

There was those reports about who moved the regiment forward and all that, of course Custer's one or two trips to the Nest to see what could have been seen with just one try, so I don't buy the 2nd trip. Doesn't make sense.

Varnum also knew the column had been discovered. He witnessed that himself and reported it to the court. Even Herendeen on that move that wasn't supposed to have moved from where they had coffee, I doubt that Girard story, caught an Indian spying on the moving column that morning. All of this would have been reported to Custer immediately. So I have no doubt Custer would have had plans of some kind to deal with the notion of attacking when they were discovered.

Custer has always been made the fool here for what he appeared to do after. But something here doesn't match that incompetence.

Benteen said at the coi that from Wallace's time he departed the regiment about the time Wallace said they crossed the divide. He might have said something somewhere else, but I like this one because there's a certain match to the miles. The officers call according to this rcoi Benteen/Wallace version would have been made on the LBH river side of the divide - still on the divide, but not so far as to have been where the stream came in there.

Custer comes down from the divide and gives Benteen his oblique orders there, some like a mile or more later, that's fine, go for it, still, Custers first response to the discovery of his regiment was to give Benteen those orders. What possible advantage would he have gained to have given those orders then? Sure Benteen said they were senseless, but were they? They couldn't have been senseless, I don't buy that, nor do I buy the line that he was supposed to "feel to his left" as suggested by Terry, that all went out the window when Custer came within fighting distance / discovery distance of those Indians. What possible tactical advantage was he working for?

[quincannon]

JAG: The short answer on Benteen is I don't know. I believe Custer was concerned about that area, but to what extent I don't believe anyone will ever know, short of an inquiry in the after life. I'll make a note to ask him, because I believe that not sending him out there would be a risk I would be prepared to take. There would be other, more simple ways of dealing with the problem, choice of attacking formation, and proper allocation of resources being only one. As to feeling to the left. If Custer wins nobody would give a damn who, what or where he felt. If he loses, who cares? One more charge against him would not matter much, would it?

I also would not be to hung up on discovery. A mindset like that could very well cause you to do something very hasty and ill advised. In addition I think it absolutely preposterous to believe that you could move a regimental sized unit through disputed territory and not consider all the way along your journey that it is highly probable that you will be detected. Looking at it from the hostiles point of view, they confronted Crook a week before, yet they did not suspect there would be more, or that Crook would come back again. That is one of the great imponderables here. It is almost like they did not care. What would have happened if Custer attacked with three thousand instead of a measly six hundred? The lack of security, even on the part of a tribal societies, with no centralized direction baffles me. Custer was very lucky, and the hostiles quite inept in this particular area.

Night marches over difficult and unknown terrain are a pain in the ass. They are taxing, They are tiring, and one hell of a lot can go wrong. Are they worth the risk? In this instance I believe so, as long as the 24 hours before you made the march are spent profitably by doing a through reconnaissance, by stealth. If Custer had rested his troops and mounts from late on the 24th to the late afternoon of the 25th, I believe he would be in good shape for an hour after dawn attack on the 26th.

I have never plotted all this on a map. Probably should, but I think it reasonable

[fred]

Jag—

I am doing this from memory, without consulting either my notes or this new book, so I may be a little off on some things…. If it matters to you, I will go back and come up with my definitive conclusions.

Custer’s original idea—and I think I have support for this—was to cross the divide by midnight of the 24th or shortly thereafter. He would then hole-up during the 25th and launch a pre-dawn attack on the 26th. At some point—either just prior to the 11 PM departure or just before Custer decided to pull into Halt One, the Crows and Herendeen told him he could never cross the divide much before light in the morning of the 25th. Even after viewing things from the Crow’s Nest, he had no intention of attacking that day—the 25th—but was still intent on hiding out during the day and attacking the following morning. That way there would be some assurance of Terry acting as the blocking force. Again, if I am not mistaken, there was no plan for Terry to move up the LBH valley, just to remain as the blocking force—a true anvil in other words.

A series of botch-ups occurred putting the kibosh on all this. The first was the sighting of two Indians—one of them apparently a boy—the second, the sighting of seven more; the third, the sighting of the troops’ campfire smoke at Halt One. Still, with doubt as to the actual location of the village—apparently, Custer was the only one who doubted its location!—he intended to stick to his plan. Then came the Curtiss pack incident; and the killer, the Herendeen and Boyer discovery of brand-spanking-new pony tracks within shouting distance of the command. These latter two incidents—plus the constant howling of the Crow scouts to attack—convinced Custer of the need for immediate action: they had been discovered; their presence would be reported; and all would scatter if immediate action were not taken.

Gray—and of course, you, therefore—was incorrect about a two-hour jaunt down Reno Creek. There are ample sources attesting to the contrary and absolutely no sources supporting Gray’s contention. From the top of the divide to the LBH river is 11.81 miles and regardless of where you believe the lone tepee was situated, Reno received his attack orders less than two miles from the river. (Gray circumvented this whole lone tepee – attack order business by claiming there was a “lead-out” order first, then an attack order shortly thereafter. Again, there is absolutely no support for such a claim and some author who couldn’t figure out the specifics of faulty distance and time estimates by participants first contrived it.)

From this point on, we have no idea of what Custer was thinking, but there are some actions that give us clues. First of all, there was the promise of “support,” and there are several accounts of men hearing this promise. Traditionally, that support would be in the form of a follow-up or follow-through attack, and the presence of Cooke—and possibly Keogh—near Ford A, would be reasonable confirmation that was Custer’s plan.

Tactically, anyone looking at this from a personality-neutral stance would recognize that surprise was paramount and that the only way to achieve a modicum of surprise was by speed. Despite the fears of being seen at the divide, there was absolutely no indication – at this point—that surprise had been compromised. The Gerard and Herendeen reports—coming on the heels of the Gerard, Hare, Herendeen, Davern, and Half Yellow Face sightings—changed things, and Cooke’s report back to Custer—plus the McIlhargey and Mitchell messages, coming one right after the other—convinced Custer that he had now lost that surprise element, and he turned sharply to the right, mounting the bluffs and leaving Reno to his own devices.

I am sure Custer believed Reno could handle himself—let’s not forget the comments Custer made to Varnum regarding the Reno scout and the name Reno could have made for himself had he attacked those “small” Rosebud villages with six companies of cavalry—so his turn from one of direct support to… whatever… was meaningless to GAC. From this point on it was simply a matter of going far enough downstream to get beyond the refugees. An attack there, decimating defenseless women, children, and the elderly, would be devastating. Conceptually, not bad in the way of a tactical design.

The debate is within the make-up of events that tinkered with that design.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[jag]

Thanks to both Fred and QC. (Fred we all know we disagree, I'm desperately trying not to go that direction and would rather not as is evidenced below. If you could please refrain your take on my views, and I'll kindly try to do the same. Much appreciated and thanks).

Fast forwarding here a bit. We've all heard those stories about Reno's battalion was meant to quote "fix the enemy". Going on that premise first. Custer doesn't recall Benteen at the time he sends Reno in. He waits until after he's seen what he's up against. Now I'm not going to go against the grain here and rub someone, anyone the wrong way because I've got my own ideas about this, but I'll stick with the current version of this and go on to say that Custer didn't do anything with Benteen for well over 2 hours (Benteen said it would've taken 1 3/4ths to 2 hours after he departed for Custer to have arrived at the tepee 11 miles away, I'm not going against this no matter what anyone says, sorry, but I'm not, if you want to say something different be my guest, its all about tactics not timing), not until after he mounted the heights. He just let him keep going on that mission as Custer had ordered him to do. That's yet another reason I don't buy the idea that those orders given to Benteen was senseless. If they had been, then by the time Custer and Reno separated, why would Custer not have recalled him if they were senseless? Custer wasn't that daft. He might have been a lot of things that day, but daft, nope. Wouldn't you say that what had become of Benteen's mission placed him in more of a reserve position after Reno and Custer departed? And I don't know any commander who took to those heights who wouldn't have looked for those troops in his rear, if for nothing else but to make sure they weren't under attack. So before he ever sent back couriers he knew their location and proximity to where the battle would take place.

Postulating a scenario here... #1

If Reno had been sent into "fix the enemy" and Benteen was to all intents and purposes 'a reserve'. What orders should Custer have given Benteen after witnessing what he observed from the heights when Custer had every intention of continuing on downstream? Benteen, come on, big village, be quick, bring pacs, ps bring pacs? Would it have mattered where Benteen "pitched in" to that battle based upon the current condition of Reno, who hadn't fired a shot yet (near enough to not know the outcome anyway), and Custer who hadn't fired a shot yet. Yet there it is as big as you please. "be quick". That one little phrase that wild keeps coming back with that says there was something urgent here. The heavy inference here being dust off those chaps and get the lead out. Add this with that little (left out of his orders) teaser Benteen stated at the coi where he said that he expected Custer to come back to him (not the other way around as everyone and his donkey keeps trying to drive home -Benteen says - NOT! And I like that a lot.), and there seems to be a gathering of force somewhere that seemed to be a predetermined part of his orders before Benteen ever left Custer. So lets roll with that. If Custer was expected to come back to Benteen, where do you think that would have been? And operating on this assumption what tactical advantage would this have given him against swarming leaderless Indians? This of course with Reno still "fixing the Indians".

PS. Fred, I don't mean to imply not to add your timing efforts to this analysis. By all means if you feel you need to, its fine by me, might help, who knows? I'd rather have your own command abilities and experience at work here,and for that reason if you'll note I've placed Custer atop the bluffs at rather an arbitrary point viewing the village, yours will do fine, I don't care. I've placed Benteen back at what might be considered a 'reserve' position and Reno advancing to attack or just getting to his SL, the pack train also being in his rear. They're rather arbitrarily stated so as to avoid collision on minor points of road rage. The tactical analysis of this is what I'm most interested in.

[wild]

An attack there, decimating defenseless women, children, and the elderly, would be devastating. Conceptually, not bad in the way of a tactical design.
You can design if you have knowledge of the terrain,if you have time,if you have knowledge of enemy dispositions.
Custer was bereft of the makings of anything resembling tactical "design".
Custer controlled nothing other than his pathetically understrength unit and this suggested "design" called for him to dissipate even that?
Look at how Custer reacted to being strategically discovered and yet the probability of being tactically discovered [as he was]forms no part of the suggested design;calling as it does for a two hour jaunt along the front of a zillion warriors.
One can only conclude that the Custer who arrived at Ford D was blind, delusional and stark raving mad.

[Yan Taylor]

Hi Richard, I don’t know about you but imagine when Benteen arrived on Reno Hill and saw the place crawling with Indians, and then he asks for a volunteer to try and reach Custer and tell him what the score was, I bet that would have gone down well with his men, operation suicide.

Hello Jag, the placement of the Regiment (Reno ‘’fix the enemy’’ Custer ‘’main attack’’ & Benteen ‘’reserve’’) dose sound like a good military tactic, a three unit fight with Reno keeping the Warriors fixed to his front and Custer with the main body striking into the side or rear causing confusion in the minds of Indians plus having a mobile reserve in Benteen is a classic manoeuvre.

If they pulled off this manoeuvre then this could divide the warriors, and Benteen could commit to the attack by driving up through the valley and both he and Reno could unite and continue the advance against a disorganised village.

So in essence this was a sound tactic, the only flaw was Benteen being too far away, and given the fact that he could have run into trouble himself then this would take him out of any reserve mode.

I can see were you are all going with the debate over night marches and the village getting wind of the Troops and moving, but for all we know Custer and his scouts had only scant info on were the village actually was located, they had no idea of its size and for all they know it could of started to move on the 24th, I agree over the points Fred makes about the Regiment being spotted, the reports of Indians in the vicinity and losing a bread box etc. etc. would have given Custer cause for concern, so he had to make a choice (given the fact that he does not know what we know now) and looking at what he may have gathered about what lay up ahead makes him sound like a man who wants to get the job done quick and act before the village could react.

Ian.

[mac]

One important point that is overlooked when we overthink the situation is that Custer, Benteen et al are of the conviction that the NA are in several village circles along the river and will run when they can to avoid the cavalry.
Think this and as many have said keep it simple.
Custer wants to plan an attack later after resting and looking but then decides if he waits they will run away and his opportunity is gone.
Earlier Custer sends Benteen out left as requested by Terry (had a cousin who was a career officer, my sister asked what was the difference between disobeying a request and disobeying an order. His answer was "about 2 years!" . He tells Benteen to "pitch in" if he finds any NA.
So off goes Benteen, finds nothing and next he gets a note from Custer telling him to "Come on" because there is just one "Big Village" so drop what your doing and "Be quick" but don't do so without "bring Packs". Benteen does this! Remember he doesn't know anything other than that NA always run and that the messengers say that is what is happening!
There is no way that note says drop everything and come as fast as you can to engage a hostile enemy force. And certainly nothing from the messengers to suggest that intent, in fact just the opposite, the NA are doing what they always do and are on the run.
How can we suggest any more subtle or sinister intents by Benteen? Why would we think he is trying to get Custer and his men killed? Benteen probably thinks the enemy are on the run and Custer wants him to come up with the packs as a priority to join in the action which Benteen again probably thinks will be a mop up.
I really think we get carried away with deep analysis because we know what happens. They don't! They are just doing what they do in their working day and in the past it usually turns out fine.
Cheers