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Post by Bruce Robert on Jan 30, 2022 11:05:04 GMT -6
Custer's command was in motion while in contact with the enemy. He had no covering force , no fallback position. He was moving South - North across the enemies front in line astern. In fact it could be stated that the enemy was closer to his rear units than he was. He had so maneuvered his force as to place it perfectly for double envelopment [pincer movement]and the enemy effortlessly obliged him. [Keogh was possibly still fighting when resistance ceased on LSH.]Dragoons are not a stand alone element but rather act in a support role. Custer's 7th cavalry was no more than colonial horse suited mainly for attacking unsuspecting villages/settlements. Simply put ...the village was too big , and he arrived [ unlike Bedfor F] the slowest with the leastest. Cheers I find this "Last Stand Hill" idea more dime novel than reality. Sure, any battle where one side is destroyed has its own LSH, but the last stand might have been Keogh's position. And very likely Deep Ravine was the "Last Stand."
And your description of Custer's maneuvers says it all. Custer essentially gave the Cheyenne/Sioux the win.
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Post by wild on Jan 30, 2022 13:27:15 GMT -6
"And your description of Custer's maneuvers says it all. Custer essentially gave the Cheyenne/Sioux the win."
Agreed on a plate. Custer advanced on a south North axis on a 2 horse frontage presenting to the enemy [5 minutes distance]a mile long flank. In this configuration he collided head on with with the first responders in and around LSH. The command [lead companies]piled up all cohesion gone , no leadership , everyman for himself ..enough to see the markers they tell the sorry tale. Further back Keogh has a few minutes .Closing up with Custer is just feeding more meat into the grinder. He probably lasted a bit longer than his co but the odds were too great. I think the few markers on Calhoun hill might indicate Keogh survivors making a break for it ....was there a sergeant Butler who nearly got away?
As regards to effectiveness you have to ask how effective is a trooper with a single shot weapon mounted on what is a moving platform. Only by charging en masse [every trooper he had] into the village from stem to stern could he hope for any tangible success.
Cheers
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Post by wild on Jun 15, 2023 11:28:10 GMT -6
I might change my opinion on the above post . I was watching on youtube an account of the Texas Rangers and their tactics against the Comanche . They used their mounts to get them into position to attack on foot. The skirmish line being their offensive formation. If the 7th also saw the skirmish line as their main attack mode and not a defensive tactic then it puts a more positive spin on Reno's performance. When Reno dismounted he did in fact advance on foot a short distance towards the village.. His withdrawal to the timber was not an attempt to break contact but to stay engaged as long as possible. His dash [maybe charge ] from the timber may not have been pretty but it did save the majority of his battalion.
[ just wondering; with the sad passing of Fred am I now the longest serving member of the board?]
Best Richard
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Post by herosrest on Jun 15, 2023 16:09:11 GMT -6
Starting at the bottom and working up.
No, but hang in there.
A skirmish on foot with rifle or carbine, after manouvre to deploy is somewhat more than vallid and perfectly reasonable. A mounted charge relied entirely upon shock and power of the mount and troopers six, or was it five, rounds in pistols. The charges into Black Kettle's camp by battalions which arrived in time, routed the residents, with the camp then being destroyed. Same at Powder on 03/17/1876.
The deployed skirmishline in Little Bighorn was something I have long appreciated as the fact of it. My own view is that that did not last very long and sufficient record exists to back into considerable discussion of the duration, if blushes can be ignored. My view, for what it's worth is that there were difficulties with the ammunition troops carried and as told later in Chicago, the guns were jamming during rapid fire. There's a discussion to had with this but, hell guns jammed. What was a reasonable stance (tactical deployment) fell apart rather rapidly.
Thus it wasn't a great, or even competent performance but the guns didn't work as intended and at the worst possible time. is that Reno's fault? No, of course not. Unfortunately, had there been an inquiry into the weapon syatem then it would have been Reno's fault since he signed off (for the cavalry), as member of the Small Arms Board which recommended adoption of the weapon system. The Springfield weapons went on to give great service and there were even people who slept with them, so great were the love affairs.
Dismounted skirmish, fighting on foot was certainly a tactic by the book, established practice, and is what Reno oredered when he halted his advance at Garryowen. It simply didn't work out very well.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 15, 2023 16:36:23 GMT -6
I was, over time, involved in a number of interesting and pedantic discussions of the initial deployment to fight on foot; with some people who had a lot of information, insight and interest in the precise location. For me this proved to be the classic location rather than upriver in the middle of nowhere, doing nothing.
I'll brief my conclusions succinctly. The advance came to a halt just short of the western end of the Garryowen river loop with a detail ordered to skirmish the timber along the river. Ten men of Company M were led by Sgt. Ryan to this end, with the remaining companies mounted and drifting in from the plain onto the timber below Company M. The skirmishers reported the timber and river bank clear and the advanced companies deployed with their mounts led to shelter in the timber. That placed Company G furthest downriver and nearest the river bank. Company A were on line to the left and advanced down the valley to their position. Company M then formed a reserve at rear on the river, and were deployed almost immediately to the flank of Company A across the rear of Companies G and A, to face south across the valley. A small force of Indian scouts was then deployed to the left flank of Company M.
That's my understanding of an awful lot of discussions of opinion and information.
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Post by wild on Jun 15, 2023 17:51:45 GMT -6
Sounds like the halt was geographical rather than a reaction to developing frontal issues. Also seems to have been somewhat leasurely with flankers out and deployment of a reserve and ranges marked out. I much prefare the sceanario as depicted in SOTMS you know "holy crap "
I also feel that on seeing the size of the village Custer realized that charges and skirmish lines were just not going to cut the mustard that day and that Benteen was his only and forlorn hope.
Az might just pip me by a month or two but my stuff is much better. Best Richard
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Post by wild on Jun 15, 2023 18:15:19 GMT -6
Further On contact with the enemy the units of the regiment had two postures ie in full flight/ every carbine on the line ....outnumbered 10 to 1 employing a reserve was a tad over optimistic
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Post by herosrest on Jun 16, 2023 6:58:57 GMT -6
Sounds like the halt was geographical rather than a reaction to developing frontal issues. Also seems to have been somewhat leasurely with flankers out and deployment of a reserve and ranges marked out. I much prefare the sceanario as depicted in SOTMS you know "holy crap " I also feel that on seeing the size of the village Custer realized that charges and skirmish lines were just not going to cut the mustard that day and that Benteen was his only and forlorn hope. Az might just pip me by a month or two but my stuff is much better. Best Richard Nope, I agree that holy crap came into it and probably involved a shovel. Benny.... Call a halt.... Look at that village.............. What Custer saw will forever be a wonder. In honesty I find it difficult that he didn't have a plan but it is what it is. The entire opening move doesn't make sense, given what Custer didn't know but that is a phyrric argument. It is sold as making sense but it doesn't make any at all, at all. White Man Runs Him summed it up neatly in 1905 but I strongly suspect that was after a session with Brininstool. Regards.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 16, 2023 7:32:22 GMT -6
I don't know if this is of interest but here is the original opus by EAB A trooper with Custer and other historic incidents of the battle ..., overturning 50 years of injustices and 'just Plain wrong'. One of Brininstool's legacies is Bouyer's Skull, which it turns out, isn't bouyer's. 2005 research In fact, it was not W.A. Graham who instituted the image of the Ute tribal chief Capote, as Bouyer and was rather Brininstool as far as I can ascertain to date, in publishing the picture at page 115, of his book published by 'The Hunter-trader-trapper co.' in 1925. Graham's story of the battle followed a year later. The story of the Little Big Horn; Custer's last fight,. The reality may be amongst correspondance between the two but the weight of evidence tips (dumps) in favour of EAB on publishing dates. Both good reads but I imagine that you may have them on a shelf somewhere. Marker thirty-three was not where Bouyer died.
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Post by wild on Jun 16, 2023 8:41:11 GMT -6
"Combat effectiveness after the rout?" Im rather late to this discussion and perhaps the question has been answered to everyone's satisfaction but its a slow day so here's my tuppance worth.
The question should have addressed the combat effectineness of the regiment after the massacre; that is more an existential consideration than a rout. The regiment had zero offensive capibility because of the leadership . The rout was just a waymarker indicating massacre ahead. Custer's report card [which can be viewed in Trinity college] reads room for improvement. Seriously though if you actually set out to maliciously render the regiment useless you could not have done a better job than George, ably abbetted by col Benteen esquire. Best Richard
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Post by wild on Jun 17, 2023 1:15:59 GMT -6
"The charges into Black Kettle's camp by battalions which arrived in time, routed the residents, with the camp then being destroyed.
The key to a successful charge was surprise and sufficent troopers to encompass the entire village. This was to ensure that no portion of the village escaped attention allowing for the first responders to form and act against your rear and flanks. [the unfortunate Major Elliott] I think that Reno acting as he did [cancelling his charge] saved not only his battalion but the late arriving Benteen&co.
Just to ramble on.....Benteen was the man who cautioned Custer to keep the command together and some time later he triggers a dispersal [if not a rout]of the non engaged companies and pack train over a mile ? Reno Hill to weir point. Best Richard
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Post by wild on Jun 17, 2023 11:30:19 GMT -6
There is a principal known as the Peter principle which states that there is a flaw in the promotion system in that it perits a person to be promoted to a level at which he is incompetent, I think this works both ways as in the case of Custer. Our hero was demoted to a level/rank at which he was incompetent.
I have also always felt that the classification of the the units in the regiment was misleading. The basic unit was classed as a company while in fact it was in reality a platoon with reduced firepower. We say Custer divided his command into battalions while again in reality they were no more than companies. Unit classification indicates strenght. Custer died on LSH commanding two platoons. The regiment was the smallest unit which could act alone and stand alone and had a command system which reflected this. By deviding the regiment Custer went beyond its command and control capibility. Best Richard
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Post by montrose on Jun 17, 2023 20:06:13 GMT -6
There is a principal known as the Peter principle which states that there is a flaw in the promotion system in that it perits a person to be promoted to a level at which he is incompetent, I think this works both ways as in the case of Custer. Our hero was demoted to a level/rank at which he was incompetent. I have also always felt that the classification of the units in the regiment was misleading. The basic unit was classed as a company while in fact it was in reality a platoon with reduced firepower. We say Custer divided his command into battalions while again in reality they were no more than companies. Unit classification indicates strength. Custer died on LSH commanding two platoons. The regiment was the smallest unit which could act alone and stand alone and had a command system which reflected this. By dividing the regiment Custer went beyond its command and control capability. Best Richard Richard, Glad to see you back. Your talent as an amazing poster has not faded. The reverse Peter principle is a brilliant observation. LTC Custer was a very good division commander, one of the best in the ACH. But at company and field grade assignments he was below average, inconsistent, and unreliable. So a very good division commander demoted to a job where he is incompetent? Just a brilliant observation, I wish I had thought of it first. Very Respectfully, William
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Post by wild on Jun 18, 2023 9:52:11 GMT -6
HI William Praise indeed thank you.
As for being back I miss the old gang and you really needed your theories tested in the heat of robust debate. I don't think we had enough serious new blood coming on board and probably the comrades who passed could never be replaced. Best Richard
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Post by noggy on Jun 20, 2023 0:52:26 GMT -6
There is a principal known as the Peter principle which states that there is a flaw in the promotion system in that it perits a person to be promoted to a level at which he is incompetent, I think this works both ways as in the case of Custer. Our hero was demoted to a level/rank at which he was incompetent. I will gladly raise my hand and admit this was a new thing for my part. It is something I feel, unfortunately, is an established thing at my work place... Thank you for this. It's nice to have a "name" for something all too common in military history and life in general. Noggy
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