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Post by quincannon on Feb 9, 2014 9:46:53 GMT -6
Mac: I am with Montrose on this. Custer never imagined this thing would play out in any way, other than what he conceived would happen. Showing himself at B was a double dumb move.
Those Indians may have only seen Reno at that time, not including Wolf Tooth sighting and harassment of Custer, but I think they could, and did assume that if Reno was there, that others would be around as well. Surprise is relative in that you could be surprised at where they did show up, but not surprised, therefore wary of possible presence. Like I said above there were ten ways to win this battle, maybe even decisively, with what Custer had, and he chose the one way it could be lost.
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Post by fred on Feb 9, 2014 12:40:35 GMT -6
As far as I am concerned, Custer made three fatal mistakes that day...
(1) ... he abandoned his plan of supporting Reno directly and turned his five companies to the right, mounting the eastern ridges of the Little Big Horn River. This move sealed Reno’s fate.
(2) This move north, linking up with Keogh on Calhoun Hill was the second fateful—and fatal—decision Custer made this day. This is the one that took him-- irretrievably-- out of any semblance of support and it allowed Indians to fill the void between Custer and any hope of reinforcement.
(3) The move north to Ford D became the final fateful decision Custer made and the one sealing his doom.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 9, 2014 13:35:52 GMT -6
Hi Fred, good stuff;
(1) ... he abandoned his plan of supporting Reno directly and turned his five companies to the right, mounting the eastern ridges of the Little Big Horn River. This move sealed Reno’s fate.
Yes Fred, but what would be his reason for doing that, did he miss judge the distance and time it would take? And did he also have faith in Reno to hold the whole combative force that a village this size would contain?
(2) This move north, linking up with Keogh on Calhoun Hill was the second fateful—and fatal—decision Custer made this day. This is the one that took him-- irretrievably-- out of any semblance of support and it allowed Indians to fill the void between Custer and any hope of reinforcement.
Again I agree, especially with Deep Coulee acting like a giant ditch separating him from Blummer-Nye-Cartwright Ridge.
(3) The move north to Ford D became the final fateful decision Custer made and the one sealing his doom.
His decision to move north could have easier by the Indians ability to use the terrain, it may have looked all hunky dory on his left flank but in reality these bluffs and trees held a lot of places to gather and all out of view.
Ian.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 9, 2014 14:36:53 GMT -6
Ian, You asked what would be his reason for turning to the bluffs from Reno Creek. This thread is from a year ago where I asked something similar. lbha.proboards.com/thread/4395/custers-turn-reno-creek-rightThink I'll try starting up the daily history post tomorrow morning, expanded just a tad to include things other than military that may spark interest. Best, c.
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Post by alfakilo on Feb 9, 2014 14:41:16 GMT -6
I am really enjoying this discussion!
Whenever the talk turns to intel and recce regarding Custer's split at Ford A and his subsequent moves north of Ford B, I am always reminded of those who insist that he had an expert on the lay of the land in Bouyer. I'm not a believer in Bouyer knowing the LBH area "like the back of his hand"...this implies a level of specific knowledge that I find hard to credit Bouyer with, for if this was the case, then why did Custer do what he did?
I suppose it's possible that Bouyer did have this intimate knowledge of the east side of the river and Custer simply ignored him.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 9, 2014 14:49:32 GMT -6
Hello chaps, yes why would he take his men on a journey lasting nearly an hour? I am sure the AZ has mentioned that there is a shorter way to MTC then the treacherous Cedar coulee (if I have got that wrong Steve I apologise in advance), if there was a short route then Bouyer must have missed it, if he did know that a shorter rout existed and never told the good Colonel, then Custer himself should have hit him on the head.
I also remember the thread on the link you posted (now that I have seen it again).
Go for it Chris and good luck!
Ian.
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Post by Margaret on Feb 9, 2014 15:19:57 GMT -6
Fred...
thanks for your replies.... I shall not persist with the crossings at Ford B, as I now understand from your last post that you think the movement to the right across the bluffs was the first of Custer's fatal mistakes... so do I take it from this that you think he should have kept to his original plan and followed Reno?... is that what you would have done?
...so, with this in mind.. I would like to pose the question to you, or anyone else who has been in a military leadership role.... that, if supporting Reno in the valley, what would you expect to be able to achieve, and do you think you could have achieved it...? there would now be about 350 of you... with Benteen and the pack train still to come up...so unavailable for this initial engagement... presumably you still could not afford to wait....
...if you are supporting Reno from the south end, then there are no easy pickings - non-combatants - along the way for you.... would you expect the several hundred Indians to your immediate front, at the Garryowen Loop area.. to move out the way...? how would you see this through, with the, it seems to me, quite limited range of firepower at your disposal....that is unsuited to horseback delivery...
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Post by Margaret on Feb 9, 2014 15:27:51 GMT -6
Margaret: Cavalry operations in Virginia during the ACW were largely an exercise in either exploiting fords, or guarding/watching them. It is inconceivable to me then that a man who had served in the cavalry and in Virginia, did not realize the importance of a ford, and how an unguarded or lightly guarded ford one minute could become a festering boil on your backside the very next. The fords should have been heavily outposted, particularly if Custer expected Benteen to follow his trail up on the bluffs. The problem is one not of it being a good idea, but one of non-existent resources to do the job. Custer was waging a Champagne battle on a Budwiser budget. ....I like this very much...as it is what I suspected and feel it reinforces my opinion... perhaps if he had managed to keep everyone closer together... he might have done something like that...although as I said before, he seems to have had a fair disregard for them, in this instance...
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Post by montrose on Feb 9, 2014 16:01:27 GMT -6
Look at the intelligence situation when LTC Custer turned right. MAJ Reno was crossing the river and heading north. Varnum had just reported in also with a report of signs of a village northfrom Ford A. No one had positive information of the exact size and disposition of the village. There was no possible way to see or know of a ford in an appropriate location downstream.
So I assume Bouyer or another Crow told him about another ford. Note that 3411 is the fastest vantage point once you climb that ridge. From here he is able to see not just the village, the herds, the warriors; but also confirm fording sites downstream. If he was wrong about fords he was still able to turn back and head to Ford A. He had ridden well ahead of the main body when he went up the bluffs. Custer was showing prudent decision making so far. (Screwing the pooch occurs downstream, where each of his decisions leads to higher risks, for lower gains).
In fact, I believe that Reno's messengers arrived while he was gone. Cooke send his own orderly, the infamous rogue Goldin, back to Reno since GAC was not there, and he had no authority to use an assigned HQ messenger. Goldin never delivered this message, and forgot what it was. It was probably of little consequence, something on the order of keep going.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 9, 2014 16:20:10 GMT -6
I don't think you can see anything north of Weir Pt. and Sharpshooter Ridge from 3411. You could certainly see the pony herd and the south end of the village, depending which tale is prominent today of its extent but enough to elevate Custer's previous assumptions to "larger than I'd have thought.....", obtainable from the pony herd alone. I do not think he could confirm a fording site downstream, nor the existence of MTC whatsoever. He certainly could do ALL that from Weir Point. It's 2.5 to 3 miles straight line to what might be seen of MTC ford, but foliage, smoke and else might inhibit the view, and in any case I don't know if that would be apparent at that distance.
Admitting the importance of 3411 does not dispel the realization that it surely would be apparent to Custer he'd have to get to Weir to see all that needed to be seen to the west of LBH. Of course, it would be too late to reverse course for Reno support after he did so. It then became important to do something constructive, and I think they headed down Cedar or Weir coulee to MTC OR headed along the the current road to MTCF. Or Keogh alone took the latter.
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Post by montrose on Feb 9, 2014 16:24:31 GMT -6
Fred... thanks for your replies.... I shall not persist with the crossings at Ford B, as I now understand from your last post that you think the movement to the right across the bluffs was the first of Custer's fatal mistakes... so do I take it from this that you think he should have kept to his original plan and followed Reno?... is that what you would have done? ...so, with this in mind.. I would like to pose the question to you, or anyone else who has been in a military leadership role.... that, if supporting Reno in the valley, what would you expect to be able to achieve, and do you think you could have achieved it...? there would now be about 350 of you... with Benteen and the pack train still to come up...so unavailable for this initial engagement... presumably you still could not afford to wait.... ...if you are supporting Reno from the south end, then there are no easy pickings - non-combatants - along the way for you.... would you expect the several hundred Indians to your immediate front, at the Garryowen Loop area.. to move out the way...? how would you see this through, with the, it seems to me, quite limited range of firepower at your disposal....that is unsuited to horseback delivery... 1. The valley fight. The Reno Bn advanced with the river providing some protection to the right flank and the left flank in the air. Reno committed his reserve company to extend the line left, but he needed at least 3 more companies to cover his flank. He sent 2 messengers back to Custer, which should have caused the main body to support the advance guard. Reno was beaten when 500 ish Indians swept around his open flank to his rear. The Indians tied their own right flank against the river and were now attacking from south to north. 2. What should have happened is the commitment of the Keough Bn to Reno's left and the Yates Bn as reserve. Since the main body is covering the valley, the regiment rear detachment has a safe approach. This means a messenger can be sent telling Benteen to move up as fast as practical, with no brings packs mission to slow him down. Same messenger continues to McDougall informing him that a battle is in progress and telling him where to bring the trains. I would assume have the trains go to vicinity of Ford A , cover the ford and await further orders. 3. Your comment on would the Indians move out of the way is a pet peeve of mine. The purpose of the battle and the campaign was not to capture a papoose. I am not a fan or proponent of the noncombatant theory. The best way to win this battle is to fight and defeat the Indian warriors. Smack them n the teeth with a closed fist, a massed regiment. The next best way of obtaining victory is to prevent the evacuation of the village. Let the buggers run, they will starve in the winter. Maintaining a presence in the valley will force the Indians to abandon supplies. It also forces the Indians to retreat west, going north runs them into Gibbon. A secondary objective is to capture or kill a large part of the pony herds. I think the terrain favors the Indians on this. You could capture a few, but enough to make a difference does not seem possible. I do not see how capturing noncombatants even ranks as a method of victory. If you want to capture any meaningful numbers of noncombatants, you must decisively defeat the enemy warriors. You came a long way to find and fight these guys. If you don't intend to actually fight, you may as well aimlessly wander the prairie in the only available terrain of no practical use to obtaining a victory, the area east of the river. Ohhh,....wait.
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Post by fred on Feb 9, 2014 16:32:45 GMT -6
I agree… this is becoming a fascinating thread.
Despite the fact I believe Custer’s first fatal error was in turning from Reno and heading up the bluffs, it was a sound tactical move based on what he believed. His error—here—was in “what he believed” and the fact this “belief” was really only an assumption: he should have made allowances for the unforeseen; he left himself with no options.
Once he made his decision, let’s try to put ourselves in his position. For me, I do exactly what I believe he did: head for the highest point near the edge of the bluffs, closest to the valley and what he wanted to see and needed to see: 3,411. I would never have gone to Sharpshooters’ Ridge. To me, it would be preposterous. (The same for Weir Point.)
Terrain dictates movement most of the time, especially when it is in the same general direction of flow and that was what happened here: Cedar Coulee. It was a natural entryway north.
Now, did he go the entire distance? I have no idea and I would entertain any opinions to the contrary. What I firmly believe is Custer started down the coulee. He could, however, have deviated from that route for a number of reasons. First, it narrowed and may have become to difficult to negotiate because of that narrowing and because there were apparently quite a number of juniper bushes/trees in his way. Second, half-way down—or so—there is a dog-leg that fades you away from the river, and Custer may have felt that he was slowing too much and that dog-leg might take him too far away. Either of those reasons may have made him move more to his left—as AZ Ranger feels was the easiest route—or he may have simply ordered his command into a different formation, i. e., twos rather than fours, or he may have split them, ordering the right set up the right bank of the coulee and the left set up the left bank. Any of those solutions is reasonable.
As for Boyer knowing the “lay of the land,” I suspect he know its basics, how the ravines and coulees flowed, and how they formed fords. And he probably knew the river pretty well, i. e., that it was generally fordable, that it had many twists and turns, etc.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 9, 2014 16:36:43 GMT -6
Margaret, I am USAF, not USA, enlisted, not officer corp., but I have been very interested in the above posts. Not nearly as well informed about Custer's actions as I am Reno's. I have always said Custer lost this battle before he ever engaged. Due to lack of intel., recon, scouting, or whatever you want to call it. Also pre battle communication and planning. But you may have hit on a winner. If Custer had supported Reno from the get go we may have had a very different ballgame. Again I say no intel, Custer had no idea of what he was asking Reno to accomplish. He had no idea of the real terrain. Reno set off to the river watered his horses, tightened their cinches and set an order of battle. That was Company M to the right, A to the left, G slightly to the rear center, he deployed an advance guard, had 1st Sgt. Ryan scout the woods along the river to be sure there was developing trap, and he initially led the attack himself. Company M somehow ended up on the left when they were deployed in skirmish lines, no matter. This attack brought the NA's out in force. As the NA's saw the opportunity to defeat this group in detail. they could flank and overwhelm them. Had Custer remained in reserve and then come to Reno's aid by blocking the flanking movements, while waiting for Benteen and Mathey, they may have fought to a stand still. Two things could have been accomplished.
1 The NA's would have had a very difficult time getting between, Custer, Benteen, Mathey and supplies. 2 It may have caused the NA's non-combatants to retreat north. Damn where was Terry.
The above was very simplistic, but I have never been one to write a novel.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 9, 2014 16:36:54 GMT -6
Montrose, you posted: "Look at the intelligence situation when LTC Custer turned right. MAJ Reno was crossing the river and heading south. Varnum had just reported in also with a report of signs of a village south from Ford A."
I'm confused. The river flows to the north and Reno went that way, didn't he?
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 9, 2014 16:42:02 GMT -6
Feral, he did, west than north.
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