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Post by welshofficer on Jun 2, 2015 12:05:44 GMT -6
I think it is fair to say that nobody has to be a great student of military history to appreciate that Terry was using the Yellowstone river to logistically facilitate his summer 1876 campaign.
Much of his infantry was stretched out along it. 3 companies of the 6I, with another (B/6I) aboard a steamer, and 2 companies of the 17I. Terry/Gibbon left B/7I at a further depot at the mouth of the BH river before the remaining 5 companies of the 7I and 4 companies of the 2C moved up Tullock's Creek before, in the absence of any report from GAC via Herendeen, making the difficult crossing of the divide between TC and the BH valley.
It follows on that Terry wanted to keep the hostiles south of the Yellowstone, to minimise the risk to and the interference with his supply lines.
So what were the issues involved if GAC had attacked in force from the southern end of the hostile village in the LBH valley?
How would any dispersing or scattering hostiles be driven into the arms of Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin...., and not allowed to escape via another valley and possibly to cross the Yellowstone river without meeting serious resistance?
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 2, 2015 12:40:52 GMT -6
WO, We have talked all around this. Glad you propose a frontal assault on the topic. First the Yellowstone would not be an easy river to cross if the NA's managed to slip by the blocking force. The terrain to the east would have been difficult, the Crow to the west, would not be welcoming. Pursuit would be the name of the game, if Custer had done the proper assault from the south. The campaign probably could have been completed by years end.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Colt45 on Jun 2, 2015 12:42:24 GMT -6
WO, If Custer had mounted a southern valley attack, as we described in the other thread, and had more or less routed them, most would have fled north toward Terry, some would have moved east, and some probably would have tried west, into Crow territory. The northbound fleeing NDNs would be grabbed or engaged by Terry/Gibbon, which probably would have been the majority. The few that went east or west would be without shelter or sustenance and would most likely return to the reservations on their own.
If Custer hadn't routed the hostiles, but fought to a stalemate, the majority of the NDNs would still be in the battle area when Terry arrived from the north, assuming he gets there by the 27th. The southern route to the Big Horn mountains would be blocked. Again, movement to the west is not a good option, nor is east a real attractive option either, so if they get tired of a prolonged battle with Custer, they move north, right to Terry. Some will move off to the east, but again they won't have the staying power to avoid going to the reservations at some point.
Given the overall mission of getting them back to the reservations, I don't think a small contingent that escapes the army would have presented a problem to Sheridan. He would have accepted that as the price of doing business, knowing full well the majority have been returned and their ability to resist removed.
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Post by Beth on Jun 2, 2015 12:57:48 GMT -6
I wonder practically if Sheridan just needed a few key individuals either returned to the reservation or killed to consider the campaign a success. If Custer had managed to take someone like Gall and Crazy Horse with him for example or capture Sitting Bull the end results would have been a lot different. Perhaps biggest problem in the eyes of some wasn't that Custer got himself and 210 others killed but that they failed to take any significant amount of the tribal leadership with them?
Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 2, 2015 12:59:09 GMT -6
Tubman13/Colt45,
With TC undefended and Terry having moved across to the BH, I think the key issues are:
(1) GAC to attack in such force that there is a scattering rather than any semi-organised dispersal;
(2) The natural escape route for most would be away from the southern attack and northwards down the LBH valley;
(3) That's where you want any remaining combat resistance to also go, into the welcoming arms of Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin.
What, if anything, might GAC do to minimise any flight eastwards towards TC/the Rosebud?
WO
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Post by Colt45 on Jun 2, 2015 13:01:37 GMT -6
Beth, you have an interesting point. Public opinion certainly could have viewed the campaign as a success, even with Custer and his 210 dead, if Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, Gall, and/or a few other well-known names had been killed or captured. I think the army would most certainly have played the battle as a success, and would probably have spun the Custer defeat as the great sacrifice that allowed for the main Indian leaders to be killed/captured, if things had played out with the chiefs killed or captured.
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Post by Colt45 on Jun 2, 2015 13:07:12 GMT -6
WO, If Custer had been thinking clearly, he would have had almost all of his regiment in the valley, where the fight was. However, if he were concerned with escape via Tullock's, he could have sent 1, maybe 2 (though 1 is probably best), companies up the bluffs and off to the east to guard the route east, in case any northward fleeing hostiles got the idea of changing direction and moving east through the area Terry could have advanced down to LBH if Herendeen had been sent to scout Tullock's and had reported that route to Terry. Of course, had Custer followed the order to scout Tullock's and report to Terry, Terry and Gibbon might have arrived at LBH on the 26th, thus changing everything we know today.
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 2, 2015 13:08:55 GMT -6
I wonder practically if Sheridan just needed a few key individuals either returned to the reservation or killed to consider the campaign a success. If Custer had managed to take someone like Gall and Crazy Horse with him for example or capture Sitting Bull the end results would have been a lot different. Perhaps biggest problem in the eyes of some wasn't that Custer got himself and 210 others killed but that they failed to take any significant amount of the tribal leadership with them? Beth Beth,
I don't know re: managing expectations. 265 is a large number. Compare Gratton and Fetterman. And the right wing of the regiment was a 210 man wipe out.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 2, 2015 13:24:52 GMT -6
WO, If Custer had been thinking clearly, he would have had almost all of his regiment in the valley, where the fight was. However, if he were concerned with escape via Tullock's, he could have sent 1, maybe 2 (though 1 is probably best), companies up the bluffs and off to the east to guard the route east, in case any northward fleeing hostiles got the idea of changing direction and moving east through the area Terry could have advanced down to LBH if Herendeen had been sent to scout Tullock's and had reported that route to Terry. Of course, had Custer followed the order to scout Tullock's and report to Terry, Terry and Gibbon might have arrived at LBH on the 26th, thus changing everything we know today. Colt45,
(1) So concentrate firepower in the southern valley, but 1 or 2 companies to cautiously show themselves on the eastern bluffs to discourage easterly flight?
(2) If Terry came up TC, there is a risk of GAC attacking before Terry entered the LBH and with the north undefended but for the steamer (B/6I) at LBH mouth and the company (B/7I) at BH mouth?
(3) If any attack is on the 26th, Terry might still not be in a position north of the village or the village moves northwards down the LBH to beyond where TC joins?
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 2, 2015 13:27:31 GMT -6
Tubman13/Colt45, With TC undefended and Terry having moved across to the BH, I think the key issues are: (1) GAC to attack in such force that there is a scattering rather than any semi-organised dispersal; (2) The natural escape route for most would be away from the southern attack and northwards down the LBH valley; (3) That's where you want any remaining combat resistance to also go, into the welcoming arms of Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin. What, if anything, might GAC do to minimise any flight eastwards towards TC/the Rosebud? WO I would think if the escape was to the east, going would be tough, at last at first. They would have a difficult time moving that herd and needs for sustainment. They would be followed, tough to stop for a picnic. Also that was the basic direction of the reservations. They could scatter, but Custer had just been through those badlands, not much forage. They would have to have some sort of blocking force to delay the 7th and Terry's wings. Your initial proposal above would have been the worst case scenario for the NA's. If they get away east there are still rivers to cross, badlands, and hopefully a relentless trailing force
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Jun 2, 2015 13:27:46 GMT -6
I wonder practically if Sheridan just needed a few key individuals either returned to the reservation or killed to consider the campaign a success. If Custer had managed to take someone like Gall and Crazy Horse with him for example or capture Sitting Bull the end results would have been a lot different. Perhaps biggest problem in the eyes of some wasn't that Custer got himself and 210 others killed but that they failed to take any significant amount of the tribal leadership with them? Beth Beth,
I don't know re: managing expectations. 265 is a large number. Compare Gratton and Fetterman. And the right wing of the regiment was a 210 man wipe out.
WO
It is a very large number and I would never make light their loss. However if something could have been salvaged from Custer's defeat then it would have been a less bitter pill to swallow. If today we had a similar loss of life or percentage of loss in a battle that took out a few key people on the enemy's side and forced the enemy to give up their position and scatter--would it be a win or a loss? Would it appear different to the public eye than it would to the military? Thanks for heads up on the number. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 2, 2015 13:31:13 GMT -6
Beth,
I don't know re: managing expectations. 265 is a large number. Compare Gratton and Fetterman. And the right wing of the regiment was a 210 man wipe out.
WO
It is a very large number and I would never make light their loss. However if something could have been salvaged from Custer's defeat then it would have been a less bitter pill to swallow. If today we had a similar loss of life or percentage of loss in a battle that took out a few key people on the enemy's side and forced the enemy to give up their position and scatter--would it be a win or a loss? Would it appear different to the public eye than it would to the military? Thanks for heads up on the number. Beth Beth,
Not sure how Bush or Obama would have sold losing 1% of the entire US Army in a single battle in Iraq or Afghanistan?!
WO
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Post by Beth on Jun 2, 2015 13:43:40 GMT -6
It is a very large number and I would never make light their loss. However if something could have been salvaged from Custer's defeat then it would have been a less bitter pill to swallow. If today we had a similar loss of life or percentage of loss in a battle that took out a few key people on the enemy's side and forced the enemy to give up their position and scatter--would it be a win or a loss? Would it appear different to the public eye than it would to the military? Thanks for heads up on the number. Beth Beth,
Not sure how Bush or Obama would have sold losing 1% of the entire US Army in a single battle in Iraq or Afghanistan?!
WO
Very carefully. As Twain said. Facts are stubborn, statistics are pliable. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 6, 2015 15:45:50 GMT -6
Tubman13/Colt45, With TC undefended and Terry having moved across to the BH, I think the key issues are: (1) GAC to attack in such force that there is a scattering rather than any semi-organised dispersal; (2) The natural escape route for most would be away from the southern attack and northwards down the LBH valley; (3) That's where you want any remaining combat resistance to also go, into the welcoming arms of Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin. What, if anything, might GAC do to minimise any flight eastwards towards TC/the Rosebud? WO I would think if the escape was to the east, going would be tough, at last at first. They would have a difficult time moving that herd and needs for sustainment. They would be followed, tough to stop for a picnic. Also that was the basic direction of the reservations. They could scatter, but Custer had just been through those badlands, not much forage. They would have to have some sort of blocking force to delay the 7th and Terry's wings. Your initial proposal above would have been the worst case scenario for the NA's. If they get away east there are still rivers to cross, badlands, and hopefully a relentless trailing force
Regards, Tom
Tom,
But if they move northwards down TC after Terry/Gibbon have moved to the BH/LBH...? Who is then blocking the Yellowstone, subject to crossing issues? The only concentrated force is the 5 infantry companies and the "additional 7th battalion" (dismounted) operating out of the Powder River depot....?
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 6, 2015 16:02:11 GMT -6
Moving up Tullocks toward the Yellowstone, is certainly a possibility, and a viable option.
The thing that mitigates against it I think is that the Indians would not know it was clear, and it would take some time to determine that. Time is money.
I have never been there. I think Tom has and maybe he can comment. Is there sufficient water for sustainability? My impression from the map is that it is a fairly narrow corridor with very difficult ground close in on both sides. Feel free to relieve me of this notion if it is incorrect.
Water availability and narrowness of corridor are mitigating factors. Someone help me out here.
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