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Post by dave on Jul 19, 2015 11:36:59 GMT -6
Michael Welcome to the board. You have certainly come out of the gate full speed. Very interesting post and I will reread several times. Glad to have you with us. Regards Dave
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Post by mchlwilson on Jul 19, 2015 12:39:34 GMT -6
Thanks for taking the time to read this. And fire away! Michael Michael, First of all, allow me to welcome you here. It is not only nice to have a new member who is obviously interested as much as you appear to be, but it is a delight for me to see someone as knowledgable as your post indicates. So welcome to Never-Never Land. I hope you remain; I hope you continue to contribute. If you have read my book, you know where our disagreements would lodge. I haven't the time right now to go over each and every aspect of your post-- I promise I will get to it-- but the main objection I have at this time is what I see as a lack of consideration for Indian accounts... and I may be wrong so please do not accept that as an immediate criticism. The warrior accounts are extremely important and form-- along with aural and post-battle impressions and marker placements-- the only real evidence we have as to what went on. At a quick glance only, I see no use of Indian accounts in your Ford B, Deep Coulee, and Calhoun Coulee scenarios. I am something of an organizational freak and when I set out to try to figure out what happened I developed a series of spreadsheets organizing, chronologically, various accounts. By doing so, I discovered several other little tricks I think most people overlook. While your theories are certainly plausible-- and therefore possible-- they seem to fall outside the norms of this type of organization. Another thing I would suggest... you have tended to make things a little too complicated and a little outside the norm of military actions. These, however, are discussions for the next few days and weeks, hopefully. For what it is worth, I loved your post. I am sincere in my welcome, sincere in my wishes and hopes you contribute more. Best wishes, Fred. Hi Fred, Thanks for your kind response and consideration! I wrote in a concise style that I thought would work well for a message board, so I was leaving out plenty of detail that might better explain why I was drawing certain conclusions. I was also writing from the vantage point of the soldiers because I wanted to convey that they were confused by the events at Ford B, and that everything follows from that initial confusion. When they heard firing in the rear, and then were fired upon from across the river, the fog of war had set in. They were having trouble making sense of what was going on. So they kept moving across the flats and up into Deep Coulee. As for the Indian narratives, while I am not citing them, I do believe I am considering them. For example, the firing in the rear is the Wolf Tooth band and the firing at Ford B on the gray horse company comes from several narratives. My take on the Finley-Finkle and Calhoun Coulee events I take from Wooden Leg’s narrative as well as your treatment of it and that of Dr. Fox. I admit I may be totally wrong about this, but I can’t help but think that Company C charged off Battle Ridge in order to take FF Ridge and not to flush Indians out of Calhoun Coulee. It may have had the effect of flushing out Indians, but I find myself doubting whether that was the intent. I believe Wooden Leg’s narrative says the soldiers came down to a “low ridge”. I interpret that as Finley-Finkle. I must admit that part of the reason I believe this is because every time I’ve been on Calhoun Hill, I look down at FF Ridge and I see it through the eyes I had when I was 23 years old and I was a sergeant in the Marine Corps infantry (nearly 30 years ago.) It looks like key terrain to me! I can almost hear my lieutenant’s or company commander’s voice ordering someone down to that hill. It seems to me that Indians on Greasy Grass Ridge would want to move up to it, too. Why fire from GGR when FF is closer and provides cover as well? I have a hard time believing Keogh would want that piece of terrain to fall into Indian hands. I realized this morning that I made a mistake in what I originally posted. I had meant to say that Company C was initially in a skirmish line on Battle Ridge and not in reserve behind Battle Ridge. I conceptualize Keogh’s battalion in a “U” shaped defense. Using the map on page 166 of your book, what I imagine is: Company C in skirmish line Battle Ridge, to the right of the word “GAP”. They are the left arm of the “U” shape. They tie into Company L just below the crosses you show on Calhoun Hill. Company L is the rounded bottom of the “U” shape. They tie into Company I, which wraps back around to the northwest, to the left of the word “SWALE” and extend along that ridge. They are the right arm of the “U” shape. Fred, would you consider leading a walk around the LBH grounds at some point? I would love to walk the grounds and discuss things with you and others. Thanks! Michael
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Post by mchlwilson on Jul 19, 2015 12:44:12 GMT -6
Michael Welcome to the board. You have certainly come out of the gate full speed. Very interesting post and I will reread several times. Glad to have you with us. Regards Dave Thanks Dave!
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Post by fred on Jul 19, 2015 13:25:32 GMT -6
Fred, would you consider leading a walk around the LBH grounds at some point? I would love to walk the grounds and discuss things with you and others. Michael, First of all, I am absolutely flattered you are taking my book seriously. The fact it is driving you to any sort of conclusion, especially one where you are thinking things through, arriving at your own conclusions is, to me, the most sincere form of flattery. I want people to think about this battle. Obviously, I feel I have found the answers-- and the book cites them only partially: there is much more behind the scenes... not in answers, but in methodology, and to me, methodology rules (along with time). Having said that, I am quite open to new ideas if they can be "proven" in the same way I have "proven" mine. Unfortunately, right now, I am pressed for time... plus I am working on another thread which I am hoping might add something to a new venture of mine. That means I cannot address either of your posts in the detail they deserve. At least not at this moment. I am, however, copying-and-pasting them so I can work on answers that are deserving of your posts. Now... and this addresses the cited quote above. I was supposed to go to the LBH in June and meet up with some friends: six of us do this jaunt every other year. Family issues popped up with three of us, so we postponed it until next June. The LBHA is having its annual conference in Rapid City next year... around June 18: that weekend... and we six clowns intend on being there. Some time between then and the anniversary we will be spending several days at the battlefield. If you want to meet us there, I would be honored to walk the entire field with you-- valley included-- and we can all discuss it at our leisure. As the days go by, we shall firm things up more and more. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jul 19, 2015 13:35:09 GMT -6
I realized this morning that I made a mistake in what I originally posted. I had meant to say that Company C was initially in a skirmish line on Battle Ridge and not in reserve behind Battle Ridge. I conceptualize Keogh’s battalion in a “U” shaped defense. Using the map on page 166 of your book, what I imagine is: Company C in skirmish line Battle Ridge, to the right of the word “GAP”. They are the left arm of the “U” shape. They tie into Company L just below the crosses you show on Calhoun Hill. Company L is the rounded bottom of the “U” shape. They tie into Company I, which wraps back around to the northwest, to the left of the word “SWALE” and extend along that ridge. They are the right arm of the “U” shape. ... Michael... I forgot... I agree C Company was in skirmish line formation along Battle Ridge, but not that far north. Facing west, it is my opinion the unit's right was anchored right where (what I call) Harrington's Ridge joins Battle Ridge. Keogh was farther north. This should all be cleared up in the forthcoming issue of the LBHA's Research Review. Also... and I have meant to bring this up when I first noticed it in your original post. The military usefulness of Finley-Finckle Ridge is absolutely nil and there is no way I believe any unit was sent to defend it, fortify it, or occupy it. Think about it: it is long and narrow which means you cannot defend it in depth, and by occupying it you are allowing your enemy to get at you from three sides... south, west, and north, two of which afford greater concealment than you have, and the third a wide open run at a charge if desired... and your only means of retreat/escape is uphill. Where would you even place your horses? Of all the terrible defensive positions that entire area afford, Finley-Finckle Ridge is the worst. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 19, 2015 13:36:43 GMT -6
Fred, As I understand it the conference in Rapid starts on 16 June 2016.
Regards, Tom
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Post by chris on Jul 19, 2015 13:52:23 GMT -6
Michael, I don't post here a lot. Read though. Welcome ! Best, c.
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Post by Beth on Jul 19, 2015 16:05:39 GMT -6
Micheal I want to echo everyone with their praise of your post. It is a great read. Welcome to the group.
Beth
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Post by fred on Jul 19, 2015 19:14:03 GMT -6
Michael,
I am not sure you will like this, but I have gone over your first post and am including my responses here. I have done this a little differently, copying everything to a Word document rather than using the Proboards quote format, so my responses will be in bold italics and a different color. The rest is what you put up here originally. Here goes...
1. Companies C, I and L on Luce Ridge. Companies E and F move to the river via Medicine Tail Coulee. Headquarters moves off Luce Ridge toward the “Custer Bluff” overlooking Ford B.
This is an extremely good point and quite possible. The reasons I have chosen not to accept are as follows: (1) Custer and Yates were very close and there was no reason to send both E and F back into MTC. McClernand wrote he saw two columns in the coulee, but that can easily be explained by Smith’s choice of formations. (2) There is no Indian accounting for anything but gray horses at the base of the ford. Private Brown, whose body was found in the village, was an F Company trooper, but he could have been one of the F Company men assigned to scout ahead. That would explain his presence there. While your point is as valid as mine, it makes more sense to me—militarily—to retain Yates by my side.
2. As Companies E and F near the river, they become aware of firing in their rear. This was probably the event they were least expecting, and as a result, confusion sets in. To complicate matters, firing erupts from the treeline along the river's edge.
I would tend to doubt there would be any surprise here. With the F Company troopers out front, they would have drawn the initial fire, so the advancing E Company men—who had to see the handful of Sioux in the coulee turning and retreating toward the ford—would have expected some resistance. Your point about Indians, i. e., Wolf Tooth, to their rear is also valid, but I feel a little to early yet to appear. Remember, the volley firing—which I suspect was directed partially at them, only occurred after Benteen had reached the hilltop and this was a little too early for that. Still, your point is not unreasonable.
3. Aware that there is firing to their rear and their front, the officers of the companies E and F react conservatively. They instruct their men to keep moving across the flats and take the path of least resistance, i.e. move up Deep Coulee.
I have no issue with this, providing Custer and HQ are with them.
4. As Companies E and F move up Deep Coulee, Custer sees a relatively small number of Indians moving across Deep Coulee in the direction of Calhoun Hill. He tells Yates to pursue them. Yates sends Company E in pursuit. Company F effects an orderly retirement from the river by dismounting soldiers and providing covering fire.
There is no support for this, especially archaeological. The artifacts discovered in this area point to a slow-moving pursuit, firing at a distance and not very vigorous. If these Indians would be Wolf Tooth’s band—or part of it—I see no reason for them to be making such a move—yet!
5. Custer makes it known to Keogh that he wants him to remain on Luce Ridge and effect communication with Benteen. Headquarters and Company F continue up to Calhoun Hill vicinity to monitor Company E’s pursuit of Indians. By the time Company F and headquarters reach Calhoun Hill. Company E has moved further to the north. Headquarters and Company F pause on Calhoun Hill to take stock of the situation.
So far, to me, this is your weakest point. Indians accounts reject a piecemeal move to Calhoun Hill: piecemeal by the troops in Deep Coulee. At this point you have Custer’s command split in three parts and I seriously doubt he would have allowed that to happen at this stage in the battle.
6. Within a few minutes Custer becomes aware of the enormity of what he is facing. Headquarters and Company F set out to extract Company E from the maelstrom it is wandering into. By this time, Company E is down in the Ford D vicinity. (Custer may have sent the Trumpeter Dose back across Deep Coulee to communicate his intention to Keogh.)
This is way too soon for Custer to understand the odds: the Indians have not yet galvanized their efforts, most of them still concentrating on the diminishing valley threat. Indian forces are building, but MY timing analysis still has maximum effort, maximum build-up, still in the future.
If I am reading you correctly, you have E Company moving up Deep Coulee, then swinging north to chase Indians toward Ford D. Again, it is too early for any significant build-up there, as well, and there is also no Indian account that can be used to verify such a move. In addition, Trumpeter Dose’s body was found much closer to the ford (B) to support your contention. This would be especially true were he sent as a messenger.
7. Meanwhile, Keogh is feeling pressure on his front as Indians cross the river at Ford B. Further complicating matters, Indians starting coming off the bluffs to the south. Keogh decides that, with Indians both to his front and to his left flank, his own position is untenable and Custer's rear is wide open. He orders Company L down into Deep Coulee to cover the movements of Companies C and I off the Luce/Nye-Cartwright complex and over to Calhoun Hill. This action will protect Custer's rear and allow Keogh to orient his defense toward the south, thereby putting the Indians coming across the Ford and off the bluffs more or less on a single front.
This is a reasonable assumption and its detail is not unsupportable. I think your point is fairly accurate, but your timing is off. This would have occurred earlier, as E and F were moving up Deep Coulee toward the top of Finley-Finckle. Again, Indian accounts claim these troops (the Yates E and F battalion) moved as a single unit. Militarily, it would also make more sense for Custer to re-unite his entire command on the hilltop and finalize plans there.
8. Upon arriving on Calhoun Hill, Keogh deploys his three companies as follows:
- Company L: On a skirmish line facing south on Calhoun Hill. Company L horses are in the depression that now is the area of the modern road loop.
I have no issue with this.
- Company I: Mindful that they had originally been attacked from the east, Keogh places Company I to the left of Company L and wraps them around onto the thin ridgeline behind Calhoun Hill that runs to the northwest and tapers out into the bottom. Company I horses are placed in the low ground below this ridge.
There is no evidence for this move or troop placement (if I understand it correctly).
- Company C: Placed initially in reserve on the east side of battle ridge. But Keogh soon realizes that Indians are not only coming up Deep Coulee. They are now to the west and on Greasy Grass Ridge. He realizes that if Indians gain Finley-Finkle ridge, they will be unacceptably close to his position and will be able to fire with greater accuracy onto the Company L right flank. He orders Company C down to Finley-Finkle and to tie-in as best as possible with the right flank of Company L. This movement has the effect of flushing out Indians that had begin to move up Calhoun Coulee. This is a fatal move, as Finley-Finkle Ridge is vulnerable from three sides and there is nowhere to safely put the Company C horses.
Up until I did the work on the Custer timing and the discovery of the “gap” in Battle Ridge, I would have bought the “administrative” positioning of C and/or I companies. The timing analysis and the “gap” changed everything, however. It is important for you—and others who use my work as a template for your own theories (and that is perfectly legitimate)—to understand events and accounts drove my timeline: not me and preconceived notions!!
I reject all ideas of a voluntary movement to Finley-Finckle Ridge. As you have pointed out, it is vulnerable from three sides, a military nightmare. In addition, there is little cover and concealment there, especially compared to what is in Calhoun Coulee. Indians were loathe to expose themselves in the Deep Coulee flats; they certainly would not have taken a bare, wide-open high ground on which to move. In addition, while you can rationalize several Indian accounts claiming the battle began on FFR, a closer study of those accounts indicate those warriors had come from the Reno fighting and therefore entered this part of the battle a little late. By the time they had reached FFR Company C had already been routed out of Calhoun Coulee.
9. When the collapse of the Calhoun Hill defense occurs, it occurs quickly. Gall’s push from the south sends Indians through the point where the Company I and Company L lines had tied in. Company I now finds itself out of position. Indians are pouring into their rear and driving off their horses. The men panic at the sight of their horses being driven off. Discipline and tactical stability collapses as the Company I men come down off their ridge to pursue their horses. The buffalo hunt has begun.
Several Indian accounts claim the hardest fighting occurred on Calhoun Hill. It stands to reason: according to the archaeology, this was the only organized defense. When it broke, however, it broke quickly, probably because of the panic of retreating C Company men. The loss of both officers atop the hill and the departure of the company first sergeant abetted the rout.
Also, you are not allowing for the “gap.” Militarily, it was the most important feature in the entire area and I cannot accept that it was not seen and not defended. Keogh was no fool and while he was caught with poor options only, he HAD to set up a defense of that gap. It could NOT have been overlooked. If Keogh sent C Company anywhere, he had to have spent SOME time following their progress. The best place for that was a high point near the southern end of Battle Ridge. From that vantage point he could NOT have missed the gap to his right.
10. Company C men quickly discover that Finley-Finkle ridge and Calhoun Coulee are one big death trap, as Indians from the west move up the Coulee and from the south move up the lower ground between Calhoun Hill and Finley-Finkle ridge. With the twin collapses on their right and left flank, Company L begins to fall back to the north and are overrun.
11. Meanwhile, Headquarters and Company F, having gone off in pursuit of Company E with the intention of pulling it back, discovers Company E has taken casualties, possibility including some VIPs. It is the presence of casualties in Company E that prevents Custer from reuniting the five companies in his immediate command. The “long delay” on Cemetery Ridge that so puzzled Indians was due entirely to casualties. At this point, with the Keogh’s collapse to the south, companies E and F and the headquarters element are doomed.
There was no “long delay” on Cemetery Ridge and the only account I am aware of that even mentions it is the Stands In Timber account, obviously hearsay/lore, but something I accept as plausible. Historians and writers, never doing the timing work, harp on this “delay” as inexplicable. If you go to my book and study the timelines pertaining to that event (Figures 21 and 22) you will see virtually no time was wasted: no delay.
12. My argument differs from published narratives in this way:
- Other the plan to reconnoiter Ford B, there was no plan. From the moment companies E and F heard firing in their rear, all action was a reaction to events.
The use of the word “plan” here is relative. While I tend to agree about the specific comment, “no plan,” I think you are doing Custer something of a disservice. I believe whatever he had in his mind coalesced on Calhoun Hill when he had his entire 5 companies together. Ford B was a reconnaissance… nothing more. It was a recon based on necessity: Custer’s perception of a need to move farther north to stop the exodus of Indians. This was paramount and everything he did or planned was based on this objective. This was his objective from the start and each of his movements set something else in motion and became a reaction to that motion; but Custer precipitated it, not the warriors. He never saw his predicament until he reached Cemetery Ridge and by then it was too late… the irony being, it only became too late when he sent Yates into the basin.
- There was no reunion of the five companies on Calhoun Hill after the move away from Ford B. Custer had left Keogh on Luce Ridge.
I disagree completely with this theory.
- Keogh had originally oriented Company I toward the east in the belief that a threat remained from that direction. This misplacement contributed to the collapse of Calhoun Hill.
This makes little or no sense from a military perspective. Unless he occupied the ridge to the east, there was no place for him to set up any reasonable defensive position. Plus, the main threat came from the west, not the east.
- Custer didn’t move north for irresponsible reasons. He attempted to pull back Company E from its pursuit of Indians but by the time he caught up to them they had taken casualties and were not in a position to move.
I agree with your first sentence, but not the rest.
- Company C didn’t come off Battle Ridge to drive Indians out of Calhoun Coulee. They came off to seize Finley-Finkle ridge.
Again, I disagree completely, for two reasons: (1) there was a clear and present threat in the coulee, and (2) the futility of even considering holding FFR.
My agreements and/or disagreements have nothing to do with the quality of your ideas or your thinking. You have presented a reasonable and a cogent scenario and you are to be congratulated for it. It shows in-depth knowledge and a pretty fair understanding. My only negative comments would be a bit of a failure to understand fully-- or maybe I should say, organize-- the Indian accounts (some of them, anyway) and a lack of knowledge of military tactics. If I were a professor and you my student and this was up for an MA, I would grade you an A. Your work is far better than two masters theses I have seen done by West Pointers.
I will deal with your 2nd post and Conrad's response later.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 19, 2015 19:29:18 GMT -6
Michael,
Welcome to the forum. I can't say I particularly agree with your overall theory, and I (broadly) tend to agree with Fred's overall analysis from Ford B to wipe out, but that's a cracking opening post from a new joiner and I look forward to your further views.
WO
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Post by callmeconrad on Jul 19, 2015 21:41:24 GMT -6
I will deal with your 2nd post and Conrad's response later. Best wishes, Fred.Hi Fred, Before I take too much of a hiding, I'd like to clarify a couple of points: First, regarding the gunfire as a surprise, I agree that the fire from the ford area would have been expected. I think Keogh firing from behind would have been unexpected, but if you say it's too early for Wolf Tooth to enter then it's too early since you've got the timeline nailed down. Second, I've looked over everything again regarding C Company charging onto FF Ridge and I've decided that C did go down Calhoun Coulee then retreated to FF. I might put together a post later to describe my thought process regarding the whole matter, but I've found one particular thing that's sealed the deal for me. Cheers, conrad
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Post by fred on Jul 20, 2015 7:27:51 GMT -6
First, regarding the gunfire as a surprise, I agree that the fire from the ford area would have been expected. I think Keogh firing from behind would have been unexpected, but if you say it's too early for Wolf Tooth to enter then it's too early since you've got the timeline nailed down. Second, I've looked over everything again regarding C Company charging onto FF Ridge and I've decided that C did go down Calhoun Coulee then retreated to FF. I might put together a post later to describe my thought process regarding the whole matter, but I've found one particular thing that's sealed the deal for me. You are piquing my interest! And there is no reason for you take a hiding. I do believe you and Michael Wilson are correct about some element of surprise involved in the Keogh firing: I think the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot band surprised Keogh when it was discovered the Indians were coming down MTC from the east. That is where they were reported to have been. Based on everything I have done over the years, I am absolutely convinced-- as close 100% as I can be with this thing-- regarding my Calhoun Coulee and Finley-Fickle Ridge scenarios. To me, that is the weakest part of Michael's argument/thesis. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jul 26, 2015 19:10:10 GMT -6
(My first time posing HERE. I have posted a few times on the "other" board.)
I have spent about six full days at the battlefield over the last two years and have made my way throught most of the relevant literature on the LBH, including Fred Wagner's book. Here are my thoughts on the fall of Keogh's battalion and the ultimate destruction of the companies C,I,E,F and L:
1. Companies C, I and L on Luce Ridge. Companies E and F move to the river via Medicine Tail Coulee. Headquarters moves off Luce Ridge toward the "Custer Bluff" overlooking Ford B.
2. As Companies E and F near the river, they become aware of firing in their rear. This was probably the event they were least expecting, and as a result, confusion sets in. To complicate matters, firing erupts from the treeline along the river's edge.
3. Aware that there is firing to their rear and their front, the officers of the companies E and F react conservatively. They instruct their men to keep moving across the flats and take the path of least resistance, i.e. move up Deep Coulee.
4. As Companies E and F move up Deep Coulee, Custer sees a relatively small number of Indians moving across Deep Coulee in the direction of Calhoun Hill. He tells Yates to pursue them. Yates sends Company E in pursuit. Company F effects an orderly retirement from the river by dismounting soldiers and providing covering fire.
5. Custer makes it known to Keogh that he wants him to remain on Luce Ridge and effect communication with Benteen. Headquarters and Company F continue up to Calhoun Hill vicinity to monitor Company E's pursuit of Indians. By the time Company F and headquarters reach Calhoun Hill. Company E has moved further to the north. Headquarters and Company F pause on Calhoun Hill to take stock of the situation.
6. Within a few minutes Custer becomes aware of the enormity of what he is facing. Headquarters and Company F set out to extract Company E from the maelstrom it is wandering into. By this time, Company E is down in the Ford D vicinity. (Custer may have sent the Trumpter Dose back across Deep Coulee to communicate his intention to Keogh.)
7. Meanwhile, Keogh is feeling pressure on his front as Indians cross the river at Ford B. Further complicating matters, Indians starting coming off the bluffs to the south. Keogh decides that, with Indians both to his front and to his left flank, his own position is untenable and Custer's rear is wide open. He orders Company L down into Deep Coulee to cover the movements of Companies C and I off the Luce-Nye-Cartwright complex and over to Calhoun Hill. This action will protect Custer's rear and allow Keogh to orient his defense toward the south, thereby putting the Indians coming across the Ford and off the bluffs more or less on a single front.
8. Upon arriving on Calhoun Hill, Keogh deploys his three companies as follows:
- Company L: On a skirmish line facing south on Calhoun Hill. Company L horses are in the depression that now is the area of the modern road loop. - Company I: Mindful that they had originally been attacked from the east, Keogh places Company I to the left of Company L and wraps them around onto the thin ridgeline behind Calhoun Hill that runs to the northwest and tapers out into the bottom. Company I horses are placed in the low ground below this ridge.
- Company C: Placed initially in reserve on the east side of battle ridge. But Keogh soon realizes that Indians are not only coming up Deep Coulee. They are now to the west and on Greasy Grass Ridge. He realizes that if Indians gain Finley-Finkle ridge, they will be be unacceptably close to his position and will be able to fire with greater accuracy onto the Company L right flank. He orders Company C down to Finley-Finkle and to tie-in as best as possible with the right flank of Company L. This movement has the effect of flushing out Indians that had begin to move up Calhoun Coulee. This is a fatal move, as Finley-Finkle Ridge is vulnerable from three sides and there is nowhere to safely put the Company C horses.
9. When the collapse of the Calhoun Hill defense occurs, it occurs quickly. Gall's push from the south sends Indians through the point where the Company I and Company L lines had tied in. Company I now finds itself out of position. Indians are pouring into their rear and driving off their horses. The men panic at the sight of their horses being driven off. Discipline and tactical stablility collapses as the Company I men come down off their ridge to pursue their horses. The buffalo hunt has begun.
10. Company C men quickly discover that Finley-Finkle ridge and Calhoun Coulee are one big death trap, as Indians from the west move up the Coulee and from the south move up the lower ground between Calhoun Hill and Finley-Finkle ridge. With the twin collapses on their right and left flank, Company L begins to fall back to the north and are overrun.
11. Meanwhile, Headquarters and Company F, having gone off in pursuit of Company E with the intention of pulling it back, discovers Company E has taken casualties, possibily including some VIPs. It is the presence of casualties in Company E that prevents Custer from reuniting the five companies in his immediate command. The "long delay" on Cemetary Ridge that so puzzled Indians was due entirely to casualties. At this point, with the Keogh's collapse to the south, companies E and F and the headquarters element are doomed.
12. My argument differs from published narratives in this way:
- Other the plan to reconnoiter Ford B, there was no plan. From the moment companies E and F heard firing in their rear, all action was a reaction to events.
- There was no reunion of the five companies on Calhoun Hill after the move away from Ford B. Custer had left Keogh on Luce Ridge.
- Keogh had originally oriented Company I toward the east in the belief that a threat remained from that direction. This misplacement contributed to the collapse of Calhoun Hill.
- Custer didn't move north for irresponsible reasons. He attempted to pull back Company E from its pursuit of Indians but by the time he caught up to them they had taken casualties and were not in a position to move.
- Company C didn't come off Battle Ridge to drive Indians out of Calhoun Coulee. They came off to seize Finley-Finkle ridge.
Thanks for taking the time to read this. And fire away!
Michael
Huge quote, stand by
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Post by montrose on Jul 26, 2015 19:39:45 GMT -6
Michael,
You raise some interesting points.
But I see your theory as a variant of the fatalistic theory, with an extremely low probability of reflecting events.
Friendly situation. LTC Custer with 2 Companies vicinity Ford B. CPT Keogh with 3 companies on Nye Ridge, out of supporting range of Custer.
Enemy situation. 30-50 Indians east of river. (The term Wolf Tooth Band implies a command and control that was nonexistent). A handful at Ford B. But massive numbers in the village area.
Sidebar. How many warriors were at LBH? Reasonable estimates are 1200 minimum to 3k maximum. So if 900 were fighting Reno then 300 to 2100 were still in the village to fight Custer. LTC Custer went to Ford B (ok 350 meters from Ford B) and blinked. He did not withdraw from the handful of Indians 3 meters from the ford,. He saw the massive force in the village, and withdrew.
The chase hypothesis. You state that E Company attacked a few Indians east of the river and north of Ford B. Estimated numbers 10. They chased these Indians for more than a mile, to Ford D are. LTC Custer took F Company and HHD to follow and support E Company attack.
I mean no offense, I hope I can make a discussion without emotion.
Why send 40% of your combat power to chase 10 Indians on your side of the river, when you have at least 1500 on the other side?
If LTC Custer saw a combat threat in the Ford B excursion, I see no possible scenario where he would have split his force.
The more reasonable conclusion is that LTC Custer assumed away the enemy threat, and hoped no enemy force would cross the river.
Hope is not a method. LTC Custer created a cloud cuckoo land where he ignored all the evidence of enemy locations, size, dispositions, activities, abilities, capabilities, culture, weapons, tactics, operations, intent and a few dozen other factors. His ignorance at LBH stands out from his actions in 1867, 1868, 1873, 1874.
Why did he not follow his own previous behavior?
Sidebar Two. LBH is unique in stating that a ridiculous theory that The Indians always ran from US forces. This right up there with the US Army never lost a battle in Vietnam, or that US drug gangs do not commit violence. The Indian actions at LBH filled the following conditions in IPB: The most probable enemy course of action. They dis what they were most likely to do.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 30, 2015 7:35:46 GMT -6
Sidebar. How many warriors were at LBH? Reasonable estimates are 1200 minimum to 3k maximum. So if 900 were fighting Reno then 300 to 2100 were still in the village to fight Custer. LTC Custer went to Ford B (ok 350 meters from Ford B) and blinked. He did not withdraw from the handful of Indians 3 meters from the ford,. He saw the massive force in the village, and withdrew.
Sometimes the obvious is overlooked.
Thanks for that view William it makes sense to me. I could never figure why Custer would let a few Indians prevent him from crossing.
Regards
Steve
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