Tullock's Creek and the Yellowstone "northern barrier"

[welshofficer]

Jun 6, 2015 16:02:11 GMT -6 quincannon said:

Moving up Tullocks toward the Yellowstone, is certainly a possibility, and a viable option.

The thing that mitigates against it I think is that the Indians would not know it was clear, and it would take some time to determine that. Time is money.

I have never been there. I think Tom has and maybe he can comment. Is there sufficient water for sustainability? My impression from the map is that it is a fairly narrow corridor with very difficult ground close in on both sides. Feel free to relieve me of this notion if it is incorrect.

Water availability and narrowness of corridor are mitigating factors. Someone help me out here.

QC,

I am thinking in close combat terms.

GAC attacks from the south, in concentrated force. The assault is held, sufficiently to spend the 7th's "silver bullet", and the hostiles or the majority withdraw northwards down TC. Terry/Gibbon have moved westwards into the BH, having received no word from GAC via Herendeen. We now have the hostiles north of GAC, east of Terry/Gibbon and west of the Powder River depot, heading for the Yellowstone. What are the crossing issues....?

WO  

[quincannon]

You mean other than Terry and Custer's pending trip to the unemployment line I guess.

The hostiles still do not know that Terry has crossed over into the LBH valley.

Depends if Custer is still viable after he has spent. How long is travel time? How much water to sustain? Fords of the Yellowstone available without having to go too far east or west? No substantial military barrier to movement.

Throw a screen across Tullock's Creek, a strong one and go for it. I rate it at 80 percent plus as working.

[welshofficer]

Jun 6, 2015 18:23:31 GMT -6 quincannon said:

You mean other than Terry and Custer's pending trip to the unemployment line I guess.

The hostiles still do not know that Terry has crossed over into the LBH valley.

Depends if Custer is still viable after he has spent. How long is travel time? How much water to sustain? Fords of the Yellowstone available without having to go too far east or west? No substantial military barrier to movement.

Throw a screen across Tullock's Creek, a strong one and go for it. I rate it at 80 percent plus as working.

QC,

That's the issue (in blue ink), if the (majority of the) screened hostiles had turned down TC rather than down the LBH on 25/6 in response to a concentrated southern attack by GAC. Terry's 9 companies are to the West (in the BH), plus also the detached infantry companies under Baker (the steamer?) and Kirtland (mouth of the BH?)? Another 5 infantry companies and the horseless 7th are way to the east at the Powder River depot. So just need to find a way northwards across the Yellowstone...?

WO

[quincannon]

And by Custer not conducting a reconnaissance of Tullock's Terry crossed hostile ground causing a delay, and left the front door open to boot.

Sounds like Custer could have provided a daily double winner for the Indians had they chosen to go that way.

[welshofficer]

QC,

There was always a co-ordination issue with a massed southern attack that was held. If the hostiles had moved down the LBH whilst Terry's 9 companies were in TC, there was a similar problem. Possibly worse. The steamer might take a safe position, but Kirtland's infantry company...?

WO

[quincannon]

KISS WO KISS. Like the concubines these two Terry and Custer did not take the affair seriously enough and they giggled. Knowing their limitations any plan they came up with should have been simple. We concentrate too much on what was, and we do not see the flaws in the basic plan, flaws like what you just pointed out. The plan itself stunk for then, and probably now as well.

If you do not adequately whiff a plan before you put it in action, bad results occur.

[welshofficer]

QC,

Fred has got me thinking on TC. There are all sorts of issues. What if GAC had remained undiscovered and holed up until the 26th? Terry comes up TC, only to find that the village has moved northerly down the LBH from their 25 June 1876 location? Tricky.

WO

[quincannon]

Again what we are both saying is that these people were on a brigade sized snipe hunt.

The ideal solution is to find before you maneuver. That is tough, but such action a prior and thorough reconnaissance of the potential battle space, would have provided for Terry all of the whiffs, so they could be addressed by allocation of forces. There is no guarantee, in fact a high probability against the hostiles staying in once place, but at least you would know the lay of the land, last known location, and put probabilities on direction and pace of travel, all more than Terry had going in.

It is a huge battle space, that is no surprise to anyone, but I think with patience it could have been done.

I always find it prudent to take a good long look before you leap.

[welshofficer]

QC,

Takes us back to that entire flawed "touch an go" mentality....

WO

[quincannon]

WO: If you have your mental in place, the physical becomes easier, and better results are usually achieved.

Good teams beat their opponent mentally before they ever step on the field.

Not a new concept, for it can be traced back at least twenty five hundred years, just on this occasion an unused concept.

[welshofficer]

QC,

This all goes back to the defeatist "touch and go" philosophy to counteract dispersal or scattering.

The mischief requiring remedy was avoiding discovery upon "touch".

WO

[quincannon]

Sounds like you are saying that the United States Army required dedicated scouts, schooled in the art of reconnaissance, rather than hirelings, scabs, out of work relatives, and who could communicate their findings to their commander in the King's English, and I trust you are expecting no argument from me.

Professional armies organize themselves professionally. Our Cousins had no problem finding people like I describe in the French and Indian (Rogers) and Revolutionary War (The Queen's Rangers), Lee had no problem either finding partisan rangers to fulfill the task, and all three lessons from the past were ignored in the post-ACW tables of organization, and remained so until World War II.

It's all in "The Point" Justin.

[tubman13]

Wo,
Sorry this response took so long. Yes the NA's could have moved through TC. Amount of water better sometimes than others. We must consider what they are dragging. Also I have only been on paved roads in to that area. I do not how if the area has changed over 139 years. The key to all of this is what they are dragging, they had no wheels. How many ponies and needs would be lost.

I think that they would have been run down, or have lost most of their belongings and scattered north and east.

Aside from floating, visiting Eagles Nest, I will ask AZ if he wants to inspect TC. I will also ask Rangers at the park. I don't have a horse, and would not take one that far if I did. That would be the proper way to inspect, if the Crows would not shoot me.

Regards,
Tom

[welshofficer]

Tom,

How much harassment would surely depend upon the damage done to the 7th....?

I don't see much harassing coming from Brisbin, if the 7th have been severely mauled before the hostiles mostly withdraw northwards down TC towards the Yellowstone?

WO

[tubman13]

WO,
Consider whatever portion of the 7th remains intact joins with the existent 2nd Cav. The NA's can only go so fast. They can't remain together, if they do they will only be as fast as their slowest. A cohesive fighting force would dwindle. I am not saying cavalry attempt to engage in battle at this point, just don't let them stop and eat or camp. Remember some of the infantry is mounted as well. If the warriors attack you fall back on your main body. The most important thing is don't get sucked into a trap. You may not get the win you wanted but you are clearing the plains. I think the majority would angle for the reservations. Again a group of circles that large can not even outdistance the infantry.