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Ford D
Oct 19, 2015 10:57:22 GMT -6
Post by edavids on Oct 19, 2015 10:57:22 GMT -6
Here is a photo that was taken last year when we floating the river downstream from MTF. Those are seriously high bluffs on the east side of LBHR! If I am reading this correctly you are floating between Ford B and Ford D? Best, David
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Ford D
Oct 19, 2015 11:38:44 GMT -6
Post by dan25 on Oct 19, 2015 11:38:44 GMT -6
I guess that answer's my question. Only if you could fly.
Thanks AZ
dan25
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Ford D
Oct 19, 2015 14:22:08 GMT -6
Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 19, 2015 14:22:08 GMT -6
Here is a photo that was taken last year when we floating the river downstream from MTF. Those are seriously high bluffs on the east side of LBHR! If I am reading this correctly you are floating between Ford B and Ford D? Best, David you're correct Regards Steve
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Ford D
Oct 20, 2015 10:38:07 GMT -6
fred likes this
Post by brenda56 on Oct 20, 2015 10:38:07 GMT -6
Reading Dan's post and having a look at the photo above the Maguire map sprung to mind. The map shows two routes to Last Stand Hill. Namely ford B to Calhoun to LSH. On the map that is noted as the bde line. The second route being ford B to the ravine South of LSH where bodies were found to LSH. That is bhe on the map. Maguire stated that this South line indicated the men were on foot and fighting all the way to LSH. The South route is about two miles long. So to follow this route, say most of the way by foot, is a good hour. Now add in the terrain, the heat and the need to fight it seems as the South route is unlikely ? But Maguire had a "fresh" battlefield and must have observed something which made sense to his military eye ? His northern route line is more or less in agreement with thoughts expressed on this board so why not the South line ? Two seperate lines from ford B and one of those lines referred to being on foot suggests a ford B "issue" ? Or should I ignore the Maguire map for a good reason ?
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Ford D
Oct 21, 2015 8:25:16 GMT -6
Post by fred on Oct 21, 2015 8:25:16 GMT -6
Or should I ignore the Maguire map for a good reason ? Ignore the Maguire map. Indian accounts prove that latter route completely incorrect. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by brenda56 on Oct 25, 2015 14:53:40 GMT -6
Why anchor 60% of your "direct" unit at a location in order to reunite with a fairly perceptive character like Benteen who, incidentally, has no issues as they relate to his sense of direction ?
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Ford D
Oct 25, 2015 17:53:47 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Oct 25, 2015 17:53:47 GMT -6
Why anchor 60% of your "direct" unit at a location in order to reunite with a fairly perceptive character like Benteen who, incidentally, has no issues as they relate to his sense of direction ? Brenda, YOU ARE NOT ONLY VERY ASTUTE, BUT YOU ASK GREAT QUESTIONS. We have all heard of divide and conquer, it seems that on this day GAC applied divide and be conquered. You have solved the mystery of the loss at the LBH. Thank you I will die a happy man.
Fred, no more books, I've got it.
Regards, Tom
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Post by wild on Oct 25, 2015 18:30:45 GMT -6
Tom YOU ARE NOT ONLY VERY ASTUTE, BUT YOU ASK GREAT QUESTIONS. We have all heard of divide and conquer, it seems that on this day GAC applied divide and be conquered. So we have Custer taking leave of his senses and not only that, Keogh does the same. One commander taking leave of his senses is unfortunate but two seems a little careless. Cheers Richard
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Ford D
Oct 26, 2015 6:02:55 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Oct 26, 2015 6:02:55 GMT -6
Richard, GAC tunnel vision. Keogh attempting to follow orders to the end, to a fault, result, DIP. Things went south very fast for the Keogh command, awareness was flawed. Regards, Tom
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Ford D
Nov 5, 2015 16:52:13 GMT -6
Beth likes this
Post by brenda56 on Nov 5, 2015 16:52:13 GMT -6
Was it more important to wait for Benteen's arrival than it was to maintain forward momentum, bearing in mind the former was uncertain and the latter manageable ? If the latter and based on Custer's actions post Calhoun my estimate is Keogh had no more than ten minutes on location, probably a bit less. That timeframe falls well within the previously suggested twenty to thirty minute period free of compromise. Although I've suggested ten minutes it may have been nearer seven minutes. If that is the case was there anything specific or unique that could have happened within that short period that would explain the appearance of each company on Calhoun fighting its own battle ? If not Keogh was maybe a bit out of his depth, to say the least.
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Post by edavids on Nov 5, 2015 17:18:16 GMT -6
Thank you Brenda for posting! I was worried this board had gone dark!! Seriously though it seemed like June 25, 1876 was the high watermark for Murphy's Law. Flawed assumprions, strange decision making, poor communications of course being the responsibility of the Fighting 7th's leadership all doubly discombobulated by Murphy. Then there were 2-3000 warriors to muck things up.
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Ford D
Nov 5, 2015 17:38:05 GMT -6
Post by fred on Nov 5, 2015 17:38:05 GMT -6
Was it more important to wait for Benteen's arrival than it was to maintain forward momentum, bearing in mind the former was uncertain and the latter manageable ? If the latter and based on Custer's actions post Calhoun my estimate is Keogh had no more than ten minutes on location, probably a bit less. That timeframe falls well within the previously suggested twenty to thirty minute period free of compromise. Although I've suggested ten minutes it may have been nearer seven minutes. If that is the case was there anything specific or unique that could have happened within that short period that would explain the appearance of each company on Calhoun fighting its own battle ? If not Keogh was maybe a bit out of his depth, to say the least. Sorry, Brenda, I do not follow you. I think I understand your initial question, and if I do, then I would say the latter was more important. Custer surrendered that however, when he reached Cemetery Ridge. As for Keogh's times, I do not understand from when to when: ten minutes? seven minutes? What event precipitated the "start" time and what event was the culmination? Best wishes, Fred.
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Ford D
Nov 5, 2015 20:06:20 GMT -6
Post by magpie on Nov 5, 2015 20:06:20 GMT -6
I am going to admit my limitations on the Custer sector but why could not the repulse of the probing force at Ford B2 (or Birds if you must)with Custer in reserve near Luce R.. So the probe force sets of the ambush and the Indians cut off the retrograde retreat up Medicine Tail much as they say they did and they drive with so much violence that the probe force runs. Custer firing long distance ( his reserve should be at 600 yards not Luce). This firing leading to the one Indian perception Custer was firing at his retreating men. Custer backs up to the Nye-Cartright maybe(he can move in a column switching back and forth (spiraling up the hill), dismounting firing 3 remounting etc. He obviously decided it was hopeless to commit his reserve. If the Indians start to herd and drive the probe force like buffalo, firing into their flanks and Custer makes the decision to follow parallel giving only long distance fire support but at least he isn't abandoning the probe force. He moves to LSH to create a rally point dismounts puts E as reserve of the south skirmish flank. The mounted probe force tries to reach but ends up leaving a trail of bodies ( all those pictographs) as it winds past greasy grass and through the Calhoun sector. Crazy hits the skirmish line it folds and the reserve runs not into the line but down the deep. Why not that? To me it fits the common thread of the warriors tales and the soldiers tales. No Ford D though unless it's Crazy Horses route. Maguire must of rode the rout so I wouldn't discount his observations so quickly. Sergeant Windolph said shod calvary horses cut the ground up so bad a blind man could follow. Indians are unshod just as our ranch horses where and I don'r remember them cutting the sod.
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Ford D
Nov 6, 2015 21:38:19 GMT -6
Post by herosrest on Nov 6, 2015 21:38:19 GMT -6
DucemusMany confusions are a part of the Custer fight, where with numerous survivors no-one can definitively detail Reno's position of events or time spent in the valley. In regards broad outline which guides opinion and developing theory, here is some stuff which should be seriously weighed as relevant to any thought about Custer's fight. There is what has become the fight at the ford, regardless of what happened, it happened at the mouth of MTC and Deep Coulee. That is where White Shield saw the troops and it is where Roan Bear and a few others shot at troops near the river. Those troops, halted and delayed there. They dismounted and did whatever they did. There is a hill called variously Greasy Grass Hill, Knoll or whaatever, which dominates all local terrain and provides the best possible view of the valley, in that locale. It is important terrain from a tactical point of view. There is military data from the battle period. Obviously the Maguire maps and also, a sketch made by Capt. Freeman of 7th Infantry www.friendslittlebighorn.com/drawingbattlelines.htm showing the routes of march of two movements with the lower, nearer the river, progressing along the river in some fashion. So that must be considered and propsitioned into any realistic ideas of what happened. The idea that Benteen can be trusted in his change of mind about Custer's route of march, is rubbish. He followed Custer's trail to MTC. Maguire's B and up to Finley and Calhoun. In regarding Freeman's information it should be noted that he was with Benteen. This is simple fact - and while Maguire did not accompany Benteen, Freeman did. It was unanimous decision by all military present that an attempt to cross the river was made, if only by scouting befoe a delay at the mouth of Deep Coulee and retreat towards Finley Calhoun under attack. The ford called B2 or Real Bird was the ideal crossing place and troops headed towards it before halting and delaying and retreating. When Two Moon returned from the Reno fight, he saw Custer's companies from the Cheyenne village and he saw them across the river on the terrain of Deep Coulee. The route to battle taken by Cheyenne's including Two Moon is shown in the drawing made by Big Beaver here - www.friendslittlebighorn.com/bigbeavermapdetail.pdfBig Beaver was interviewed and published in 1928. Reading the account makes it very easy to believe that he rode down the valley and crossed to reach Custer at the lower D fords. This was not so. Big Beaver ran to bring in the herds and joined Two Moon in moving 'AFTER' the cavalry. This is shown quite clearly where they rode over Greasy Grass Ridge to Battle Rige, near LSH. www.friendslittlebighorn.com/bigbeavermapdetail.pdfAn awful lot of thinking and myth underpins models of the fight. If you wish to get near to reality, consider this data and what it means in being from the people who were there, without the myth and misinformation of us all who were not there and pick over the bones. Once you begin to understand the amount of time delayed at Deep Coulee because that was where the village and ford to it were, some of the modern thinking simply falls apart. Those doing the modern thinking will not even discuss the stuff pointed out above. According to Two Moon, the first soldiers killed were sixteen horse holders at Finley and he then moved on along GGR to swing north of LSH acrosss Battle Ridge. With that in mind, quite a few other tribal accounts can begin to make some sense. The question then is, were companies of cavalry moving about on and beyond the National Cemetery terrain and if you believe they were, you actually do not have a single shred of realistic evidence that they were. Regards Be well. Custer's command 'retreated' from the river. They were cut off from returning towards Reno Hill. They had nowhere else to go. They did not know what shape Reno was in. They did not know if Benteen would follow his orders and go to the Big Village. Pulling hostiles away from the village helped Benteen and McDougall to follow their orders and go quickly to the Big Village. Across Ford A, which all the hostiles left! To go after Custer. Obviously, he was a fool. 1886 Edgerley Benteen Godfrey McDougall Custer No wonder Server gave Benteen a tough time! Check out Fred Server, previously Company G, 2nd Cavalry. He ran Lima Bravo Hotel. Pea under the matress, maybe.....
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Ford D
Nov 7, 2015 18:02:27 GMT -6
Post by herosrest on Nov 7, 2015 18:02:27 GMT -6
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