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Ford D
Jan 7, 2017 10:15:40 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Jan 7, 2017 10:15:40 GMT -6
Richard, Who said engaged. Not me! Cutoff from reaching their objective and not being able to deploy for an attack crossing, also dealing with the Wolf Tooth band shooting at them from afar. They chose wisely to wheel and attempt to return for support that they so stupidly left far behind. Custer went looking for the battle he wanted not the one he should have fought in the valley at the south end of the village.
Regards, Tom
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Ford D
Jan 7, 2017 10:17:07 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Jan 7, 2017 10:17:07 GMT -6
Sadly Richard, they were cut up on the attempted return.
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Ford D
Jan 7, 2017 11:41:52 GMT -6
Post by wild on Jan 7, 2017 11:41:52 GMT -6
Ih Tom If there was no engagement at Ford D and the 5 companies withdrew in good order you are left with explaining the course of the Battle on Battle Ridge and the final positions of the companies. Cheers Richard
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Ford D
Jan 7, 2017 11:56:18 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Jan 7, 2017 11:56:18 GMT -6
Richard,
That part is easy, if Colt does not come back today I will answer tomorrow, I don't want to tell a story that he does better, plus it was, I think, done earlier on.
Regards, Tom
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Ford D
Jan 7, 2017 11:57:59 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Jan 7, 2017 11:57:59 GMT -6
Richard,
When are we going to get you over here for a battlefield trip?
Regards, Tom
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Ford D
Jan 7, 2017 16:22:42 GMT -6
Post by wild on Jan 7, 2017 16:22:42 GMT -6
Hi Tom When I rekindled this thread I said there are two approaches to this battle; possible , probable. We know for certain that there were 6 movements or deployments of troops. I can suggest a scenario based on those 6 movements. The Ford D scenario requires at least 8 movements to support it and possibly more. The extra movements are suggested and not supported by evidence. You state that the conjuring up of extra movements is easy ? Of course it is easy but there is a price to pay and thet is the stretching of credibility.
A trip to the LBH would cost me a fortune but who knows . Cheers Richard
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Post by Colt45 on Jan 7, 2017 18:39:40 GMT -6
I have stated the reasons. The repulsion at ford D and the delay at CR caused the withdrawal. HQ and Custer were at the front of the line. When the 5 companies had to return where they came from, the head became the tail, and the tail the front. Custer, as commander, would be at the rear during the withdrawal as that is the proper place for the commander. HQ goes where the commander goes, so it is no surprise at all that they were found at the northern most points. The order of march doesn't do a u-turn. They just do an about-face and move back the other way.
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Post by wild on Jan 7, 2017 19:37:26 GMT -6
If Custer reached Ford D and threatened to cross, this would have been a huge failure for the Indians. They had stopped Reno and had the warriors to stop Custer. If Custer turned tail at Ford D he would have suffered the same result as Reno ; losing half his command in and around the ford. There is no evidence of such an occurance. The evidence and logic is all for him being stopped at LSH. Hurrah Richard
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Post by wild on Jan 8, 2017 10:17:14 GMT -6
Just as an epilogue to this discussion and to return to an issue raised by Dan some posts back and that is the conditions physical and emotional prevailing at the time. Exhaustion,thirst, heat,fear, terror ,crap,confusion,pain,despair V exhilration,excitment,aggression,vengence,arrogrance. Crappy single shot carbine v rapid fire Winchester + terror weapons. Initally the pockets of troopers might have held the warriors at bay and the casualty rate might have been slow but gradualy that rate increased till a point when the troopers knew that they could no longer hold the warriors. They saw their officers and ncos going down , they have to drop their carbines from the aim, fumble for a cartridge ,open the breech ,push the cartridge home ,close the breech, take aim ......think of how they felt knowing they were dead men if they were lucky. Add the above to the mix and then consider reccies and withdrawals and 180 degree maneuvers. Hurrah Richard
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Post by Bruce Robert on Jan 9, 2017 18:10:22 GMT -6
Richard,
Thank you for the answers to my questions.
And I thank everyone for these interesting discussions on this part of the battle. While still highly contentious, these differing positions are worth exploring as possible narratives to "explain" what Custer was thinking.
I like the N to S scenario, as it clarifies some issues for me, but I don't see the evidence from Fox supporting it, nor the fact that the companies weren't intermingled.
But I also have a hard time with the assumption that the action around Ford D ultimately hinged on Benteen's arrival.
However, when I add in far greater pressure by the enemy than some have suggested, it makes more sense to me. Which then brings me back to a Custer who refused to except the evidence that was staring him in the face. Or, he had an overwhelming (and unrealistic) amount of confidence regarding the 7th. Or both.
Bruce
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Post by wild on Jan 17, 2017 6:02:26 GMT -6
Hi Bruce But I also have a hard time with the assumption that the action around Ford D ultimately hinged on Benteen's arrival. And I think you would be right to hold such doubts.
The thinking on the effect of Benteen's arrival is most untidy. I never questioned this section of the action just blindly accepted that a 1000 Indians broke off their chase of Reno on the arrival of Benteen. Most of the Indians engaging Reno in the Timber would have been dismounted...it was a fire fight and being mounted made for a bigger target and rendered firing your weapon effectively the stuff of a circus. Reno's success in breaking free of the timber was down to surprise and the fact that the majority Indians were afoot ,ponies being to the rear. Thus the Reno chase was taken up by [guessing]150 Indians. If Reno had been pursued by anything like a 1000 Indians not only would Reno not have survived but Benteen's chances would not have been sunny. Could it have been that Benteen and Reno inflated the numbers for their own ends? So we have 850 Indian having missed out on the chase mounting up and heading back to cover the village as they knew of Custer's approach . So they are on Custer's case not long after he enters MTC. Thus he is now "it" being chased into the arms of the residents of the North suburbs. No Ford D. Regards all Richard
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Ford D
Jan 20, 2017 19:24:59 GMT -6
Post by herosrest on Jan 20, 2017 19:24:59 GMT -6
Richard, A retreat from the ford D area is not based on marker locations, but rather on sound TPP for a withdrawal. L company probably led the way back the way they came, followed closely by C, and then I. L stops in the face of opposition at Calhoun hill and sets up a skirmish line down the slope, expecting the rest of the regiment very shortly behind. C company arrives, sees the danger to L's right flank, and occupies FFR to provide support, also expecting help from I, E, and F. Sadly, I gets caught where they were found, and E and F never get the chance to withdraw any further than LSH. Markers only tell us where they wound up approximately. They say nothing about how they got there or what direction they were moving when they fell. There is plenty of archeological and account information that backs up action at CR and in the ford D area. A standard, by-the-book withdrawal from those areas under pressure would have been what was called for, and most likely was in the process of occurring when the Indian pressure became more than they could handle. There simply wasn't enough time to effect the withdrawal successfully due to the delay on CR, for whatever reason they delayed. I agree Custer was not doing a recce to ford D, he was in attack mode. I also don't believe he parked 3/5ths of his combat power on BR and Calhoun Hill while he took 2 companies to the river. That is crap. That is why Bruce senses that the traditional story smells fishy. Even a poor field grade commander like Custer would not make those kinds of mistakes. A new 2LT from West Point would not make those kinds of mistakes. No, Custer took all 5 companies to ford D to attack. The Indians voted to not let him cross the river and to not let him retreat back south. He delayed at CR just long enough to allow hostiles crossing at ford B, and probably C, and ford D, to block the escape route back south and to provide heavy pressure on the flanks of E and F companies, and from the north to force I company off BRE and into the swale. L and C were the only 2 companies to have made the withdrawal away from ford D, only to get stopped short of crossing Deep Coulee and returning the way they came. DucemusA similar idea was expressed back in 1951 by Charles Kuhlman but without the jaunt to the western fords. That innovation was delivered and developed by Rickey and John Stands in Timber's 1956 interview. Of course, no-one participating supported this model of the battle which emerged after their demise. The 7th Cavalry did ride up to LSH from western Fords and were photographed and filmed doing it. In 1926. Check the 50th Anniversary footage at about 1:00 minute in as 7th Cavalry ride up from the western fords. Unravelling what was 1926 story of the 3 day re-enactment battle and 1876 battle remembrance is...... an interesting exercise. The action on Custer Field, Legend into History (Online resource - read and weep) according to Chas Kuhlman (1951) with maps and minute detail of his understanding of events as whispered to him by the ghost of G.A. Custer on the ground at LBH one haunted night.
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Ford D
Feb 7, 2017 17:54:31 GMT -6
Post by wild on Feb 7, 2017 17:54:31 GMT -6
Just in passing
If we take Custer down to ford D we have to conjure up some reason to bring him back and another reason as to why he was arrse about face on Battle Ridge. And to date, in my superior opinion we have failed miserably so to do. Hurrah
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Ford D
Dec 14, 2017 14:15:13 GMT -6
Post by alquedahunter on Dec 14, 2017 14:15:13 GMT -6
Just in passing If we take Custer down to ford D we have to conjure up some reason to bring him back and another reason as to why he was arrse about face on Battle Ridge. And to date, in my superior opinion we have failed miserably so to do. Hurrah Furthermore, we would have to allow the southern troops a bunch more time to fight and less to break down in the face of superior numbers. Plus, way more firearm evidence would need to be in those areas.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 15, 2017 6:31:09 GMT -6
AH
When you say more firearms evidence in what particular area are you referring to. We know there is more firearms evidence north of Last Stand Hill (LSH) than there is in the Ford B area. We also know that Ford D is an area with many fords and not one specific ford. Ford B is formed at the junction of MTC and the LBH whereas Ford Ds start just below Cemetery Ridge and around the river to Willy's bend. As far as expectation of finding more evidence in the flats where the current highway is located we know that they removed material from there and used to fill in the gap between Battle Ridge Extension and the current entrance booth on Cemetery Ridge (CR). So Douglas Scott suggested on a field trip that there could be artifacts in the road bed materials.
What ford characteristics would cavalry look for in a fording place to cross with 5 companies when in close proximity of the enemy?
Certainly any ford that has opposition by the enemy would not be a favorable crossing place characteristic. Whereas a wide area where troopers can cross on line rather than column and then regroup on flat ground could be a favorable characteristic. I gave examples of favorable and unfavorable characteristic of a ford when closing to contact which is much different then after the battle and an officer riding by himself states he can cross anywhere. I think without threats the only limitation of crossing the LBH in this particular area is the ingress and egress terrain features. So there are numerous places where an individual sitting on a horse can enter the river and see a place to get out.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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