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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 21, 2022 9:39:37 GMT -6
I have never really took a real interest in time lines, I think that a lot of info was took from accounts to make them work and in Freds case, time spent on the field doing measuring and timings, so I know he put in the hours. I don't know if Gray did this, but if I want to use a time line it would probably be Freds. So accounts used soldiers noting watch times but I am sure that they used different times like "St Pauls time" which would make the watches out of sync, check this out linkIan
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Post by herosrest on Dec 21, 2022 10:30:49 GMT -6
I have never really took a real interest in time lines, I think that a lot of info was took from accounts to make them work and in Freds case, time spent on the field doing measuring and timings, so I know he put in the hours. I don't know if Gray did this, but if I want to use a time line it would probably be Freds. So accounts used soldiers noting watch times but I am sure that they used different times like "St Pauls time" which would make the watches out of sync, check this out linkIan One of the misnomers which has applied to Little Bighorn like a limpet is 'timing' and the consequences of studying it which is a porcelaine knot (excuse the pun). A fundemental difficulty with 'time of the place' attached itself to proceedings on 30/31 May 1876, in Davis Ck near Medora, SD. Clearly reported amongst a trove of trestle designs included to Lt. Edward Maguire's report of the expedition, the engineering officer's wagon was lost from a bridge and the chronometers it carried were disrupted. This was not immediately realised since astronomical observation was not possible during snowstorms. 7 places on 7th Cav's route. Marching with Custer A Day to Day Evaluation of the Uses, Abuses and Conditions of the horses on the ill-fated Expedition of 1876 by Col. Elwood Nye. A consequence of this was that regardless whatever actual time was kept, Walter M. Camp believed it was St. Paul railway time, that time was wildly imprecise and deterioratating until at least arrival to the Far West. There in lies a difficulty since it appears the two instruments, or possibly one of them, was transferred to the steamer and used by Sgt. Becker to chart the journey up the Bighorn river. They have serial numbers, you see. Terry's column did not hsve accurate time and try as anyone might during the subsequent almost century and a half headed into the new visitor center opening in2026, there was no precise time in 1876 on the Far West, when Terry formulated his plan of action. We know that 7th Cavalry ergo Terry, did NOT synchronize watches on 21st June, 1876. That was odd when I learnt of it and took decades to get to the bottom of. Little Bighorn timing is subjective and not ever specific. Do we know what happened at 4:20pm, 25th June 1876, by Godfrey's watch? We do. Benteen ordered his battalion to put their saddles back on their mounts.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 21, 2022 10:46:21 GMT -6
If there is someone, somewhere, who would like specific time and distance data giving precisely where 7th Cavalry were at a given time and location, before charging into battle, that information is noted HERE at the penultimate paragraph of information handed to Clement A. Lounsberry, by Capt. E. W. Smith, 18th Infantry AAJG. at Bismarck on the night of 5th July, 1876; when Far West docked. A little footnote to history from Mark Kellogg's boss.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 21, 2022 11:28:03 GMT -6
Worry knot. I haven't lost track of Weir's duration or period, observing what was to be observed north of the ground named for epithet. I link Google maps terrain around Busby and the Davis Ck.'s for purpose of assessing Elwood's assessment of distances covered on 25th June 1876, by Custer;s regiment. Which whateverway I prick this pin into the donkey, 7th Cavalry covered 10 miles from Busby Camp to Crow's Nest. It isn't really worth worrying about the divide with what became Reno Ck. since no-one really knew where it was which tends to abuse and it is irrelevant to modern study. So, 28 miles to Busby on the 24th. Then 10 miles to Crow's Nest. That is 38 miles. Therefore about noon of 25th June. 7th Cavalry were 10 miles beyond Crows Nest and 3 miles from Ford A. About noon, 25th June 1876, 7th Cavalry were just short of three miles from Ford A. How kool is that! You can measure for yourself, link - right click on the map. Measure distance. Before realising how long Weir spent on his peak, it is wise to decide when he arrived there which is the beautiful can of worms that is Fred Benteen. Weir was commander of 7th Cavalry's 4th Battalion but had been supplanted by Benteen and it did not sit well with Benton. He just carried on battalion commanding and Benteen be damned!
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Post by herosrest on Dec 21, 2022 12:19:55 GMT -6
Noggy, Your quite right, Weir would have been cautious, after all there had been Indians up on Sharpshooter rige not long before, and again I think your right about Hare, he would have heard no incoming fire being directed at Weir and so he would have felt a bit more confident about moving along a little quicker. I have a perennial problem which tends to occur whenever I want to make some comment on this board, one which I probably share with many of you, which is, although I've read numerous books about this battle and been a luker on the board for more than 20 years, whenever I want to call up a fact, I find myself having to with get up and go to another room where I keep all my books, and then spend several hours wading through them in search of the answer, by which time I've lost the will to live. So let me ask you all this. How long after Reno arrived at the top of the bluffs, was it before A, Benteen joined him, B, how long did it take them to exchange news and organise some kind of defence, and C, how long after this was it before Weir, and then Hare left to go see what was happening with Custer? My rememberence of the various books I've read is that the time frame for Weir leaving can vary from between 45 mimutes to 1 hour 20 minutes. Of course this is extremly relevent to what Weir must have seen once he got to Weir point. There is talk for instance of them seeing what looked like mopping up operations up on Calhoun hill, but I have no sense of whether they saw this when they first arrived, or whether this was shortly before they left. If they did indeed see the end of the action around Calhoun Hill, then it indicates that the Custer fight didn't last very long. Yan, thanks for the offer, yes, I'd appeciate that, thanks Shan Hi, If you look at digging out research as a 'hunt' then you might be able to enjoy it rather than reaching for vein openers...... I never saw a pretty and neatly managed story for the demise of the five companies and HQ, and rather like 2/7 at LZ Albany just companies and horse holders chopped up in detail. That happens very quickly, surprisingly quickly once the enemy has closed to knife fight with their spears and mallets. It may be as Marquis was told, that a holdout hilltop action occured but I don't think Indians would have rushed in until the soldiers had shot away their ammo. What is a little interesting is moving beyond the original accounts and early adaptions of things to the genre which developed from the early 1950's when, Graham, Kuhlman, Dustin before them, were reconstucting perceptions. Moving into 1956 with Don Rickey, gave us this THIS way of it by John Stands in Timber. I am seriously sceptical of much of it but it can be made to work, and is. Unfortunately I see considerably more that truth in this thrust of events and the Cheyenne Way is political and practical. Members of Lame White Man's family were asking for markers for their fallen in 1925, shortly before Godfrey's Burying the Hatchet ceremony at Garryowen and were completely ignored while the unknown soldier ceremony took place. Anyway, at page two of the transcript, JSiT's version of it is: 'The Calhoun soldiers were facing west at the last, and were the last ones to be killed. As you certainly know, the Keogh fight area is not visible from the bluffs and Weir Peak so all that's left is SSL and LSH. You cannot see into the ravine. That leaves LSH and you would certainly see Custer's Battle Flag if it was flying. No missing it.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 21, 2022 12:45:42 GMT -6
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Post by herosrest on Dec 22, 2022 11:48:51 GMT -6
Battle markersNow, there is considerable diffidence with regards events related to Col. Weir disobeying orders on Reno Hill, and it might be considered fair comment that for military, 7th Cavalry seem to have been deeply troubled doing what they were told to do. Whether that is moot is worth contemplation and it turned out when I did the consideration many moons ago, that, things were not black on white and actually deeply muddied by practical misguidance. It began early and after it was detected and criticised publicly then assessment of what went on turned into mush. You simply need to consider this initial document link reporting events on Reno Hill as Reno and Benteen's battalions arrived there - to realise that someone was not telling the truth to senior Officers. Captain Benteen, was not ordered to return. Quote: 'Captain Benteen, who, with three companies, D, H, and K, was some two (2) miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced, but who had been ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to attempt to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reno on the bluffs.' That simply didn't happen so how did Terry gain that impression, or, how has the existing versions of events come to be so inaccurate. Major Reno, was not up to his bottom lip in hordes of Indians at 2:30pm when he arrived on Reno Hill. So, how in the name of Gertrude C. Hesselstein's auntie Beth did Terry gain that impression of events. It's all rather simple to determine, is it not. OK, how long was Weir watching Custer being killed?
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Post by herosrest on Dec 22, 2022 12:13:34 GMT -6
Well, we know from documents carried for Terry, by Capt. Smith to Bismarck on 5th July, 1876; where 7th Cavalry were at about noon of the day of the attack. Whilst the time 'about noon' can be seen a bit wollen, we have interesting testimony about that time and particularly from Wallace who specifically remembered 12:15 (I think - pretty sure i'm right but RCoI isn't to hand). We know therefore that at 12:15, Reno and Custer were about 2.5-3 miles from Ford A and about to get it on. Stay tuned. archive.org/details/earlyhistorynort00loun/page/322/mode/2up Private Thomas O'Neill's letter to General Godfrey about the Little Big Horn, Aug. 17, 1908, in the Francis R. Hagner Collection, Box 1, Manuscript Division, New York Public Library; states as follows: ' In what now seems to have been 10 minutes, the Indians closed in on our left flank, and we were wheeled, so our backs were towards the river. [Note: O'Neill describes the refusal of the left side of the skirmish line as the warriors rode around their left flank.] The Indians now began passing in front of us, we firing at them; I remember some of them fell off their ponies; after they passed down the bottom they turned on our left flank, our horses were brought back in the brush and word was passed, "They are taking the horses!". This seemed to cause considerable confusion, when someone gave the command, "Get to your horses!" I remember Lieut. Varnum was standing over me on the line. The Lieut. called out: "Don't leave the line, men. There are enough of you here to whip the whole Sioux nation!" That brought several men back to the line, myself included, and in a short time we saw the greater part of the command mounted. Lieut. Hodgson called, "What are you going to do, Moylan?" Capt. Moylan said, "We are going to charge them." So everyone thought we were going to charge to the front. So the column rode out by two's or threes; there was not any line formed as the Indians were up quite close this time. The troopers continued on the run towards the river. My horse being shot in the knee, I was left with several others who could not get away. And that is as far as my personal observations went as to the command.That will do for now, as I assemble the matrix relevant to a 10 minute valley skirmish which of course, vitally impinges Weir's later time for making observations to the North.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 22, 2022 12:24:57 GMT -6
Into the timing sequence assessment. W hour is taken as 12:15. link
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 22, 2022 14:28:14 GMT -6
Hi HR, hope you are ready for the weekend! Good to see big Mike D on the screen.
Ian
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Post by herosrest on Dec 23, 2022 4:37:19 GMT -6
Yo. I think it was last year.... maybe the one before, he was over in Blightey giving a talk on styling brush strokes to CAGB or maybe it was EWS but back in the Covid havocs. His tribute to Fred Wagner is up on the Facebook page. CAGB. I have quite a bit of time for him and admire some of his artwork from Austin, but Ford D...... ouch! I'm gonna pop up an assessment which I consider up there with the best ever, about the military fight on 25th June, '76, because it is slightly better done than my own. In a nutshell though, being so good doesn't nail the tail to the little horse. If Custer sent a battalion into the lower fords then he repeated the Washita attack tactics and Benteen and Reno besides a few others covered that up, because Benteen sat back, sent a message to Custer telling him not to be a silly arse attacking a village that size, and Custer then poked him with message carried by Martin. Of course, there was no battleplan and we know this from every Officer who survived with the exceptions of Weir, and Varnum. Enough said. Enjoy the stuffing and what did that poor turkey ever do to you? This is William Torbitt II ( Loved a puzzle, did this guy }: Forget what you know about the Battle of the Little Bighorn! This study is based on the known tactical deployment and horsemanship aspects of the Custer era cavalry; and it will reveal a very untraditional reconstruction. It will not be based on the Hollywood non-military thinking and the many false theories called Custer Myths. It will be based on the horse clues that Walter Camp recorded during his twenty-three years of research with participants who were there. And, as a horseman, this authors fifty years of unraveling their memories.
For the most part the fighting on the Custer Battlefield was a dismounted infantry action. The warriors also fought dismounted except when moving from one action scene to another. They just followed what the army did. When the soldiers dismounted to fight on foot in one place, so did the warriors.
When Curly took Walter Camp over the Custer Battlefield environs in 1908, Camp soon became convinced that some, if not all of Custer's companies, had tried to cross at the Minneconjou Ford, (Ford B) at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee.
On the same hand, Camps contemporary, John Stands In Timber, was convinced that at least some of Custer's soldiers had gone to another set of fords farther to the north. His conviction was formed when his fellow Cheyenne informants guided him over a trail that went northward from Medicine Tail Coulee to a set of fords a considerable distance downstream. If the battalions with Custer were operating as separate military units, than both sources of information could be correct. Did Custer divide his forces Medicine Tail Coulee; and if he did, why?
We know from Walter Camps research that Captain Myles Keoghs First Battalion went to the Ford B area. And after an aborted river crossing they were forced to retreat they then deployed on what is now known as the Finley and Calhoun Hill areas. The Second Battalion, under Captain George Yates, were Strands In Timbers northbound soldiers that attempted to cross at the lower fords. This startling conclusion is based on knowing the correct battalion assignments made on June 25.
For far too long, writers have placed Company L in the wrong battalion! Along with the now identifiable terrain that the two Custer Battalions traveled over, and with the armys regulated rate of march of their horses, we can now create a blueprint of the time, distance and events as they unfolded. Thanks to modern cavalry reenactors, who with great diligence have reconstructed the protocol for the deployment of the Custer era Cavalry, we can now fill in the blanks. This new knowledge gives us far more logical military scenarios.
Within minutes of the departure of John Martin from the Fourth Halt in Medicine Tail Coulee, Custer ordered Yatess Second Battalion, consisting of Companies E, F and L, into motion. Their mission was to circle around to the North, and attack the rear of the encampments on Onion Creek. To do this they would have to cross the river farther downstream. Once across the river, they were to attack the Onion Creek villages from the downstream (north) side. This flanking movement was like the multi-front deployment at the Washita Fight against Black Kettles winter village.
The startling conclusion that the Great Custer divided his forces in the face of a superior number of enemy flies in the face of most Custer researchers. But the simple fact that two separate army units were now in operation cannot be denied, not if both Walter Camps and John Stands In Timbers sources are correct. Having two military units moving in two different directions is the military strategy of a double envelopment, a pincer movement with two separate attack fronts.
This was the original intent of Custer, who may have thought the villages that Varnum had seen were just in the upper valley. Custers earlier departure from the Lower Ash Creek Valley proves that he intended to execute the same style of pincer movement on the opposite downstream side of the villages that Reno had been ordered to attack.
But now, in Medicine Tail Coulee, Custer discovered that there were additional villages much further downstream. If he continued the attack the northern side of the Upper Camps, he would leave warriors from these new villages in his rear. This was not an acceptable military scenario.
If Custer attacked the southern end of the new Onion Creek camps, then their North side would be left open for the possible escape of the lodges. Sending one of the two battalions on an end run northward was a cut and dried plan for any experienced combat officer. What is not apparent is that Custer did not seem to be aware of the size and strength of these downstream villages. Nor did he know of the total failure of his subordinates, Reno and Benteen, either to hold their positions or to come to his aid with reinforcements. Custer now needed Benteens reserve Fourth Battalion to replace the Second Battalion which was on its way north to attack these newly discovered encampments. Two previous orders had already been sent to Benteen to come to Custer's advanced front in Medicine Tail Coulee.
Merry Crimbo........... link
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Post by herosrest on Dec 23, 2022 5:44:24 GMT -6
Here's stuff on the Welch Dakota Papers site pertinent to the 1876 Plains campaigns and neatly carrying Reno's battle report link, from which I quote the following: 'I assumed command of the C’s assigned to me without any definite orders, moved forward with the rest of the column & well to its left. I saw Benteen moving further to the left & as they passed, he told me he had orders to move well to the left and sweep everything before him. I did not see him again until about 2.30 PM. The command moved down the creek towards with Little Big Horn valley, Custer with five Co’s on the right bank, myself & three Co’s on the left bank, and Benteen further to the left & out of sight. As we approached a deserted village in which was standing one tepee about 11 AM Custer motioned me to cross to him, which I did and moved nearer to his column until about 12.30 AM, when Lt. Cooke, Adj, came to me & said the village was only two miles ahead & running away; “to move forward at as rapid gait as I thought prudent & to charge afterwards, & that the whole outfit would support me.” I think those were his exact words.' We have a corroboration of the information passed to Clement A. Lounsberry in Bismarck, by Terry's ADC Capt. Smith. This offers a 12:30pm timing for Reno with the village only two miles ahead & running away. The information allows for straightforward assessments of travel times over known distances down Reno Ck, and given Reno's meeting with Benteen about 2:30pm would mean two hours elapsed until Reno and Benteen united at the RBDS. Anyone one who finds that hard swallow should chew a little harder. 12:15 to 12:30 introduces a problem I wish to get into briefly since a galloping horse with rider will be four miles further during 15 minutes where a pedestrian might just have made the mile at brusque walk. Assessments are cursed by the 'about' expression of times which introduces difficulties with precision that cannot be resolved since let's say 4 (four) succesive events so reported, can accumulate a discrepency in the range of 1-2 hours giving 'about', values of 15-30 minutes. Tidy and accurate precision with events at Little Bighorn is impossible and actually a pipedream fantasy which has occupied way to many modern minds in the idea that timing can solve the social difficulties inherent to the principal issue whether or not Custer repeated his tactics at Washita. It would have been entirely reasonable that he did and more likely so than results from flipping a coin. However, virtually all accounts and testimony which we have indicate not and that Custer had no battle plan and was expected to support Reno from the rear. The 12:30 timing is good, with Reno's report corroborated through the chain of command (Terry) and bereft of time of the place complications and sagacity. There was 7th Cavalry time. Officer's had watches and relied upon one another to get it done. They each had Orderlies who would daily ensure they were wound up - the Officer's watches. That's how things worked. So, for example, if Lt. Godfrey noted 4:20pm then it is certain that all other Officer's watches said the same and I would have difficulty beyond reason accepting this was not so. We know that Lt. Hodgson's watch was lost when he was killed because Maj. Reno noted its absense when he took a detail back to the river to obtain water and find the body.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 24, 2022 8:04:30 GMT -6
St. Paul Minn, current Modern time - Crow Agency MT, current Modern time - Busby MT, current Modern time Adapting between Minnesota and Montana time introduces a one difference to times with St. Paul being one hour advanced. This is frequently offered to defray and squander difficulties associated with interpretting time data related to the June 1876 military campaign across North Dakota, Montana and Wyoming. This is a straw man topic and discussion since, for example, 7th Cavalry operated 7th Cavalry time and had an engineering ooficer present to maintain time and make astronomical observations and with each Officer having an orderlie to ensure their watches were working and keeping time. Because this was a military unit conducting military operations it is entirely reasonable to accept that Officer's of the 7th Cavalry operated the same time. Walter M. Camp believed that 7th Cavalry operated under the time constant established in St. Paul, Minnesota. That seems to be accepted as reasonable these days. Camp was a railroad engineer of some note and a great ferret. Bismarck ND current Modern time. So, when did the railway arrive to Bismarck? Now let me see..... it was of course not Bismarck, was it..... it was Ft. McKean? or some such outpost slap bang in the middle of Sitting Bull's favorite camping ground. We could get into time of the place but this jumps ahead to Whittaker (1876) and then Wallace (1879), so... it's best avoided.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 24, 2022 8:53:33 GMT -6
ANNUAL REPORT OF LIEUTENANT EDWARD MAGUIRE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1877. This is the report dated June 30, 1877[ rather than that hurried belatedly into the previous years report to the CoE, covering Maguire's March 9th, 1877 report. 'REPORT.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA,
CHIEF ENGINEER'S OFFICE. Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report:
In obedience to Special Orders No. 80, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, April 21, 1876, I reported for duty at these headquarters May 8, 1876, relieving Capt. William Ludlow, Corps of Eugineers, of his duties as chief engineer of this department; and in compliance with Special Orders No. 64, Headquarters Department of Dakota, dated May 9, 1876, I proceeded to Fort Abraham Lincoln, May 10, to join the expedition against the hostile Sioux.
After a delay of a few days, due to rain, the column finally started from the encampment at 5 am, May 17, and commenced its march into the land of the turbulent Dakotas.
The morning was raw and cold, and a heavy mist hung over the whole region round about. It gradually rose, however, as we passed Fort Lincoln, and when we reached the foot of the long ascent leading to the prairie above, it was a very beautiful sight, that of the gradual fading.,,,,,,.'We get a reasonable idea of the expeditions time of day and the place from Maguire's early detail. We should assume that Terry, Custer, and every any other Officer at Ft. Lincoln and moving with expedition, held watches giveing precisely that precise time. It would have been 4am at Crow Agency and Busby by Modern time but that was then entirely irrelevant and remains so 146 years later - &th Cavalry operated under 7th Cavalry time which precisely equalled time practiced by Lt. Maguire and his CO, Alfred H. Terry. During the march to Rosebud river the chronometers used by Maguire for astronomical observations and accurate time-keeping jumped time during an incident which dumped the wagon carrying them, off a tressle bridge in Davis Ck. into the bottom below. This difficulty was not then realised for a number of days afterwards due to poor weather and in consequence at Rosebud on 21st June, 1876, the time of the place at the summer solstice was not calibrated and the expedition continued without changing clock times to co-incide with midday - had Terry so desired. The expedition did not recalibrate time. It most certainly did synchronise Officer's watches and continue so to do. Here's the interesting consequence and actually the only one related to subsequent events. Where was the Sun in the sky when a 7th Cavalry Officer's watch said 12pm (12pm being abstract midday)?
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Post by herosrest on Dec 24, 2022 10:40:58 GMT -6
Lt George D. Wallace's report as Engineer Officer of 7th Cavalry - of January27, 1877' At 12m on the 25th, we crossed the divide between the Rosebnd and Little Big Horn. From the divide could be seen the valley of the Little Big Horn, and about 15 or 20 miles to the northwest could be seen a light blue cloud, and to practiced eyes showed that our game was near. A small stream starting from the point near where we crossed tbe divide flowed in the direction of the smoke. After the assignment of battalions was made, General Custer followed down the right bank of this stream, and Major Reno the left. When within three miles of Little Big Horn, Major Reno was ordered across to the right bank and the two columns moved together for some distance, when Major Reno was ordered ahead. He recrossed this stream, moved down it, crossed the Little Big Horn, balted his column, formed line and moved down the valley and commenced the battle of June 25.The time data given by Wallace is basic and fundamental to time study of the battle and deeply flawed and deeply contradicted by many sources. That aside, his report is instructive and seriously ignored. As given previously, distance from the Busby halt to Major Reno being ordered to cross the Little Bighorn about three miles away, is 20 miles. Taken as having started the march at midnight and continuing 12 hours by various halts, that is a rate of march of 20/12 miles per hour. Adapting the calculation to Lt. Wallace gives 20/14 miles per hour. That differential of two furlongs per hour of mounted march is inconsequential[ but the time difference of two hours completely confounds any time based study of events of 25th June 1876. It's salt and pepper, cheese and onion, vodka and lemonade which can variously be added to or subtracted from any time arrived at for Weir arriving in view of the Custer battleground and the time spent on that terrain. Merry Xmas.
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