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Post by fred on Jul 15, 2015 21:02:24 GMT -6
Looking at the direction of travel from ford B, one has to assume that first action for Keogh's battalion would have been in company L's area, Henryville and Deep Coulee. If that is true, then given where Keogh was found, one could conclude that Keogh was not wounded early in the battle, but later after the Indians from Deep Ravine began coming over Battle Ridge, or through the gap in the ridge. Personally, I would agree with this comment, 100% Agreed, as well. In my opinion, very smartly analyzed. I do not believe L was that far away from its horses, and I think C was sent into the coulee for a specific purpose. Once that occurred, however, and the unit broke, things happened too quickly to be reversed. By then, L was virtually forced to defend and protect C, and suddenly I Company was assaulted. Remember, there was entirely too much terrain to defend with the available men and that gap was the worst thing that could have happened. Understood, but I tend to doubt it, don't you? Granted, but still, we can see trends here. Are you a member of the LBHA? If so, you will be receiving the Research Review within the next few weeks. There is an article in there discussing this exact thing. I like this post a lot: your analysis is outstanding... really good. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jul 15, 2015 23:01:55 GMT -6
I disagree strongly with Fred's last post on this thread.
My issue is that I have been unable to have a rational discussion of theory on this board for about a year.
One day I hope to be able to discuss what is so wrong with his last post.
I am not holding my breath.
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Post by fred on Jul 16, 2015 8:43:52 GMT -6
I disagree strongly with Fred's last post on this thread. Oh yeah?!!!I will address your issue in a bit, Will. Running around like a chicken without a head the last couple of days. Do you get the Research Review? If not, I will send you the new one coming out soon. Then we can beat each other up a little more effectively. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jul 16, 2015 9:27:01 GMT -6
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Post by benteen on Jul 16, 2015 14:02:22 GMT -6
So that begs the unanswerable question; why did Keogh not timeously vacate...?
WO
Welsh Officer, Sir I agree with you. However, I think a more important question is why was he there in the first place? I know authors, historians, and the very knowledgeable people in this forum accept as a fact that Custer ordered Keogh to be there. Truth be told that is not a fact, it is an assumption. After app 1600hrs 6/25/1876, no one knows what Custer said to anyone or what orders he gave, since anyone that did know died with him. I have my own theory on this.I like to believe I think out of the box, but in reality it is probably lunacy starting to take place. I dont want to go off thread so when I get some time I will post it in the thread Col Montrose started about "Why does Keogh get a pass" Be Well Dan
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 16, 2015 14:17:49 GMT -6
Dan,
Good post. I think the probable answer goes back to Cooke's note to Benteen, redirecting his battalion and the pack train away from Reno's assault in the valley and up the eastern bluffs. Keogh would effect the link-up, and possibly draw any limited hostile attention away from the northern recon by GAC/Yates. What GAC failed to factor in was the number of hostiles that ascended the eastern bluffs after his Ford B approach. This build-up, together with Reno's defeat, precluded any reinforcement by Benteen. And the build-up was of sufficient strength to overwhelm Keogh's position, unless he vacated northwards/eastwards in time.
WO
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Post by benteen on Jul 16, 2015 16:51:44 GMT -6
Dan, Good post. I think the probable answer goes back to Cooke's note to Benteen, redirecting his battalion and the pack train away from Reno's assault in the valley and up the eastern bluffs. Keogh would effect the link-up, and possibly draw any limited hostile attention away from the northern recon by GAC/Yates. What GAC failed to factor in was the number of hostiles that ascended the eastern bluffs after his Ford B approach. This build-up, together with Reno's defeat, precluded any reinforcement by Benteen. And the build-up was of sufficient strength to overwhelm Keogh's position, unless he vacated northwards/eastwards in time. WO Welch Officer, Thank you. I certainly agree with you that the "Come quick" order was for Benteen to come to him (Custer) I also believe that your opinion of what Custer was doing or thinking as regards to Keogh could be spot on. My problem is that it doesnt make sense to me. No, not your post, that makes perfect sense, rather that Custer doesnt make sense. I say this for the following, Can an Officer re-deploy one unit predicated on the movement of another of his units. Yes and I am sure it happens all the time. You sir, may have done it yourself. However I believe the most important factor in this is communication.You have to know the units situation that you are asking to re-locate. Lets take the LBH. Custer doesnt know Benteens situation. He doent even know if Martini gave him the message. He got nothing back from Benteen acknowledging it. Also remember that Martinis horse was shot if it was Martini instead of his horse, and got one through the running lights, Custers message would have been floating in the LBH River. So I guess what I am saying is that it makes no sense to me that a commander (Even Custer) would use 3/5 of his effectives to await a situation (Link Up) that at best he has no idea of the ETA of this link up, and at worse it isnt going to happen at all. PS....So there is no misunderstanding, when I say it makes no sense to me, that is what I mean, it makes no sense to me, it may make total sense to others Be Well Dan
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 16, 2015 17:07:53 GMT -6
Dan, Good post. I think the probable answer goes back to Cooke's note to Benteen, redirecting his battalion and the pack train away from Reno's assault in the valley and up the eastern bluffs. Keogh would effect the link-up, and possibly draw any limited hostile attention away from the northern recon by GAC/Yates. What GAC failed to factor in was the number of hostiles that ascended the eastern bluffs after his Ford B approach. This build-up, together with Reno's defeat, precluded any reinforcement by Benteen. And the build-up was of sufficient strength to overwhelm Keogh's position, unless he vacated northwards/eastwards in time. WO Welch Officer, Thank you. I certainly agree with you that the "Come quick" order was for Benteen to come to him (Custer) I also believe that your opinion of what Custer was doing or thinking as regards to Keogh could be spot on. My problem is that it doesnt make sense to me. No, not your post, that makes perfect sense, rather that Custer doesnt make sense. I say this for the following, Can an Officer re-deploy one unit predicated on the movement of another of his units. Yes and I am sure it happens all the time. You sir, may have done it yourself. However I believe the most important factor in this is communication.You have to know the units situation that you are asking to re-locate. Lets take the LBH. Custer doesnt know Benteens situation. He doent even know if Martini gave him the message. He got nothing back from Benteen acknowledging it. Also remember that Martinis horse was shot if it was Martini instead of his horse, and got one through the running lights, Custers message would have been floating in the LBH River. So I guess what I am saying is that it makes no sense to me that a commander (Even Custer) would use 3/5 of his effectives to await a situation (Link Up) that at best he has no idea of the ETA of this link up, and at worse it isnt going to happen at all. PS....So there is no misunderstanding, when I say it makes no sense to me, that is what I mean, it makes no sense to me, it may make total sense to others Be Well Dan Dan,
Another very good post. As I have said previously on this forum, GAC was for me "off his game" on this campaign in addition to being given too much latitude. No doubt personal and career issues were also weighing heavily. My own view is that GAC grasped around 3411 that there could be little left for Benteen to find, even in the Upper LBH itself, and that he would need him. GAC didn't want Benteen, let alone the pack train, stumbling into Reno's valley fight. But when Reno fled from the timber, his high ground sanctuary placed him exactly between Benteen and GAC. Reno was Benteen's superior, and Reno's defeated battalion was in distress. Remember Terry's entreaty about looking after wounded? For me, it all really went wrong on the 24th and which precipitated the premature blind attack on the 25th.
WO
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Post by Colt45 on Jul 16, 2015 19:28:46 GMT -6
Benteen, I have to agree with you that it makes no sense at all to "assume" that Martini got through to Benteen, and that Benteen would understand perfectly the gibberish Cooke hastily wrote, and that Benteen would be able to "come quick" and "bring packs" at the same time. Custer made an awful lot of assumptions that day. WO is also correct in stating that things that went wrong can be traced back to actions and non-actions that occurred or didn't occur on the 24th.
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Post by Colt45 on Jul 16, 2015 20:46:41 GMT -6
Looking at the direction of travel from ford B, one has to assume that first action for Keogh's battalion would have been in company L's area, Henryville and Deep Coulee. If that is true, then given where Keogh was found, one could conclude that Keogh was not wounded early in the battle, but later after the Indians from Deep Ravine began coming over Battle Ridge, or through the gap in the ridge. Personally, I would agree with this comment, 100% Agreed, as well. In my opinion, very smartly analyzed. I do not believe L was that far away from its horses, and I think C was sent into the coulee for a specific purpose. Once that occurred, however, and the unit broke, things happened too quickly to be reversed. By then, L was virtually forced to defend and protect C, and suddenly I Company was assaulted. Remember, there was entirely too much terrain to defend with the available men and that gap was the worst thing that could have happened. Understood, but I tend to doubt it, don't you? Granted, but still, we can see trends here. Are you a member of the LBHA? If so, you will be receiving the Research Review within the next few weeks. There is an article in there discussing this exact thing. I like this post a lot: your analysis is outstanding... really good. Best wishes, Fred. No, I am not a member of LBHA, so I probably won't see the article you reference, but I would really like to see the articles you are doing if possible.
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Post by mchlwilson on Jul 18, 2015 20:18:09 GMT -6
(My first time posing HERE. I have posted a few times on the "other" board.)
I have spent about six full days at the battlefield over the last two years and have made my way throught most of the relevant literature on the LBH, including Fred Wagner's book. Here are my thoughts on the fall of Keogh's battalion and the ultimate destruction of the companies C,I,E,F and L:
1. Companies C, I and L on Luce Ridge. Companies E and F move to the river via Medicine Tail Coulee. Headquarters moves off Luce Ridge toward the "Custer Bluff" overlooking Ford B.
2. As Companies E and F near the river, they become aware of firing in their rear. This was probably the event they were least expecting, and as a result, confusion sets in. To complicate matters, firing erupts from the treeline along the river's edge.
3. Aware that there is firing to their rear and their front, the officers of the companies E and F react conservatively. They instruct their men to keep moving across the flats and take the path of least resistance, i.e. move up Deep Coulee.
4. As Companies E and F move up Deep Coulee, Custer sees a relatively small number of Indians moving across Deep Coulee in the direction of Calhoun Hill. He tells Yates to pursue them. Yates sends Company E in pursuit. Company F effects an orderly retirement from the river by dismounting soldiers and providing covering fire.
5. Custer makes it known to Keogh that he wants him to remain on Luce Ridge and effect communication with Benteen. Headquarters and Company F continue up to Calhoun Hill vicinity to monitor Company E's pursuit of Indians. By the time Company F and headquarters reach Calhoun Hill. Company E has moved further to the north. Headquarters and Company F pause on Calhoun Hill to take stock of the situation.
6. Within a few minutes Custer becomes aware of the enormity of what he is facing. Headquarters and Company F set out to extract Company E from the maelstrom it is wandering into. By this time, Company E is down in the Ford D vicinity. (Custer may have sent the Trumpter Dose back across Deep Coulee to communicate his intention to Keogh.)
7. Meanwhile, Keogh is feeling pressure on his front as Indians cross the river at Ford B. Further complicating matters, Indians starting coming off the bluffs to the south. Keogh decides that, with Indians both to his front and to his left flank, his own position is untenable and Custer's rear is wide open. He orders Company L down into Deep Coulee to cover the movements of Companies C and I off the Luce-Nye-Cartwright complex and over to Calhoun Hill. This action will protect Custer's rear and allow Keogh to orient his defense toward the south, thereby putting the Indians coming across the Ford and off the bluffs more or less on a single front.
8. Upon arriving on Calhoun Hill, Keogh deploys his three companies as follows:
- Company L: On a skirmish line facing south on Calhoun Hill. Company L horses are in the depression that now is the area of the modern road loop. - Company I: Mindful that they had originally been attacked from the east, Keogh places Company I to the left of Company L and wraps them around onto the thin ridgeline behind Calhoun Hill that runs to the northwest and tapers out into the bottom. Company I horses are placed in the low ground below this ridge.
- Company C: Placed initially in reserve on the east side of battle ridge. But Keogh soon realizes that Indians are not only coming up Deep Coulee. They are now to the west and on Greasy Grass Ridge. He realizes that if Indians gain Finley-Finkle ridge, they will be be unacceptably close to his position and will be able to fire with greater accuracy onto the Company L right flank. He orders Company C down to Finley-Finkle and to tie-in as best as possible with the right flank of Company L. This movement has the effect of flushing out Indians that had begin to move up Calhoun Coulee. This is a fatal move, as Finley-Finkle Ridge is vulnerable from three sides and there is nowhere to safely put the Company C horses.
9. When the collapse of the Calhoun Hill defense occurs, it occurs quickly. Gall's push from the south sends Indians through the point where the Company I and Company L lines had tied in. Company I now finds itself out of position. Indians are pouring into their rear and driving off their horses. The men panic at the sight of their horses being driven off. Discipline and tactical stablility collapses as the Company I men come down off their ridge to pursue their horses. The buffalo hunt has begun.
10. Company C men quickly discover that Finley-Finkle ridge and Calhoun Coulee are one big death trap, as Indians from the west move up the Coulee and from the south move up the lower ground between Calhoun Hill and Finley-Finkle ridge. With the twin collapses on their right and left flank, Company L begins to fall back to the north and are overrun.
11. Meanwhile, Headquarters and Company F, having gone off in pursuit of Company E with the intention of pulling it back, discovers Company E has taken casualties, possibily including some VIPs. It is the presence of casualties in Company E that prevents Custer from reuniting the five companies in his immediate command. The "long delay" on Cemetary Ridge that so puzzled Indians was due entirely to casualties. At this point, with the Keogh's collapse to the south, companies E and F and the headquarters element are doomed.
12. My argument differs from published narratives in this way:
- Other the plan to reconnoiter Ford B, there was no plan. From the moment companies E and F heard firing in their rear, all action was a reaction to events.
- There was no reunion of the five companies on Calhoun Hill after the move away from Ford B. Custer had left Keogh on Luce Ridge.
- Keogh had originally oriented Company I toward the east in the belief that a threat remained from that direction. This misplacement contributed to the collapse of Calhoun Hill.
- Custer didn't move north for irresponsible reasons. He attempted to pull back Company E from its pursuit of Indians but by the time he caught up to them they had taken casualties and were not in a position to move.
- Company C didn't come off Battle Ridge to drive Indians out of Calhoun Coulee. They came off to seize Finley-Finkle ridge.
Thanks for taking the time to read this. And fire away!
Michael
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Post by Colt45 on Jul 18, 2015 22:19:35 GMT -6
(My first time posing HERE. I have posted a few times on the "other" board.)
I have spent about six full days at the battlefield over the last two years and have made my way throught most of the relevant literature on the LBH, including Fred Wagner's book. Here are my thoughts on the fall of Keogh's battalion and the ultimate destruction of the companies C,I,E,F and L:
1. Companies C, I and L on Luce Ridge. Companies E and F move to the river via Medicine Tail Coulee. Headquarters moves off Luce Ridge toward the "Custer Bluff" overlooking Ford B.
2. As Companies E and F near the river, they become aware of firing in their rear. This was probably the event they were least expecting, and as a result, confusion sets in. To complicate matters, firing erupts from the treeline along the river's edge.
3. Aware that there is firing to their rear and their front, the officers of the companies E and F react conservatively. They instruct their men to keep moving across the flats and take the path of least resistance, i.e. move up Deep Coulee.
4. As Companies E and F move up Deep Coulee, Custer sees a relatively small number of Indians moving across Deep Coulee in the direction of Calhoun Hill. He tells Yates to pursue them. Yates sends Company E in pursuit. Company F effects an orderly retirement from the river by dismounting soldiers and providing covering fire.
5. Custer makes it known to Keogh that he wants him to remain on Luce Ridge and effect communication with Benteen. Headquarters and Company F continue up to Calhoun Hill vicinity to monitor Company E's pursuit of Indians. By the time Company F and headquarters reach Calhoun Hill. Company E has moved further to the north. Headquarters and Company F pause on Calhoun Hill to take stock of the situation.
6. Within a few minutes Custer becomes aware of the enormity of what he is facing. Headquarters and Company F set out to extract Company E from the maelstrom it is wandering into. By this time, Company E is down in the Ford D vicinity. (Custer may have sent the Trumpter Dose back across Deep Coulee to communicate his intention to Keogh.)
7. Meanwhile, Keogh is feeling pressure on his front as Indians cross the river at Ford B. Further complicating matters, Indians starting coming off the bluffs to the south. Keogh decides that, with Indians both to his front and to his left flank, his own position is untenable and Custer's rear is wide open. He orders Company L down into Deep Coulee to cover the movements of Companies C and I off the Luce-Nye-Cartwright complex and over to Calhoun Hill. This action will protect Custer's rear and allow Keogh to orient his defense toward the south, thereby putting the Indians coming across the Ford and off the bluffs more or less on a single front.
8. Upon arriving on Calhoun Hill, Keogh deploys his three companies as follows:
- Company L: On a skirmish line facing south on Calhoun Hill. Company L horses are in the depression that now is the area of the modern road loop. - Company I: Mindful that they had originally been attacked from the east, Keogh places Company I to the left of Company L and wraps them around onto the thin ridgeline behind Calhoun Hill that runs to the northwest and tapers out into the bottom. Company I horses are placed in the low ground below this ridge.
- Company C: Placed initially in reserve on the east side of battle ridge. But Keogh soon realizes that Indians are not only coming up Deep Coulee. They are now to the west and on Greasy Grass Ridge. He realizes that if Indians gain Finley-Finkle ridge, they will be be unacceptably close to his position and will be able to fire with greater accuracy onto the Company L right flank. He orders Company C down to Finley-Finkle and to tie-in as best as possible with the right flank of Company L. This movement has the effect of flushing out Indians that had begin to move up Calhoun Coulee. This is a fatal move, as Finley-Finkle Ridge is vulnerable from three sides and there is nowhere to safely put the Company C horses.
9. When the collapse of the Calhoun Hill defense occurs, it occurs quickly. Gall's push from the south sends Indians through the point where the Company I and Company L lines had tied in. Company I now finds itself out of position. Indians are pouring into their rear and driving off their horses. The men panic at the sight of their horses being driven off. Discipline and tactical stablility collapses as the Company I men come down off their ridge to pursue their horses. The buffalo hunt has begun.
10. Company C men quickly discover that Finley-Finkle ridge and Calhoun Coulee are one big death trap, as Indians from the west move up the Coulee and from the south move up the lower ground between Calhoun Hill and Finley-Finkle ridge. With the twin collapses on their right and left flank, Company L begins to fall back to the north and are overrun.
11. Meanwhile, Headquarters and Company F, having gone off in pursuit of Company E with the intention of pulling it back, discovers Company E has taken casualties, possibily including some VIPs. It is the presence of casualties in Company E that prevents Custer from reuniting the five companies in his immediate command. The "long delay" on Cemetary Ridge that so puzzled Indians was due entirely to casualties. At this point, with the Keogh's collapse to the south, companies E and F and the headquarters element are doomed.
12. My argument differs from published narratives in this way:
- Other the plan to reconnoiter Ford B, there was no plan. From the moment companies E and F heard firing in their rear, all action was a reaction to events.
- There was no reunion of the five companies on Calhoun Hill after the move away from Ford B. Custer had left Keogh on Luce Ridge.
- Keogh had originally oriented Company I toward the east in the belief that a threat remained from that direction. This misplacement contributed to the collapse of Calhoun Hill.
- Custer didn't move north for irresponsible reasons. He attempted to pull back Company E from its pursuit of Indians but by the time he caught up to them they had taken casualties and were not in a position to move.
- Company C didn't come off Battle Ridge to drive Indians out of Calhoun Coulee. They came off to seize Finley-Finkle ridge.
Thanks for taking the time to read this. And fire away!
Michael
Welcome aboard, Michael Interesting post, and entirely possible to have occurred the way you describe. Keogh's battalion being on N/C and Luce ridge would have been to provide deep cover for E and F as they approached ford B. There is not much evidence of dismounted firing in the vicinity of ford B, so I don't think there would have been a large dismount by Company F, covering E's move away from the ford. Some maybe, but not the whole company. While not yet located at Calhoun Hill, Keogh could have fired at the hostiles coming across ford B, and at Wolf Tooth's band, hence the cartridge cases found on Luce and N/C, but I don't believe he would have been feeling heat on his left flank at that time. His move to Calhoun Hill and Battle Ridge would have been made due to being ordered by Custer, or because he lost sight of the Custer wing, or at least most of it, and felt he needed to follow so as to keep the 5 companies together. But by staying in the Calhoun Hill area, this indicates that perhaps Custer tells him to stay there, as by this time, if your scenario is correct, E company is in the ford D area and F company is enroute to or already at Cemetery ridge to extricate them. If Custer ordered him to stay there and wait for Benteen, that would have been almost criminal, since he would have to know that Benteen couldn't possibly arrive in a timely fashion if bringing the packs with him. The buildup of hostiles coming across ford B would also indicate remaining in that area was a bad idea. Especially if E and F are a mile away in the ford D general area. The prudent thing to do would be to have the entire battalion move to assist E and F. Now if we assume Custer told Keogh to stay and wait on Benteen, then rode off with F company, it falls to Keogh to make a command decision about aborting the stay and wait order when it becomes apparent the opposing force is way too strong for him to cover the necessary area with the few men he has. He should have realized very early on he didn't have sufficient force to cover the area required and in attempting to do so, he would put each of his companys out of supporting distance of one another. That was the time to bug out either north or east, and attempt to reunite with Custer. Failing to do this puts the blame on Keogh for his battalion's destruction. If Custer ordered Yates to chase the Indians seen according to your theory, he was falling into the same kind of trap that killed Fetterman some time before, and one would think Custer would have been able to recognize that trap and not fall into it, but maybe that's what he did. We will never know. I don't believe he made that order because he already has 3 companies removed a distance away, though not a great distance, and sending E company off on its own chasing Indians would have stretched his forces out quite thinly and made support almost impossible. Your comment about no plan is spot on, as is the observation that the cavalry was in reaction mode. From ford B on, they were totally reactive. Casualties at Cemetery Ridge could very well account for the delay at that site reported by the Indian accounts, as could Custer catching up with Yates and the two of them trying to figure out what to do next, cross at ford D and attack or go back to get Keogh. I believe the delay there was an "oh crap. Now what do we do" moment, and Custer was just then beginning to realize his fat was in the fire and he had no idea how to get it out of the fire. Of course, the Indians had a vote in what happened as they were the ones driving the bus, effectively removing any options Custer had. Your post was very thoughtful and entirely possible. I look forward to more great posts from you.
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Post by troybrickman on Jul 19, 2015 6:20:46 GMT -6
(My first time posing HERE. I have posted a few times on the "other" board.)
I have spent about six full days at the battlefield over the last two years and have made my way throught most of the relevant literature on the LBH, including Fred Wagner's book. Here are my thoughts on the fall of Keogh's battalion and the ultimate destruction of the companies C,I,E,F and L:
1. Companies C, I and L on Luce Ridge. Companies E and F move to the river via Medicine Tail Coulee. Headquarters moves off Luce Ridge toward the "Custer Bluff" overlooking Ford B.
2. As Companies E and F near the river, they become aware of firing in their rear. This was probably the event they were least expecting, and as a result, confusion sets in. To complicate matters, firing erupts from the treeline along the river's edge.
3. Aware that there is firing to their rear and their front, the officers of the companies E and F react conservatively. They instruct their men to keep moving across the flats and take the path of least resistance, i.e. move up Deep Coulee.
4. As Companies E and F move up Deep Coulee, Custer sees a relatively small number of Indians moving across Deep Coulee in the direction of Calhoun Hill. He tells Yates to pursue them. Yates sends Company E in pursuit. Company F effects an orderly retirement from the river by dismounting soldiers and providing covering fire.
5. Custer makes it known to Keogh that he wants him to remain on Luce Ridge and effect communication with Benteen. Headquarters and Company F continue up to Calhoun Hill vicinity to monitor Company E's pursuit of Indians. By the time Company F and headquarters reach Calhoun Hill. Company E has moved further to the north. Headquarters and Company F pause on Calhoun Hill to take stock of the situation.
6. Within a few minutes Custer becomes aware of the enormity of what he is facing. Headquarters and Company F set out to extract Company E from the maelstrom it is wandering into. By this time, Company E is down in the Ford D vicinity. (Custer may have sent the Trumpter Dose back across Deep Coulee to communicate his intention to Keogh.)
7. Meanwhile, Keogh is feeling pressure on his front as Indians cross the river at Ford B. Further complicating matters, Indians starting coming off the bluffs to the south. Keogh decides that, with Indians both to his front and to his left flank, his own position is untenable and Custer's rear is wide open. He orders Company L down into Deep Coulee to cover the movements of Companies C and I off the Luce-Nye-Cartwright complex and over to Calhoun Hill. This action will protect Custer's rear and allow Keogh to orient his defense toward the south, thereby putting the Indians coming across the Ford and off the bluffs more or less on a single front.
8. Upon arriving on Calhoun Hill, Keogh deploys his three companies as follows:
- Company L: On a skirmish line facing south on Calhoun Hill. Company L horses are in the depression that now is the area of the modern road loop. - Company I: Mindful that they had originally been attacked from the east, Keogh places Company I to the left of Company L and wraps them around onto the thin ridgeline behind Calhoun Hill that runs to the northwest and tapers out into the bottom. Company I horses are placed in the low ground below this ridge.
- Company C: Placed initially in reserve on the east side of battle ridge. But Keogh soon realizes that Indians are not only coming up Deep Coulee. They are now to the west and on Greasy Grass Ridge. He realizes that if Indians gain Finley-Finkle ridge, they will be be unacceptably close to his position and will be able to fire with greater accuracy onto the Company L right flank. He orders Company C down to Finley-Finkle and to tie-in as best as possible with the right flank of Company L. This movement has the effect of flushing out Indians that had begin to move up Calhoun Coulee. This is a fatal move, as Finley-Finkle Ridge is vulnerable from three sides and there is nowhere to safely put the Company C horses.
9. When the collapse of the Calhoun Hill defense occurs, it occurs quickly. Gall's push from the south sends Indians through the point where the Company I and Company L lines had tied in. Company I now finds itself out of position. Indians are pouring into their rear and driving off their horses. The men panic at the sight of their horses being driven off. Discipline and tactical stablility collapses as the Company I men come down off their ridge to pursue their horses. The buffalo hunt has begun.
10. Company C men quickly discover that Finley-Finkle ridge and Calhoun Coulee are one big death trap, as Indians from the west move up the Coulee and from the south move up the lower ground between Calhoun Hill and Finley-Finkle ridge. With the twin collapses on their right and left flank, Company L begins to fall back to the north and are overrun.
11. Meanwhile, Headquarters and Company F, having gone off in pursuit of Company E with the intention of pulling it back, discovers Company E has taken casualties, possibily including some VIPs. It is the presence of casualties in Company E that prevents Custer from reuniting the five companies in his immediate command. The "long delay" on Cemetary Ridge that so puzzled Indians was due entirely to casualties. At this point, with the Keogh's collapse to the south, companies E and F and the headquarters element are doomed.
12. My argument differs from published narratives in this way:
- Other the plan to reconnoiter Ford B, there was no plan. From the moment companies E and F heard firing in their rear, all action was a reaction to events.
- There was no reunion of the five companies on Calhoun Hill after the move away from Ford B. Custer had left Keogh on Luce Ridge.
- Keogh had originally oriented Company I toward the east in the belief that a threat remained from that direction. This misplacement contributed to the collapse of Calhoun Hill.
- Custer didn't move north for irresponsible reasons. He attempted to pull back Company E from its pursuit of Indians but by the time he caught up to them they had taken casualties and were not in a position to move.
- Company C didn't come off Battle Ridge to drive Indians out of Calhoun Coulee. They came off to seize Finley-Finkle ridge.
Thanks for taking the time to read this. And fire away!
Michael
Welcome aboard, Michael Interesting post, and entirely possible to have occurred the way you describe. Keogh's battalion being on N/C and Luce ridge would have been to provide deep cover for E and F as they approached ford B. There is not much evidence of dismounted firing in the vicinity of ford B, so I don't think there would have been a large dismount by Company F, covering E's move away from the ford. Some maybe, but not the whole company. While not yet located at Calhoun Hill, Keogh could have fired at the hostiles coming across ford B, and at Wolf Tooth's band, hence the cartridge cases found on Luce and N/C, but I don't believe he would have been feeling heat on his left flank at that time. His move to Calhoun Hill and Battle Ridge would have been made due to being ordered by Custer, or because he lost sight of the Custer wing, or at least most of it, and felt he needed to follow so as to keep the 5 companies together. But by staying in the Calhoun Hill area, this indicates that perhaps Custer tells him to stay there, as by this time, if your scenario is correct, E company is in the ford D area and F company is enroute to or already at Cemetery ridge to extricate them. If Custer ordered him to stay there and wait for Benteen, that would have been almost criminal, since he would have to know that Benteen couldn't possibly arrive in a timely fashion if bringing the packs with him. The buildup of hostiles coming across ford B would also indicate remaining in that area was a bad idea. Especially if E and F are a mile away in the ford D general area. The prudent thing to do would be to have the entire battalion move to assist E and F. Now if we assume Custer told Keogh to stay and wait on Benteen, then rode off with F company, it falls to Keogh to make a command decision about aborting the stay and wait order when it becomes apparent the opposing force is way too strong for him to cover the necessary area with the few men he has. He should have realized very early on he didn't have sufficient force to cover the area required and in attempting to do so, he would put each of his companys out of supporting distance of one another. That was the time to bug out either north or east, and attempt to reunite with Custer. Failing to do this puts the blame on Keogh for his battalion's destruction. If Custer ordered Yates to chase the Indians seen according to your theory, he was falling into the same kind of trap that killed Fetterman some time before, and one would think Custer would have been able to recognize that trap and not fall into it, but maybe that's what he did. We will never know. I don't believe he made that order because he already has 3 companies removed a distance away, though not a great distance, and sending E company off on its own chasing Indians would have stretched his forces out quite thinly and made support almost impossible. Your comment about no plan is spot on, as is the observation that the cavalry was in reaction mode. From ford B on, they were totally reactive. Casualties at Cemetery Ridge could very well account for the delay at that site reported by the Indian accounts, as could Custer catching up with Yates and the two of them trying to figure out what to do next, cross at ford D and attack or go back to get Keogh. I believe the delay there was an "oh crap. Now what do we do" moment, and Custer was just then beginning to realize his fat was in the fire and he had no idea how to get it out of the fire. Of course, the Indians had a vote in what happened as they were the ones driving the bus, effectively removing any options Custer had. Your post was very thoughtful and entirely possible. I look forward to more great posts from you. Excellent post Colt. I agree wholeheartedly with the "criminal" accusation if Custer ordered Keogh to hold the area pending link up with Benteen. There is no way Custer could have realistically anticipated the timely arrival of Benteen and the packs. So why did Keogh stay? For me, it shows a complete lack of situational awareness on the part of Custer and subsequently Keogh.
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Post by fred on Jul 19, 2015 6:31:55 GMT -6
Thanks for taking the time to read this. And fire away! Michael Michael, First of all, allow me to welcome you here. It is not only nice to have a new member who is obviously interested as much as you appear to be, but it is a delight for me to see someone as knowledgable as your post indicates. So welcome to Never-Never Land. I hope you remain; I hope you continue to contribute. If you have read my book, you know where our disagreements would lodge. I haven't the time right now to go over each and every aspect of your post-- I promise I will get to it-- but the main objection I have at this time is what I see as a lack of consideration for Indian accounts... and I may be wrong so please do not accept that as an immediate criticism. The warrior accounts are extremely important and form-- along with aural and post-battle impressions and marker placements-- the only real evidence we have as to what went on. At a quick glance only, I see no use of Indian accounts in your Ford B, Deep Coulee, and Calhoun Coulee scenarios. I am something of an organizational freak and when I set out to try to figure out what happened I developed a series of spreadsheets organizing, chronologically, various accounts. By doing so, I discovered several other little tricks I think most people overlook. While your theories are certainly plausible-- and therefore possible-- they seem to fall outside the norms of this type of organization. Another thing I would suggest... you have tended to make things a little too complicated and a little outside the norm of military actions. These, however, are discussions for the next few days and weeks, hopefully. For what it is worth, I loved your post. I am sincere in my welcome, sincere in my wishes and hopes you contribute more. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by callmeconrad on Jul 19, 2015 7:37:22 GMT -6
2. As Companies E and F near the river, they become aware of firing in their rear. This was probably the event they were least expecting, and as a result, confusion sets in. To complicate matters, firing erupts from the treeline along the river's edge.
6. Within a few minutes Custer becomes aware of the enormity of what he is facing. Headquarters and Company F set out to extract Company E from the maelstrom it is wandering into. By this time, Company E is down in the Ford D vicinity. (Custer may have sent the Trumpter Dose back across Deep Coulee to communicate his intention to Keogh.)
8. Upon arriving on Calhoun Hill, Keogh deploys his three companies as follows: - Company I: Mindful that they had originally been attacked from the east, Keogh places Company I to the left of Company L and wraps them around onto the thin ridgeline behind Calhoun Hill that runs to the northwest and tapers out into the bottom. Company I horses are placed in the low ground below this ridge.
- Company C: Placed initially in reserve on the east side of battle ridge. But Keogh soon realizes that Indians are not only coming up Deep Coulee. They are now to the west and on Greasy Grass Ridge. He realizes that if Indians gain Finley-Finkle ridge, they will be be unacceptably close to his position and will be able to fire with greater accuracy onto the Company L right flank. He orders Company C down to Finley-Finkle and to tie-in as best as possible with the right flank of Company L. This movement has the effect of flushing out Indians that had begin to move up Calhoun Coulee. This is a fatal move, as Finley-Finkle Ridge is vulnerable from three sides and there is nowhere to safely put the Company C horses.
10. Company C men quickly discover that Finley-Finkle ridge and Calhoun Coulee are one big death trap, as Indians from the west move up the Coulee and from the south move up the lower ground between Calhoun Hill and Finley-Finkle ridge. With the twin collapses on their right and left flank, Company L begins to fall back to the north and are overrun.
Thanks for taking the time to read this. And fire away!
Michael
Hi Michael, Nice post and welcome aboard. I'd like to ask some questions as well as have you potentially answer some of my own: 2. A very good point that is not often considered. 6. If the situation is obvious from Calhoun Hill then why hasn't E noticed it? If still a long ways off then why doesn't Custer send a smaller group for a recall? 8, Co. I: An interesting idea, but would Custer or Keogh have considered the east to be a bigger worry then the south and west (the direction of the villiage and the main ford) so early in the fight? 8, Co. C & #10.: I've been pondering something similar for a while; I've made some maps to help but I'm still undecided. The trouble I keep hitting is why would Keogh send C Company into that situation? Again, a very intriguing post. Cheers, conrad
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