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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 18:50:55 GMT -6
The one thing that can un-controversially be said about the 7th cavalry in 1876 was that it was imprinted with the personality of its Lt Col in a way that would never be considered healthy in a modern combat regiment. There was clearly nepotism, but how badly in practical terms did this "Custer clan" mentality actually degrade the combat efficiency of the 5 companies that quickly disintegrated between circa 4pm and circa 4.40pm on 25 June 1876?
We know that TWC was not commanding C Company on this campaign. Did Harrington recklessly charge with C Company of his own volition and, if so, why? Was he ordered to by Keogh? If ordered by Keogh, why?
We know that Calhoun was defending steadily with L Company, until C Company got into trouble. Did the collapse of C Company do for L Company? Were L Company given advance notice of the movement by Harrington or Keogh? Why did L Company not timeously evacuate, given the distance to their horse holders? Was Calhoun constrained by orders from above?
Why did I Company put up so little resistance in the swale beyond the DR head cut? What orders had GAC given Keogh, to cause Keogh's battalion to be so widely dispersed and out of mutual support? Why did the entire Keogh battalion not evacuate northwards long before overrun? Was Keogh incompetent, constrained by GAC's orders, or independently reluctant to pull away from the rest of the regiment?
Why did E Company lose so many of their critical mounts, and end up butchered in Deep Ravine?
Why did F Company find itself fixed up on LSH, a position from which they could do little damage and actually did even less?
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 18:51:40 GMT -6
This will be interesting, and I think the end result will entail pealing Custer away layer by layer like an onion. The answers at not to be found on LSH or Battle Ridge. The answers are as far back as Monroe Michigan
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Post by mac on Jul 13, 2015 18:51:53 GMT -6
Gotta go back to work. More later. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 18:56:22 GMT -6
The possibility that occurs to me is that he had orders that specified a time to stay at that position. (This links to my suggestion on the Custer plan thread). The near synchronous return of Custer to Cemetery and the over run of Keogh may be linked in that Keogh overstayed as he had a time to leave to meet Custer. Such a time would suggest the Keogh position is more than just some kind of defense, in fact perhaps not defensive at all. Cheers Mac,
Why the Keogh battalion overstayed their welcome on battle ridge is the key to understanding why the GAC wing got massacred.
Not why GAC got defeated, which we have explored elsewhere, but why he got killed as part of a needless massacre.
There was no hostile force blocking his east, and little to his north.
WO
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Post by Beth on Jul 13, 2015 19:13:50 GMT -6
Beth, No Lt Col requires an ADC, and certainly not if it leaves his company in the sole custody of a 2nd Lt. They clearly didn't appreciate the extent of the hostiles build-up via Ford B. WO Thanks for the correction. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 19:15:37 GMT -6
No worries Beth.
It makes a change from getting "This post is hidden" in having a post from you or Mac....
WO
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Post by Beth on Jul 13, 2015 19:28:53 GMT -6
LOL hopefully post at the scrolling is worth reading. It reminds me of living in Florida, ever day you have a thunderstorm come through that causes all sorts of disruptions, outages, and traffic problems, but each storm quickly blows itself out and leaves behind a cooler brighter day.
Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 19:46:14 GMT -6
Just a reminder in case anybody doesn't want to see my posts on this forum. Select my name to view my profile. It will give you a menu that to the right will be the options; Follow, send message, and the little wheel icon. Select the little wheel icon and select block member. That's all you have to do. You will never have to read more than one post from me or any other user on this forum using this facility. It's so easy.
WO
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Post by montrose on Jul 13, 2015 21:00:34 GMT -6
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Post by mac on Jul 13, 2015 21:06:54 GMT -6
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Post by mac on Jul 13, 2015 21:09:22 GMT -6
The possibility that occurs to me is that he had orders that specified a time to stay at that position. (This links to my suggestion on the Custer plan thread). The near synchronous return of Custer to Cemetery and the over run of Keogh may be linked in that Keogh overstayed as he had a time to leave to meet Custer. Such a time would suggest the Keogh position is more than just some kind of defense, in fact perhaps not defensive at all. Cheers Mac,
Why the Keogh battalion overstayed their welcome on battle ridge is the key to understanding why the GAC wing got massacred.
Not why GAC got defeated, which we have explored elsewhere, but why he got killed as part of a needless massacre.
There was no hostile force blocking his east, and little to his north.
WO
[/font][/p][/quote] The warriors would have quickly moved to block these exits I would think. When do you see no impediment to an escape? Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 21:11:23 GMT -6
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Post by quincannon on Jul 13, 2015 21:22:52 GMT -6
Unfortunate but true.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 21:29:23 GMT -6
Mac,
Why the Keogh battalion overstayed their welcome on battle ridge is the key to understanding why the GAC wing got massacred.
Not why GAC got defeated, which we have explored elsewhere, but why he got killed as part of a needless massacre.
There was no hostile force blocking his east, and little to his north.
WO
The warriors would have quickly moved to block these exits I would think. When do you see no impediment to an escape? Cheers Mac,
How would they block 200+ soldiers moving to the east?
Admittedly there are greater problems at Ford D and heading down the valley towards the Montana column...
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 13, 2015 21:39:32 GMT -6
The one thing that can un-controversially be said about the 7th cavalry in 1876 was that it was imprinted with the personality of its Lt Col in a way that would never be considered healthy in a modern combat regiment. There was clearly nepotism, but how badly in practical terms did this "Custer clan" mentality actually degrade the combat efficiency of the 5 companies that quickly disintegrated between circa 4pm and circa 4.40pm on 25 June 1876?
We know that TWC was not commanding C Company on this campaign. Did Harrington recklessly charge with C Company of his own volition and, if so, why? Was he ordered to by Keogh? If ordered by Keogh, why?
We know that Calhoun was defending steadily with L Company, until C Company got into trouble. Did the collapse of C Company do for L Company? Were L Company given advance notice of the movement by Harrington or Keogh? Why did L Company not timeously evacuate, given the distance to their horse holders? Was Calhoun constrained by orders from above?
Why did I Company put up so little resistance in the swale beyond the DR head cut? What orders had GAC given Keogh, to cause Keogh's battalion to be so widely dispersed and out of mutual support? Why did the entire Keogh battalion not evacuate northwards long before overrun? Was Keogh incompetent, constrained by GAC's orders, or independently reluctant to pull away from the rest of the regiment?
Why did E Company lose so many of their critical mounts, and end up butchered in Deep Ravine?
Why did F Company find itself fixed up on LSH, a position from which they could do little damage and actually did even less?
WO So what can we deduce about GAC, from his upbringing, West Point, his ACW service, his marriage, his service with the 7th cavalry, his troubles in 1875-76?
WO
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